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Young People's Images of
Canadian Society

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2

Young People's Images of Canadian Society

An Opinion Survey of
Canadian Youth
13 to 20 Years of Age

John C. Johnstone

with the assistance of
Jean-Claude Willig and
Joseph M. Spina

This study has been prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Although published under the auspices of the Commission, it does not necessarily express the Commission's views.



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Introduction and Summary of Findings

General Nature of the Study

This volume describes how the 1965 cohort of Canadian young people 13 to 20 years old perceived their homeland. It presents the results of a national sample survey in which 1,365 young Canadians gave their views on the nature of their country, its people and its problems, and on their own expectations about living in Canada as adults.

The main purpose of this research was to gain a better understanding of how contemporary Canadian youth feel about various social issues in Canadian life and, in particular, about the question of bilingualism in the national community.

The contents of this report are organized around three distinct themes: impressions of Canada as a nation, reactions to the internal make-up of Canadian society, and expectations and aspirations regarding the future.

Chapter I assesses young people's perspectives on Canadian society as a whole, and begins by exploring what they identified as the most prominent features of their country. Following this, the focus shifts to their assessments of what it takes to become successful in Canadian life. A third section then considers two areas concerning Canada's connections with the past: opinions regarding Canada's ties with other nations and attitudes on the national flag issue—which had been resolved just a few months prior to the beginning of the study. A fourth section examines attitudes regarding different levels of government in the Canadian federal system, and a fifth, by reviewing impressions of the extent and ways Canadians differ from their neighbours to the south, touches on the sensitive question of national identity.

In Chapters II and III, reactions to the internal complexities of Canadian society are discussed. Chapter II considers young people's awareness of the social diversity of the population, their impressions of consensus and cleavage in Canadian life, and their views on relations between the two main cultural groups within Canada. Chapter III then focusses exclusively on attitudes regarding bilingual goals for Canada.

The two remaining chapters deal with young people's feelings about their own position and role in Canadian life. Attitudes to bilingualism are re-examined in Chapter IV, but here

in relation to the uses young people see for bilingual skills in their own lives—both at present and in the future. And Chapter V, finally, reviews their thoughts on residential mobility in the future.

Although the young people were asked both what they thought and how they felt about these topics, the study is somewhat more heavily focussed on beliefs and impressions than on attitudes and sentiments—that is, on cognitive rather than affective reactions. These perceptual components are never easily disentangled, of course, and the adage that one sees what one wants to see is probably nowhere more applicable than in the case of a concept as emotionally laden as “homeland.” Nonetheless, the inquiry is more concerned with how young people see their country than in what they like or dislike about it; is more concerned with how they describe relations among Canadian subgroups than with their feelings about these groups; and is much more concerned with the problems they see as threatening national unity than with their own personal satisfactions or grievances as members of Canadian society or a particular subculture within it.

Data for the study were collected by means of a self-administered questionnaire distributed to a national sample of adolescents and young adults between May and early July of 1965. The study was carried out in conjunction with the Commission's national survey of Canadian adults, the general strategy being to distribute questionnaires to all 13- to 20-year-olds living in the households contacted in the main survey.¹ A total of 1,365 usable questionnaires were completed by 66.6 per cent of the young people located.

As it turned out, response rates were considerably higher among younger adolescents than older ones, so it was necessary to weight the respondents not only according to the specifications of the original sampling plan but also in terms of the completion rate for the age group in which they fell. There were discrepancies in the rate of response, primarily because older teenagers were more difficult to locate at home, but in part because a number of 19- and 20-year-olds were interviewed as part of the adult survey and were therefore ineligible to receive a questionnaire.

The discussion is centred around three comparisons—language spoken at home, region, and age. The general strategy of reporting here is to introduce each topic by first comparing the views of young people who speak English, French, or a language other than English or French at home;² to assess variations in these points of view among Francophones living in two regions (Quebec and non-Quebec) and among Anglophones living in five (Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, Ontario, Prairie Provinces, and British Columbia); and then to evaluate the stability of these perspectives among Anglophone and Francophone young people in four age groups.³ In the first two chapters the emphasis is on describing and evaluating images of Canadian society rather than on tracing their social determinants.

¹ A more detailed description of the study methods, field procedures, sample design, completion rates, and weighting procedures is presented in Appendix A. A copy of the questionnaire, in both English and French, appears in Appendix B.

² Throughout this study the terms “Anglophones,” “Francophones,” and “Others” are used respectively to refer to persons who speak English, French, or another language in their homes.

³ Because only a small number of respondents reported speaking a language other than English or French at home, this group cannot be subdivided on additional characteristics. Comparisons based on region and age, then, are restricted to Anglophone and Francophone youth.

In Chapter III, attitudes to bilingualism in the national community are linked to a much wider variety of factors in the young persons' origins, and in addition the influence of inter-group contacts and bilingual facility on these dispositions is analyzed. In Chapter IV, the discussion concerns the different meanings Anglophone and Francophone youth attach to the importance of being bilingual, and in Chapter V, their expectations regarding where they will live as adults are again examined in relation to language, region, and age.

One of the principal concerns of this study is with the impact of adolescence on beliefs and attitudes regarding the homeland. Because all of the data were collected at just one period of time, developmental changes must be inferred from cross-sectional age comparisons, with a certain risk of misinterpretation. In a study of adolescents, however, these risks would be extremely slight. Not only is this stage of life one in which development is to be expected, but the age range is just eight years. All persons in the study were born between the late summer of 1944 and the late spring of 1952. Thus, except for the foreign-born, all had lived their childhood years during the post-war period of Canada's national growth and prosperity. Moreover, none had lived through the ethnic tensions of the World War II years, and all had been at least pre-adolescents at the time of the most recent up-swing of ethnic tensions in Canada. In short, the young people studied here were raised in a fairly uniform national social climate.

Principal Findings of the Study

I. Definitions of Canadian Society

A. Sharp ethnic differences were found in the features young people identified as most prominent about their country. Francophones were markedly impressed by the provincial divisions of the nation, and showed a much greater propensity than either Anglophones or "Others" to define Canada in terms of its provinces. Members of both other groups, on the other hand, were much more likely to think of Canada in terms of economic characteristics—natural resources, industries, and general economic prospects for the future. Except for minor variations, these discrepancies were found in all regions of the country, and among younger adolescents as well as older. The results would suggest that Francophones learn very early in life to think of their country in political terms, while Anglophones and "Others" become much more conscious of Canada as an economic entity.

B. Anglophone and Francophone youth also differed in their perspectives on the Canadian opportunity structure. English youth viewed Canada very much as an open-class society, where the most important factors leading to success are hard work, good grades in school, a university education, and a pleasing personality. French young people by comparison held a more qualified view of the openness of Canadian society. They were more likely than the English to stress the importance of social background, and were much less likely to agree that hard work would result in success. For Francophones, being bilingual was seen as the most important single factor guaranteeing success in Canadian life.

Another extremely important difference between the groups was in the way their assessments about bilingualism changed over the teen years. Among the Francophones this factor was rated as increasingly important by older youth, while among the Anglophones the trend was exactly the reverse. The adolescent years thus appear to have a quite different impact

on young people's views about bilingualism in Canadian life: for the French they reinforce beliefs as to the necessity of being bilingual; for the English they convince many that the ability to speak French is less important than they had once thought. Variations on this result turned up again and again throughout the study.

C. Canadian young people define their country much more often from contemporary than historical perspectives. All three language groups felt that Canada has closer ties today with the United States than with any other country, and this conviction was particularly strong among the French. In addition, all three groups favoured the new Canadian flag over a hypothetical alternative that would be historically symbolic, and it was the French again who most substantially rejected symbolism of the past. Attitudes on the flag issue did vary markedly among Anglophone youth from different regions, however. Support for the new emblem was strongest among those from Quebec and British Columbia, and weakest among those from the Atlantic Provinces.

D. Strong regional differences were also found in young people's attitudes to different governmental bodies. Both the Quebec Francophones and the British Columbia Anglophones displayed a strong provincial emphasis in their evaluations, although the provincialism of the former was accompanied by strongly negative dispositions regarding the federal government, while that of the latter was not. Positive orientations toward the federal government were strongest among Anglophones from Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces, but here again there was evidence that the meaning of these assessments differed for the two groups: for the Quebec Anglophones, federal support seemed to stem from a lack of confidence in both the provincial and municipal levels of government, while for those in the Atlantic Provinces it was balanced only by negative impressions of the efficacy of local administrations.

One of the most striking age shifts found in the study was in orientations to government. Among both Anglophones and Francophones, positive evaluations of government at the provincial level increased sharply among the older age groups. It appears that during the adolescent years young people become aware of the importance of sectional interests in Canadian life.

E. Most Canadian young people viewed themselves, collectively, as more similar to than distinct from Americans. Anglophones and "Others" shared a high consensus about this, but an actual majority of Francophones too saw similarities as greater than differences.

All in all, there were relatively few features on which young people rated Canadians as distinct from Americans. The only marked distinctions they reported were in the relative wealth of the two peoples, and the nature of their form of government. Here again, however, Francophones saw a larger number of distinctively Canadian features than did Anglophones.

Although all three groups also rated Canadian Anglophones and Francophones as more alike than different, the two non-French groups did so just marginally. Both these latter groups, in fact, saw more areas of social and cultural similarity between Canadians and Americans than between the two main groups within Canada. Anglophones were therefore more likely than Francophones to stress differences between the two cultures, and this was particularly true in their ratings of English and French views on national goals for Canada, and on the form of government Canada should have.

Sharp regional variations were also found in these reactions, the English from the western provinces and the Quebec French being much more likely to stress intergroup differences than their counterparts in other regions. Regional perspectives seemed to be more influential here than ethnic ones.

Finally, when confronted with the issue directly, Anglophones agreed they had more in common with Americans than with French Canadians, while Francophones felt they shared more with English Canadians than with their neighbours to the south. The social and cultural orientations of Anglophone youth, in other words, would appear more frequently to cross national than ethnic lines, while those of the French would not. This indicates weak intergroup solidarity among Canada's young adults.

II. Social Relations in Canadian Society

A. At least the larger ethnic minorities in Canada were plainly visible to young people of the two main cultures. Awareness of them was found to increase somewhat with age but, more importantly, it varied sharply by region. Non-French minorities were much more visible to those living in regions of greater ethnic heterogeneity. Young people appear to derive their impressions of the social diversity of Canadian society more often from interpersonal encounters than from secondary sources of information.

There was also a marked tendency for young people from all three language groups to misrepresent their own numbers in the population. All three groups saw themselves as more numerous than they actually were and tended only infrequently to underestimate themselves. One revealing finding here was that the estimates made by Francophones changed markedly with age. Those just entering their teens were much more likely to over-represent themselves than to overestimate the Anglophone population, while those just entering adulthood did the opposite. It would appear that during the adolescent years Francophones become so impressed with the fact of English-language dominance in Canadian life that they see themselves as a smaller group than they really are.

B. All groups of young people felt that English-French differences of opinion about Canada's future posed a relatively greater threat to national unity than did differences between other social aggregates. Here again, however, the Francophones and Anglophones appraised the seriousness of their disagreements rather differently. The English saw fewer areas of potential agreement than the French. Interestingly, however, it was the "Others" who rated English-French cleavage as most serious.

On other social dimensions there was a fairly high consensus that regional interests and differences between the economic classes were more threatening to Canada's future than cleavages between immigrant and native-born populations, religious groups, or urban and rural populations.

C. All three groups of young people thus felt that during the early summer of 1965 English-French relations in Canada left considerable room for improvement. In the eyes of Anglophones, however, no improvement was to be realized in the short-term future: they felt that the trend at that time was towards a worsening of relations. Over a ten-year period they were more optimistic. Francophones, on the other hand, thought that the situation had already begun to improve, and they were highly confident about the longer-term prospects.

III. Commitment to Bilingual Goals for Canada

A. The Anglophones were only moderately tolerant in their attitudes regarding bilingual goals for Canada. Although they were almost as ready as the Francophones to support bilingualism for Canada as an ideal, they were considerably less likely to endorse positions which implied personal or social change. For example, they were much less ready to agree that instruction in the second language should be required universally in Canadian schools, that Canadians had some personal obligation to become bilingual, or that it would be a good idea to have bilingual road signs throughout Canada. In other words, they seemed to accept the fact that French has some role to play in Canadian life, but were rather reluctant to endorse any extension of that role.

B. Boys and girls reacted differently on this issue: in both main language groups girls showed a higher commitment to bilingual goals for Canada. With respect to age, however, different trends were found in the responses of the two groups. Among the Anglophones a slight but consistent diminution of commitment was found in each progressively older group, while among the Francophones an equally consistent trend was found in the other direction. As Anglophones pass through adolescence their tolerance for bilingualism appears to decrease while over the same years Francophones come to feel even more strongly about the position of their language in Canadian society. Members of the two cultures thus enter adulthood a good deal further apart in their views on bilingualism than they were when they entered adolescence.

Social class position was not found to have a very substantial impact on these attitudes, although there was evidence that Anglophones and Francophones from the middle classes were further apart in their views than those whose families were situated either higher or lower on the socio-economic continuum. Commitment to bilingualism was also found to be stronger among those with high educational and occupational goals for themselves. This was true in both language groups. Finally, the reactions of Anglophone boys reflected a pattern often found in studies of race and ethnic relations: levels of linguistic tolerance were highest among those anticipating modest upward social mobility and lowest among those expecting downward social mobility.

Among the Anglophones, Roman Catholics were somewhat more tolerant than Protestants on the language issue, but much of this relationship was accounted for by the influence of regional perspectives. Regional differences were extremely pronounced on these attitudes. Favourable sentiments were much higher among the Anglophones in the East than in the West, with the drop being particularly noticeable west of Ontario; among the Francophones, those outside Quebec felt most strongly on the issue. The general pattern which emerged was that commitment to a bilingual Canada was stronger among young people living in territories where their own language and culture were not dominant.

C. Intergroup contacts did not influence attitudes regarding bilingualism in any consistent manner: their impact depended on the type of demographic environment in which the contact took place. Although no instances were found in which intergroup contacts resulted in heightened linguistic intolerance among English youth, there were many situations in which contacts appeared to have little effect of any kind. Outside Quebec, for example, knowing Francophones at school, or even having them as close friends, did not meaningfully strengthen the convictions of Anglophones regarding the necessity of more widespread

bilingual practices in the national community. In Quebec, on the other hand, similar types of contact did result in more tolerant attitudes.

For English youth, attitudes regarding bilingualism seem highly responsive to local conditions: where a sizable proportion of the local population is French-speaking, their attitudes are much more tolerant; where the population is predominantly English-speaking, however, they see no reason to extend bilingual practices.

For Francophone youth, all types of contact with Canadian Anglophones greatly strengthened their convictions on the language issue. This was particularly true among those living outside Quebec.

D. Bilingual skills appear to be quite unevenly distributed among Canadian young people, just as they are among their elders. Interestingly, however, the ethnic imbalance in claims to bilingual facility was found only among those reporting frequent contact with members of the other culture: among those isolated from such contacts, identical proportions of Anglophones and Francophones claimed conversational skills in the other language. When young people from the two cultures do come together, however, it is obvious that the burden of linguistic accommodation is assumed primarily by the Francophones.

IV. Perceived Functions of Being Bilingual

A. As anticipated, many more French youth than English viewed bilingual skills as a necessity of life. Most Francophones were aware of this by the time they were 13, and if anything were even more convinced by the time they reached 20. For Anglophones, on the other hand, the teen years seem to teach different facts of life in so far as bilingualism is concerned: the older ones were considerably less convinced than their juniors about the value of bilingual facility either in their present circumstances or in the future. It is likely, in fact, that a good many learn during adolescence to regard a knowledge of French as valuable mainly in order to graduate from high school or college.

B. Both groups agreed that a knowledge of the second language would probably help them in finding a job, but it was only among the Francophones that large numbers saw a long-term occupational relevance for bilingual facility. Anglophones viewed bilingual skills much more as credentials for entering the labour market than for advancing their careers.

We also found that Francophones tended to orient their thinking about the value of being bilingual very much around occupational considerations: for example, those who thought that English would be useful to them for purposes of travelling in Canada, for reading or watching television, or for getting around more in their community seemed to interpret these uses primarily as channels to employment opportunities. For the Anglophones, similar evaluations of the uses of French were quite unrelated to occupational contingencies.

C. Finally, in both language groups, attitudes regarding bilingualism in Canada were found to depend very much on whether young people saw uses for bilingual skills in their own lives: those who did were much more likely to endorse bilingual practices in the nation at large. This tendency was much more pronounced among the English than the French, however. Among the latter even those who saw no personal advantage in knowing English were more likely than not to be strongly committed to bilingual goals for Canada.

V. Expectations Regarding the Future

A. Canadian young people showed definite preferences on the areas of their country where they would like to live. Although most rated their own province favourably, all groups thought that British Columbia and Ontario would be good places to live, and all mainland groups reacted negatively to the prospect of living in Newfoundland. These ratings varied sharply among the different language groups, of course, and as expected, Francophone youth identified considerably fewer locations in which they would consider taking up residence. The Quebec French, in fact, listed more provinces they would prefer to avoid than live in. More generally, both Anglophones and Francophones tended to restrict their positive evaluations to provinces within their own territories of linguistic and cultural influence.

In terms of expectations regarding the future, the Quebec Francophones were the most likely to anticipate staying in their own province, and seemed to become more certain of this as they grew older. Among the Anglophones, the Atlantic youth were most likely to anticipate moving to a different province, Ontarians had the most stable residential expectations, and those from Quebec and the Prairies showed the highest levels of uncertainty about where they would be living.

B. Anglophones also displayed a clear-cut readiness to accept employment opportunities wherever they might be found in Canada. In contrast, a majority of the Francophones rejected the idea of moving to a different Canadian region in response to economic incentives. Both groups looked with disfavour on the idea of taking a job in the United States, although among the Quebec Francophones slightly more recommended going there than to a different part of Canada. They saw their future job prospects as much better in their own province than elsewhere in Canada, but Quebec Anglophones thought they would probably do better somewhere else. Of all the regional groups, however, the Atlantic Anglophones most frequently saw their best prospects to be elsewhere than at home.

The child . . . preserves both an astonishing degree of ignorance and a striking insensitivity not only to his own designation and that of his associates . . . but toward his own country as a collective reality. . . . The adolescent is the individual who begins to build “systems” or “theories” in the largest sense of the term. . . . Most of them have political or social theories and want to reform the world; they have their own ways of explaining all of the present-day turmoil in collective life.¹

This chapter discusses a number of perspectives from which Canadian adolescents and young adults view their society. The main aim here is to compare the incidence of particular beliefs, impressions, and feelings among different subgroups of the population rather than to elaborate in depth the “theories” or “systems” young people construct regarding the nature of their homeland.

Three basic questions concerning young people’s definitions of Canadian society are dealt with: Do young people from different ethnic backgrounds share the same beliefs and opinions about their country? Do impressions about Canada vary among young people living in different parts of the country? Do beliefs about Canada remain stable over the adolescent years, or do they change?

Salient Images of Canada

This section examines the features Canadian young people most often associated with their nation. It reviews the answers they gave to the following question, which appeared on the last page of the questionnaire:

Question 64. Here is a blank map of Canada. It has no place names on it at all. Your job is to write in five words or phrases that you think best describe Canada. You can

¹ Bärbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, *The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence* (New York, 1958), 338, 340, 348.

put down anything you want, and write anywhere on the map, but you can only put on five things. Which five places or things do you think best describe Canada?

Due to the nature and location of this question, the responses it elicited can hardly be represented as young people's spontaneous impressions of their country. Indeed, the presence of the map outline, the particular phrasing used in the question, and its placement at the end of a lengthy series of references to Canada would all induce respondents to select features which might not have occurred to them otherwise. Nonetheless, the question did afford considerable freedom in the selection of answers, and the context was equivalent for everyone who answered it. Moreover, for purposes of intergroup comparisons it is no less valid or instructive to assess considered thoughts than completely unaided initial impressions.

Table I-1 reports the frequency with which features of different types were entered by young people from the three language groups.² The answer categories shown in this table include references of the following types:

Natural terrain or geography Owing undoubtedly to the stimulus of the map, the features most frequently cited by members of all three language groups were natural—oceans, lakes, rivers, mountains, or descriptive designations such as "beautiful country" or "big country." References of this type were entered by approximately three-quarters of the non-Francophone respondents, and by two-thirds of the Francophones.

Table I-1. Salient Features of Canada, by language spoken at home

Type of Content	English (N=738)	French (N=448)	Other (N=31)
Natural terrain or geography	75	66	77
Economic resources or industries	67	44	61
Climatic conditions	15	4	7
Form of government or way of life	27	13	36
Political subdivisions—regional	14	18	12
Political subdivisions—provincial	12	52	16
Political subdivisions—municipal	11	26	18
Social environment—demographic	15	8	6
Social environment—social and cultural subdivisions	15	13	14
Personal characteristics of Canadian people	18	4	11
Symbolic-patriotic content	11	8	2
Total	280 ^b	256	260

^aPercentages exclude persons who did not answer the question, and are computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bTotals to more than 100 per cent because most respondents entered more than one type of content.

Economic resources or industries Either resources in their natural state ("forests" or "iron ore"), industries or the products of human industry ("wheat," "tourist trade,"

² Eighty-nine per cent of the respondents entered content of some type on the maps while 11 per cent left the question unanswered. In this and subsequent tables pertaining to this question, percentages are computed only for those who did answer the question.

"manufacturing," "fishing"), or general economic conditions ("land of opportunity" or "depressed area") were often cited. Interestingly, Francophone youth entered such features much less frequently than did members of the other two groups.

Climatic conditions Canada's climate was of little importance to most young people, although 15 per cent of the Anglophones did make such references. Most of them described the severity of the Canadian winter.

Form of government or way of life Moving into dimensions more reflective of the social order, a sizable minority made reference to the general political structure of Canadian society. The entries consisted in the main of terms such as "democratic" or "free society," and were most frequent in the responses of the "Others" and least frequent in those of the Francophones.

Political subdivisions With the stimulus of the map outline, a number of respondents also identified specific locations in the country—regions, provinces, cities, or towns. The interesting point here was that Francophones made these references, particularly to provinces, much more often than members of the other two groups. More than half the Francophones, compared with just 12 per cent of the Anglophones and 16 per cent of the "Others," entered names of provinces on the map. Table I-2 shows the rates at which all ten provinces were identified, and indicates that it was the French who most frequently listed specific provinces, except for Prince Edward Island.³ Forty-four per cent identified Quebec, 22 per cent Ontario, and 16 per cent British Columbia. Regions, provinces, and municipalities, in fact, represented the only features of Canada cited most frequently by Francophones.

Table I-2. References to Specific Provinces in Content Assigned to Free-answer Maps of Canada, by language spoken at home

Content	English (N=738)	French (N=448)	Other (N=31)
Percentage who named or identified provinces	12 ^a	52	16
Alberta	2 ^b	12	5
British Columbia	5	16	11
Manitoba	1	9	—
New Brunswick	1	5	—
Newfoundland	1	12	5
Nova Scotia	1	4	—
Ontario	4	22	—
Prince Edward Island	1	2	5
Quebec	7	44	10
Saskatchewan	1	8	—
Percentage who did not name or identify provinces	88	48	84
Total	100	100	100

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bSubtotals exceed group totals because most persons who named one province tended to name others.

³Owing to a printer's error, Prince Edward Island was not shown on the outline map.

Social environment—demographic features Table I-1 also indicates that 15 per cent of the Anglophones and smaller numbers in the other two groups referred to the general nature of Canada's population in defining their country. Most referred to Canada's population as "small," although some referred to it as "young" or as "heterogeneous." This dimension was not particularly stressed by any group.

Social environment—social and cultural subdivisions This category included all references to specific groups of people living in Canada, to the bilingual or bicultural nature of the country, and all designations suggesting consensus or cleavage among different subgroups within the population ("divided country"). Interestingly, only about one person in seven made reference to any of these characteristics, even though the questionnaire had dealt heavily with them. There were no meaningful differences among groups in the rates at which designations of this type were entered.

Personal characteristics of the Canadian people A small number of respondents, principally Anglophones, identified traits either of the Canadian people as a whole ("an industrious people") or of a specific group within the population ("religious"—written over Quebec). Only 4 per cent of Francophones made references of this type compared with 18 per cent of the Anglophones and 11 per cent of the "Others."

Symbolic-patriotic content The final category brought together all content of a symbolic or patriotic nature, and included references to the Queen, the flag, the RCMP, and the maple leaf. Very few young people described Canada in this way, however, although Anglophones and Francophones did so somewhat more frequently than the "Others."

The most important finding to emerge here is that there were prominent differences between the groups on references both to economic resources and to provinces. Francophones seem to be quite strongly impressed by the provincial make-up of Canadian society and, apart from features of the natural environment, they most frequently thought about this aspect of Canada when filling out the maps. Non-Francophones did not cite this feature of their country very often, and were very much more likely to think about economic characteristics when confronted with a map of Canada. In the eyes of young Francophones, Canada would appear to be seen fundamentally as a political union; for the other two groups it represents much more an economic union.

Next, these same responses are reported regionally in Table I-3. The Francophones were divided into two regional groupings and the Anglophones into five. The two Francophone groups differed most widely in the rates at which they assigned names of provinces to the maps, the Quebec Francophones doing so 17 per cent more often than those living in other regions. This tendency, coupled with the fact that the non-Quebec Francophones were 9 per cent more likely to cite economic characteristics of the country, suggests that of the two groups it was the Quebec Francophones who differed more widely from the Anglophones in their perspectives on these matters. At the same time, however, the responses of the non-Quebec French were more similar to those of the Quebec French than to those of the Anglophones.

In addition to these differences, the Quebec Francophones were 8 per cent more likely to refer to social and cultural subdivisions within Canada, while those living outside Quebec were 11 per cent more likely to cite symbolic or patriotic content and 10 per cent more likely to describe Canada's form of government or way of life.

Table I-3. Salient Features of Canada, by language spoken at home and region

Type of Content	Per cent who assigned content of each type to free-answer maps of Canada ^a							
	French		English					
	Quebec (N=291)	Non-Quebec (N=157)	Atlantic (N=111)	Quebec (N=99)	Ontario (N=264)	Prairies (N=169)	B.C. (N=95)	
Natural terrain or geography	65	66	65	70	81	76	72	
Economic resources or industries	42	51	69	69	64	66	69	
Climatic conditions	4	5	16	7	11	20	18	
Form of government or way of life	11	21	34	32	29	23	19	
Political subdivisions—regional	18	17	7	19	15	18	13	
Political subdivisions — provincial	55	38	18	21	9	11	12	
Political subdivisions — municipal	26	24	9	15	7	12	19	
Social environment — demographic	8	4	14	14	15	16	16	
Social environment — social and cultural subdivisions	15	7	17	23	16	14	10	
Personal characteristics of Canadian people	3	5	25	20	16	18	13	
Symbolic-patriotic content	6	17	16	12	9	10	11	
Total	253 ^b	255	290	302	272	284	272	

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted group totals.

^bTotals to more than 100 per cent because most respondents entered more than one type of content.

References to the Canadian way of life and to characteristics of the Canadian people varied among the Anglophones of different regions. Both these features were cited much less frequently by Westerners, with the East and West Coast groups being furthest apart of all. These trends cannot be immediately explained, but they do suggest a greater propensity on the part of Eastern young people to think of Canada in generalizations about either the nature of the society or the personal traits of its people. There are no equally prominent regional trends operating in the opposite direction.

The figures indicate a consensus among Anglophones from different parts of the country about the economy; the rates vary by just five percentage points across the five regions. On other features, the main findings were as follows: the Atlantic Anglophones referred most often to symbolic and patriotic themes; regions, provinces, and social and cultural subdivisions were cited most often by the Quebec Anglophones; young people from Ontario—for some reason not altogether clear—were the ones who most frequently identified features of the natural terrain; references to climate were made most frequently by young people from the Prairies; and British Columbia youth were most likely to identify specific cities or towns.

Although modest regional variations thus appear on a number of dimensions, Table I-3 also suggests that the differences based on language were more prominent than those based on region. This tendency is demonstrated more clearly in Table I-4.⁴ The results show that in all comparisons, levels of similarity were higher within language groups than between them, thus suggesting that ethnicity had a greater influence than region on these responses.

In addition, the figures confirm that, of the two groups of Francophones, the perspectives on Canada of those from Quebec differed more widely from the views held by Anglophones: for Anglophone youth from all five regions, levels of consensus were lower with the Quebec Francophones than with those living in other provinces. "Interethnic" consensus was highest between the Quebec English and the non-Quebec French (.819) and lowest between the Quebec French and the English from the Atlantic Provinces (.693).

Table I-4. Degree of Similarity among Language and Regional Groups in Distribution of Content Entered on Free-answer Maps

Groups	Scores on index of similarity						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) Quebec French	—	.872	.693	.767	.723	.743	.749
(2) Non-Quebec French		—	.760	.819	.770	.801	.813
(3) Atlantic English			—	.910	.889	.882	.860
(4) Quebec English				—	.900	.901	.890
(5) Ontario English					—	.931	.890
(6) Prairie English						—	.940
(7) B.C. English							—

Comparisons among the five Anglophone groups indicate a mild tendency for young people from adjacent regions to share more perspectives on their country. For those living in adjacent regions, the average level of shared response was .920; for those separated by one region it was .893; for those separated by two, .886, and it was .860 for those living at the eastern and western extremities of the country. This gradient, even though modest, nonetheless indicates that perspectives on Canada tended to be similar among groups of young people living close to one another. Levels of shared response were highest between Anglophones from British Columbia and the Prairies (.940), second highest between those from Ontario and the Prairies (.931), and lowest between those from the two coastal regions (.860).

Finally, to what extent do these impressions vary over the adolescent years? Table I-5 examines the same responses with the two groups divided into four age clusters. The main finding here is that the English-French differences observed for the sample as a whole tend

⁴ These measures are frequently employed in demographic and ecological studies, and indicate as proportions the extent to which two response distributions are identical. First, the figures in Table I-3 were repercentaged as profile measures totalling to 100 per cent. The "index of similarity" is 1.000 minus the sum of either positive or negative discrepancies between the two distributions of percentages.

Table I-5. Age Differences in Salient Features of Canada, by language spoken at home

Type of Content	Per cent who assigned content of each type to free-answer map of Canada ^a							
	English				French			
	13-14 (N=239)	15-16 (N=242)	17-18 (N=190)	19-20 (N=65)	13-14 (N=126)	15-16 (N=141)	17-18 (N=121)	19-20 (N=55)
Natural terrain or geography	77	74	78	70	65	64	66	67
Economic resources or industries	63	68	66	72	45	37	44	49
Climatic conditions	19	11	15	17	6	5	3	3
Form of government or way of life	28	24	28	32	10	9	12	23
Political subdivisions—regional	14	16	12	17	16	17	23	12
Political subdivisions—provincial	10	11	14	12	50	63	48	42
Political subdivisions—municipal	9	11	13	8	22	22	27	37
Social environment—demographic	15	16	11	20	6	5	11	9
Social environment—social and cultural subdivisions	15	13	19	16	10	11	14	19
Personal characteristics of Canadian people	15	23	14	20	1	3	5	5
Symbolic-patriotic content	10	9	15	6	8	7	8	11
Total	275 ^b	276	285	290	239	243	261	277

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bTotals to more than 100 per cent because most respondents entered more than one type of content.

also to be found in comparisons between specific age groups, an outcome suggesting that the ethnic differences emerge before adolescence and are not substantially erased during these years. At all ages, Anglophone adolescents were considerably more likely to cite economic characteristics of the country, while Francophones were more likely to name provinces.

Several minor fluctuations, principally among the Francophones, should be noted. Older French youth showed a somewhat greater propensity to name cities and towns and to refer to social or cultural groupings within the country, and were a little less likely to name provinces. More 19- and 20-year-old Francophones, in fact, cited economic features than named provinces.

For the most part, however, the age trends revealed in Table I-5 are neither sharp nor consistent, and when further comparisons were made of the similarity of response between

Anglophones and Francophones of different ages, the results indicated no meaningful trend towards either agreement or disagreement. From youngest to oldest, these scores were .750, .718, .737 and .750. The main conclusion suggested here is that the ethnic differences in perspective which exist at age 13 are still there at age 20.

Perception of the Canadian Social Structure

Impressions regarding the social structure of Canadian society were measured by asking young people to rate the importance of 10 different factors in "helping a young person to get ahead in Canadian life today" (see Question 40, Appendix B). These evaluations included factors relating both to ascribed and achieved statuses, and thus allow an appraisal of the extent to which members of different groups think the opportunity structure of their society is open or closed.

Table I-6 shows the rates at which members of the three language groups evaluated each of these factors as "very important." While Francophones' ratings diverged widely from those given by both other groups, the evaluations of Anglophones and "Others" were very similar. On the average, English and French reactions differed by 20 per cent, while those of the "Others" differed from the French by 17 per cent and from the English by just 7 per cent. This suggests once again that young people from the "Other" groups tend to perceive Canada much more from English Canadian than French Canadian perspectives.

Table I-6. Images of Canadian Opportunity Structure, by language spoken at home

Factor	Per cent who said each factor was very important in helping a young person get ahead in Canadian life ^a		
	English (N=793)	French (N=529)	Other (N=37)
(1) Get good grades in school	95	69	94
(2) Work hard	94	47	90
(3) Have a nice personality	85	69	77
(4) Get a university education	80	49	83
(5) Know the right people	50	51	61
(6) Be able to speak both French and English	39	75	45
(7) Come from the right family	23	27	27
(8) Come from the right religious group	11	32	35
(9) Be born in Canada	10	22	2
(10) Have parents with a lot of money	6	11	11

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

These responses also suggest that Anglophone youth view the opportunity structure of Canadian society very much as an open system—one where success depends primarily on talent and effort. They were virtually unanimous in the opinion that good grades in school

and hard work would lead to success, and were also in fairly high agreement on the importance of a pleasing personality and of a university education. By contrast, all four factors describing social origins—coming from the “right” family or religious group, being born in Canada, and having rich parents—were rated extremely low by the Anglophones.

Achieved statuses were also rated higher than ascribed ones by Francophones, but the factor perceived to be of most crucial importance was bilingualism. Seventy-five per cent of the Francophones evaluated language skills as “very important” compared with just 39 per cent of the Anglophones and 45 per cent of the “Others.”

Additional comparisons between Anglophones and Francophones suggest an underlying pattern of differences. All factors related to achievement were rated much higher by the English than by the French (hard work by 47 per cent, university training by 31 per cent, and academic performance by 26 per cent), while the four ascribed statuses were all rated higher by the French (religious background by 21 per cent, place of birth by 12 per cent, economic background by 5 per cent, and social class—coming from the “right” family—by 4 per cent). Thus, although all three groups of young people perceive the Canadian social structure as more open than closed, Francophones would appear to do so in much more qualified terms. In their view, opportunity is certainly open—providing one can speak English.

The widest discrepancy between English and French assessments, and certainly the most interesting, was in the importance attached to hard work. Virtually all Anglophones rated this as a very important ingredient of success, but among the Francophones it was endorsed by less than half and was rated only sixth highest out of 10. Of all the channels to success listed, hard work is undoubtedly the one most representative of an open opportunity system, since it makes no restrictions based either on social origins or on individual differences in ability. It is particularly in this evaluation that Francophones can be said to view the Canadian opportunity structure as relatively more restricted.

Next, Table I-7 indicates once again that the main regional variations in assessments occurred among the Francophones. Here, the pattern of differences is very interesting. It was the non-Quebec Francophones who rated achievement considerably higher, and on the importance of hard work and a university education their assessments were closer to the views of Anglophones than to those of the Quebec Francophones. These tendencies would suggest that, of the two groups, those living outside Quebec saw the Canadian social structure in more open terms. Yet this conclusion is clearly contradicted by the fact that all four ascribed statuses were also rated more important by the non-Quebec French, albeit just slightly so. They were also 15 per cent more likely than their Quebec counterparts to stress the importance of being bilingual. It would appear that the non-Quebec French on the one hand were more likely to share the central English Canadian beliefs regarding channels to social mobility, but on the other were more sensitive to the existence of social barriers which prevent completely free access to these channels.

Table I-7 also displays a strikingly high degree of consensus among Anglophones from different regions. The only evaluations which varied meaningfully among the five groups were those concerning the importance of bilingual skills—these were rated highest by a considerable margin by the Quebec Anglophones, and lowest by an equally great margin by young people from British Columbia. For the most part, Anglophones from all regions

Table I-7. Images of Canadian Opportunity Structure, by language spoken at home and region

Factor	Per cent who said each factor was very important in helping a young person get ahead in Canadian life ^a							
	French		English					
	Quebec (N=337)	Non-Quebec (N=192)	Atlantic (N=122)	Quebec (N=107)	Ontario (N=291)	Prairies (N=175)	B.C. (N=98)	
(1) Get good grades in school	66	80	99	95	93	95	94	
(2) Work hard	42	73	91	97	95	94	92	
(3) Have a nice personality	70	64	86	81	87	85	81	
(4) Get a university education	44	67	82	82	75	82	87	
(5) Know the right people	49	56	50	52	47	51	57	
(6) Be able to speak both French and English	72	87	52	72	37	40	18	
(7) Come from the right family	26	33	24	27	25	21	19	
(8) Come from the right religious group	30	40	15	6	10	11	9	
(9) Be born in Canada	22	26	10	5	10	11	10	
(10) Have parents with a lot of money	10	12	2	8	5	7	6	

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

of Canada share the view that success in Canadian life is gained by scholastic achievement, hard work, higher education, and interpersonal know-how.

Finally, Table I-8 compares the ratings made by English and French young people in different stages of adolescence. The most interesting trend here is that the two groups grow further apart in their views on the importance of bilingualism as they pass through the adolescent years. Among Anglophones, this factor was rated very important by 44 per cent of the 13- and 14-year-olds, the ratings then falling off progressively to 29 per cent among those entering their twenties. Over the same years, however, the evaluations of Francophones rise moderately and consistently. This suggests that while adolescence reinforces the beliefs of Francophones that they need to be bilingual, it teaches many Anglophones that they do not really need to know both languages in order to get along successfully in Canadian life.

A second trend of some interest is that older Francophones were considerably less likely than their juniors to perceive religious affiliation as important. On this, their evaluations fell off sharply from 50 to 18 per cent. Coupled with the increasing propensity to cite linguistic skills, this suggests that during the adolescent years Francophones come to redefine the meaning and consequences of ethnicity in Canadian society. Among those just entering the teen years, both religion and language were felt to have an effect on one's chances of success; for those entering their twenties, on the other hand, ethnicity would seem to be interpreted much more exclusively in terms of language.

Table I-8. Age Differences in Images of Canadian Opportunity Structure, by language spoken at home

Factor	Per cent who said each factor was very important in helping a young person get ahead in Canadian life ^a							
	English				French			
	13-14 (N=261)	15-16 (N=260)	17-18 (N=202)	19-20 (N=68)	13-14 (N=161)	15-16 (N=162)	17-18 (N=140)	19-20 (N=60)
(1) Get good grades in school	97	94	96	91	76	69	62	69
(2) Work hard	95	92	92	98	52	45	41	55
(3) Have a nice personality	88	86	82	81	63	71	65	79
(4) Get a university education	84	76	79	79	55	38	51	54
(5) Know the right people	56	43	52	50	50	46	53	57
(6) Be able to speak both French and English	44	40	35	29	69	74	78	82
(7) Come from the right family	28	23	18	24	32	23	32	22
(8) Come from the right religious group	14	7	12	10	50	31	27	18
(9) Be born in Canada	12	10	10	4	27	23	16	26
(10) Have parents with a lot of money	4	8	6	4	13	12	9	9

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

Orientations to the Present and the Past

All [societies] have their conceptions of the Past, the Present, and the Future. Where they differ is in the preferential ordering of the alternatives, and a very great deal can be told about the particular society or part of a society being studied and much can be predicted about the direction of change within it if one knows what the rank-order emphasis is.⁵

We next examine two sets of reactions which reflect young people's orientations to their country's present and past. The first of these concerns attitudes about having a completely new national flag, while the second focusses more on cognitive than evaluative reactions by looking at the countries which young people named as Canada's best friends today.

In order to avoid references to specific symbolism, attitudes on the national flag issue were measured by asking young people whether, if they still had a choice, they would

⁵ Florence R. Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations* (Evanston, 1961), 14.

prefer a flag "which makes you think more of Canada's past history" or one which is "completely new" (Question 1). In response to this particular phrasing, young people from all three language groups answered in favour of a new flag, the pluralities being 10 per cent among Anglophones, 14 per cent among "Others," and 23 per cent among Francophones (Table I-9). It is perhaps surprising that endorsements of the new flag were not highest of all among members of the smaller minorities, since an emblem symbolizing anything but the most recent Canadian history would tend to reflect Canada's primarily British and French heritage. Nonetheless, the Francophones rejected an historical emblem most substantially, although it is not altogether clear whether this can be interpreted as rejection of *any* historical content, or simply of the dominant British symbolism of former Canadian banners. At face value, however, the reactions of all three groups indicate support for contemporary rather than traditional symbols of Canadian nationhood. Young people also appeared to be quite involved in this issue, since only 15 per cent of the French and 10 per cent of those in the other two groups indicated they did not care one way or the other, and only tiny proportions said they did not know.

Upon more detailed examination, it turned out that the distribution of responses to this question tended to mask important regional and age variations. Table I-10 indicates that the principal regional variations occurred among the English rather than the French, for the responses of the two Francophone groups were virtually identical. Among the Anglophones, however, the reactions of those from the Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, and British Columbia deviated substantially from the national average. Strongest support for a completely new flag came from the British Columbia and Quebec Anglophones, and by pluralities as large as 32 and 30 per cent. By contrast, the margins were only 11 per cent and 2 per cent among the Ontario and Prairie Anglophones, and young people from the Atlantic Provinces were 8 per cent more likely to prefer traditional symbolism. These results, then, indicate a considerable lack of consensus among Anglophones from different regions—a particularly meaningful outcome in view of the high levels of agreement they displayed on other points.

Table I-9. Flag Preferences, by language spoken at home

Question 1. As you know, Canada now has a new flag. Some people still think we would be better off with a flag which makes you think more of Canada's past history, while other people like having a flag that is completely new. If you still had a choice, which type of flag would you like better?

Responses	French	English	Other
A flag which makes you think of Canada's past	29%	38% ^a	35%
A completely new flag	52	48	49
I'm not sure	3	5	5
I wouldn't care one way or the other	15	10	10
Total	99	101	99
Base	(529)	(793)	(37)

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

Table I-10. Regional Differences in Flag Preferences, by language spoken at home

Responses	Per cent giving different responses ^a						
	French		English				
	Quebec (N=337)	Non-Quebec (N=192)	Atlantic (N=122)	Quebec (N=107)	Ontario (N=291)	Prairies (N=175)	B.C. (N=98)
A flag which makes you think of Canada's past	30	28	50	23	37	42	25
A completely new flag	52	51	42	53	48	44	57
I'm not sure	2	7	4	7	4	6	3
I wouldn't care one way or the other	16	14	4	16	11	8	15
Total	100	100	100	99	100	100	100

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

Among both language groups, moreover, support for traditional symbolism was much stronger among younger adolescents (Table I-11). This tendency was particularly prominent among the Anglophones, where the youngest group favoured a traditional emblem (by 7 per cent), while all three other groups favoured a new flag—and by margins increasing from 5 to 20 to 43 per cent. A similar trend may also be noted among the Francophones, at least up to the age of 17 or 18.

Table I-11. Age Differences in Flag Preferences, by language spoken at home

Preference	Per cent giving different responses ^a			
	13-14 (N=261)	15-16 (N=260)	17-18 (N=202)	19-20 (N=68)
A flag which makes you think of Canada's past	47	40	32	20
A completely new flag	40	45	52	63
I'm not sure	5	4	4	8
I wouldn't care one way or the other	7	11	13	9
Total	99	100	101	100

Preference	B. French			
	13-14 (N=161)	15-16 (N=162)	17-18 (N=140)	19-20 (N=60)
A flag which makes you think of Canada's past	33	30	29	25
A completely new flag	49	50	58	49
I'm not sure	4	1	6	2
I wouldn't care one way or the other	14	19	7	23
Total	100	100	100	99

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

Table I-12. Countries Named as Canada's Best Friends, by language spoken at home

	Per cent who named each country ^a		
	A. Best Friend		
Country	English	French	Other
United States	65	72	67
Great Britain	29	6	31
France	1	8	—
All other countries	1	1	1
No country named	4	13	2
Total	100	100	101
Base	(793)	(529)	(37)

	B. Three Best Friends		
Country	English	French	Other
United States	94	84	98
Great Britain	89	58	98
France	33	64	35
Australia	18	1	10
Japan	7	4	2
All other countries	28	27	11
Total	269 ^b	238	254
Base	(793)	(529)	(37)

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bTotals exceed 100 per cent because respondents asked to name three best friends. They do not total to 300 per cent because some did not name three countries.

A second indicator of young people's time perspectives was the countries they selected as Canada's best friends. The main issue here was whether they saw Canada as closer to the United States or to Britain (or France). These evaluations are reported in Tables I-12 through I-14.

Part B of Table I-12 indicates that a majority of the Francophones and virtually all of the Anglophones and "Others" included both the United States and Britain in their selections of Canada's three closest friends. The issue thus resolves into the question of which country was rated higher, and on this the results were strikingly clear cut: all three groups thought Canada's closer ties were with the United States rather than Britain, by margins of 36 per cent among the two groups of non-French, and 66 per cent among the French. Only 6 per cent of the French named Britain as closest friend and, interestingly, only 8 per cent named France. The main difference between the French and the other two groups, then, was in their tendency to omit Britain from their selections—although they were also more likely to name no country at all. Rates of non-response on this question (Question 11) were 13 per cent among the Francophones, but just 4 per cent and 2 per

cent among the Anglophones and "Others." This would suggest that considerably more Francophones found it difficult to think about Canada's ties with the outside world.

Another striking feature of these responses is that very few countries were nominated as best friends. Only 9 per cent of the Francophones, 2 per cent of the Anglophones, and 1 per cent of the "Others" named any country other than the United States or Britain as Canada's closest friend, and only two other countries—France and Australia—were named at all by more than one person in 10 from any group. Although not often selected as Canada's first friend, 64 per cent of the Francophones and about a third in the other two groups did include France in their selections, while 18 per cent of the Anglophones included Australia.

Table I-13. Regional Differences in Countries Named as Canada's Best Friends, by language spoken at home

Countries	Per cent who named each country ^a						
	French		English				
	Quebec (N=337)	Non-Quebec (N=192)	Atlantic (N=122)	Quebec (N=107)	Ontario (N=291)	Prairies (N=175)	B.C. (N=98)
A. Canada's Best Friend							
United States	73	66	68	72	63	62	69
Great Britain	4	12	28	21	29	32	27
France	9	4	—	2	1	1	1
All other countries	2	1	2	—	1	—	1
No country named	12	16	2	4	6	4	2
Total	100	99	100	99	100	99	100
B. Canada's Three Best Friends							
United States	85	82	98	95	93	93	95
Great Britain	55	73	89	93	87	92	91
France	64	61	36	58	29	31	35
All other countries	35	17	47	25	51	48	49
Total	239 ^b	233	270	271	260	264	270

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bTotals exceed 100 per cent because respondents asked to name three best friends. They do not total to 300 per cent because some persons did not name three countries.

Unlike attitudes on the flag question, these impressions were remarkably stable among different age and regional groupings. Table I-13 indicates that young people from all parts of the country placed the United States ahead of the United Kingdom by a considerable margin, the tendency being strongest in the case of the two groups from Quebec, and slightly less pronounced, inexplicably, among Anglophones from the Prairies. For the

most part, however, these results are more impressive in their similarity than their variation. The responses differed only slightly among the age groups (Table I-14). The only meaningful age trends were that older youth were a little more likely to think of the United States as Canada's first friend, and a little less likely to leave the question unanswered.

Table I-14. Age Differences in Countries Named as Canada's Best Friends, by language spoken at home

Countries	Per cent who named each country ^a							
	English				French			
	13-14 (N=261)	15-16 (N=260)	17-18 (N=202)	19-20 (N=68)	13-14 (N=161)	15-16 (N=162)	17-18 (N=140)	19-20 (N=60)
A. Best Friend								
United States	64	64	65	69	63	75	73	75
Great Britain	29	30	29	28	6	5	5	9
France	1	1	1	—	12	6	10	3
All other countries	1	—	2	2	(.3)	3	1	1
No country named	5	6	3	(.4)	19	10	11	12
Total	100	101	100	99	100	99	100	100
B. Three Best Friends								
United States	93	93	95	98	79	88	86	83
Great Britain	87	89	92	92	53	60	54	71
France	32	34	36	24	59	68	63	66
All other countries	50	44	46	63	28	32	34	31
Total	262 ^b	260	269	277	219	248	237	251

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bTotals exceed 100 per cent because respondents asked to name three best friends. They do not total to 300 per cent because some persons did not name three countries.

In the main, it would appear that all Canadian young people perceive their country more in terms of its North American roots than its European heritage. And to the extent that these reactions could be said to reflect orientations to the past, present, or future, it could perhaps be concluded as well that their viewpoint is contemporary rather than traditional.

Orientations to Different Levels of Government

According to Piaget,⁶ at the age of about 10 or 11 children are able to comprehend properly the notion of "country," that is, to understand the territorial relationships

⁶ Jean Piaget, "The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and of Relations with Other Countries," *International Social Science Bulletin*, Vol. 3, 1951, 561-71.

between a country as a whole and the various administrative units which may function within it—towns, cities, provinces, cantons, states, regions, and the like. In a study of Canadian 13- to 20-year-olds, then, it is not at all fanciful to inquire into their attitudes toward different levels of government in the Canadian federal system. This section is concerned with how young people assess the effectiveness of their federal, provincial, and local governments in serving the needs of the Canadian people. The evaluations were measured in relative rather than absolute terms: the respondents were asked which government they felt did most and least for people (Questions 15 and 16). In addition, they were asked which one they thought would be best to work for—providing the remuneration from each was the same (Question 17).

Even though these questions avoided reference to specific administrations, political parties, or national, provincial, or municipal leaders, it is inevitable that in answering them some young people would have thought about the particular parties or individuals in power at the time. These results, therefore, cannot be represented as necessarily enduring orientations to government; there is no guarantee that the ratings would have been the same had other parties or persons been in office during the summer of 1965.

While only limited interpretations can be made from these responses when considered as national totals, Table I-15 does indicate a number of points of similarity and difference in the reactions of the three language groups. Considering the balance between positive and negative assessments in Parts A and B of the table, for example, the following tendencies may be noted. First, members of all three groups rated their provincial governments much more positively than negatively. The percentage margins were +27 among the Francophones, +21 among the Anglophones, and +20 among the "Others." Secondly, only Anglophones made an overall positive appraisal of the federal government. The scores in this case were +6, -3 and -12, respectively, among the Anglophones, "Others," and Francophones. Thirdly, the "Others" gave by far the most positive assessments to the role of municipal government, their net balance between positive and negative ratings being +27 compared with +2 and -7 for the French and English.

Generally, then, all three groups thought their provincial governments were effective in doing things for people; the "Others" rated local governments strongly; and no group favoured the national government. Such results indicate a decidedly provincial orientation in young people's thinking about public administration.

At the same time, however, the federal government fared much better when considered as an employer. Part C of Table I-15 indicates that all three groups rated it more strongly on this criterion than on the other, and that both groups of non-French youth preferred it. These same two groups also rated their provincial governments lowest, thus indicating that the governments they saw as most effective in serving people's interests were the ones they thought least attractive to work for. This reversal is especially curious since the employment question stated quite clearly that the salaries from each job would be the same. In effect, then, these youth used quite different criteria when evaluating an administration's service to the community and its employment potential.

Francophones, by comparison, were much more consistent in their ratings on these two dimensions. For them, provincial governments were ranked first both as servants of public interests and as potential employers.

Table I-15. Orientation to Different Levels of Government, by language spoken at home

Response	English	French	Other
The government of your city, town or township	23% ^a	23%	37%
The government of your province	33	40	39
The government of Canada	32	22	22
I'm not sure	13	15	2
Total	101	100	100
Base	(793)	(529)	(37)
B. Question 16. Which one would you say does the least for people?			
The government of your city, town or township	30% ^a	21%	14%
The government of your province	12	13	19
The government of Canada	26	34	25
I'm not sure	31	32	42
Total	99	100	100
Base	(793)	(529)	(37)
C. Question 17. Which government would be best to work for—if the salary was the same on each job?			
The government of your city, town or township	28% ^a	27%	27%
The government of your province	22	34	19
The government of Canada	39	28	38
I'm not sure	11	11	16
Total	100	100	100
Base	(793)	(529)	(37)

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

Although it would be highly instructive to examine the reactions of young people living in specific localities, the small number of individuals sampled in most cities and towns precludes this level of analysis. Regional variations, however, are displayed in Figure I-1. The rationale for this particular mode of presentation is that strictly by chance alone we would expect each level of government to be named both positively and negatively by one-third of the respondents. Figure I-1 thus highlights the extent to which the ratings deviated from random expectation. Here, the direction of the bars to the right or left of the centre line indicates either a positive or negative balance, while the length of the bar reflects the strength of departure from chance expectancy.⁷

⁷ The actual measures were computed by the following formula: (per cent positive assessments – 33.3 per cent) + (33.3 per cent – per cent negative assessments) divided by 2. Signs were taken into account and percentages were computed only for those persons who gave substantive answers to the questions. These measures have a zero-sum property, meaning that any imbalance in one direction must be matched by an imbalance of equal size in the opposite direction.

Figure I-1. Regional Variations in Orientation to Different Levels of Government, by language spoken at home


Direction and Strength of Orientation

NEGATIVE


NEUTRAL

POSITIVE


A. Federal government



B. Provincial government



C. Municipal government



These data point to a number of important regional differences in young people's views of government. First, when we compare the two Francophone groups, it is clear that those from Quebec held much more positive views of their provincial government, and much more negative ones of the federal government than did their counterparts living in other provinces. By contrast the non-Quebec Francophones appear to have no particularly strong feelings about any level of government. Their reactions are all close to what would be expected strictly from random allotment.

Interestingly, the Anglophones in British Columbia showed an even stronger propensity than the Francophones in Quebec to favour the provincial level: their assessments deviate 23.3 points above chance expectancy compared with 16.3 points for the Francophones. Although both groups thus displayed strong provincial sentiments, their patterns of negative response were quite dissimilar: among the Quebec Francophones these were directed principally at the federal government while among the British Columbia Anglophones they clustered heavily at the local level. In other words, the provincialism of the Quebec Francophones was accompanied by strongly negative dispositions regarding the federal administration while that of the British Columbia group was not.

Figure I-1 also indicates that all groups except the Quebec Anglophones entered provincial governments on the positive side of the ledger. As might have been anticipated, then, the perspectives of the Anglophones and Francophones from Quebec were radically different. Although showing less consensus in their views, the Quebec Anglophones quite clearly perceived their primary source of support as Ottawa.

Besides the Quebec Anglophones, only those from the Atlantic Provinces rated the national government more positively than negatively, the reactions of both groups falling approximately nine points above chance expectancy. Unlike their Quebec neighbours, however, the Easterners also made positive assessments of their provincial administrations and, while both groups gave their most negative ratings to local government, those from the Atlantic Provinces were more negative. For the Atlantic Anglophones, then, federal support would seem to emerge primarily as a reaction to local inertia; for the Quebec Anglophones it would appear to stem from a relative lack of confidence in both local and provincial administrations.

Finally, Figure I-1 indicates that all groups rated the functions of municipal government relatively low. Since in a zero-sum statistic all deviations must be balanced, it is difficult to assess whether these particular ratings reflect genuinely negative sentiment or whether they emerge primarily because provincial administrations were rated so highly. It is perhaps most reasonable to assume the latter.

Apart from the pronounced provincial orientation of the British Columbia Anglophones, these results could be said to conform to expectation. Young people from the different regions seem to share the same kinds of perspectives as their elders regarding the structure of public administration in Canadian society.

Finally, Figure I-2 compares the evaluations of Anglophones and Francophones in the four age groups. The results indicate sharp changes of perspective with age. The older groups gave progressively higher positive ratings to their provincial governments. These trends are continuous among both language groups, and among the Francophones they are accompanied by consistently increasing negative feelings towards the federal government.

Figure I-2. Age Differences in Orientation to Different Levels of Government, by language spoken at home

Direction and Strength of Orientation


NEGATIVE NEUTRAL POSITIVE

A. English


(i) Federal government



(ii) Provincial government




(iii) Municipal government



B. French



(i) Federal government



(ii) Provincial government



(iii) Municipal government



These findings are important. They suggest that during the adolescent years Canadian young people become aware of the important sectional, regional, and provincial interests in Canadian life, and this awareness in turn is translated into beliefs regarding how well provincial governments serve the needs of Canadians. If then, as Piaget suggests, the first 10 or 11 years of life are characterized by a clearly marked process of widening perspectives regarding the homeland, "starting from motives essentially bound up with subjective or personal impressions and progressing toward acceptance of the values common to the group, first to the family group and then society as a whole,"⁸ then the adolescent years, at least for Canadian young people, could be characterized as the period of emergent sectionalism.

Perceived Distinctiveness of the Canadian People, and of the Two Main Canadian Subgroups

In the final section of this chapter we look at young people's impressions of the Canadian people both as a whole and as two major subgroupings. The discussion centres first on areas of similarity and difference between, on the one hand, Canadians and Americans, and on the other, Anglophone and Francophone Canadians. Following this, it then focusses directly on the triangle of relationships between English Canadians, French Canadians, and Americans by reviewing young people's impressions as to which pairs of groups share the larger number of things in common with one another.

We are dealing here with themes which might well be discussed under the labels "national identity" and "national solidarity." To the extent that national identity can be defined as the qualities a person associates himself with and differentiates himself from, the analysis could indeed be said to explore young people's identity both as Canadians and as "hyphenated Canadians." And to the extent that the solidarity of any group—a family, organization, community, or nation—is reflected in the degree to which its members have more in common with one another than they do with outsiders, then it also explores the social cohesiveness of the national community of Canadian young people.

I. Canadians and Americans

To what extent and in what ways do Canadian young people think of themselves as distinct? Questions 12 and 13 asked respondents to compare themselves with Americans on 11 specific traits and characteristics, and in addition to make an overall judgement as to whether Canadians and Americans were, in most respects, alike or different. In selecting characteristics for comparison, we attempted to reflect the kinds of things young people commonly say about themselves and about Americans, and at the same time to cover features relating to a number of different dimensions—personality traits of the two peoples, tastes and life-style preferences, characteristics of the social and institutional structure of the two countries, and most important, underlying values about life.

⁸ Piaget, "The Development of the Idea of Homeland," 566.

When asked for a global assessment, most Canadian young people viewed themselves collectively as more similar to than distinct from Americans. Seventy-nine per cent of Anglophones and 75 per cent of the "Others" perceived similarities between the two peoples (Table I-16). Francophones held these views much more tentatively, although a majority (56 per cent) thought similarities were more important than differences. The levels of response are somewhat difficult to interpret in isolation, but they suggest at the very least that Canadian young people's sense of national distinctiveness does not derive its shape from fundamental contrasts with Americans.

Table I-16. Perceived Similarity between Canadians and Americans, by language spoken at home

Question 12. Some people think that Canadians and Americans are very much alike, while others think they are very different. What would you say?

Response	English	French	Other
Alike in most ways	79% ^a	56%	75%
Different in most ways	18	37	25
I'm not sure	3	7	—
Total	100	100	100
Base	(793)	(529)	(37)

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

The international comparisons on specific features are reviewed in Figure I-3. These results are once again represented in graphic form so as to highlight only dominant opinion⁹ and are arranged in order of consensus. This chart shows marked opinions in both directions, and also illustrates a number of features on which members of the three groups differed.

The first three entries on the chart (Figure I-3) represent tastes or life styles, and all reflect a consensus of opinion on Canadian-American similarity. At the same time, however, the three groups did not share these views to the same degree. Virtually no Anglophones or "Others" saw anything particularly distinctive about Canadian food, musical tastes, or grooming styles and manners of dress, but a sizable minority of the Francophones did. One could conclude, therefore, that Francophone youth were at least relatively more sensitive to distinctively Canadian tastes and styles.

Next, there was general agreement that Canadians and Americans work at similar types of jobs, although here the "Others" made much more tentative judgements than either the Francophones or Anglophones. For the most part, however, young people did not recognize a uniquely Canadian occupational structure.

⁹In this and other charts presented in this section, the figures represent the percentage discrepancies between those saying Canadians and Americans were "definitely alike" and "definitely different." These percentages were based on the responses of all young persons rather than just those who gave substantive assessments.

Figure I-3. Ways in Which Canadians and Americans are Perceived as Similar and Different, by language spoken at home




Figure I-3—(Continued)


Direction and Strength of Opinion

HIGHLY DIFFERENT


NO CONSENSUS

HIGHLY SIMILAR


6. The importance they attach to having a
good time




7. The importance they attach
to making a lot of money




8. Their friendliness to strangers





9. The importance they attach to religion



10. The amount of money they have



11. The kind of government they have



As expected, Francophones recognized the difference in language of the two peoples much more frequently than others did. We might also conclude that in answering these questions Anglophones and Francophones tended to think about the Canadian people as a whole much as they thought of their own cultural group. By the same token, the "Others" appear to have defined the Canadian people in terms of predominantly English Canadian characteristics.

The sixth and seventh features listed both concern values—the importance attached to economic achievement and to enjoying life. Both sets of ratings illustrate moderately high agreement as to Canadian-American similarity, although levels of consensus on both points tended to be higher among Anglophones and lower among the "Others." These findings are perhaps a little surprising in that, along with "friendliness to strangers," these features are often the object of stereotypes regarding Canadian-American differences: Americans are often characterized as keener on making money, more gregarious, and more extroverted, and Canadians (or at least English Canadians) are usually stereotyped as more serious, more conservative, and more reserved in making friends. However, young people would appear not to reflect these stereotypes.

Members of the three language groups also differed markedly in the assessments they made of the importance Canadians and Americans attach to religion. The Francophones felt the two peoples placed quite different emphases on these matters, while the Anglophones and the "Others" thought the views were basically similar.

All in all, there were just two characteristics out of the 11 on which all three groups agreed that Canadians and Americans were definitely different: in economic wealth, and even more in the form of government of the two countries. These results are hardly surprising, but it is interesting that the two peoples were perceived as different when rated on actual wealth, but similar when rated on the importance they attach to making money. Otherwise, the responses indicate relatively few areas in which Canadians were seen as distinct from Americans, although Francophone youth tended to see more of these features as distinctively Canadian. In addition to wealth and form of government, they rated language and religious attitudes as different and were much more likely than their compatriots to perceive distinctive tastes and styles.

Regional and age variations on the global comparisons are reviewed in Figure I-4. The results indicate little variation of perspective among Anglophones from the different regions, but rather marked differences between the two groups of Francophones. All five groups of Anglophone youth viewed Canadians and Americans as highly similar by about the same degree, but the Quebec Francophones saw considerably more areas of national difference than did those from other provinces. The non-Quebec Francophones, in short, tended to view Canadians as more Americanized, and in this respect came somewhat closer to the views held by the Anglophones. There was a slight tendency for older youth to see more areas of national distinctiveness. These trends are neither pronounced nor linear, however, and as such do not warrant any definite conclusions regarding changes in perspective at different ages.

II. English Canadians and French Canadians

Further along in the questionnaire, respondents were asked to make similar judgements for English and French Canadians (Questions 25 and 26). These evaluations, while inter-

Figure I-4. Regional Variations and Age Differences in Perceived Similarity of Canadians and Americans, by language spoken at home


Direction and Strength of Image

HIGHLY DIFFERENT




NO CONSENSUS

HIGHLY SIMILAR

A. Language and Region



B. Language and Age



esting in their own right, take on added significance when interpreted in conjunction with the Canadian-American comparisons. All three groups rated the English and French as more alike than different, but the two non-Francophone groups did so only marginally. (See Table I-17.) Whereas 79 per cent of the Anglophones rated Canadians and Americans as alike, only 50 per cent rated the French and English in Canada thus, and for the "Others" the discrepancy was even wider—75 per cent compared with 42 per cent. The two sets of ratings were much more similar among Francophones, although they too thought the two Canadian groups were less similar (54 per cent compared with 56 per cent). Of the three groups, however, it was the Francophones who most often saw English and French Canadians as alike, and Americans and Canadians as different.

Table I-17. Perceived Similarity between Anglophone and Francophone Canadians, by language spoken at home

Response	English (N=793)	French (N=529)	Other (N=37)
Alike in most ways	50% ^a	54%	42%
Different in most ways	41	38	40
I'm not sure	10	8	18
Total	101	100	100

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

Comparisons on specific characteristics are presented in Figure I-5. Here, of 12 points of comparison, eight were rated by a majority as areas of similarity and four as areas of difference. All groups agreed on English-French similarity in food habits, economic motivation and types of employment, the pluralities in no case falling below 41 per cent. There was no consistent pattern to these three sets of ratings, however, consensus of opinion being highest among the Francophones on food, among the "Others" on economic motivation, and among the Anglophones on types of jobs held. The three groups also saw more similarity than difference in hair and clothing styles, but in differing degrees. Agreement here was higher among the Anglophones, and was much lower among the "Others." A similar pattern was also found in the importance attached to having a good time. Anglophones agreed slightly more often on similarity than the Francophones, and the "Others" perceived more differences. Finally, on wealth, musical tastes, and friendliness to strangers, all three groups made moderately high appraisals of English-French similarity, and their ratings were more alike than unlike.

Let us now turn to the differences. All groups felt that English and French Canadians place a different emphasis on religion. The "Others" thought this more often and the Francophones less. The more interesting differences, however, were on the statements reflecting national goals for Canada—the kind of government they want Canada to have and the type of country they want Canada to be in the future. Here the perspectives of

the three groups differed quite markedly. On both statements, the Anglophones and the "Others" saw the two groups as oriented in quite different directions, while the Francophones were much more evenly divided in their opinions. The English were 36 per cent more likely to see the two groups as wanting different goals for Canada while the French were 7 per cent more likely to see similar goals. And while the Francophones acknowledged differences of opinion on government, they did so by a margin of just 11 per cent, compared with 45 per cent among the Anglophones and 54 per cent among the "Others." These results are important even though they do not indicate specific points of disagreement. They suggest that while English and French Canadians are seen as having much in common, the points on which they are seen to differ are serious ones.

Finally, Figure I-5 shows that virtually all young people recognized that English and French Canadians speak different languages. Had the result been different, the credibility of the other responses would be questionable.

Variations by region and age are again presented only in relation to the overall assessments (Figure I-6). Here prominent regional variations may be noted in the responses of both groups. Among the Anglophones, especially those living further west, there is a clear-cut though slightly uneven tendency to see greater differences; whereas youth in the Atlantic Provinces were 30 per cent more likely to perceive similarities than differences, the groups were rated as more dissimilar than alike west of Ontario. Western Anglophones thus felt they had less in common with French Canadians than did their counterparts living in central Canada, who in turn saw fewer similarities than did young people from the Atlantic area. The two Francophone groups again gave radically different appraisals: consensus of opinion on English-French similarity was highest of all among those living outside Quebec, and by contrast the Quebec group held views more similar to those of the Quebec Anglophones than to those of the non-Quebec Francophones. On this issue, in short, regional perspectives could probably be said to over-ride ethnic ones.

The findings with regard to age are once again inconclusive, although among both groups agreement on similarity was highest among the 13- and 14-year-olds, and lowest among either the oldest group or the second oldest. This suggests at least mild support for the generalization that as Canadian young people pass through adolescence they become more sensitive to ethnic differences.

III. Interethnic Ties versus Ties over the Border

In addition to these separate evaluations, respondents were also asked directly which pairs of groups they thought shared more in common. The questions were phrased as follows:

(Question 14) Who would you say have more in common—English-speaking Canadians and Americans or English-speaking Canadians and French-speaking Canadians?

(Question 27) Who have more in common—French Canadians and Americans or French Canadians and English Canadians?

In effect, then, both Anglophones and Francophones were asked to rate the strength of their interethnic ties within Canada against their ties south of the border and to make a similar assessment from the point of view of the other group.

Figure I-5. Ways in Which Anglophone and Francophone Canadians are Perceived as Similar and Different, by language spoken at home




Figure I-5—(Continued)


Direction and Strength of Image

HIGHLY DIFFERENT



NO CONSENSUS

HIGHLY SIMILAR


7. The types of music they like




8. Their friendliness to strangers




9. The importance they attach to religion



10. The type of country they want Canada to be in the future




11. The kind of government they want Canada to have



12. The language they speak

Figure I-6. Regional Variations and Age Differences in Perceived Similarity of Anglophone and Francophone Canadians, by language spoken at home



The responses elicited by these questions are reported in Table I-18, and indicate sharp differences of perspective among the three groups. The key finding here is that many more Anglophones felt closer ties to Americans than to French Canadians. Although already suggested by the responses to previous questions, this tendency is brought into sharp focus here: when forced to choose, better than two-thirds of the Anglophones said they had more in common with Americans and only one in five identified with French Canadians. The "Others" moreover, strongly agreed with this appraisal, and in fact stated it even more sharply: they were 60 per cent more likely to identify English Canadians with Americans than with French Canadians, while the Anglophones themselves did so by a margin of just 48 per cent.

French views on this were considerably different. Although more agreed with the appraisal than disagreed with it, they thought English Canadians' ties were with the French just 2 per cent less often than with Americans. Part B of the table illustrates the high degree of social-psychological difference in these appraisals. The Francophones felt they had more in common with English Canadians than with Americans, and by a margin as great as 39 per cent. Moreover, the other groups, and particularly the Anglophones, also thought they had.

Table I-18. Perception of Closeness of Ties between Anglophone and Francophone Canadians, and Americans, by language spoken at home

A. Question 14. Who would you say have more in common—English-speaking Canadians and Americans or English-speaking Canadians and French-speaking Canadians?

Responses	English	French	Other
English-speaking Canadians and Americans	68% ^a	41%	69%
English-speaking Canadians and French-speaking Canadians	20	39	9
I'm not sure	12	20	22
Total	100	100	100
Base	(793)	(529)	(37)

B. Question 27. Who have more in common—French-Canadians and Americans or French-Canadians and English-Canadians?

French-Canadians and Americans	8% ^a	21%	10%
French-Canadians and English-Canadians	70	60	63
I'm not sure	21	19	27
Total	99	100	100
Base	(793)	(529)	(37)

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

Together, then, these reactions describe a grossly unbalanced set of relationships. The social orientation of the Anglophones crosses national lines much more frequently than ethnic lines, while that of the Francophones is exactly the reverse. The most interesting feature here, perhaps, is that this situation seemed to be clear to everyone: it was obvious

to the Anglophones and the "Others," and even the Francophones recognized it more often than not. The French did tend to overestimate the ties English Canadians felt toward them, and this can perhaps be interpreted as a reaction to the uncomfortable situation of recognizing attachments which are not reciprocated.

The results suggest a rather weak foundation for intergroup solidarity among Canadian young people. And while it would be foolish to suggest specific implications of this imbalance, it should be clear enough that a tendency to identify stronger social ties outside the national borders than within could become extremely significant in situations of either individual or collective cross-pressure.

To conclude the chapter, regional and age variations in these evaluations are reviewed in Figures I-7 and I-8. As with the ratings of French-English commonalities, Anglophones from the western regions less often identified themselves with the Francophones. When forced to choose, even the Atlantic Anglophones more often identified cross-nationally, and by a margin of 32 per cent. Nonetheless, the tendency was still much stronger in the Canadian West.

The two Francophone groups did not differ meaningfully when appraising English Canadian attachments, but they assessed the ties of their own group rather differently, and Quebec French were much less likely to perceive their primary ties within Canada. Anglophone assessments regarding French ties did not vary much from region to region, although they were particularly one-sided in British Columbia and Quebec, the same regions where Canadian-American similarities were rated the highest (Figure I-1). In other words, Anglophones in Quebec and British Columbia made both the strongest Canadian-American associations and the strongest French Canadian-American disassociations.


Finally, Figure I-8 shows extremely pronounced differences in these perspectives in various age groups. The most important finding here was that older Francophones were much more likely to rate English Canadians as closer to Americans. Over the teen years, then, Francophones appear to become much better informed on how English Canadians actually feel about this issue. At 13 and 14, most rated English Canadians as more closely tied to the French; at 19 and 20, the majority thought differently.

At the same time, however, the two older groups of Anglophones seemed to be more tentative about their ties with Americans, although still identifying solidly in that direction. This counter-trend is interesting, although its implications are not altogether clear. In Figures I-4 and I-6, for example, slight tendencies were noted for older Anglophone youth to see fewer common interests *both* between Americans and Canadians and between English and French Canadians. The trend in Figure I-8 probably does not reflect a growing tendency for English youth to feel they have more in common with French so much as it reflects their growing propensity to perceive themselves as nationally distinct. In this sense, the results suggest that over the adolescent years English youth perhaps become slightly more aware of the fact that one of the main things they do share with French Canadians is a common national identity.

Figure I-7. Regional Variations in Perception of Closeness of Ties between Anglophone and Francophone Canadians, and Americans, by language spoken at home

Direction and Strength of Image

A. English-speaking Canadians have more in common with . . .



B. French-speaking Canadians have more in common with . . .




Figure I-8. Age Differences in Perception of Closeness of Ties between Anglophone and Francophone Canadians, and Americans, by language spoken at home


Direction and Strength of Image

A. English-speaking Canadians have more in common with . . .

FRENCH CANADIANS	NO CONSENSUS	AMERICANS
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
(i) English—13-14

-15-16
-17-18
-19-20



(ii) French—13-14

16
-15-16
-17-18
-19-20



B. French-speaking Canadians have more in common with . . .

ENGLISH CANADIANS	NO CONSENSUS	AMERICANS
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-62
-59
-66
-64

NO CONSENSUS


(i) English—13-14

-15-16
-17-18
-19-20

-41
-39
36
-43

(ii) French—13-14

-15-16
-17-18
-19-20



The focus of attention now shifts from young people's perceptions of Canada as a whole to their impressions regarding social diversity in Canadian life. Once again the discussion is more concerned with beliefs than with feelings, and the evidence reviewed consists primarily of cognitive rather than affective reactions. Images of social diversity in Canada are discussed under three subheadings: the impressions young people have of the social and linguistic composition of the Canadian population; their opinions on the cohesiveness of various groups; and their opinions on relations between English and French.

Awareness of Social Diversity

As might well be imagined, a wide variety of groups were identified when respondents were asked to list the peoples, other than English or French, who lived in Canada (Question 24). Most young people listed between one and six groups, although some named many more than this and others were able to think of none at all.¹ Altogether, 7 per cent named more than 10 groups, 16 per cent named between seven and 10, 46 per cent named three to six, 18 per cent named one or two, and 14 per cent named none.

By way of introduction, Table II-1 reports the median number of groups identified by different young people. Part A of the table shows, first, that respondents who were themselves members of ethnic minorities were most aware of the existence of other minorities in Canada, and second, that the Francophones named fewer groups than did the Anglophones. The latter difference is large for comparisons of medians, and it suggests, there-

¹ Because the administration of the questionnaire was in most cases not closely supervised, it would have been possible for respondents to consult sources other than their memories when answering this question. There is no accurate way of determining how often this was actually done, but there was no evidence to suggest it was done frequently. Moreover, since different groups would have probably done so at uniform rates, it seems safe enough to make at least comparative statements regarding levels of social awareness.

fore, that of the three groups the Francophones were by far the least aware of the heterogeneity of their national social environment.

Part B indicates in addition that the Quebec Francophones were somewhat less well informed than their counterparts living in other provinces. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it turned out that this was the case only for Quebec Francophones living outside the Montreal area. Although not shown in the table, the medians for Francophones from Montreal and other parts of Quebec were, respectively, 3.62 and 2.09. Thus it was only the non-Quebec Francophones and the Quebec Francophones living outside Montreal whose entries were relatively less numerous.

Among the Anglophone groups, levels of awareness were higher in the West than the East, and were highest of all among those from the Prairies. This undoubtedly reflects the fact that the population living in western regions of Canada is more ethnically heterogeneous, and would suggest, therefore, that where ethnic minorities are more numerous in the local environment, more young people are aware of their existence.

Table II-1. Total Number of Groups Identified as Living in Canada, by language spoken at home, region and language spoken at home, and age and language spoken at home

Question 24. Besides the English and the French, what other groups
of people do you know about who live in Canada?

Classification of Respondents	Median Number of Groups Named ^a	
		Median
A. Language spoken at home		
English (N=793)		4.26
French (N=529)		2.79
Other (N=37)		4.41
B. Region and language spoken at home		
French - Quebec (N=337)		2.74
- Non-Quebec (N=192)		3.05
English - Atlantic (N=122)		3.61
- Quebec (N=107)		4.34
- Ontario (N=291)		3.97
- Prairies (N=175)		5.41
- B.C. (N=98)		4.47
C. Age and language spoken at home		
English - 13-14 (N=261)		3.88
- 15-16 (N=260)		4.43
- 17-18 (N=202)		4.41
- 19-20 (N=68)		4.47
French - 13-14 (N=161)		2.03
- 15-16 (N=162)		2.85
- 17-18 (N=140)		3.06
- 19-20 (N=60)		3.23

^aMedians calculated from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

Finally, Part C of the table shows higher levels of social awareness among older groups of respondents, particularly among the Francophones.

For the most part, these results line up as we would have expected, although it is revealing that the non-Montreal Francophones made noticeably fewer entries. However, it is not surprising to learn that Canada's social diversity is more visible to members of smaller ethnic minorities, or to young people living in areas of greater social heterogeneity.

These responses were also classified by the groups named, and Tables II-2 and II-3 thus indicate the relative visibility of specific minorities. The right-hand column in Table II-2 shows how frequently different groups were identified by the total sample, and indicates that only Italians were named by an actual majority (54 per cent). Almost half of the young people (48 per cent) noted the presence of Germans in Canada, and both non-French groups named Germans more frequently than they did Italians. For Francophones, Germans were considerably less obvious than Italians, but this again probably reflects differences in the location of these minorities throughout English- and French-speaking Canada.

Table II-2. Visibility of Specific Groups of People Living in Canada, by language spoken at home

Groups Named	Per Cent Who Named Different Groups ^a			Total Sample (N=1,359)
	English (N=793)	French (N=529)	Other (N=37)	
(1) Italians	52	56	61	54
(2) Germans	58	23	72	48
(3) Chinese	38	31	30	36
(4) Europeans—unspecified or not elsewhere classified	30	34	31	31
(5) Polish	31	13	53	26
(6) Dutch	31	6	46	24
(7) Japanese	27	17	28	24
(8) Ukrainians	25	9	43	21
(9) Scandinavians	25	3	25	18
(10) Hungarians	15	11	35	15
(11) Irish	17	7	16	14
(12) Scottish	18	3	10	14
(13) Jews	12	21	19	14
(14) Russians	16	8	20	14
(15) Americans	10	13	2	11
(16) Negroes	11	11	9	11
(17) Indians—unspecified	13	4	8	10
(18) Greeks	9	10	18	10
(19) Eskimos	5	1	4	4
(20) Africans	4	4	—	4
(21) Indians—from India	3	2	—	3
(22) Australians	4	b	—	3
(23) Canadian Indians	3	1	4	3
(24) All other peoples	18	6	12	14

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

bLess than one-half of 1 per cent.

Table II-3. Regional Variations in Visibility of Other Groups Living in Canada, by language spoken at home

Group	Per Cent Who Named Different Groups ^a							
	French		English					
	Quebec (N=337)	Non-Quebec (N=192)	Atlantic (N=122)	Quebec (N=107)	Ontario (N=291)	Prairies (N=175)	B.C. (N=98)	
(1) Italians	59	43	48	66	65	31	53	
(2) Germans	19	41	46	62	59	62	61	
(3) Chinese	30	35	43	34	26	46	52	
(4) Europeans—NEC.	36	26	19	38	34	26	33	
(5) Polish	13	14	27	39	33	37	18	
(6) Dutch	3	15	30	16	38	27	25	
(7) Japanese	17	20	20	25	19	34	42	
(8) Ukrainians	8	16	12	15	18	52	20	
(9) Scandinavians	2	6	16	17	18	36	36	
(10) Hungarians	11	11	16	29	15	16	12	
(11) Irish	6	11	18	9	15	24	11	
(12) Scottish	2	7	20	6	15	26	17	
(13) Jews	21	20	12	23	12	11	6	
(14) Russians	7	11	11	18	14	20	22	
(15) Americans	14	9	10	7	10	12	10	
(16) Negroes	11	10	6	9	10	15	11	
(17) Indians—unspecified	2	10	13	15	11	16	15	
(18) Greeks	12	3	13	17	7	8	8	
(19) Eskimos	1	2	7	5	4	3	7	
(20) Africans	4	4	4	9	5	5	3	
(21) Indians—from India	1	4	4	3	3	1	6	
(22) Australians	b	b	2	4	3	5	5	
(23) Canadian Indians	b	1	4	7	2	2	4	
(24) All others	5	9	15	8	14	21	30	

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted group totals.

^bLess than one half of 1 per cent.

The listing corresponds moderately well to the size of various ethnic minorities in Canadian society, except that both Chinese and Japanese were cited relatively more often than would have been predicted by their numbers in the actual population. Of the 23 different groups classified, the Chinese were named third most frequently, and the Japanese seventh.

Table II-2 also indicates several sharp differences in the rates at which specific peoples were identified by members of the three language groups. The most typical pattern was for groups to be listed most often by the "Others," second most often by the Anglophones, and least often by the Francophones. This was especially pronounced in the case of people of European origin, and in particular Germans, Dutch, Poles, Ukrainians, Hungarians, and Russians. Francophones, on the other hand, were a little more likely than the others to list "Europeans" without making reference to specific national origins.

These responses are also reviewed by region in Table II-3, and marked discrepancies may be noted within practically all categories. The main tendency here was for groups to be named most often in those regions where they are actually most numerous. Thus Italians were identified relatively more often by young people from Ontario and Quebec, Chinese and Japanese more often by the British Columbia Anglophones, and Ukrainians very much more often by Anglophones from the Prairies. These detailed breakdowns add few new insights, and their major contribution is simply to confirm that young people were better informed about the social make-up of their own region.

While it is difficult to decide whether these patterns of response represent high or low levels of social awareness, one could at least conclude that the larger ethnic minorities in Canada are visible to sizable numbers of young people from the two main cultures. Levels of awareness also appear to increase with age, but the most important finding here is that awareness is influenced markedly by the demographic features of particular regions. On the whole, Francophones were less aware than Anglophones of the presence of other minorities in Canada, but in Montreal, where their chances for intergroup contacts are higher, they were no less well informed than many Anglophones. The results suggest that young people derive their impressions of the social diversity of Canadian society more often from direct personal experiences than from other sources.

A second indicator of social awareness was provided by the estimates young people made of the linguistic composition of the Canadian population. Respondents were asked to guess how many Canadians out of every 10 spoke English, French, or a language other than English or French as their first language (Question 23). According to the breakdowns by mother tongue in the census of 1961,² answers of five or six English, two or three French, and one or two persons speaking other languages would be correct. The responses were therefore scored in this fashion, and the results are reported in Tables II-4 through II-6.

The most important single finding in Table II-4 is that all three groups showed a marked tendency to overestimate their own numbers. Forty-three per cent of the Anglophones gave accurate estimates of their numbers, but almost as many (38 per cent) estimated too high; the Francophones' estimates were almost identical—44 and 37 per cent; and the "Others" were only a little more accurate about themselves—50 per cent estimating correctly and 27 per cent too high.

As it turned out, then, no group made its most accurate judgement about itself. The best estimate of the English-speaking population was made by the "Others" (49 per cent correct), while the Anglophones were the best at estimating the numbers speaking French and other languages (63 and 76 per cent, respectively).

To sum up, all three groups saw themselves as more numerous than they actually were, very infrequently underestimated themselves, and were in general more accurate in appraising other groups than themselves.

These estimates did not show much regional variation, although Table II-5 indicates one or two differences worth noting. First, the Francophones outside Quebec were somewhat more accurate in assessing the size of the English-speaking population, although they

²The distribution of population by mother tongue in 1961 was 58 per cent English, 28 per cent French, and 13 per cent other languages.

Table II-4. Awareness of Linguistic Composition of Canadian Population, by language spoken at home

Question 23. Out of every ten Canadians how many would you guess speak English (French, a language other than English or French) as their first language?

Accuracy of Answers	Per Cent Making Different Estimates ^a		
	English (N=793)	French (N=529)	Other (N=37)
A. How many speak English?			
Accurate answer (5-6)	43	34	49
High estimate	38	22	15
Low estimate	10	29	16
No estimate made	9	14	19
Total	100	99	99
B. How many speak French?			
Accurate answer (2-3)	63	44	48
High estimate	11	37	13
Low estimate	18	4	19
No estimate made	9	14	19
Total	101	99	99
C. How many speak other languages?			
Accurate answer (1-2)	76	71	50
High estimate	10	8	27
Low estimate	5	7	3
No estimate made	9	14	19
Total	100	100	99

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

were no more likely than their counterparts from Quebec to estimate correctly either themselves or the "Others." The Quebec Anglophones were least often correct in judging their own numbers and most likely to over-represent the French. In both these cases, however, the margins were only slight.

By comparison, the variations by age were much more pronounced. Although no large or consistent age trend was observed among the Anglophones, Table II-6 shows that older Francophones were a great deal more likely than their juniors to over-estimate the Anglophones. These errors increased steadily from rates of 11 per cent among the youngest group to 39 per cent among those just entering their twenties. The perceptual distortions of French young people thus showed a remarkable shift during adolescence: those just entering their teens were about three times more likely to over-represent themselves than to over-represent the English (36 per cent compared with 11 per cent), while for those just entering adulthood the errors were predominantly in the opposite direction (27 per cent

Table II-5. Regional Variations in Awareness of Linguistic Composition of Canadian Population, by language spoken at home

Accuracy of Answers	Per Cent Making Different Estimates ^a							
	French		English					
	Quebec (N=337)	Non-Quebec (N=192)	Atlantic (N=122)	Quebec (N=107)	Ontario (N=291)	Prairies (N=175)	B.C. (N=98)	
A. How many speak English?								
Accurate answer (5-6)	32	44	42	36	46	38	54	
High estimate	24	16	41	39	31	47	39	
Low estimate	30	25	10	19	12	9	6	
No estimate made	14	16	7	6	11	6	10	
Total	100	101	100	100	100	100	99	
B. How many speak French?								
Accurate answer (2-3)	44	46	65	63	64	57	68	
High estimate	38	37	15	18	8	13	8	
Low estimate	5	2	13	13	18	24	14	
No estimate made	14	16	7	6	11	6	10	
Total	101	101	100	100	101	100	100	
C. How many speak other languages?								
Accurate answer (1-2)	71	71	77	83	72	81	81	
High estimate	7	10	6	10	12	10	5	
Low estimate	8	4	10	1	5	3	4	
No estimate made	14	16	7	6	11	6	10	
Total	100	101	100	100	100	100	100	

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

and 39 per cent). In effect, then, it would appear that during the adolescent years Francophones not only become aware of the dominance of the English language in Canadian society, but are so impressed by this fact that they see themselves more in the minority than they really are.

Areas of Consensus and Cleavage in Canadian Life

Impressions about national unity were measured by asking young people the extent to which they thought different groups in Canada would agree on questions regarding Canada's future (Questions 4 to 10). These assessments were first made for Canadians as a whole, and then separately for six pairs of subgroups—Westerners and Easterners, Roman Catholics and Protestants, French and English, native-born and foreign-born, rich and poor, and urban

Table II-6. Age Differences in Awareness of Linguistic Composition of Canadian Population, by language spoken at home

Accuracy of Answers	Per Cent Making Different Estimates ^a							
	English				French			
	13-14 (N=261)	15-16 (N=260)	17-18 (N=202)	19-20 (N=68)	13-14 (N=161)	15-16 (N=160)	17-18 (N=140)	19-20 (N=60)
A. How many speak English?								
Accurate answer (5-6)	45	41	37	53	37	33	35	30
High estimate	36	37	42	40	11	17	28	39
Low estimate	12	11	10	7	30	37	24	22
No estimate made	8	11	11	1	22	13	13	9
Total	101	100	100	101	100	100	100	100
B. How many speak French?								
Accurate answer (2-3)	66	57	63	72	42	38	47	56
High estimate	12	14	7	8	36	45	34	27
Low estimate	14	19	20	19	—	4	7	8
No estimate made	8	11	11	1	22	13	13	9
Total	100	101	101	100	100	100	101	100
C. How many speak other languages?								
Accurate answer (1-2)	78	74	75	84	61	75	71	80
High estimate	9	10	9	11	9	6	10	2
Low estimate	5	5	5	4	7	6	7	8
No estimate made	8	11	11	1	22	13	13	9
Total	100	100	100	100	99	100	101	99

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

and rural. The replies, therefore, can be meaningfully interpreted either separately—as estimates of levels of agreement or disagreement between groups—or comparatively—as the dimensions perceived as more and less threatening to Canadian national unity.

Table II-7 reports the percentage distributions of response on all seven questions, and also shows the mean level of consensus for each dimension. These mean scores were calculated by assigning values of between one and five to the different responses, one representing appraisals of great agreement, and five appraisals of great dissent. The range of possible group scores, therefore, is between 1.00 and 5.00, with lower scores indicating higher estimates of consensus. Mean scores lower than 3.00 thus represent deviations in the direction of consensus, while scores higher than 3.00 indicate that the groups were more often seen to disagree than to agree. The issue here is whether the scores deviated above or below 3.00—the threshold between images of consensus and dissent.

Table II-7. Areas of Perceived Consensus and Cleavage in Canadian Society, by language spoken at home

Per Cent Giving Different Responses^a

A. Canadians in General. Question 4. Suppose that votes were taken on a lot of (other) questions about the future of Canada. Do you think Canadians would agree on most things about Canada's future, or that they'd tend to disagree?

Responses	English (N=793)	French (N=529)	Other (N=37)
They'd agree on practically everything	5	6	1
They'd agree on most things	39	31	33
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	35	36	49
They'd disagree on most things	10	14	10
They'd disagree on practically everything	2	4	—
I'm not sure	8	8	7
Total	99	99	100
Mean ^b	2.63	2.78	2.74

B. Regions. Question 5. How about people from Eastern Canada and people from Western Canada—would they agree or disagree on most questions about Canada's future?

They'd agree on practically everything	3	7	1
They'd agree on most things	25	23	14
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	35	32	43
They'd disagree on most things	20	15	11
They'd disagree on practically everything	5	5	1
I'm not sure	13	18	30
Total	101	100	100
Mean	2.98	2.85	2.96

C. Religion. Question 6. How about Roman Catholics and Protestants—would they agree or disagree on Canada's future?

They'd agree on practically everything	9	16	13
They'd agree on most things	35	30	20
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	29	21	22
They'd disagree on most things	11	12	21
They'd disagree on practically everything	3	6	4
I'm not sure	12	16	20
Total	99	101	100
Mean	2.61	2.54	2.78

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bBased on scores of 1-5 with low scores indicating higher levels of perceived agreement. Excludes those with no opinions.

Table II-7.—(Continued)

Responses	Per Cent Giving Different Responses ^a		
	English (N=793)	French (N=529)	Other (N=37)
D. Ethnicity. Question 7. How about French-speaking Canadians and English-speaking Canadians—would they agree or disagree on Canada's future?			
They'd agree on practically everything	3	10	2
They'd agree on most things	16	26	3
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	32	30	37
They'd disagree on most things	28	18	28
They'd disagree on practically everything	13	9	22
I'm not sure	8	8	8
Total	100	101	100
Mean ^b	3.35	2.89	3.72
E. Birthplace. Question 8. How about people born in Canada and people born outside Canada—would they agree or disagree on Canada's future?			
They'd agree on practically everything	9	15	6
They'd agree on most things	34	34	34
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	27	21	37
They'd disagree on most things	11	9	4
They'd disagree on practically everything	3	6	—
I'm not sure	17	15	18
Total	101	100	99
Mean	2.59	2.49	2.48
F. Social Class. Question 9. How about people from rich families and people from poor families—would they agree or disagree on Canada's future?			
They'd agree on practically everything	8	12	6
They'd agree on most things	25	24	22
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	31	30	24
They'd disagree on most things	20	15	23
They'd disagree on practically everything	7	9	6
I'm not sure	9	11	19
Total	100	101	100
Mean	2.93	2.85	2.98

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bBased on scores of 1-5 with low scores indicating higher levels of perceived agreement. Excludes those with no opinions.

Table II-7.—(Continued)

Per Cent Giving Different Responses^a

G. Place of Residence. Question 10. What about people from the big cities and people from the rural areas—would they agree or disagree on Canada's future?

Responses	English (N=793)	French (N=529)	Other (N=37)
They'd agree on practically everything	5	12	6
They'd agree on most things	30	32	29
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	33	28	26
They'd disagree on most things	18	13	25
They'd disagree on practically everything	4	4	4
I'm not sure	11	10	10
Total	101	99	100
Mean ^b	2.85	2.61	2.91

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bBased on scores of 1-5 with low scores indicating higher levels of perceived agreement. Excludes those with no opinions.

The first result to be noted in Table II-7 is that considerably more dimensions were rated as areas of consensus than as sources of potential cleavage. Of 18 mean scores of intergroup agreement, 16 were lower than 3.00 and, in addition, all three groups felt that Canadians in general would agree more often than disagree. Part A of the table shows that ratings of agreement outnumbered those of disagreement by as much as 44 to 12 among the Anglophones, 37 to 18 among the Francophones and 34 to 10 among the "Others." In the main, then, these evaluations could be said to reflect images of a basically cohesive social fabric.

One rather striking contrast in the response patterns of the English and French was the reversal of their positions when rating the population as a whole and specific groups within the population. On the global assessment the Anglophones saw relatively greater consensus, while on all six comparisons between subgroups, levels of agreement were rated higher by the French. This reversal is not easily accounted for, although there is some reason to believe that the question on overall consensus may have conveyed different meanings to members of the two groups. Because of their relative numbers in the population, for example, it is likely that many more Anglophones than Francophones thought about relations within their own language group when they were confronted with this question.

Of the seven sets of responses, then, only one contained ratings indicating serious dissent, both non-French groups rating levels of agreement between English and French decidedly below the threshold of consensus. On this dimension, Part D of Table II-7 shows that evaluations of disagreement outnumbered those of consensus by ratios of 41 to 19 among the Anglophones, and by as much as 50 to five among the "Others." Francophones, by comparison, saw a much higher level of consensus possible between the two cultural groups, although they too rated this dimension lowest of the six. The average rating of the Francophones, however, fell above the threshold of consensus (2.89), with more seeing the two groups in agreement than in disagreement (36 per cent compared with 27 per cent).

Over and above this discrepancy, the three groups made similar appraisals on the areas of high and low consensus in Canadian life. This tendency can be much more clearly noted when the average ratings are ranked.

English	French	Other
1. Birthplace (2.59)	1. Birthplace (2.49)	1. Birthplace (2.48)
2. Religion (2.61)	2. Religion (2.54)	2. Religion (2.78)
3. Urban-rural (2.63)	3. Urban-rural (2.61)	3. Urban-rural (2.91)
4. Social class (2.93)	4. Social class (2.85)	4. Region (2.96)
5. Region (2.98)	5. Region (2.85)	5. Social class (2.98)
6. French-English (3.35)	6. French-English (2.89)	6. French-English (3.72)

Except for inversions at the fourth and fifth positions, these rankings are identical.

These data suggest the following conclusions:

1. All groups of young people recognized that English-French differences of opinion posed the strongest threat to Canadian national unity.
2. Regional differences and differences between economic classes were regarded as the next most threatening problems.
3. All three groups agreed that consensus would be highest between native and foreign-born, second highest between Roman Catholics and Protestants, and third highest between people from the big cities and the rural areas.
4. The English and French made quite different appraisals of their differences of opinion regarding Canada's future. Anglophones saw the two groups as definitely in disagreement on this score, while Francophones were considerably more optimistic that agreement could be found. The "Others" were again closer to the English than the French position in these views, although they perceived even greater differences here than did the English.

These ratings are also reviewed by region in Table II-8. Several points of difference may be noted in the reactions of Francophones living in Quebec and in other provinces: the non-Quebec French saw considerably higher levels of agreement among Canadians as a whole (+.20), between Easterners and Westerners (+.19), and between English and French (+.12), but were considerably more likely to think place of birth a source of cleavage in Canadian life (-.20). Compared with the Quebec French, in other words, Francophones living outside their region of cultural dominance viewed Canadian national unity as relatively less threatened by differences of opinion between French and English, and relatively more threatened by those between immigrants and native-born groups.

Among the Anglophones, interestingly, a very similar pattern characterized the responses of young people from the Atlantic Provinces. They were less likely than other Anglophone groups to see East-West or French-English differences of opinion on goals for Canada, but much more likely to see disagreements between native- and foreign-born peoples. The most important regional variations in perspectives on national unity, then, were that both the Atlantic Anglophones and the non-Quebec Francophones tended to underestimate divergences of opinion between the "charter" Canadian groups, and overstate differences between New Canadians and native-born Canadians.

Table II-8. Regional Variations in Levels of Perceived Consensus and Cleavage in Canadian Society, by language spoken at home

Dimension	Mean Scores on Measures of Perceived Consensus ^a							
	French		English					
	Quebec (N=337)	Non-Quebec (N=192)	Atlantic (N=122)	Quebec (N=107)	Ontario (N=291)	Prairies (N=175)	B.C. (N=98)	
Canadians as a whole	2.81	2.61	2.59	2.78	2.65	2.58	2.68	
Region								
Eastern Canadians and Western Canadians	2.89	2.70	2.79	2.96	3.01	3.03	2.97	
Religion								
Protestants and Roman Catholics	2.54	2.62	2.63	2.66	2.54	2.69	2.61	
Ethnicity								
French and English	2.91	2.79	3.21	3.37	3.25	3.58	3.37	
Birthplace								
Canadian born and foreign born	2.46	2.66	2.80	2.37	2.59	2.47	2.65	
Social Class								
Rich and poor	2.85	2.85	2.90	2.91	2.99	2.98	2.71	
Place of residence								
Urban and rural	2.62	2.58	2.95	2.97	2.88	2.81	2.69	

^aBased on scores of 1-5 with low scores indicating higher levels of perceived agreement. Excludes those with no opinions.

Turning now to the comparisons by age, the figures for Anglophone youth are impressive in their stability (Table II-9). Although the older ones saw slightly less overall consensus among Canadians, the figures for the six intergroup comparisons suggest no significant changes of perspective during the teen years. Rank-order comparisons among the four age groups, in fact, revealed an extremely high concordance of ratings.³ Definite shifts of emphasis may be detected among Francophone youth, on the other hand, and the concordance of their ratings was lower than that found for Anglophones.⁴ Although the trends are not perfectly linear, older Francophones were nonetheless more likely than their juniors to see divergences of opinion between ethnic and social-class groupings, and to see relatively more consensus between religious groups and native- and foreign-born persons.

To sum up, the findings in this section add further support to the conclusion that the years between 13 and 20 are extremely critical to French Canadian young people in the development of a collective identity. During these years Francophones realize not only their position as members of a minority culture in Canada, but also more ways in which their perspectives on Canada differ from those of the dominant group.

³ W = .91. This statistic, Kendall's coefficient of concordance, indicates the ratio of observed agreement among ranked judgements to the total possible agreement.

⁴ W = .64.

Table II-9. Age Differences in Levels of Perceived Consensus and Cleavage in Canadian Society, by language spoken at home

Dimension	Mean Scores on Measures of Perceived Consensus ^a							
	English				French			
	13-14 (N=261)	15-16 (N=260)	17-18 (N=202)	19-20 (N=68)	13-14 (N=161)	15-16 (N=160)	17-18 (N=140)	19-20 (N=60)
Canadians as a whole	2.78	2.90	2.84	2.92	2.58	2.64	2.57	2.67
Region								
Eastern Canadians and Western Canadians	2.88	3.08	3.03	2.83	2.67	2.88	2.65	2.94
Religion								
Protestants and Roman Catholics	2.64	2.64	2.53	2.59	2.76	2.39	2.59	2.41
Ethnicity								
French and English	3.31	3.36	3.38	3.37	2.82	2.80	2.90	3.16
Birthplace								
Canadian born and foreign born	2.56	2.54	2.70	2.57	2.67	2.43	2.42	2.42
Social class								
Rich and poor	2.89	2.98	2.90	2.96	2.74	2.86	2.82	3.01
Place of Residence								
Urban and rural	2.78	2.90	2.84	2.92	2.58	2.64	2.57	2.67

^aBased on scores of 1-5 with low scores indicating higher levels of perceived agreement. Excludes those with no opinions.

Relations between the Two Cultures—Present and Future

Young people were also asked to rate the quality of present relations between the two cultures and the prospects for improved relations both in the immediate and distant future (Questions 37 to 39). These opinions are reviewed in Tables II-10 to II-12.

First, from Part A of Table II-10, it is clear that very few young people regarded the present state of English-French relations in Canada as particularly amicable. Considerably more rated them as "poor" than as "good": the pluralities here are 25 per cent among the "Others," 18 per cent among the Anglophones, and 7 per cent among the Francophones.

This pattern is therefore quite consistent with that found in the previous section, and the results confirm that intercultural relations were viewed as least strained by the French, and as least harmonious by members of the smaller ethnic minorities.

It was in their interpretations of the direction of short-run changes in these relations, however, that the three groups differed most radically (Part B, Table II-10). More Francophones saw relations as improving than as worsening (by a margin of 28 per cent), while both other groups viewed the situation as worsening, the Anglophones by a margin of

14 per cent, the "Others" by 21 per cent. Here again, the "Others" were the most pessimistic.

Table II-10. Perception of Relations between English and French, by language spoken at home

A. Question 37. Right now, how good would you say relations are between English Canadians and French Canadians—would you say good, fair or poor?

Responses	English (N=793)	French (N=529)	Other (N=37)
Good	12% ^a	15%	8%
Fair	52	53	53
Poor	30	22	33
I'm not sure	6	10	6
Total	100	100	100

B. Question 38. Right now, would you say that English-French relations in Canada are getting better, getting worse, or staying about the same?

Getting better	22% ^a	41%	9%
Getting worse	36	13	30
Staying about the same	33	30	51
I'm not sure	10	15	9
Total	101	99	99

C. Question 39. Over the next ten years, do you think English-French relations in Canada will get better, get worse, or stay about the same as they are now?

Get better	47% ^a	57%	40%
Get worse	21	10	21
Stay about the same	14	14	10
I'm not sure	18	18	29
Total	100	99	100

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

In sharp contrast, Part C of Table II-10 indicates that all three groups saw an improved situation when they thought ahead a decade. In other words, both the Anglophones and the "Others" completely reversed their short-run interpretations, although here again the Francophones were the most optimistic and the "Others" least so.

To recapitulate, all groups of young people agreed that present relations between the two main Canadian groups were not as good as they might be, but they disagreed sharply on when an improvement might be expected. In the eyes of French youth, the situation was already improving, while both other groups saw no improvement in the immediate future. On all three evaluations, the French viewed intergroup relations most favourably, and the "Others" regarded them as most tenuous.

Unsurprisingly, marked discrepancies turned up when these assessments were examined region by region. Table II-11 indicates first that, of the two Francophone groups, those from Quebec saw current relations as more strained and also held more pessimistic views concerning prospects for both the immediate and long-range future. Although the groups differed by just 4 per cent in appraising current relations as favourable, the Quebec Francophones were 10 per cent more likely to rate them as "poor" than as "good," while for those living outside Quebec the balance was 5 per cent in the opposite direction. A similar index—the difference in the proportions who viewed the situation as improving and worsening—can be employed to summarize interpretations regarding change, and on both of these indicators the reactions of the non-Quebec French turned out to be the more optimistic (by +37 to +26 per cent in the short run, and by +52 to +45 in the more distant future). At the same time, however, it is meaningful that even the Quebec Francophones regarded the direction of current changes much more often as favourable than unfavourable.

Table II-11. Regional Variations in Perception of Relations between English and French, by language spoken at home

Responses	Per Cent Giving Different Responses ^a							
	French		English					
	Quebec (N=337)	Non-Quebec (N=192)	Atlantic (N=122)	Quebec (N=107)	Ontario (N=291)	Prairies (N=175)	B.C. (N=98)	
A. Relations right now								
Good	14	18	19	15	11	10	8	
Fair	51	62	44	58	56	49	56	
Poor	24	13	27	23	27	35	32	
No opinion	11	7	9	3	6	6	5	
Total	100	100	99	99	100	100	101	
B. Direction of changes right now								
Getting better	39	50	25	15	24	19	17	
Getting worse	13	13	36	41	32	37	39	
Staying about the same	32	23	27	40	34	32	38	
No opinion	15	14	12	4	10	11	6	
Total	99	100	100	100	100	99	100	
C. Changes over next ten years								
Get better	56	60	50	53	49	42	44	
Get worse	11	8	20	11	21	25	15	
Stay about the same	14	14	14	18	13	14	16	
No opinion	18	18	16	19	16	19	25	
Total	99	100	100	101	99	100	100	

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

Western Anglophone youth assessed the present situation much less favourably than those living in eastern regions. The proportions who described relations as "good" declined progressively from a high of 19 per cent among the Atlantic Anglophones to a low of 8 per cent among those from British Columbia. This trend is also reflected in the balance between the extreme ratings (per cent "good" minus per cent "poor"), these scores being -8 per cent for the Atlantic and Quebec groups, -16 per cent among those from Ontario, -25 per cent for the Prairies group, and -24 per cent among British Columbians. To sum up, all Anglophone groups viewed English-French relations more negatively than positively, but those furthest removed from French Canada were the ones particularly likely to do so.

A quite different kind of regional pattern was reflected in the evaluations regarding change. Here the east-to-west patterning was disrupted by the reactions of the Quebec English who, of the five Anglophone groups, were the most pessimistic about the short-run prospects for better relations, but were the most optimistic about long-term outcomes. Thus, while all five groups regarded the immediate future as unfavourable and the long-range prospects as positive, the Quebec Anglophones were most extreme in their reactions.

Finally, Table II-12 shows that older adolescents were a little more likely to perceive intergroup relations as strained. This tendency can be detected in the reactions of both language groups, although it is less consistent and less pronounced among the Anglophones. Among the Francophones however, the balance between "good" and "poor" ratings shifts progressively from a positive assessment of 7 per cent among the 13- and 14-year olds to a negative balance of 15 per cent among those entering their twenties. Parts B and C of the table, on the other hand, indicate no important shifts with age in evaluations concerning the future, although Part C does suggest that older Anglophone youth may have been a little more likely to hold optimistic views on the long-range prospects for French-English relations.

In conclusion, the most important finding here is that English and French youth, while sharing similar views on the state of present relations between their groups, made radically different assessments of the direction in which these relations were moving. In all regions of the country and in all stages of adolescence the Anglophones viewed intergroup relations as worsening while the Francophones saw them as getting better.

Table II-12. Age Differences in Perception of Relations between English and French, by language spoken at home

		Per Cent Giving Different Responses ^a							
Responses		English				French			
		13-14 (N=261)	15-16 (N=260)	17-18 (N=202)	19-20 (N=68)	13-14 (N=161)	15-16 (N=160)	17-18 (N=140)	19-20 (N=60)
A. Relations right now									
Good		12	11	14	10	22	12	13	12
Fair		55	50	49	58	52	55	53	52
Poor		26	32	31	32	15	22	24	27
No opinion		8	7	6	—	11	10	9	8
Total		101	100	100	100	100	99	99	99
B. Direction of changes right now									
Getting better		22	23	25	13	43	38	44	41
Getting worse		40	31	34	37	10	18	14	8
Staying about the same		30	34	31	44	32	21	32	40
No opinion		9	12	10	6	16	23	10	11
Total		101	100	100	100	101	100	100	100
C. Changes over next ten years									
Get better		43	47	49	51	61	54	57	57
Get worse		21	21	20	19	8	11	10	15
Stay about the same		16	14	11	17	13	15	17	11
No opinion		20	19	19	12	18	20	16	18
Total		100	101	99	99	100	100	100	101

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

Chapter III Attitudes Regarding Bilingualism—I: Commitment to Bilingual Goals for Canada*

The next two chapters deal with the question of bilingualism. First we shall examine young people's attitudes on the use of two languages in Canadian society and their readiness to see bilingualism extended within Canada. Chapter IV deals with the ways in which young people think bilingualism is useful to them, and their motives for becoming bilingual.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section introduces the measures used to tap attitudes regarding bilingualism among both Anglophones and Francophones and reports the results. The second section shows how these attitudes vary among young people in different stages of adolescence, from different regions and social backgrounds, and with different aspirations for the future. Regional differences are discussed further in the third section, where an analysis is presented of the impact of contacts on attitudes. Finally, levels of bilingual facility among young people are examined, the connections between language facility, intergroup contacts, and dispositions regarding bilingualism are explored.

Measures of Attitudes Regarding Bilingualism

Although the survey did not confront young people with direct questions on their feelings regarding other groups of people living in Canada, their attitudes were at least indirectly investigated in the section of the questionnaire dealing with attitudes towards the other language. Indeed, since language constitutes the greatest difference between the two main groups under study here, a case could be made that reactions to the other language would largely coincide with reactions to the group itself.

* Parts of this chapter and the next were prepared in collaboration with Jean-Claude Willig, and some of the results also appear in Willig's paper "Canadian Youth and Bilingualism: Choice or Necessity?" unpublished M.A. research paper, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1965.

Attitudes to the other language were measured by asking respondents to endorse or reject a series of positions regarding desirable bilingual practices or goals for Canada. These positions covered the mandatory teaching of English and French in Canadian schools, the desirability of having road signs displayed in two languages throughout Canada, acceptance of the constitutional position of Canada's two official languages, acceptance of the ideal of a fully bilingual population, and reactions to the suggestion that Canadian citizens have some non-utilitarian obligation to acquire facility in both official languages (see Question 36).

A comment or two should be made here regarding the probable meanings these questions would have for Anglophone and Francophone respondents. There is little doubt that several of the positions are in advance of current bilingual practices and would improve the status and usage of French. Indeed, if bilingual road signs were introduced throughout Canada, there would be many more additions of French than of English. For the most part, the Francophones would have considerably more to gain than their Anglophone counterparts in endorsing these positions. How should the reactions to the question be interpreted? Those of Anglophone respondents could probably be labelled as "tolerance" (or "intolerance") for extended use of the "other language" in Canada; the reactions of the French, on the other hand, as convictions that one's own language should be accorded more widespread use in the nation. In any event, the questions undoubtedly conveyed different connotations to members of the two language groups, and we could therefore expect considerably higher rates of endorsement from the French.

Table III-1 reports the incidence of favourable reactions on each of the five statements, positive dispositions being indicated on some statements by agreement and on others by disagreement. In all cases we have interpreted "no opinion" answers as reflecting a negative response. Finally, because two of the statements were phrased differently on the English and French versions of the questionnaire, the table notes separately the responses of French youth who answered English-language forms.

As we expected, the figures indicate that all five positions were endorsed considerably more often by Francophones than Anglophones. In addition, they show that the reactions of the "Others" were again closer to the English position than to the French.

The reactions of Anglophone youth indicate what could at best be assessed as a modest level of linguistic tolerance. They approved only two positions—that a fully bilingual population would be a good thing for Canada, and that both languages should be taught as required subjects in all Canadians schools—while on the other three statements their responses hovered close to an even split between support and non-support. Moreover, whereas 81 per cent endorsed the ideal of a fully bilingual population for Canada, only 45 per cent acknowledged any obligation to become bilingual themselves, a rather marked discrepancy between a stated ideal and a readiness to act on it. Similar discrepancies may be noted in the responses of the Francophone groups, but these are considerably smaller than among the Anglophones (22 per cent compared with 36 per cent).

On all five positions, the French revealed the higher levels of commitment, and on four of the five, the highest rates of all were found among the small group of Francophones who answered English-language questionnaires. Most of the French who filled out English forms lived in predominantly English-speaking provinces, where Francophone

youth were somewhat more likely to hold strong convictions regarding bilingual goals for Canada.

Table III-1. Attitudes Regarding Bilingualism in Canada, by language spoken at home and language in which questionnaire answered

Statement	Per Cent Indicating Favourable Dispositions Regarding Bilingualism ^a			
	English (N=781)	French Answered French (N=452)	French Answered English (N=77)	Other (N=35)
	Questionnaire Questionnaire			
(1) "It would be a good thing if all Canadians could speak both French and English." (Per cent who agreed)	81	91	98	74
(2) "French and English should be required subjects in all Canadian schools." (Per cent who agreed)	65	86	92	63
(3) "As far as I'm concerned, Canada should have just one official language—English." (Per cent who disagreed) "En ce qui me concerne, le Canada ne devrait avoir qu'une seule langue officielle: le français." (Per cent who disagreed)	58	—	94	59
(4) "It would be a good idea to have road signs printed in both English and French all over Canada." (Per cent who agreed)	54	86	80	60
(5) "There is no reason why an English-speaking Canadian should have to learn French if he is never going to use it." (Per cent who disagreed) "Un Canadien de langue française ne devrait pas avoir à apprendre l'anglais s'il ne va jamais s'en servir." (Per cent who disagreed)	45	—	76	47

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted bases.

The most interesting feature about these responses is that the discrepancies in rates of endorsement between English and French vary markedly on different issues. When the two largest groups are compared, for example, the differences show little consistency:

Attitude		Per cent by which endorsement by French exceeded endorsement by English
		English
(1) Bilingual population an asset for Canada		+10
(2) Canada should have two official languages		+12
(3) Mandatory instruction in all schools		+21
(4) Individuals have obligation to become bilingual		+24
(5) Bilingual road signs a good idea		+32

These figures indicate a widening divergence of sentiment on the spheres more suggestive of behavioural implications and of change. The two groups are not too far apart in their views on whether a bilingual population would be a good thing for Canada, or in their acceptance of the existing constitutional position of French and English in Canadian society. They are considerably further apart, however, in their views on the teaching of two languages in school, and on the obligations that individuals have to become bilingual. And, curiously, they are furthest apart of all in their attitudes regarding bilingual road signs. On face value this latter position would seem to be an innocuous extension of French into English Canadian life, and its implications for young people would certainly be less direct than if French were made a compulsory subject in school. On the other hand, of the five situations posed, this one probably represents the most radical departure from current bilingual practices in English Canada, and it may simply be the novelty of the suggestion which produced the unenthusiastic reaction among the Anglophones. Indeed, French is already widely taught in schools throughout English Canada, whereas bilingual road signs are not found in many places outside Quebec. These results suggest, then, that English Canadians would find the use of French more acceptable if it were extended in areas where it is already established. All in all, the reactions of the Anglophone young people suggest that they generally recognize and accept Canada's other language but are not inclined to favour its spread.

Variations in Levels of Commitment to Bilingualism

I. Sex and Age

Next, we consider how linguistic attitudes vary among different groups of young people. To facilitate the analysis and reporting at this point, all five sets of responses are grouped together to form a single index of dispositions regarding bilingualism. Such a step is justified because the responses on the different statements were found to be highly correlated with one another, as indicated by the correlation matrices in Table III-2.¹ We may therefore infer that the set of statements probably does measure some common underlying disposition or reaction. As suggested earlier, there is some difficulty in naming this dimension precisely, but since the reactions of both language groups do reflect either favourable or unfavourable evaluations of bilingualism, we could at least label the combined responses as an indication of a "commitment to bilingualism," and, for Anglophone respondents, also linguistic tolerance.

The scores are reported separately for boys and girls in Table III-3. First, it should be noted that 24 per cent of the English and 49 per cent of the French reacted favourably to all five statements, and that 47 per cent of the English and 76 per cent of the French endorsed at least four of the five positions. In later sections of the chapter, persons who responded favourably on at least four of the five measures will be represented as revealing a high level of commitment to bilingualism for Canada.

¹ All of these relationships are statistically significant. Q is a non-parametric statistic, and can be interpreted as the percentage by which predictions about one attitude are improved over chance by knowing one's response on a second.

Table III-2. Interrelationships among Attitudes Regarding Bilingualism

	Q Values				
A. Respondents who answered English-language questionnaires	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) French and English should be required subjects in all Canadian schools	—	+.81	+.40	-.77	-.75
(2) It would be a good thing if all Canadians could speak both French and English	—	—	+.59	-.80	-.81
(3) It would be a good idea to have road signs printed in both English and French all over Canada	—	—	—	-.40	-.67
(4) There is no reason why an English-speaking Canadian should have to learn French if he is never going to use it	—	—	—	—	+.73
(5) As far as I'm concerned, Canada should have just one official language—English	—	—	—	—	—
B. Respondents who answered French-language questionnaires	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Le français et l'anglais devraient être des sujets obligatoires dans toutes les écoles du Canada	—	+.87	+.70	-.63	-.73
(2) Ce serait une bonne idée si tous les Canadiens pouvaient parler français et anglais	—	—	+.81	-.55	-.74
(3) Ce serait une bonne idée si les panneaux routiers étaient rédigés en anglais et en français partout au Canada	—	—	—	-.38	-.36
(4) Un Canadien de langue française ne devrait pas avoir à apprendre l'anglais s'il ne va jamais s'en servir	—	—	—	—	+.73
(5) En ce qui me concerne, le Canada ne devrait avoir qu'une seule langue officielle: le français	—	—	—	—	—

Table III-3 also indicates that boys and girls differ considerably in their attitudes regarding bilingualism. Within both language groups, the girls—and especially the Anglophone girls—show higher rates of commitment than the boys. Among the Anglophones, 55 per cent of the girls show high commitment scores, compared to 39 per cent of the boys, while among the Francophones, the comparable proportions are 79 and 72 per cent. It is difficult to say whether these discrepancies indicate sex-linked differences in socio-political values or whether they simply reflect different attitudes towards learning languages. For example, it is often noted that girls show more aptitude for and interest in the humanistic and cultural subjects, while boys are more oriented to and skilful in the

theoretical and mechanical.² It may be that similar results would have been found had we measured attitudes towards the learning of any language.

Table III-3. Levels of Bilingual Commitment, by language spoken at home and sex

Number of Statements Endorsed Favourably	English			French		
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total
Five	20% ^a	29%	24%	45%	52%	49%
Four	19	26	23	27	27	27
Three	18	17	17	16	12	13
Two	16	14	15	6	4	5
One	14	8	11	4	4	4
None	14	6	10	2	2	2
Total	101	100	100	100	101	100
Base	(402)	(390)	(792)	(226)	(302)	(528)

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted bases.

Next, Table III-4 cross-classifies age with rates of high commitment. Here, countervailing trends are found in the responses of the two groups. The English commitment consistently declined with age, while the French increased. Again inferring longitudinal change from cross-sectional evidence, the results suggest that as Anglophones pass through adolescence their tolerance for bilingualism decreases, while over the same years Francophones come to feel more strongly about the position of their language in Canadian society. Members of the two cultures thus emerge from the adolescent years a good deal further apart in their views on bilingualism than they were when they entered this phase of life.

Table III-4. Commitment to Bilingualism, by language spoken at home and age

Age	Per Cent with High Commitment ^a		
	English	French	Difference
13-14	51 (261)	73 (161)	-22
15-16	45 (260)	75 (162)	-30
17-18	45 (202)	77 (140)	-32
19-20	40 (68)	82 (60)	-42

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted bases.

² In studies of intelligence, males usually score higher on tests of mathematical reasoning and mechanical aptitude while females exceed males in vocabulary, verbal fluency, and general language skills. David Wechsler, *The Measurement of Adult Intelligence*, 4th ed. (New York, 1958).

II. Socio-economic Background

In Table III-5 rates of high commitment to bilingualism are reported in relation to three different indicators of socio-economic background: family income, father's occupation, and father's schooling. These figures clearly demonstrate that ethnicity contributes more to the determination of these responses than does social or economic position, since in all comparisons the Francophones have the markedly higher scores. English-French differences in attitudes regarding bilingualism, then, cannot be explained away simply as differences in the relative economic or social circumstances of the two groups.

Table III-5. Commitment to Bilingualism, by language spoken at home and indicators of socio-economic position

Per Cent with High Commitment ^a			
A. Total family income	English	French	Difference
Under \$4,000	51 (195)	71 (178)	-20
\$4,000 – 6,999	45 (307)	80 (178)	-35
\$7,000 and over	45 (195)	76 (70)	-31
B. Father's occupation	English	French	Difference
Farmers	42 (62)	73 (70)	-31
Semi-skilled and unskilled jobs	46 (215)	64 (151)	-18
Skilled tradesmen	49 (182)	79 (136)	-30
White-collar (proprietors, clerical and sales)	48 (201)	90 (106)	-42
Professional and managerial	44 (90)	74 (39)	-30
C. Father's schooling	English	French	Difference
8 years or less	47 (272)	71 (309)	-24
9 – 12 years	44 (301)	84 (129)	-40
13 years or more	53 (111)	89 (53)	-36

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted bases.

The more revealing feature suggested by these results, however, is the relationship between social position and language attitudes. Among the Anglophones the social position of the parents appears to have almost no impact at all on children's views regarding bilingualism. Rates of high commitment do not vary meaningfully along any of the three

dimensions identified, and what little differences there are tend to be highly inconsistent. The highest rates are found among those from the poorest families, those whose fathers went furthest in school, and those with fathers employed as skilled tradesmen or foremen, a category neither high nor low on the occupational prestige ladder.

For the Francophones, the results show a slight pattern, although here again the trends are not consistent. The rates on two of the dimensions are highest among persons from middle-status positions, by 4 per cent among those from middle-income families, and by as much as 11 per cent among those with fathers employed as small businessmen, and clerical and sales workers. On the other hand, the figures show an increment at each higher level of scholastic attainment of the respondents' fathers.

On the whole, these findings suggest that demands for linguistic equality in the national community are strongest among Francophone youth whose fathers are fairly well educated but who have achieved only a modest level of occupational and economic success. Middle-class Francophone youth, in short, have the strongest feelings on the language issue; because this commitment is not matched by a similar tendency among the Anglophones, it is middle-class young people from the two cultures who are furthest apart in their views on bilingualism in Canada. (Note the third column of figures in Table III-5.) All in all, however, social origins cannot be said to have a very substantial impact on the outlook of either group.

III. Expectations Regarding Future Social Position

In an age of rapid social and technological change it is perhaps more meaningful to examine young people's attitudes in relation to the social positions to which they are headed rather than those from which they have come. These two sets of statuses are by no means independent of one another, of course, but it is nonetheless true that today's young people will stay in school considerably longer than their parents did, and that the Canadian labour force is rapidly changing shape.

Table III-6 relates levels of commitment to bilingualism with young people's occupational and educational aspirations, the former classifying respondents by the occupation they hope for eventually, and the latter by the total number of years of schooling they expect to attain. These results describe a rather different pattern from that which emerged when we looked at the social position of parents. Here, among members of both groups, commitment to bilingualism rises fairly consistently as educational expectations and occupational aspirations rise. These trends are neither sharp nor perfectly linear, but they do reveal enough regularity to suggest that in the next generation of young Canadian adults those who are better educated and who occupy the more influential occupational positions will be most strongly committed to bilingualism in the national community. Thus, to the extent that educational levels are rising in both English and French Canada, it can perhaps be inferred that levels of commitment to these goals are rising moderately.

One dimension of considerable significance in the general study of ethnic tolerance and hostility is social mobility. Evidence has been repeatedly uncovered linking the degree and direction of social mobility with prejudice against minorities. Briefly reviewed, this evidence suggests first, that downward social mobility is usually accompanied by an increase in ethnic hostility; second, that rapid upward mobility—because of its disruptive

Table III-6. Commitment to Bilingualism, by language spoken at home and expectations regarding future socio-economic position

Per Cent with High Commitment ^a			
A. Educational expectations			
Total years of schooling respondent expects to attain	English	French	Difference
11 or less	40 (106)	69 (119)	-29
12 or 13	40 (193)	69 (120)	-29
14 or 15	46 (194)	79 (112)	-33
16 or 17	54 (189)	82 (81)	-28
18 or more	50 (105)	84 (78)	-34
B. Occupational aspirations			
Line of work respondent hopes to enter eventually	English	French	Difference
Semi-skilled, unskilled or farmer	44 (101)	69 (59)	-25
Skilled trade	34 (57)	74 (36)	-40
White-collar	48 (135)	76 (74)	-28
Professional or managerial	51 (399)	81 (257)	-30

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted bases.

impact on the individual—also works to increase prejudice; but third, that moderate upward mobility usually functions to increase tolerance.³ Although inferences regarding social mobility cannot be made from the results shown in Table III-6, a direct measure of anticipated social mobility can be obtained from our data by classifying respondents simultaneously by their own occupational aspirations and the occupations held by their fathers. From these cross-classifications, moreover, it is possible to extract a single measure which reflects the degree and direction of mobility. To derive these measures both sets of occupational titles were first divided into four groups to approximate different positions in the occupational prestige hierarchy. Professional and managerial occupations were placed at the top level of this scale, white-collar occupations at the second

³ Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Social Change and Prejudice* (New York, 1964), Chapter 2.

level, skilled trades third, and semi-skilled and unskilled occupations, plus farmers, at the bottom. When these two sets of occupational statuses are compared, individuals are classified by the hypothetical measures of mobility shown in Table III-7. Thus, someone whose father was a plumber and who wanted to be an electronics engineer would be said to be aiming two steps upward; if the same individual's father had been a lawyer, however, he would be classified as occupationally stable rather than mobile. In this way, then, the resulting measures reflect only the stability or change in occupational level across the two generations.

Table III-7. Method of Assigning Scores on Index of Intergenerational Occupational Mobility

Respondent's occupational aspirations	Direction and Degree of Occupational Mobility			
	Father's Occupation			
	Professional or managerial	White-collar	Skilled trades	Semi-skilled or unskilled plus farmers
Professional or managerial	Stable	Up 1 step	Up 2 steps	Up 3 steps
White-collar	Down 1 step	Stable	Up 1 step	Up 2 steps
Skilled trades	Down 2 steps	Down 1 step	Stable	Up 1 step
Semi-skilled or unskilled work or farmer	Down 3 steps	Down 2 steps	Down 1 step	Stable

The relationship between anticipated mobility and attitudes regarding bilingualism is described for Anglophone boys in Table III-8. This analysis omits girls, because for them occupational goals are clearly of less salience than they are for boys and also because a large number of girls do not expect to enter the labour force. The analysis also excludes Francophone boys, since their attitudes to bilingualism are not being interpreted as indicators of ethnic tolerance.

For Anglophone boys, however, the findings are highly revealing and confirm all three propositions drawn from the literature on prejudice. They show that the lowest rates of tolerance occur among boys anticipating downward occupational mobility, that rates of tolerance increase as we move into positions reflecting occupational stability and moderate upward mobility, and finally, that the trend towards tolerance falls off among boys expecting a great deal of upward mobility. These trends are again not strong, but they do confirm that moderate upward social mobility is associated with a greater readiness to endorse an extension of French into English Canada. This also suggests that at least for the Anglophone boys, reactions to bilingualism are probably fairly good indicators of general dispositions regarding French Canadians.

Table III-8. Commitment to Bilingualism, by anticipated occupational mobility among Anglophone boys

Occupational Aspirations Compared with Father's Occupation	Per Cent Highly Committed to Bilingualism ^a	Base
Higher by three steps	39	(47)
Higher by two steps	43	(50)
Higher by one step	44	(100)
Stable	35	(101)
Lower by one or more steps	31	(29)

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted bases.

IV. Province and Region

Besides ethnicity, much the strongest predictor of commitment to bilingualism was found to be geography. This evidence is contained in Table III-9, where rates of high commitment are shown for Anglophones from five different regions, and for Francophones living both inside and outside Quebec.

Table III-9. Commitment to Bilingualism, by language spoken at home and province or region

Province or Region	Per Cent Highly Committed to Bilingualism ^a	Base
A. English		
Quebec	61	(107)
Non-Quebec	46	(686)
Atlantic	63	(122)
Ontario	52	(291)
Prairies	35	(175)
British Columbia	28	(98)
B. French		
Quebec	74	(337)
Montreal metropolitan area	72	(134)
Other Quebec	76	(203)
Non-Quebec	82	(192)

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

For the English sample, the figures describe a sharp decrease in favourable sentiment as one moves westward. This pattern is continuous from region to region and tends to accelerate as one moves further westward. Atlantic youth, interestingly, show the highest rates of favourable attitudes, although these are only 2 per cent higher than among Quebec Anglophones. Moving westward, the sharpest drop-off occurs between Ontario and the Prairies—from 52 per cent to 35 per cent. The trend then continues downward into British Columbia, where only 28 per cent revealed very favourable dispositions.

When the two Francophone groups are compared, slightly higher rates of commitment are found among those living outside Quebec. This result is a little surprising since it is the Quebec Francophones who have been the more vocal about French Canadian rights. On the whole, however, it would appear that strong feelings regarding the position and status of the French language in Canadian society are more widespread among French Canadian youth living in regions of predominantly English influence.

Commitment in both groups to a bilingual Canada is stronger among persons living outside their region of cultural dominance. For the Anglophones, the rates were 15 per cent higher among those living in Quebec rather than elsewhere, and, as just noted, they were 8 per cent higher among Francophones living in predominantly Anglophone provinces. The existence of such sharp regional variations suggests that attitudes to bilingualism may be influenced significantly by the extent of contact with the other culture. The relationship between contacts and commitment to bilingualism will therefore be explored at length later in the chapter.

V. Religion

Young Anglophones' attitudes on the language issue were also found to vary by religious background. Roman Catholic respondents showed considerably more tolerant attitudes than their Protestant counterparts (*see Table III-10*).

Table III-10. Commitment to Bilingualism among Anglophone Young People, by religion and region

Region	Per Cent Highly Committed to Bilingualism ^a		
	Roman Catholics	Protestants	Difference
East (Atlantic Provinces)	72 (51)	57 (63)	+ 15
Central (Quebec and Ontario)	57 (150)	50 (211)	+ 7
West (Prairies and B.C.)	43 (65)	30 (194)	+ 13
All Canada	57 (266)	42 (468)	+ 15

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted bases.

Religious groups tend to be distributed quite unevenly throughout Canada, however, and because of this it is necessary to assess the influence of religious background by region. Table III-10 shows in addition that linguistic attitudes of both Protestants and Roman Catholics vary markedly from region to region. Levels of commitment for both groups are highest in the East and lowest in the West. Within all three regions Roman Catholics are still found to have the higher rates of commitment, although the discrepancy is considerably less pronounced in central Canada than in the East or West. More

importantly, however, the figures also indicate that Protestants from the Atlantic Provinces, Ontario, and Quebec are more tolerant than are Roman Catholics from western Canada. This demonstrates that the impact of region on bilingual attitudes is stronger than that of religion. It can therefore be concluded that both factors are related to attitudes on the language issue but that the influence of region is the more powerful. In combination, region and religion produce extremely wide discrepancies in rates of commitment to bilingualism: favourable dispositions are more than twice as likely to be found among eastern Roman Catholics as among western Protestants.

Intergroup Contact

Information was obtained from four questions about associations, ranging from intimate personal relationships to casual contacts in the community at large (Questions 32 to 35). Two of these deal with direct social relationships with individuals while the other two measure contacts in the wider social context of the neighbourhood or community.

Just how much contact do Anglophone and Francophone young people have with one another? Since these contacts would be expected to vary markedly depending on where one lives in Canada, Table III-11 reports their incidence separately for respondents living in Quebec and in other regions of the country. These results all line up in the expected directions, and confirm that contacts are indeed more prevalent for those living outside their region of cultural dominance. On all measures the rates are higher for the Anglophone youth who live in Quebec and for the Francophone young people living outside Quebec.

Table III-11 also shows that within regions of cultural dominance it is the French who are much more likely to have contacts with the other culture. Quebec Francophones rate 39 per cent higher than non-Quebec Anglophones on daily language exposure; 23 per cent higher on residential contacts; 19 per cent higher on contacts at school; and 19 per cent higher on friendships. Within regions of cultural dominance, in short, Anglophone young people are much more isolated from the Francophones than the French are from the English. This too is what we would have anticipated.

The most revealing figures in Table III-11 are those indicating rates of exposure to spoken French among Anglophone youth. Among those living outside Quebec, only 18 per cent reported hearing French spoken as often as once a week, and only 10 per cent reported hearing it daily. By comparison, considerably more reported contacts of other types. Eight per cent more said they had close friends who spoke French at home than reported even weekly exposure to spoken French (26 per cent compared with 18 per cent), and about twice as many said they knew French Canadians either at school or in the neighborhood than said they heard French spoken at least every week. These discrepancies make it quite evident that when Francophones and Anglophones meet, outside the province of Quebec, they necessarily speak English.

For Quebec Anglophones the pattern of contacts is quite different. Here, as one might expect, environmental contacts are much more frequent than personal encounters, with

the rates varying from 97 and 81 per cent for residential contacts and daily exposure to the other language, to 67 and 53 per cent for school contacts and intimate personal encounters. As far as cultural contacts are concerned, then, the main contact of Anglophones is environmental. Daily exposure to spoken French varies between 10 and 81 per cent outside and inside Quebec, a discrepancy which is both staggering and much larger than those occurring on other types of contact.

Table III-11. Frequency of Intergroup Contacts, by language spoken at home and region

Type of Contact	English		French ^a	
	Quebec	Non-Quebec	Quebec	Non-Quebec
A. Language exposure. Frequency of hearing the other language spoken in the community at large				
Practically every day	81% ^b	10%	49%	80%
Once or twice a week	11	8	22	14
Less than once a week	7	36	23	3
Never	1	47	6	3
Total	100	101	100	100
Base	(106)	(675)	(328)	(124)
B. Residential contact. Knows of a family living within about a half a mile who speak the other language				
Yes	97%	39%	62%	74%
No	—	38	30	26
Not sure	3	24	8	—
Total	100	101	100	100
Base	(106)	(675)	(328)	(124)
C. Contact at school. Has classmate who speaks other language at home (or had one when last in school)				
Yes	67%	35%	54%	68%
No	26	57	42	27
Not sure	7	8	4	6
Total	100	100	100	101
Base	(106)	(675)	(328)	(124)
D. Close personal relationships. Has close friend who speaks other language at home				
Yes	53%	26%	45%	72%
No	47	74	55	28
Total	100	100	100	100
Base	(106)	(675)	(328)	(124)

^aOmits those who answered English-language version of the questionnaire.

^bAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted bases.

The responses of the two Francophone groups show much less variation in the different types of encounters than among the Anglophone groups. The Quebec Francophones reported that the most frequent encounters were in the school and neighbourhood, but the rates of daily exposure to spoken English and of close personal contacts were not markedly below these. For those living outside Quebec, moreover, the variation was even narrower: rates of contact were high, and varied by only 12 percentage points across the four settings.

Additional insights regarding the nature of intergroup encounters for the two groups emerge when comparisons are made between the types of contacts inside and outside regions of cultural dominance. The preceding patterns for Quebec Francophones and non-Quebec Anglophones are not found among those living outside their own region. Comparisons between the non-Quebec Francophones and the Quebec Anglophones indicate that, when the two groups are equally exposed to the other language in the street and at school, 23 per cent more Anglophones report living close to Francophones, while 19 per cent more of the Francophones have friendships with Anglophone youth. These findings are interesting, and suggest that French Canadian young people living outside Quebec (at least those who still speak French at home) tend to be more segregated residentially than their Anglophone counterparts who live in the heart of French Canada. On the other hand the Quebec Anglophones are more segregated socially than are French Canadians living in the heart of English Canada. In the main, the responses confirm the expectations about patterns of contact between French and English in Canada—the average Francophone young person is much more likely to contact the other culture than is his Anglophone counterpart.

Our principal concern at this point, of course, is how intergroup contacts affect attitudes to bilingualism (*see Table III-12*). The most important single finding here is that in all cases a positive relationship exists between contact and commitment to bilingualism. In all 15 situations in which an assessment can be made,⁴ the higher rates of commitment are found among the exposed rather than the unexposed of both language groups, and among those living in regions of both English and French influence.

Upon closer scrutiny, however, Table III-12 also shows rather marked discrepancies in levels of impact. To summarize these tendencies into a more reportable form, Table III-13 isolates a single measure of the impact of each situation. The indicator employed here is the Q coefficient of association between contact and commitment to bilingualism—a statistic which, literally interpreted, represents the percentage by which a prediction about level of commitment would be improved over chance by knowing whether or not contact had occurred. These measures show a considerable range in level, suggesting that intergroup contacts have a different impact on attitudes depending on who the respondent is, where the contact occurs, and what form the interaction takes.

What should we expect the impact of these contacts to be? Drawing from studies on race relations—a field which while not directly applicable nonetheless provides the most

⁴ Because 97 per cent of the Quebec Anglophones reported residential contacts with Franco-phone families, it is not meaningful nor indeed possible to assess the impact of these particular contacts.

meaningful parallel—we might reasonably think that those situations in which the participants come together on terms of equality would be the ones which most effectively increase feelings of tolerance and acceptance.⁵ At least for the Anglophone respondents, then, we might anticipate that encounters at school, or those based on friendship, would show the strongest impact on levels of favourable attitudes to bilingualism.

Table III-12. Commitment to Bilingualism, by language spoken at home, region, and intergroup contacts

Type of Contact	Per Cent Highly Committed to Bilingualism ^a			
	English		French ^b	
	Quebec	Non-Quebec	Quebec	Non-Quebec
A. Daily language exposure				
Yes	62 (86)	71 (68)	83 (161)	86 (99)
No	48 (20)	43 (607)	64 (167)	63 (25)
B. Residential contacts				
Yes	62 (103)	51 (263)	77 (203)	86 (92)
No		46 (3)	64 (412)	70 (32)
C. Contacts at school				
Yes	65 (71)	50 (236)	81 (177)	88 (84)
No	49 (35)	45 (439)	63 (151)	66 (40)
D. Close personal relationships				
Yes	67 (56)	51 (176)	80 (148)	86 (89)
No	52 (50)	44 (499)	69 (180)	72 (35)

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted bases.

^bOmits those who answered English-language version of the questionnaire.

⁵ The most pertinent results from the race relations field, of course, come from studies of Negro-white relations in the United States, and it would be grossly misleading to suggest any simple connection between the American and Canadian situations. Moreover, in recent years the applicability of the "equal status" hypothesis has come into some question. Evidence from recent studies suggests that it may be valid only within certain specified types of equal status contact. See George E. Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, "The Sociology of Race and Ethnic Relations," in Merton *et al.* (eds.), *Sociology Today* (New York, 1959), 397.

Table III-13. Effects of Intergroup Contacts on Commitment to Bilingualism, by language spoken at home and region

Type of Contact	Q Coefficients between Contact and Commitment			
	English		French ^a	
	Quebec	Non-Quebec	Quebec	Non-Quebec
A. Daily language exposure	.28	.53	.47	.57
B. Residential contacts	— ^b	.10	.31	.45
C. Contacts at school	.32	.10	.43	.58
D. Close personal friends	.30	.14	.28	.41

^aOmits those who answered English-language version of the questionnaire.

^bNot enough variation in exposure to allow computation.

This expectation, however, is not borne out by the figures in Table III-13. Although for Quebec Anglophones personal contact has a slightly greater impact, on the whole daily exposure to the other language most favours a commitment to bilingualism. This is particularly evident among the non-Quebec Anglophones, where language contact is the only form of encounter making any sizable impact on these dispositions.

This result suggests that the demographic rather than the interpersonal environment has the more powerful influence on dispositions regarding bilingualism—at least for groups other than the Quebec Anglophones. Outside Quebec, tolerant linguistic attitudes among Anglophone young people are much more a function of living in a community where French can be heard than of having face-to-face contacts with Francophone friends or classmates. Indeed, social contacts in areas where French is rarely spoken would appear to do little to impress the Anglophones with the need to extend bilingualism throughout Canada.

This outcome is curious sociologically, but can perhaps be interpreted through inferences regarding the quality of typical French-English interactions in English-speaking Canada. As already suggested, in these regions English is used almost exclusively; most of the Francophones speak English without much trace of accent. To the Anglophone participants, then, it is possible that the French seem quite assimilated into the English-speaking community, and perhaps even uncommitted to the preservation of their cultural identity. It would be understandable if these contacts seemed unconnected with the issue of bilingualism in Canada.

In communities where French is more frequently heard, on the other hand, the language issue would be much more evident. The data indicate that personal contacts were much more likely to affect the views of the Anglophones in Quebec than those living elsewhere in Canada.

In regions of English rather than French influence, contacts of all types have stronger effects on Francophone youth. Those outside Quebec not only feel more strongly about the issue of a bilingual Canada, but are more likely to have their convictions strengthened by cultural contacts. This probably reflects the fact that language survival is a more immediate problem outside Quebec.

In conclusion, there does not appear to be any single manner in which contacts affect attitudes regarding bilingualism. The effects, rather, depend on the type of environment in which the contact takes place. In English-speaking Canada, there are considerable differences in the effects on members of the two cultures. These are much less marked in Quebec. Anglophone youth in Quebec are not only more tolerant on the language question but seem more responsive when they come into direct contact with members of the other culture. Finally, it would appear that the "equal status" hypothesis of the race relations field is not really applicable to the Canadian situation. Intergroup contacts among equals do not have much impact on Anglophone young people except where there is a sizable Francophone population.

Bilingual Facility

Information on language skills was obtained by asking respondents to rate their speaking ability in the second language in one of five categories ranging from full fluency to a complete lack of awareness. These responses are reported by region in Table III-14, and at first glance appear to conform quite well to what might have been anticipated. They describe rather low levels of bilingualism among young people, but do indicate that the French more often than the English claimed facility in the other language.

Before interpreting these data it is necessary to point out that 78 Francophone young people filled out the English-language version of the questionnaire and were therefore asked to rate their facility in French rather than in English. Thus a small but significant group of Francophone youth are not accounted for in these figures. There is no sure way of determining how these persons would have rated their spoken English, but the fact that they received a questionnaire from an English-speaking interviewer and then filled it out in English suggests that most would have rated themselves highly. If we assume that all of these persons would rate themselves at either the highest or second highest levels of facility, then the proportion of French claiming conversational skills in English would be raised from 42 to 47 per cent. Among Quebec French it would rise from 36 to 37 per cent; and for those living outside Quebec it would go up from 80 to 87 per cent. Table III-14 thus under-represents the proportion of French youth who would rate themselves as bilingual.

It is clear, nonetheless, that the non-Quebec Francophones are the only group in which a sizable proportion claimed to be at ease in the second language. About 40 per cent of these persons claimed they could speak English without any difficulty; by contrast, only 11 per cent of the Quebec Anglophones claimed a similar facility in French. Virtually no Anglophone youth living outside Quebec said they could speak French without trouble, and it is striking that as many as a third from British Columbia and about a fifth from other English-speaking provinces admitted to knowing hardly a word of French. By comparison, only 12 per cent of the Quebec Francophones admitted a complete lack of knowledge of English.

If functional bilingualism were defined here as the ability to carry on a conversation in the other language, then the rate of bilingualism could be said to vary greatly among Anglophone youth living in different parts of Canada. These aggregates would be estimated at

Table III-14. Claims Regarding Facility in Second Language, by language spoken at home and region

Per Cent Giving Different Responses^aA. French^b

Self-ratings on facility in English	Quebec			Non-Quebec (N=124)	Total (N=452)
	Montreal Met. Area (N=131)	Other Quebec (N=197)	Total (N=328)		
Can speak it without any trouble at all	20	7	12	40	16
Can carry on a conversation but not easily	29	21	24	40	26
Can speak a little but not enough to carry on a conversation	24	34	30	13	28
Know a few words and phrases	20	22	22	6	20
Know hardly a word	6	15	12	1	11
Total	99	99	100	100	101

B. English

Self-ratings on facility in French	Atlantic (N=116)	Quebec (N=106)	Ontario (N=289)	Prairies (N=174)	B.C. (N=96)	Total (N=781)
Can speak it without any trouble at all	(.2)	11	3	—	1	2
Can carry on a conversation but not easily	13	59	25	24	17	23
Can speak a little but not enough to carry on a conversation	41	23	28	35	26	31
Know a few words and phrases	29	6	23	22	23	23
Know hardly a word	17	1	21	20	33	21
Total	100	100	100	101	100	100

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.^bOmits those who answered English-language version of the questionnaire.

13 per cent in the Atlantic Provinces; 70 per cent among Quebec Anglophones; 28 per cent among Ontarians; 24 per cent among young people living in the Prairie Provinces; and 18 per cent among those from British Columbia.⁶ Self-ratings on facility in French were therefore lowest of all among young people from the Atlantic Provinces. This is surprising for two reasons: the Atlantic Francophone population is larger than that of any other

⁶ These estimates are of course very much higher than official census figures on bilingual persons in Canada. Part of the discrepancy here would be accounted for by the fact that rates of bilingualism probably are in fact higher among young Canadians than they are in the population as a whole, and part by the fact that the present measures do not constitute very stringent criteria on which to classify persons as bilingual.

English-speaking region of Canada, and Atlantic youth revealed the highest level of tolerance of any Anglophone group on the issue of bilingualism in Canada. The dilemma, then, is that the group indicating the highest level of tolerance for French is also the group claiming to be least skilful at speaking it. For Atlantic young people, favourable attitudes regarding a bilingual Canada clearly do not depend on the ability to communicate in French.

To sum up, many more Francophones than Anglophones, both in Quebec and outside it, rated themselves as functionally bilingual. Adding the Francophones who answered English-language questionnaires, rates of functional bilingualism among French and English would be estimated at 37 and 23 per cent for those living in their region of cultural dominance, and at 87 and 70 per cent for those living outside these regions. From these same four estimates, moreover, it is possible to calculate the probabilities that any random pair of young people meeting either in Quebec or elsewhere in Canada would be able to communicate with one another, and in which language or languages they would be able to talk to one another. These probabilities are shown in Table III-15, and reveal three general conditions governing possible modes of intergroup communication in English and French Canada. First, they indicate that more communication is possible in English-speaking Canada than in Quebec, since participants would be able to talk to one another in 90 per cent of all possible meetings outside Quebec, but in just 81 per cent of those occurring in Quebec. This discrepancy is produced by the fact that among persons living outside their region of cultural dominance a greater proportion of French than English are bilingual. Second, more transactions occurring in Quebec than in English-speaking provinces could be conducted in either language (26 per cent compared with 20 per cent). This result in turn is produced by the fact that within regions of cultural dominance more French than English claim to be bilingual. Finally, the figures clearly indicate that the mode of communication most possible in either setting would be the dominant language of the region. These tendencies are by no means balanced, however, since in English-speaking provinces 67 per cent of all possible interactions could be transacted in English only while in Quebec the comparable figure for communication in French is just 44 per cent.

Table III-15. Modes of Communication Possible between Francophone and Anglophone Young People, by region

Probabilities Governing Random Intergroup Contacts between Two Individuals

Language in which transactions could take place	Quebec	Non-Quebec
Either English or French	.26	.20
English only	.11	.67
French only	.44	.03
Neither English nor French	.19	.10
Sum of probabilities	1.00	1.00

These figures indicate broad parameters, but being hypothetical they of course do not describe what actually occurs in intergroup contacts. Indeed, the central premise is somewhat unrealistic, for it assumes that any individual from one linguistic background would have an equal chance of talking with every person in his region who speaks the other language. The real impact of the ethnic difference in ability to communicate in the other language is obvious when comparisons are made between the language skills of persons having varying degrees of actual contact. These data are presented in Table III-16, where levels of functional bilingualism are shown in relation to the four types of contact discussed previously. Table III-16 indicates, interestingly, that levels are virtually the same among Anglophone and Francophone young people who do not have contact with the other culture, and that the real difference between the two groups emerges only when members of the two cultures interact. Here, considerably more French are bilingual: by 12 per cent among those who are exposed daily to the other language; by 22 per cent among those having residential contacts; by 26 per cent among those having contact at school; and by 27 per cent among those who say they have a close friend who speaks the other language. These results clearly demonstrate that when Francophone and Anglophone young people meet, the adjustments which each makes to solve the problem of communication are far from reciprocal.

Table III-16. Facility in Second Language, by language spoken at home and frequency of intergroup contact

Type of contact	Per Cent who Claim to be Functionally Bilingual ^a		
	English	French ^b	Difference
A. Daily language exposure			
Yes	47 (154)	59 (260)	-12
No	22 (627)	23 (192)	-1
B. Residential contacts			
Yes	32 (366)	54 (295)	-22
No	20 (415)	20 (157)	nil
C. Contacts at school			
Yes	29 (307)	55 (261)	-26
No	23 (474)	25 (191)	-2
D. Close personal relationships			
Yes	32 (232)	59 (237)	-27
No	22 (549)	26 (215)	-4

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted bases.

^bOmits French who answered English-language version of the questionnaire.

The ability to converse in the second language also correlates positively with attitudes regarding bilingualism, as is indicated by Table III-17. Here rates of high commitment are seen to be 17 per cent higher among Anglophone youth who can communicate in French than among those who cannot, and 16 per cent higher among the bilingual Francophones. The effect of language facility on these attitudes is therefore quite strong and would appear to be approximately the same among members of both ethnic groups. Ethnicity has a more powerful influence than bilingual facility, however, since the rates among unilingual French are 9 per cent higher than among bilingual English (68 compared with 59 per cent). The ethnic differential is nonetheless smaller than most that have been uncovered so far.

Table III-17. Commitment to Bilingualism, by language spoken at home and self-ratings on facility in other language

Commitment measure	English		French	
	Facility high	Facility low	Facility high ^a	Facility low
Per cent highly committed to bilingualism for Canada ^b	59 (239)	42 (536)	84 (295)	68 (232)

^aIncludes persons who filled out English-language version of the questionnaire.

^bAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted bases.

In conclusion, it would be meaningful to assess the combined impact of contact and the ability to communicate in the second language, and to try to determine which one contributes more to the development of positive dispositions. This assessment can be made from the figures in Table III-18, where rates of bilingual commitment are examined simultaneously by language spoken at home, facility in the second language, and experiences with different types of intergroup contact. Because this table is complex the results will be reviewed point by point:

1. The combination of facility and contact produces much higher rates of bilingual commitment. A comparison of the conditions where both are present with those where both are absent indicates an average percentage difference of 29.5 for the Anglophones and of 23.0 for the Francophones.
2. Comparisons among the figures for each independent factor indicate that for the Anglophones, rates of commitment are elevated an average of 16.4 percentage points by language facility, and an average of 13.1 points by contact. For Francophones, the comparable figures are 11.8 and 10.0. With each group, then, both factors make a substantial contribution to the differential, with language facility accounting for just slightly over one-half of the combined variance.
3. Although all 16 comparisons between Anglophones and Francophones show the latter to be higher on commitment to bilingualism, Table III-18 contains conditions in which the rates among the Anglophones exceed those among the Francophones. For

Table III-18. Commitment to Bilingualism, by language spoken at home, facility in second language, and frequency of intergroup contact

Type of Contact	Per Cent Highly Committed to Bilingualism for Canada ^a			
	English	French ^b	Facility high	Facility low
A. Daily language exposure				
Yes	75 (98)	63 (81)	87 (167)	79 (87)
No	54 (135)	40 (449)	75 (42)	61 (136)
B. Residential contacts				
Yes	69 (160)	44 (239)	86 (177)	70 (112)
No	48 (74)	41 (292)	75 (32)	66 (111)
C. Contacts at school				
Yes	66 (129)	45 (204)	90 (159)	74 (99)
No	54 (105)	41 (326)	68 (47)	64 (124)
D. Close personal relationships				
Yes	72 (114)	43 (159)	85 (154)	75 (76)
No	52 (118)	42 (369)	82 (54)	65 (146)

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted bases.

^bOmits French who answered English-language version of the questionnaire.

example, in all four situations of contact, the bilingual Anglophone youth who have contact show a higher level of bilingual commitment than Francophone young people who neither are bilingual nor have contact with English, demonstrating that the combined influence of facility and contact has a stronger effect on these attitudes than does ethnicity.

4. English and French opinion tends to converge in situations where bilingual young people have contact with one another, and is furthest apart in situations where contact occurs among persons unable to communicate in the other language. English-French differences across the four sets of combined statuses average out to 16.5 per cent among those having both contact and facility, 25.5 per cent among those who are bilingual but have no contact, 25.8 per cent where contact occurs without bilingual facility, and 23.0 per cent where neither condition is present.

5. Some types of intergroup contact have stronger effects than others. Among both groups, daily language exposure affects bilingual attitudes more strongly than language facility does, while facility has stronger effects than either residential contacts or close interpersonal contacts. With regard to contacts at school, however, the results are inconsistent: for Anglophone youth, language facility has an influence which supersedes that of school contact, while among the Francophones the order is reversed.

To sum up, bilingual skills are quite unevenly distributed among Canadian young people, just as they are among Canadian adults. This imbalance characterizes only those who have contact with the other culture, however; among those isolated from these contacts almost identical proportions of Francophones and Anglophones claim conversational facility in the second language. When young people from the two linguistic backgrounds come together, then, it is the Francophones who make the greater linguistic adjustment, and the language of intergroup transactions thus becomes predominantly English. Attitudes regarding bilingual goals for Canada are greatly influenced both by facility in the second language and by having contact with members of the other group. Young people who have the chance to converse in the second language and have developed a facility in it are much more likely to endorse the virtues of a bilingual national community.

The discussion now shifts from an emphasis on attitudes toward bilingual goals for Canadian society to a consideration of young people's assessment of the importance of bilingual skills in their own lives. Of course, these two perspectives are by no means completely independent of one another. Indeed, the fact that positive attitudes to bilingualism for the national community were much more prevalent among those who claimed to be bilingual themselves—and who had an opportunity to speak the other language—would suggest that young people evaluate the national language issue pragmatically.

This chapter has three specific goals: to find out how useful young people think facility in the second language would be to them, both in their present lives and in the future; to assess the different ways they feel bilingual skills would be helpful; and to determine whether attitudes regarding bilingual goals for Canada do in fact represent an extension of the feelings young people have regarding the functions of bilingualism in their own lives.

The Usefulness of Being Bilingual—Present and Future

On the basis of the results already reviewed, it is not surprising to learn that Francophones place a much higher emphasis than their Anglophone counterparts on the value of being bilingual. Table IV-1 indicates extremely wide discrepancies in these evaluations (Questions 29 and 30). Although both groups think that bilingual skills will be more useful to them as young adults than as teenagers, the Francophones think so more often. Moreover, comparing thoughts about the present and the future, the numbers estimating daily usage rise just 7 per cent among the Anglophones while they go up 22 per cent among the Francophones. Altogether, six Francophone youth in 10 expect to use the other language every day as young adults, a rate roughly three times higher than that found among the Anglophones. Nonetheless, as many as half the Anglophones (51 per cent) did think they would be able to use French "often" in their future lives, and this represents a sizable increase over the number who made a similar evaluation about their present circumstances.

Table IV-1. Perceived Utility of Bilingual Skills—Present and Future, by language spoken at home and sex

Per cent making different evaluations regarding how useful it would be to be able
to speak the other language—or speak it better^a

Evaluations	English			French ^b		
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total
A. Utility at present						
Very useful: I could use it every day	11	13	12	42	35	38
Quite useful: I could use it often but not every day	19	22	20	38	44	41
Slightly useful: I could use it sometimes but not very often	39	44	42	19	19	19
Not useful at all: I don't think I'd ever use it	31	21	26	1	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Base	(398)	(382)	(780)	(199)	(252)	(451)
B. Utility in ten years						
Very useful: I could use it every day	16	21	19	63	58	60
Quite useful: I could use it often but not every day	31	33	32	29	29	29
Slightly useful: I could use it sometimes but not very often	32	32	32	6	11	9
Not useful at all: I don't think I'd ever use it	20	13	17	2	2	2
Total	99	99	100	100	100	100
Base	(398)	(382)	(780)	(199)	(252)	(451)

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bOmits French who answered English-language version of the questionnaire.

Table IV-1 also indicates that among the Anglophones slightly more girls than boys rated bilingual facility as useful—in thinking about both the present and the future. This tendency is reversed among the Francophones, however: 7 per cent more boys than girls said they could use English every day in their present lives, and 5 per cent more thought they could do so in the future. For the Francophones, the most reasonable interpretation of these discrepancies is that more boys than girls feel they need to know English as preparation for entry into the labour force. It is somewhat less clear, however, why facility in French should be viewed as more useful by Anglophone girls. It may be true that more girls than boys choose language courses in high school and college, but this would hardly explain why the discrepancies also appear in the ratings of future uses. These differences are modest, of course, and as such do not warrant elaborate explanation.

Another problem of interpretation here—and a much more serious one—is to decide whether the elevated expectations regarding language uses in the future mean, on the one

hand, that young people think their lives and experiences will be different when they are in their twenties or, on the other, that they think bilingualism will be more prevalent in Canada in 1975 than it was in 1965. There is no completely satisfactory way of resolving this dilemma from the available data, although some insights can be gained by examining the assessments made by young people of different ages.

Table IV-2 summarizes the responses by age groups and orders the results so as to highlight the comparisons between present and future evaluations. These data show, first, that ratings do indeed change with age. Estimates of bilingual utility are quite a bit lower among older Anglophone adolescents, with the drop-off being somewhat sharper on evaluations regarding the future than on those for the present. This would suggest that adolescence convinces additional numbers of Anglophones that they really do not need to be able to speak French in order to get along in Canada.

Table IV-2. Perceived Utility of Bilingual Skills—Present and Future, by language spoken at home and age

Age	Per cent who say they would be able to use the other language "often" ^a			
	Present utility	Utility in ten years	Difference	Index of expected change
A. English				
13 - 14	34 (260)	58 (260)	+24	.36
15 - 16	35 (255)	49 (255)	+14	.22
17 - 18	33 (196)	48 (196)	+15	.22
19 - 20	26 (68)	43 (68)	+17	.23
B. French^b				
13 - 14	78 (128)	95 (128)	+17	.78
15 - 16	80 (149)	88 (149)	+ 8	.40
17 - 18	79 (120)	86 (120)	+ 7	.33
19 - 20	81 (50)	85 (50)	+ 4	.21

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted bases.

^bOmits French who filled out English-language version of the questionnaire.

Among the Francophones, extremely high proportions of all ages rated the ability to speak English as a very useful skill. The evaluations of its present usefulness do not show any meaningful variation with age. In thinking ahead 10 years, however, older Francophone youth did not make as universally high estimates as did their juniors.

Table IV-2 contains two additional columns of figures, the first indicating the absolute percentage difference between present and future evaluations, and the second representing a standardized measure on which to assess the net change expected by each group. This latter measure is calculated by dividing the actual increase by the total increase possible, to control the fact that the absolute numbers who could expect increased uses in the future are much larger in some groups than in others. These figures in the main describe decreasing values among the older age groups—which in turn means that there are proportionately fewer older adolescents who rate future uses above present. For example, among Francophone 13- and 14-year olds, more than three-quarters of those who feel that English is not very useful now anticipate that this situation will change by the time they become young adults; among 19- and 20-year olds, on the other hand, only 21 per cent anticipate such changes. These measures do not decline as sharply with age among the Anglophones as they do among the Francophones, but it is clear at least that by age 15, considerably fewer anticipate change.

Generally, these results suggest that as young people grow closer to adulthood they more and more come to estimate their future uses for bilingual facility on the basis of their current experiences. And to the extent that older adolescents probably know better what adult life will be like, it can perhaps be argued that much of the discrepancy between their estimates of present and future uses for bilingual skills stems from uncertainty about their own future—rather than from expectations regarding changing bilingual practices in Canadian society.

Once again these findings describe what might have been anticipated, yet one cannot but be impressed with the extent to which young people from the two cultures differ in their expectations. Virtually all Francophone young people enter adolescence fully aware that the ability to speak English is of prime importance to their future, and their experiences during adolescence would appear to reinforce this understanding. During these same years, on the other hand, many Anglophones seem to develop the outlook that their use for French will cease once they have completed their high-school language requirements. For members of one group, in short, adolescence heightens an awareness of the necessity of being bilingual, while for the other it teaches that bilingualism is something not really expected of them.

On a more optimistic note, it must also be pointed out that a fairly substantial number of Anglophones do see a use for bilingual skills in the future. Even among those near voting age, better than two in five said they expected to use French often by 1975, and this constituted 17 per cent more than saw much use for the second language in their present lives. It is perhaps not unreasonable to conclude that a significant minority of Anglophone young people—perhaps as many as a sixth—do expect changing bilingual practices in Canada to have a direct bearing on their own lives.

These evaluations would also be expected to show considerable variation by region, and Table IV-3 demonstrates that this is indeed the case. Ninety-three per cent of Francophone youth living in English-speaking provinces regarded facility in English as highly useful now, compared with 83 per cent of the Montreal-area French and 73 per cent of those living in other parts of Quebec. And among the Anglophones, similarly, while 80 per cent of those living in Quebec recognized a frequent use for French, considerably fewer from regions of English-language dominance did so.

The rates tumble to approximately 33 per cent in the regions adjacent to Quebec, to about 25 per cent on the Prairies, and to just 13 per cent in British Columbia.

Table IV-3. Perceived Utility of Bilingual Skills—Present and Future, by language spoken at home and province or region

Language and region	Per cent who said they would be able to use the other language "often" ^a			
	Present utility	Utility in ten years	Difference	Index of expected change
A. French^b				
Quebec (N=328)	77	87	+10	.44
Montreal met. area (N=131)	83	87	+ 4	.24
Other Quebec (N=197)	73	88	+15	.56
Non-Quebec (N=124)	93	97	+ 4	.57
B. English				
Atlantic (N=116)	33	51	+18	.27
Quebec (N=106)	79	84	+ 5	.24
Ontario (N=289)	36	52	+16	.22
Prairies (N=174)	28	48	+20	.28
British Columbia (N=96)	13	41	+28	.32

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bOmits French who answered English-language version of the questionnaire.

Table IV-3 also reveals pronounced differences in the rates at which different groups of young people think they will need in the future to speak the other language. The non-Quebec Francophones and the Quebec Francophones living outside the Montreal metropolitan area rated this need highest. Other than in the Montreal area, it could be concluded that proportionately more Francophones than Anglophones anticipate increasing uses for bilingual facility in the future—even though in absolute numbers more English than French do so. Finally, rates of expected change are also seen to be slightly higher among Anglophone youth from British Columbia, the region where current uses of French are rated the lowest.

The Functions of Being Bilingual

It is often said in discussions of bilingualism in Canada that members of the two cultures reflect quite different orientations toward learning the second official language. Anglophone Canadians are supposed to learn French mainly to broaden their cultural horizons, whereas Francophone Canadians learn English out of practical necessity. This distinction found expression in the *Preliminary Report* of the Commission, where it was observed that at regional meetings Anglophone and Francophone participants did not share the same views of the function and influence of the second language. Indeed, "the former saw in the French language essentially a form of cultural enrichment, whereas the latter looked upon English as a tool of practical necessity."¹

¹Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, *A Preliminary Report* (Ottawa, 1965), 84.

In recent studies of language learning,² distinctions have also been noted between "integrative" and "instrumental" orientations to the learning of a new language. A person is said to reflect an integrative orientation when his motivation is a desire to talk to members of the other language group, or simply to learn more about the other group. An instrumental orientation, on the other hand, is said to exist when the new language is to be used as a stepping-stone to some other goal, such as getting a job.

This distinction provides a useful framework for discussing the functions which young people assign to bilingual facility. In addition to making general assessments, respondents also rated how helpful they thought these skills would be in relation to nine specific behavioural contexts (see Question 31 in Appendix B). Although this list contained just one situation which could be classed as "cultural enrichment"—the use of the second language for reading or watching television—several of the situations clearly reflect integrative and instrumental functions. Learning the second language to get better grades, find a job, or advance in a career all represent stepping-stone functions, while learning it to talk to friends, to make new friends, or to date are clearly integrative uses. At the very least, then, these data are a good test of the proposition that French Canadians are more likely to stress instrumental reasons for learning the second official language.

Table IV-4 shows the rates at which members of the two groups thought bilingualism would be helpful in various situations. These responses are ordered according to the extent of the discrepancies between the two groups. Although Francophones gave considerably higher ratings on six of the nine questions, the two groups were not grossly different in the relative importance they assigned the various uses. The Anglophones most frequently thought of French as useful for travelling, improving grades in school, and finding employment; the Francophones rated finding employment highest, travel second, and career advancement third. Moreover, both groups rated the functions of dating and talking with friends lowest, and the overall correlation between the two reflected a high degree of correspondence ($\rho=+.76$; not shown in table). This outcome, in short, is not at all what might have been expected.

The most direct evidence on which to test the proposition, however, is contained in the six situations which most clearly represent the instrumental and integrative uses of language; items 1, 5, and 8 on the one hand, and 3, 4, and 9 on the other. Here again, however, the data give little support to the hypothesis. Although the groups are furthest apart in their assessment of the value of bilingualism for advancing in a career, the third and fourth widest discrepancies are found in situations reflecting integrative uses—dating and talking with friends. In addition, identical numbers of Francophones and Anglophones cited making new friends as a way in which bilingualism would be helpful, and virtually identical proportions felt this skill would help them improve their academic standing. Both comparisons are again inconsistent with the general hypothesis. All in all, then, one could not conclude from

²R.C. Gardner and W.E. Lambert, "Motivational Variables in Second Language Acquisition," *Canadian Journal of Psychology*, XIII, 1959, 266-72.

M. Anisfeld and W.E. Lambert, "Social and Psychological Variables in Learning Hebrew," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LXIII, 1961, 524-29.

W.E. Lambert, *A Study of the Roles of Attitudes and Motivations in Second Language Learning* (Montreal, 1961).

these results that Francophone and Anglophone young people differ radically in the *kinds* of benefits they think they would gain from being bilingual.

Table IV-4. Perceived Functions of Bilingual Facility, by language spoken at home

Functions	Per cent who say a better speaking knowledge of the second language would be helpful in these ways ^a		
	English (N=781)	French ^b (N=452)	Difference
(1) In getting ahead in the line of work I hope to enter	49	83	-34
(2) In reading or watching television	49	80	-31
(3) In going out on dates	21	51	-30
(4) In talking with my friends	24	49	-25
(5) In finding a job	67	92	-25
(6) In getting around to more places in my community	30	52	-22
(7) In travelling to different parts of Canada	86	89	-3
(8) In getting better grades in school	68	71	-3
(9) In making new friends	63	63	nil

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bOmits French who filled out English-language version of the questionnaire.

At the same time, however, the discrepancies are by no means identical, and the table does indicate some functions on which the groups made widely divergent assessments and others on which they did not differ at all. One tendency of considerable interest is that while many more Francophones than Anglophones perceived bilingual skills as helpful in their occupation, they differed more about advancing than on getting a job. This suggests that Francophones are more inclined to see a long-term use for bilingualism, and that Anglophones think of it mainly as a help in entering the labour market. This tendency is consistent with earlier findings and suggests that the two groups differ most on practical considerations when looking to the future. Of three practical problems, for example, getting better grades in school is clearly the most immediate, finding a job comes next, and advancing in a career is the most remote. And it is in these three stages or time periods that the groups diverge: from 3 to 25 to 34 per cent as the evaluations become more removed from the present. Francophone youth could definitely be said to reflect a higher sensitivity to the long-range instrumental functions of bilingualism. These data also support the idea that, for many Anglophones the completion of language courses at school eliminates one of the main tangible reasons for being bilingual.

Table IV-4 also reveals that many more Francophones than Anglophones evaluated bilingual facility as useful in reading and viewing television. This outcome is somewhat surprising since, if cultural enrichment is the chief reason why Anglophone Canadians learn French, one would have expected the discrepancy here to be at least relatively smaller than on other evaluations. Of the nine sets of ratings, however, the two groups differed more widely on just one. This would suggest, either that the general hypothesis is invalid for young people,

or that reading and television viewing are simply not used by young people as modes of cultural enrichment. Another possibility too is that the question itself conveyed different meanings to members of the two language groups. Anglophone young people, for example, might very well have interpreted reading French or viewing French-language television programmes as ends in themselves, things one would do for no other reason than intrinsic satisfaction. Francophone youth, on the other hand, might regard these exposures to English as ways of learning things one would need to know in order to achieve some ulterior goal—such as getting a job in an English- or American-owned company. It is possible, in short, that the very same language uses might denote quite different things to members of the two cultures.

To evaluate this latter possibility more systematically, a rudimentary form of cluster analysis was conducted on the data. First, within each language group the responses on each assessment were intercorrelated, a step which resulted in the two correlation matrices shown in Table IV-5. Next, all pairs of assessments revealing high levels of overlap (arbitrarily designated as those with Q values of .50 or higher) were extracted and examined for clustering properties. The results are diagrammed in Figure IV-1. Here, relations between pairs of assessments are indicated either by single, double, triple, or dotted lines, the number of lines representing the strength of the relationship. As it turned out, no negative correlation stronger than -.10 was found between any pair of responses. This means that the lines in the

Table IV-5. Relationships among Different Assessments of Bilingual Utility, by language spoken at home

diagram all represent positive relationships, and more generally that persons who thought bilingual skills would be helpful in one way were likely to think they would be useful in other ways too.

In charting these results in the fashion described, it was first assumed that three of the situations (talking with friends, making new friends, and dating) constituted measures of integrative uses of language and that three others (finding a job, getting ahead in a career, and getting better grades in school) were equally valid indicators of instrumental uses. The patterns which emerge in Figure IV-1 tend to support this assumption. Among both groups of respondents, the three integrative evaluations interrelate at levels of +.60 or higher, while the two occupational evaluations correlate at better than +.70. School grades are less strongly connected with the instrumental cluster—although the figures do indicate that these evaluations clearly belong there rather than on the other side of the ledger. The two clusters are also reasonably independent of one another, although among the Anglophones “meeting new friends” and “finding a job” did correlate at +.59, while among the Francophones, curiously, uses of English for dating and job-finding correlated at +.53. For the most part, however, the results describe a latent structure made up of two “factors” which could be meaningfully designated as integrative and instrumental uses of bilingualism.

The more important result to emerge from this analysis is that the three other sets of evaluations were interpreted quite differently by members of the two groups. Among the Francophones, assessments on all three of these uses bunch quite clearly with the occupational evaluations of bilingualism, while among the Anglophones they are much more closely connected with evaluations reflecting social uses of language. Travelling in Canada, reading, watching television, and getting around in one's community, in short, convey quite different meanings to Anglophone and Francophone young people—at least as far as language learning is concerned. The Francophones who think English will help them in these ways are really thinking about finding a job.

On the other hand, these uses of bilingualism have quite different meanings for Anglophones. Table IV-5 indicates that travel was correlated at just +.29 and +.17 with job-finding and career development, but at +.43 and +.48 with meeting new friends and dating. Similarly, getting around more in one's own community in the other language was much more frequently associated with social connections than with possible occupations. And finally, reading and television viewing in the second language would also appear to have a different meaning for the two groups of young people. Among the Anglophones, these uses take an intermediary position between occupational and social uses, the strongest correlation being with making new friends (+.55) and the second strongest with job-finding (+.51). Among the Francophones, on the other hand, these uses denoted primarily occupational consequences.

To conclude, then, the results confirm that members of the two cultures use the second language for different reasons. When Francophones assess the value of being bilingual, they think of occupational considerations, and they perceive the consequences in a much wider variety of situations than do their Anglophone peers. The main difference between the two groups in their orientation to learning the second official language, then, is that French youth are much more likely to view bilingualism as an occupational necessity—and particularly so when they think about their long-range career prospects.

Figure IV-1. Correlation Patterns among Different Assessments of Bilingual Utility, by language spoken at home




Table IV-6. Commitment to Bilingualism in the National Community, by perceived utility of bilingual skills—present and future, and language spoken at home

Per Cent Highly Committed to Bilingualism ^a		
A. Present utility		
Utility	English	French ^b
Very useful: I could use it every day	69 (N=143)	82 (N=181)
Quite useful: I could use it often but not every day	61 (N=175)	73 (N=170)
Slightly useful: I could use it sometimes but not very often	50 (N=284)	66 (N= 73)
Not useful at all: I don't think I'd ever use it	21 (N=162)	— (N= 7)
B. Utility in ten years		
Utility	English	French ^b
Very useful: I could use it every day	70 (N=192)	86 (N=269)
Quite useful: I could use it often but not every day	58 (N=244)	60 (N=120)
Slightly useful: I could use it sometimes but not very often	34 (N=213)	58 (N= 31)
Not useful at all: I don't think I'd ever use it	21 (N=114)	— (N= 8)

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bOmits those who answered English-language version of the questionnaire.

Bilingualism in One's Own Life and in the National Community

Having examined dispositions to bilingualism in relation to the individual's own life and as goals for the society at large, we must finally determine how these two evaluations relate to one another. To what extent do young people's attitudes on bilingualism in the national community represent an extension of their feelings regarding the functions of bilingual facility in their own lives?

The evidence bearing most directly on this question is contained in Table IV-6, where rates of high commitment to bilingualism in Canada are reported separately for groups of young people who made different personal assessments on the utility of being bilingual. That these two perspectives are by no means independent of one another is clearly evident in these figures. Among Anglophone young people, as many as seven in 10 of those who rated facility in French as highly useful—either at present or in the future—indicated strong support for bilingual practices in Canada as a whole: by contrast, of those who felt they would never use French, only one in five did so. For most Anglophones, it could be concluded that attitudes on the national language issue are in large measure based on personal experiences and expectations. Anglophone youth view bilingualism in their country from a highly pragmatic point of view, and their reactions on this issue could, if anything, be described as more egocentric than ethnocentric.

The two evaluations of Francophone respondents also overlap. Many of them also take their own linguistic needs into account when they think about bilingualism in Canada. The

basic difference between the two groups, however, is that even those Francophones who see relatively little personal advantage in knowing English are still more likely than not to endorse bilingual goals for the country at large. Their convictions, therefore, are not as strictly utilitarian as those of their Anglophone compatriots. The reactions of Francophone youth could perhaps be said to be based relatively more often on ethnocentric perspectives than on egocentric ones.

The most reasonable interpretation of these results is that both groups of young people, but especially the Anglophones, tend to evaluate the national language issue on the basis of personal experiences. Most Francophone young people can endorse bilingual goals for Canada simply because they are French—and therefore have the added investment of collective interests at stake. The attitudes of Anglophone young people, on the other hand, appear to be shaped much more exclusively by the demands of their own everyday experience: French is a commodity worth having only if you have a use for it.

While earlier sections of this study touched a number of points on young people's thoughts about the future of their country, this chapter focusses on how they perceive their own future position in Canadian society. The specific concerns here are with expectations regarding future place of residence and with evaluations of future job prospects. The first section looks at young people's attitudes regarding different Canadian provinces as places to live and examines where they actually expect to be located as young adults. The second section reports how young people from different regions rated their future employment prospects both in their own province and elsewhere in Canada, and then assesses how they would react to taking a high paying job if it involved moving to a different Canadian region or to the United States.

Residential Preferences and Expectations

Toward the middle of the questionnaire, young people were asked to indicate which Canadian provinces, including their own, they might like to live in some day, and also where they would definitely never want to live (Questions 20 and 21). These evaluations are reviewed first in Tables V-1 and V-2, the former indicating the proportions in each language group who assigned both positive and negative evaluations to each province, and the latter showing the balance between positive and negative ratings for young people living in different regions.

The first feature to be noted in Table V-1 is that not all ten provinces were equally likely to evoke a specific reaction from young people. As many as 68 per cent of the Anglophones had definite reactions (either positive or negative) to British Columbia, but only 32 per cent made a judgement about New Brunswick. Similarly, 75 per cent of the Francophones held definite views about Quebec while only 29 per cent rated Manitoba, and among the "Others," 57 per cent made judgements about Quebec whereas Prince Edward Island evoked a positive or negative reaction from just 16 per cent. Considered as places to live,

some provinces stimulated emotional responses from large numbers of young people, while others were for the most part regarded without effect.

The specific reactions noted in Table V-1 are: that British Columbia and Ontario were evaluated very favourably by Anglophone youth; that Quebec was the only province about which Francophones had a strongly positive consensus; and that Ontario and Alberta were viewed as the most attractive places to live by the "Others." The results also indicate that on balance both the Anglophones and the "Others" rated a majority of provinces favourably, while the Francophones made positive assessments only about Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia.

Table V-1. Attractiveness of Different Provinces as Places to Live, by language spoken at home

Question 20. In which Canadian provinces—including your own—do you think you might like to live at some time in the future?

Question 21. In which Canadian provinces would you definitely never want to live?

Provinces	English (N=793)			French (N=529)			Other (N=37)		
	Live in	Avoid	Balance	Live in	Avoid	Balance	Live in	Avoid	Balance
Alberta	33% ^a	11%	+22	12%	20%	- 8	41%	1%	+40
British Columbia	64	4	+60	23	18	+ 5	34	8	+26
Manitoba	20	13	+ 7	11	18	- 7	16	1	+15
New Brunswick	16	16	0	18	19	- 1	4	13	- 9
Newfoundland	11	33	-22	8	33	-25	4	25	-21
Nova Scotia	20	16	+ 4	10	22	-12	17	6	+11
Ontario	55	4	+51	35	15	+20	44	1	+43
Prince Edward Island	17	19	- 2	8	26	-18	10	6	+ 4
Quebec	21	36	-15	70	5	+65	40	17	+23
Saskatchewan	21	19	+ 2	8	22	-14	21	2	+19
Prefer to live outside Canada	11	-	+24	7	-	+31	9	-	+50
Would live in any province	-	35	-	38	-	-	59	-	-

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

These reactions are much more meaningfully interpreted on a regional basis, of course, and Table V-2 indicates, as was to be expected, that young people in general gave highly favourable ratings to their own provinces—especially the British Columbia Anglophones, the Quebec Francophones, and the Ontario Anglophones. At the same time, however, all regional groups regarded British Columbia and Ontario as good places to live, and all rejected Newfoundland. Moreover, Anglophone youth were particularly impressed with the residential possibilities of British Columbia and, in all regions except Ontario, more rated that province higher than they did their own. On the other hand, even though both groups of Francophones made positive evaluations of Quebec, one could infer from the figures that those living outside Quebec gave relatively higher ratings to their own provinces.

Table V-2. Attractiveness of Different Provinces as Places to Live, by region and language spoken at home

Net balance in ratings: Per cent who say they would like to live in the province minus per cent who say they definitely would never want to live there^a

Provinces	French		English				
	Quebec (N=337)	Non-Quebec (N=192)	Atlantic (N=122)	Quebec (N=107)	Ontario (N=291)	Prairies (N=175)	B.C. (N=98)
Alberta	-12	+ 9	+11	+ 8	+10	+54	+18
British Columbia	+ 4	+14	+46	+55	+53	+65	+83
Manitoba	-10	+ 4	+ 8	-10	+ 1	+26	- 2
New Brunswick	- 8	+29	+24	- 7	0	-11	-11
Newfoundland	-27	-14	-23	-17	-23	-22	-23
Nova Scotia	-14	- 7	+36	+ 1	+ 4	- 7	-11
Ontario	+14	+45	+43	+44	+64	+39	+43
Prince Edward Island	-20	- 7	+ 4	- 4	+ 2	- 7	- 9
Quebec	+74	+22	-14	+42	-10	-33	-14
Saskatchewan	-16	- 8	+ 6	- 3	0	+ 6	-10

^aPercentages for both positive and negative ratings computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

In addition, all groups of non-Quebec Anglophones viewed the prospects of living in Quebec more negatively than positively, and only two English-speaking provinces, Ontario and British Columbia, were given an overall favourable rating by the Quebec Francophones. In the main, young people from both cultures would prefer to avoid the territories where the other culture is dominant. The Anglophones from the Prairies most strongly rejected Quebec, while the Quebec Francophones viewed most negatively Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, of the English-speaking provinces.

Next, Table V-3 summarizes the responses by showing the mean number of provinces identified both positively and negatively by different language, age, and regional groupings. The most important findings here are: that, of the three language groups, the Francophones chose the fewest number of provinces as places to live and the largest number as places to avoid; that the "Others" were the least likely to exclude specific provinces; that, on balance, the Quebec Francophones evaluated more provinces negatively than positively; and that between the ages of 13 and 20 the ratings of French youth shifted from a positive to negative balance. These results suggest that Francophone young people from Quebec not only show a definite inclination to restrict themselves territorially within Canada, but that their thinking in this regard becomes much more pronounced during the adolescent years.

In summary, Canadian youth could be said to hold quite definite views on the prospects of living in some areas of their country, while other areas have relatively little meaning to them. Moreover, since both Anglophones and Francophones tended to limit their positive evaluations to provinces located within their own territories of linguistic and cultural influence, one could conclude that Canadian youth by no means ignore bilingual and bicultural considerations when thinking about a future place of residence.

Table V-3. Number of Canadian Provinces in Which Young People Would Like to Live and Would Definitely Not Want to Live, by language spoken at home, region and language spoken at home, and age and language spoken at home

Mean Number of Provinces Named			
	Live in	Avoid	Difference
A. Language spoken at home			
English	2.77	1.72	+1.05
French	2.03	1.99	+ .04
Other	2.31	.80	+1.51
B. Region and language spoken at home	Live in	Avoid	Difference
French—Quebec	1.91	2.08	-.17
French—non-Quebec	2.51	1.62	+.89
English—Atlantic	3.03	1.58	+1.45
English—Quebec	2.58	1.48	+1.10
English—Ontario	2.65	1.64	+1.01
English—Prairies	2.78	1.69	+1.09
English—British Columbia	2.87	2.25	+.62
C. Age and language spoken at home	Live in	Avoid	Difference
English—13-14	2.85	1.58	+1.27
15-16	2.69	1.87	+.82
17-18	2.72	1.69	+1.03
19-20	2.96	1.80	+1.16
French—13-14	2.34	1.82	+.52
15-16	2.03	2.01	+.02
17-18	1.73	1.83	-.10
19-20	2.10	2.52	-.42

When asked where they thought they would actually be living in 10 years, it is not surprising that the Francophones were most likely to anticipate remaining in their own province: they were 15 per cent more likely to say this than the Anglophones, and 37 per cent more likely to do so than the "Others" (Table V-4). By comparison, the rates at which the three groups had definite intentions to relocate were much more similar, the Anglophones being only 5 per cent more likely to cite a specific destination than the Francophones, and only 3 per cent more likely to do so than the "Others." The responses were brought back into balance, in the rates at which groups expressed uncertainty about the future: only 16 per cent of the Francophones, compared with 26 per cent of the Anglophones, and as many as 51 per cent of the "Others" indicated they were not sure where

they would be living in 10 years. The main difference between the groups, then, was that the French thought they were much more likely to remain in their own province.

One other feature to be noted in Table V-4 is that no single destination was cited very frequently by any of the groups: not more than 4 per cent indicated a specific Canadian location, and not more than 5 per cent a specific country. Of those who did expect to move, however, a majority in both non-Francophone groups indicated they would do so within Canada, while a majority of the French said they expected to leave Canada.

Table V-4. Residential Expectations in Ten Years, by language spoken at home

Question 22. Where do you think you'll actually be living ten years from now?

Area of expected residence	English (N=793)	French (N=529)	Other (N=37)
Same province	56% ^a	71%	34%
Different Canadian province	10	5	9
Atlantic	1	b	b
Quebec	1	2	—
Ontario	3	1	—
Prairies	2	1	4
B.C.	3	b	4
Province not indicated	1	b	—
Different country	8	8	6
United States	5	3	5
Great Britain	1	1	—
France	b	2	—
All other	1	1	1
No country named	1	1	—
Not sure	26	16	51
Total	100	100	100

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^bLess than one-half of 1 per cent.

These responses are much more easily interpreted on a regional basis, and Table V-5 clearly shows that the high rates of anticipated stability among the Francophones reflect primarily the expectations of those from Quebec. Of the two Francophone groups, those living outside Quebec were 16 per cent less likely to cite their own province, and in fact were 10 per cent less likely to do so than the Ontario Anglophones. Thus, it was the Quebec Francophones and the Ontario Anglophones who most often expected to remain in their own provinces. By contrast, fewer than half of the Anglophone youth from either Quebec or the Prairies indicated a firm intention to stay in their own provinces, and both of these groups expressed much uncertainty about where they would be living as young adults. Nonetheless, more Atlantic Anglophones expected to move: 19 per cent named other Canadian provinces and 6 per cent other countries.

Interesting regional variations may also be noted in the destinations cited by young people who firmly intended to move. These are made more visible when the groups are ordered according to the extent to which Canadian locations were cited over foreign ones:

Grouping	Per cent by which Canadian destinations were cited more frequently than foreign ones
Atlantic Anglophones	+ 13
Non-Quebec Francophones	+ 10
Ontario Anglophones	+ 2
Prairie Anglophones	+ 1
Quebec Anglophones	0
Quebec Francophones	- 6
B.C. Anglophones	- 6

There are three distinct levels in these figures. The Atlantic English and non-Quebec French clearly chose Canadian destinations over foreign ones; the Quebec, Ontario, and Prairie English showed an even balance in their intentions to stay in Canada or leave; and the Quebec French and British Columbia English more frequently anticipated emigrating from Canada.

To recapitulate, Table V-5 indicates that more Quebec Francophones expected to remain in their own province—and were least likely to anticipate a move to a different province; that more Atlantic Anglophones thought of moving to another province; that the Quebec and Prairie Anglophones were least certain about where they would take up residence as young adults—and least convinced of the virtues of staying in their own province; that the British Columbia Anglophones and Quebec Francophones were more likely to think about leaving Canada than of moving within their country; and, finally, that of the Anglophone groups, Ontarians were the most firm in their intentions to remain in their own province. It is clear that both region and ethnicity have a great deal of influence on how Canadian young people view their future position in Canadian society.

Table V-5. Regional Differences in Residential Expectations in Future, by language spoken at home

Area Where Respondent Expects to be Living in 10 Years	Per Cent Who Expect to Live in Different Locations in 10 Years ^a							
	French		English					
	Quebec (N=337)	Non-Quebec (N=192)	Atlantic (N=122)	Quebec (N=107)	Ontario (N=291)	Prairies (N=175)	B.C. (N=98)	
In same province	74	58	51	45	68	43	54	
In another Canadian province	2	16	19	11	6	12	5	
In another country	8	6	6	11	4	11	11	
Not sure	15	21	24	32	21	33	30	
Total	99	101	100	99	99	99	100	

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

Residential expectations were also examined in relation to age (see Table V-6). It turned out that the number of Francophones who expected to remain in their own province increased steadily from 63 per cent among those just entering their teen years to 84 per cent of those entering their twenties. This increment is therefore quite substantial, and it would appear to be accounted for both by shifts in intentions regarding mobility, and by less indecisiveness. Over the eight-year span, responses indicating uncertainty about the future fell from 20 to 9 per cent among the French, while expectations regarding mobility showed a similar drop from 17 to 7 per cent.

Table V-6. Age Differences in Residential Expectations in Future, by language spoken at home

Area Where Respondent Expects to be Living in 10 Years	Per Cent Who Expect to Live in Different Locations in 10 Years ^a							
	English				French			
	13-14 (N=261)	15-16 (N=260)	17-18 (N=202)	19-20 (N=68)	13-14 (N=161)	15-16 (N=162)	17-18 (N=140)	19-20 (N=60)
In same province	61	56	48	60	63	70	72	84
In another Canadian province	8	10	12	10	9	3	5	2
In another country	8	6	13	—	9	7	9	5
Not sure	23	28	26	30	20	20	13	9
Total	100	100	99	100	101	100	99	100

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

The most striking feature here is that none of these trends appears among Anglophone youth. Indeed, the responses of the older age groups suggest no increasing propensity to stay put but, if anything, increasing uncertainty. Even though at all ages more Anglophones than Francophones indicated they did not know where they would be located in the future, this difference widened considerably over the adolescent years: from 3 to 8 to 13 to 21 per cent. Thus, while virtually all Francophone youth had firm expectations by the age of 20, a substantial number of the Anglophones had still not made up their minds. These results suggest, in short, that Francophone youth decide where they are going to live as adults at a somewhat earlier age than do Anglophones.

Readiness to Move in Response to Economic Incentive

Economic considerations would appear largely to account for the regional differences found in expectations regarding residential mobility. When asked to rate their future job prospects (Questions 43 and 44), young people from the different regions made widely varying appraisals of the opportunities available to them both in their own province and in other parts of Canada. Part A of Table V-7 shows that the proportions who rated their

Table V.7. Perception of Job Opportunities in Own Province and Elsewhere in Canada, by language spoken at home and region

		Per Cent Giving Different Responses ^a								
Responses	French		English				Other			
	Quebec (N=337)	Non-Quebec (N=192)	Total (N=529)	Atlantic (N=122)	Quebec (N=107)	Ontario (N=291)	Prairies (N=175)	B.C. (N=98)	Total (N=793)	Total (N=37)
A. Job opportunities in own province										
Definitely good	43	32	40	21	37	43	29	41	35	26
Probably good	29	29	29	42	39	31	48	35	38	23
Fair	19	23	20	19	15	17	11	15	16	23
Probably not so good	4	6	4	5	3	3	4	4	4	2
Definitely not so good	1	2	2	1	3	1	1	3	2	1
I'm not sure	5	8	5	12	4	5	7	2	6	25
Total	101	100	100	101	101	100	100	100	101	100
B. Job opportunities somewhere else in Canada										
Definitely good	21	26	22	33	41	30	28	27	30	21
Probably good	29	32	30	38	40	37	35	44	38	35
Fair	25	22	24	15	11	19	24	17	19	22
Probably not so good	5	5	5	b	—	2	4	7	3	4
Definitely not so good	5	b	4	—	4	b	1	—	1	1
I'm not sure	15	14	15	14	4	11	8	5	10	16
Total	100	99	100	100	100	99	100	100	101	99

^a All percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

^b Less than one-half of 1 per cent.

prospects as "definitely good" in their own province ranged from lows of 21 to 29 per cent among the Atlantic and Prairie Anglophones to highs of 43 per cent among both the Quebec Francophones and the Ontario Anglophones. In general, young people who lived in areas where job opportunities were thought to be best more often indicated they expected to remain there, and vice versa. Moreover, the extent to which a group perceived its job prospects to be better in other provinces than at home turned out to be a good predictor of the proportion of young people from that region who expected to move when they were adults.¹ All in all, the migratory expectations of Canadian young people would appear to fit the usual pattern.

From a strictly behavioural point of view, of course, individual decisions to change a place of domicile would be analyzed in terms of the forces which both attract the individual from the outside and which tie him to the local environment. Decisions not to change residence when given strong motivation to do so constitute a rough kind of index of the strength of one's attachment to one's environment, including the local government. In survey, young people were placed in precisely this kind of situation when asked whether they would advise a friend to take the better of two job offers if it involved moving "about 1,000 miles away in a different province of Canada," or moving to the United States (Questions 18 and 19). An examination of the responses to these questions offers some clue to the relative strength of both provincial and national ties when tested against strong economic incentives.

These responses are reviewed in relation to language spoken at home, region, and age in Tables V-8 through V-10.² First, from Part A of Table V-8, it is clear that members of the three language groups were quite differently disposed to the prospects of moving within Canada. Anglophone young people demonstrated a readiness to accept employment opportunities wherever they might be found in Canada, while an even more clear-cut majority of

¹When regional groups were ranked by the proportion who expected to move to a specific Canadian province in the future (Table V-5) and by the extent to which they rated "definitely good" job prospects more often to be found in other provinces than at home, the resulting rankings showed a correlation of +.86.

Group	Per cent expecting to move to a different province	Job prospects in other provinces compared to those at home		Rank
		Rank		
Atlantic Anglophones	19	1	+12	1
Non-Quebec Francophones	16	2	- 6	4
Prairie Anglophones	12	3	- 1	3
Quebec Anglophones	11	4	+ 4	2
Ontario Anglophones	6	5	-13	5
B.C. Anglophones	5	6	-14	6
Quebec Francophones	2	7	-22	7

$$\rho = +.86$$

²A much more intensive analysis of these attachments will appear as part of Joseph M. Spina's doctoral dissertation, "Adolescent Attachment to Canada and Commitment to a National Community," Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, in progress.

Francophone youth rejected the idea of moving to a different Canadian province even if that meant getting a much better paying job. The "Others" were again closer to the Anglophone point of view than to the Francophone.

Table V-8. Readiness to Move under Economic Incentive, by language spoken at home

Per Cent Giving Different Responses ^a			
Responses	English (N=793)	French (N=529)	Other (N=37)
A. Readiness to move within Canada			
The job close to home which paid a pretty good salary	38	63	46
The job in another province which paid a lot better	52	31	53
I'm not sure	10	6	1
Total	100	100	100
B. Readiness to leave Canada			
Question 19. What if his choice was between a job close to home which paid a pretty good salary and a job in the United States which paid a lot better? Which would you tell him to take then?			
Responses	English (N=793)	French (N=529)	Other (N=37)
The job close to home which paid a pretty good salary	54	59	43
The job in the U.S. which paid a lot better	35	34	45
I'm not sure	11	7	12
Total	100	100	100

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases. Table shows unweighted case bases.

In Part B of the table, on the other hand, the English and French show much more agreement, and both substantially rejected the notion of emigrating to the United States in response to economic temptation. The "Others," on the other hand, reacted somewhat more favourably than the other groups to this possibility.

Although most Francophones would prefer not to migrate in either direction, it is revealing, nonetheless, that slightly more said they would recommend taking a job in the United States than in a different region of their own country (34 compared with 31 per cent). As might be anticipated, however, this discrepancy characterized the responses only of Francophones from Quebec. Table V-9 indicates that they, although not often in favour of either type of move, were nonetheless 7 per cent more likely to endorse a move to the United States than to a different province of Canada, while their counterparts living elsewhere in Canada were 9 per cent more receptive to job offers within the country.

Some of the other figures in Table V-9 represent sharp departures from the regional patterns found in earlier sections of this chapter, the most notable being the responses of Anglophone youth from the two coastal regions. The Atlantic English, while showing the greatest willingness to move between provinces, turned out to be least ready of all the Anglophone groups to accept job offers in either the United States or other regions of Canada; and the British Columbia Anglophones, who expressed the greatest reluctance to relocate within Canada, indicated strongly a readiness to do so if monetary gains were at stake. These discrepancies are somewhat perplexing, but perhaps do reflect genuine East-West differences in young people's readiness to take advantage of economic opportunities. The fact that these groups differed markedly in their views about moving elsewhere in Canada could, of course, be explained by the economic conditions in the respective regions.

Table V-9. Regional Variations in Readiness to Move under Economic Incentive, by language spoken at home

Language and region	Per Cent Who Would Advise a Friend to Move ^a	
	To another Canadian province	To the United States
French—Quebec (N=337)	27	34
—Non-Quebec (N=192)	46	37
English—Atlantic (N=122)	43	28
—Quebec (N=107)	45	43
—Ontario (N=291)	48	34
—Prairies (N=175)	63	39
—British Columbia (N=98)	56	37

^aAll percentages are computed from weighted bases and include those who are not sure. Table shows unweighted case bases.

The responses of the British Columbia Anglophones are also interesting when compared to the strong provincial orientation that group displayed in its evaluation of different levels of government in Canada. They gave their provincial government an even stronger vote of confidence than the Quebec Francophones gave theirs. In light of the present results, however, it would appear that the provincialism of the two groups is indeed different: that of the Quebec Francophones would seem clearly to over-ride economic advantage, while that of the British Columbia Anglophones just as clearly would not.

Finally, Table V-10 indicates that while older Anglophone youth were much more responsive than younger ones to the idea of changing provinces for economic gain, older Francophone youth were, if anything, less so than their juniors. Although at all ages more English than French recommended taking the better job, the discrepancies were considerably wider among older youth than younger: 40 and 25 per cent compared to 16 and 14 per cent. Neither Anglophones nor Francophones, however, displayed any shifts by age in their readiness to recommend accepting employment offers from the United States.

These results illustrate once again that as young people from the two cultures mature they come to reappraise their relation to the national environment in quite different ways.

Table V-10. Age Differences in Readiness to Move under Economic Incentive, by language spoken at home

Language and age	Per Cent Who Would Advise a Friend to Move ^a	
	To another Canadian province	To the United States
English—13-14 (N=261)	44	33
15-16 (N=260)	51	41
17-18 (N=202)	56	33
19-20 (N=68)	64	33
French—13-14 (N=161)	28	36
15-16 (N=162)	37	38
17-18 (N=140)	31	29
19-20 (N=60)	24	35

^aAll percentages computed from weighted bases and include those who are not sure. Table shows unweighted case bases.

Between the years of 13 and 20, Anglophone youth could be said to expand their territorial horizons quite literally while the Francophones seem to be limiting theirs.

We can conclude that neither the Francophones nor the Anglophones showed a propensity to value economic advantage above national attachments; that the provincial ties of the Quebec Francophones would appear to be relatively less vulnerable to outside economic stimuli than those of any other group; and that, among the Anglophones, provincial attachments seem to be stronger in the East than in the West, and to be relatively less important to older youth than to younger.

In the initial stage of this inquiry a series of exploratory interviews was carried out with 14 Anglophone and Francophone young people in Montreal, Ottawa, and Calgary. The first interviews were completely unstructured and were conducted in order to get a preliminary feeling for the kinds of subjects young people would identify when asked to talk freely about their country. Later interviews were partially structured in order to test the feasibility of certain lines of questioning and to suggest the phrasings of questions.

Next, a questionnaire was drafted and pretested on 124 Anglophone and Francophone youths. These pretests were carried out in Montreal and Ottawa with classes of high-school students,¹ and in Toronto with a small sample of young people contacted in their homes. Following the trial run in Toronto, the final version of the questionnaire was prepared.

The questionnaire was written in English and then double-translated. Translations were checked by a number of observers for suggestions and corrections. In its final form it was a 20-page self-administered questionnaire taking 30 to 40 minutes to complete. Copies are shown in both English and French in Appendix B.

This questionnaire was then administered to a national sample of Canadian young people by Canadian Facts Limited of Toronto. Field work was conducted between May and early July of 1965. The survey was carried out as part of the field work for the Commission's national interview survey of Canadian adults, the general procedure being to give questionnaires to all persons in the specified age range located in the households contacted in the main survey. No young people were sampled other than in households where an adult had already been interviewed. Age was the sole criterion for the selection of respondents. Persons between 13 and 20 were given questionnaires, regardless of

¹The Commission is grateful to Doctor Jacqueline Massé, who pretested the questionnaire among secondary school students in Montreal, and to Doctor Harry Pullen and Mr. J.W. Neil, of the Collegiate Institute Board of Ottawa, and to Père Rosaire Cloutier, O.M.I., of the High School of the University of Ottawa, who granted us permission to conduct pretests with his students.

whether they were married or single, working or attending school. Young people who had been interviewed as part of the adult survey, however, were ruled ineligible to receive a youth questionnaire.

The sample employed in the main study of adults was a weighted, multi-stage, stratified area random sample of 4,163 names appearing on the electoral lists of the 1963 general election. Stratification was carried out in the following steps. First the country was divided into five regions (excluding the Yukon and the Northwest Territories): the four Atlantic Provinces; Quebec; Ontario; the three Prairie Provinces; and British Columbia. The electoral districts (as defined by the *Report* of the Chief Electoral Officer for the 1963 election) were then classified as either urban or rural. An urban district was defined as one in which all the polling areas were considered in the *Report* of the Chief Electoral Officer to be urban or one which, irrespective of the classification of its polling areas, included one of the 23 large urban centres as determined by the 1961 census.² Any districts not classified as urban were automatically classified as rural.

The urban and rural districts in each of the four regions outside Quebec were then divided into three strata according to the proportion of Canadians of French origin in each district compared with the proportion in the region. In Quebec the districts were divided according to the relative proportions of Canadians whose origins were other than French (see Table A-1).

The electoral districts in which interviews were to be held were chosen at random from each of the resulting strata. From one to 16 districts were chosen in each stratum according to the relative size of the stratum. From the universe of 263 districts, 142 (or more than half) were chosen (see Table A-1). The total number of interviews to be given was fixed at 4,000, the number to be given in each stratum being determined proportionally according to the population as given in the 1961 census (see Table A-2).

In weighting the minority groups (French Canadians outside Quebec and non-French within Quebec) the polling areas of each district in the sample were divided into two categories: minority and majority. In the regions outside Quebec a minority category was formed by all the polls in which French names were at least 25 per cent of all the names listed for the polling area concerned. The remaining polls were assigned to the majority category. In Quebec a similar process was followed except that the criterion of division was reversed. The respective proportions of electors registered in each category of polling area served to determine the number of interviews to be given in each of the two categories of polling area in each electoral district sampled. Both minority categories were oversampled at a ratio of 3:1. Non-French electors living outside Quebec were undersampled at a ratio of 2:3 while the Quebec French were sampled according to their actual representation in the population.

It had been agreed that the addresses at which interviews would be conducted would be chosen from 400 polling areas. Thus 10 addresses would be taken in each of the polling areas sampled. However, since the weighting necessitated that the minority lists be tripled

²These centres are: St. John's, Newfoundland; Halifax, Nova Scotia; Saint John, New Brunswick; Montreal, Quebec City, Sherbrooke, and Trois-Rivières, Quebec; Hamilton, Kingston, Kitchener, London, Oshawa, Ottawa, Sudbury, Toronto, and Windsor, Ontario; Winnipeg, Manitoba; Regina and Saskatoon, Saskatchewan; Calgary and Edmonton, Alberta; Vancouver and Victoria, British Columbia.

it was found that in choosing a list based on "blocs" of 12 (unweighted) potential interviews, about 400 polling areas would be covered.³

The number of polling areas, whether majority or minority, to be chosen in each electoral district was obtained by dividing by 12 the number of interviews to be made in each category of each electoral district.⁴ The polling areas within each group were chosen at random. However, as the interviews of minority groups were to be tripled, the minority polling areas chosen were immediately tripled; that is, for every minority polling area chosen two others were drawn. Within the areas drawn, whether majority or minority, addresses equal to the number of proposed interviews were drawn at a given interval (the number of registered electors divided by the number of interviews), the first residence being chosen at random within the first interval.

While choosing the addresses outside Quebec, each time the name of the elector at the address chosen was French, two other addresses were chosen from among those tenants who had French names. In Quebec a similar procedure was followed when the name chosen was *not* French. However, outside Quebec every third name chosen which was not French was eliminated in order to keep the total number of interviews at about 4,000.

It was arbitrarily decided that should it not prove possible to conduct an interview at the chosen address, the neighbouring address would be substituted. However, substitution for "minority" addresses was made from among the minority group whether or not the address substituted was next door.

In the original design for the survey, the field plan called for an individual administration of the questionnaire to each young person who turned up in the sample. Interviewers were instructed to deliver questionnaires in person to all respondents, and to remain in the household while the questionnaire was being filled out. After the field work had been launched, however, it became evident that the number of call-backs would seriously alter the schedule for the main survey, which called for the completion of over 4,000 adult interviews. Therefore, it was decided that questionnaires could be left with an adult member of the household and passed on to the adolescent. These questionnaires were then either mailed back to the field office or picked up by the interviewer on a subsequent field trip. All in all, 23 per cent of the completed schedules were deposited and returned in this way, but 77 per cent were delivered in person to the respondents.

Questionnaires were available in both French and English and were distributed according to the language spoken most frequently by the respondent at home. Persons speaking languages other than English or French at home were given English-language questionnaires unless they specifically requested a French form. It turned out, however, that 78 young people who filled out English-language forms indicated on their questionnaires that

³It was expected that about 8 per cent of the polling areas (that is, 32 out of 400) would be in the minority category. These being tripled, 64 areas would be added. Hence it was agreed to establish the approximate number of 400 polling areas at 336 (unweighted) in order not to exceed 400 (weighted). Since 4,000 interviews were to be held, the choice of 336 polling areas led to the decision that 12 addresses should be chosen in each polling area.

⁴For example, in a district where it had been established that 15 interviews would be held in the minority group and 24 in the majority group, the division of 15 and 24 by 12 gave 1.25 polling areas in the minority group and 2 in the majority.

they spoke French most often at home. These persons therefore had to be dropped from the analysis in the sections dealing with assessments of the utility of bilingual skills, and with the influence of intergroup contacts on attitudes regarding bilingualism.

In all, 1,365 complete and usable questionnaires were returned for analysis. This represented 66.6 per cent of the weighted total of young people located in the survey. As it turned out, however, the rates of response varied considerably over the eight ages sampled, and ranged from a high of 76.2 per cent among 13-year-olds to a low of 47.4 per cent of the 20-year-olds (*see Table A-3*). These differentials were produced in part by the fact that older youth were much less often found at home than their juniors, and in part because a number of 19- and 20-year-olds were ineligible to receive questionnaires because they were interviewed as members of the adult sample. This necessitated the reweighting of each individual according to the completion rate for all persons his age, a step which, when combined with the sampling specifications, resulted in a final set of individual weights ranging from 26 to 189 (*see Table A-4*). All computations and calculations for the analysis were therefore conducted on a total weighted case base of 119,039.

Table A-1. Sample Districts, by strata

Region	Type of electoral district	Stratum	Minority population* as percentage of district population	Electoral districts in sample
Atlantic Provinces	Urban	I	Less than 5	St. John's West, St. John's East
		II	5 - 10	Halifax
		III	More than 10	Saint John-Albert
	Rural	I	Less than 25	Queens, York-Sunbury, Victoria-Carleton, Royal, Cumberland, Colchester-Hants, Pictou, Cape Breton South
		II	25 - 50	Westmorland, Northumberland-Miramichi, Inverness-Richmond
		III	More than 50	Restigouche-Madawaska, Kent
Quebec	Urban	I	Less than 5	Hochelaga, Laurier, Sainte-Marie, Québec, Montmorency, Papineau, Trois-Rivières
		II	5 - 25	Cartier, Maisonneuve-Rosemont, Laval, Sherbrooke, Québec sud, Mercier, Dollard, Longueuil, Outremont-Saint-Jean
		III	More than 25	Verdun, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce, Sainte-Anne
	Rural	I	Less than 5	Bellechasse, Joliette-L'Assomption-Montcalm, Rimouski, Beauce, Lévis, Chicoutimi, Lac Saint-Jean, Rivière-du-Loup-Témiscouata, Dorchester, Saint-Hyacinthe-Bagot, Richelieu-Verchères, Charlevoix
		II	5 - 25	
		III	More than 25	

*French Canadians in regions outside Quebec, non-French within Quebec.

Table A-1. — (Continued)

Region	Type of electoral district	Stratum	Minority population*	Electoral districts in sample
			as percentage of district population	
Ontario	Urban	II	5 – 20	Châteauguay-Huntingdon-Laprairie, Saint-Jean-Iberville-Napierville, Hull, Gaspé, Terrebonne, Richmond-Wolfe, Compton-Frontenac, Beauharnois-Salaberry
		III	More than 20	Gatineau, Brome-Missisquoi, Argenteuil-Deux-Montagnes, Chambly-Rouville
		I	Less than 10	Ontario, Hamilton West, Davenport, York Centre, Hamilton South, Trinity, Danforth, York-Humber, London, Rosedale, York-Scarborough, Kingston, Waterloo North, York East
	Rural	II	10 – 25	Carleton, Essex West
		III	More than 25	Ottawa West, Ottawa East, Russell
		I	Less than 10	Brantford, Halton, York North, Waterloo South, Grey-Bruce, Grey North, Lambton West, Huron, Prince Edward-Lennox, Hastings South, Wentworth, Peterborough, Brant-Haldimand, Middlesex East, Leeds, Niagara Falls
Prairie Provinces	Urban	II	10 – 25	Algoma West, Kent, Essex South, Renfrew South
		III	More than 25	Algoma East, Glengarry-Prescott, Simcoe East, Stormont
		I	Less than 4.3	Saskatoon, Winnipeg North
	Rural	II	4.3 – 5.2	Edmonton-Strathcona, Calgary South
		III	More than 5.2	Winnipeg South, Winnipeg North Centre
		I	Less than 10	Marquette, Selkirk, Brandon-Souris, Portage-Neepawa, Yorkton, Moose Mountain, Moose Jaw-Lake Centre, Qu'Appelle, Red Deer, Battle River-Camrose, Acadia, Bow River, Wetaskiwin, Medicine Hat, Macleod
		II	10 – 20	Lisgar, Rosthern, Prince Albert, Jasper-Edson

*French Canadians in regions outside Quebec, non-French within Quebec.

Table A-1. -- (Continued)

Region	Type of electoral district	Stratum	Minority population* as percentage of district population	Electoral districts in sample
British Columbia	Urban	III	More than 20	Saint-Boniface, Provencher
		I	Less than 3.2	Vancouver South
		II	3.2	Vancouver East, Victoria
	Rural	III	More than 3.2	Vancouver-Burrard
		I	Less than 3.7	Coast-Capilano, Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands, Okanagan Boundary
		III	3.7 - 4.8	New Westminster, Kootenay West, Okanagan-Revelstoke
		III	More than 4.8	Comox-Alberni, Burnaby-Coquitlam, Kootenay East

* French Canadians in regions outside Quebec, non-French within Quebec.

Table A-2. The Canadian Population and Number of Interviews, by regional strata

	Population	Per cent	Number of interviews
Atlantic Provinces	1,897,425	10.4	416
Quebec	5,259,211	28.9	1,156
Ontario	6,236,092	34.3	1,372
Prairie Provinces	3,178,811	17.5	700
British Columbia	1,629,082	8.9	356
Total	18,208,724	100.0	4,000

Table A-3. Rate of Response, by age

Age	Total located (weighted)	Total returned and usable (weighted)	Completion rate (per cent)	Adjusted weight
13	1,797	1,370	76.2	13
14	1,702	1,121	65.9	15
15	1,734	1,231	71.0	14
16	1,843	1,331	72.2	14
17	1,518	976	64.3	16
18	1,672	987	59.0	17
19	1,050	544	51.8	19
20	521	247	47.4	21
Not given	—	81	—	
Total	11,837	7,888	66.6	

Table A-4. Adjusted Weights for Respondents

Age	Language and Region			
	Quebec French	Quebec Non-French	Non-Quebec French	Non-Quebec Non-French
13	78	26	26	117
14	90	30	30	135
15	84	28	28	126
16	84	28	28	126
17	96	32	32	144
18	103	34	34	153
19	114	38	38	171
20	126	42	42	189

NORC-488
3/65

CANADIAN FACTS LIMITED
and
NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER

Opinion Survey of Canadian Youth

You are one of about 2,000 people in Canada who have been selected to take part in this survey.

The purpose of the study is to find out what Canadians think of their country today, and about certain other events of the day.

It is important that you answer the questions exactly the way you feel. There are no right or wrong answers to any questions, and no one you know will ever see the answers you put down. IT IS NOT A TEST.

Most of the questions can be answered by putting a circle around one of the numbers printed next to the answers for each question. For example:

In which age group do you fall?

(circle one answer)

Under 25 1
25 to 39 2
40 or above 3

Please do not write in the right hand margins. The numbers in the margins are to help us add up the answers back in the office.

PLEASE TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE AND BEGIN WITH QUESTION 1. THANK YOU.

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1/	2/	3/	4/	5/	6/	7/	8/	9/	10/	11/	

-2-

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1. As you know, Canada now has a new flag. Some people still think we would be better off with a flag which makes you think more of Canada's past history, while other people like having a flag that is completely new. If you still had a choice, which type of flag would you like better?

(Circle one answer)

A flag which makes you think of Canada's past	1	12/0
A completely new flag	2	
I'm not sure	3	
I wouldn't care one way or the other	4	

2. Which one do you think most other Canadians your age would like better--if the choice were still open?

(Circle one answer)

A flag which makes you think of Canada's past	6	13/5
A completely new flag	7	
They'd probably be divided about 50-50	8	
I'm not sure	9	

3. Suppose that votes were taken today on this question in all ten Canadian provinces. How do you think the votes would come out? (Circle one answer for each province)

	THEY'D VOTE FOR....		
	A FLAG WHICH MAKES YOU THINK OF CANADA'S PAST	A COMPLETELY NEW FLAG	I'M NOT SURE
Alberta	1	2	3
British Columbia	5	6	7
Manitoba	1	2	3
New Brunswick	5	6	7
Newfoundland	1	2	3
Nova Scotia	5	6	7
Ontario	1	2	3
Prince Edward Island	5	6	7
Quebec	1	2	3
Saskatchewan	5	6	7

24/

-3-

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4. Suppose that votes were taken on a lot of other questions about the future of Canada. Do you think Canadians would agree on most things about Canada's future, or that they'd tend to disagree?

(Circle one answer)

They'd agree on practically everything	1
They'd agree on most things	2
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	3
They'd disagree on most things	4
They'd disagree on practically everything	5
I'm not sure	6

25/0

5. How about people from Eastern Canada and people from Western Canada--would they agree or disagree on most questions about Canada's future?

(Circle one answer)

They'd agree on practically everything	1
They'd agree on most things	2
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	3
They'd disagree on most things	4
They'd disagree on practically everything	5
I'm not sure	6

26/0

6. How about Catholics and Protestants--would they agree or disagree on Canada's future?

(Circle one answer)

They'd agree on practically everything	1
They'd agree on most things	2
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	3
They'd disagree on most things	4
They'd disagree on practically everything	5
I'm not sure	6

27/0

7. How about French-speaking Canadians and English-speaking Canadians--would they agree or disagree on Canada's future?

(Circle one answer)

They'd agree on practically everything	1
They'd agree on most things	2
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	3
They'd disagree on most things	4
They'd disagree on practically everything	5
I'm not sure	6

28/0

-4-

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8. How about people born in Canada and people born outside of Canada--
would they agree or disagree on Canada's future?

(Circle one answer)

They'd agree on practically everything	1
They'd agree on most things	2
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	3
They'd disagree on most things	4
They'd disagree on practically everything	5
I'm not sure	6

29/0

9. How about people from rich families and people from poor families--
would they agree or disagree on Canada's future?

(Circle one answer)

They'd agree on practically everything	1
They'd agree on most things	2
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	3
They'd disagree on most things	4
They'd disagree on practically everything	5
I'm not sure	6

30/0

10. What about people from the big cities and people from the rural areas--
would they agree or disagree about Canada's future?

(Circle one answer)

They'd agree on practically everything	1
They'd agree on most things	2
They'd agree on half and disagree on half	3
They'd disagree on most things	4
They'd disagree on practically everything	5
I'm not sure	6

31/0

11. Which countries would you name as Canada's three best friends?

32/
33/

BEST FRIEND: _____

34/

SECOND BEST FRIEND: _____

35/

THIRD BEST FRIEND: _____

36/

-5-

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12. Some people think that Canadians and Americans are very much alike, while others think they are very different. What would you say?

(Circle one answer)

I'd say they were alike in most ways 1
 I'd say they were different in most ways 2
 I'm not sure 3

37/0

13. On which of the following things would you say Canadians and Americans are definitely alike, and on which are they definitely different?
 (Circle one answer for each part of the question)

	DEFINITELY ALIKE	DEFINITELY DIFFERENT	I'M NOT SURE	
(a) the types of food they eat	1	2	3	38/4
(b) their friendliness to strangers	5	6	7	39/8
(c) their hair and clothing styles	1	2	3	40/4
(d) the language they speak	5	6	7	41/8
(e) the types of music they like	1	2	3	42/4
(f) the types of jobs they hold	5	6	7	43/8
(g) the amount of money they have	1	2	3	44/4
(h) the importance they attach to religion..	5	6	7	45/8
(i) the importance they attach to having a good time	1	2	3	46/4
(j) the importance they attach to making a lot of money	5	6	7	47/8
(k) the kind of government they have	1	2	3	48/4 49/ 50/

14. Who would you say have more in common--English-speaking Canadians and Americans or English-speaking Canadians and French-speaking Canadians?

(Circle one answer)

English-speaking Canadians and Americans 5
 English-speaking Canadians and French-speaking Canadians.. 6
 I'm not sure 7

51/8

-6-

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15. Which government would you say does the most for people?

(Circle one answer)

The government of your city, town or township	1
The government of your province	2
The government of Canada	3
I'm not sure	4

52/0

16. Which one would you say does the least for people?

(Circle one answer)

The government of your city, town or township	6
The government of your province	7
The government of Canada	8
I'm not sure	9

53/5

17. Which government would be best to work for--if the salary was the same on each job?

(Circle one answer)

The government of your city, town or township	1
The government of your province	2
The government of Canada	3
I'm not sure	4

54/0

18. Suppose you had a friend who had just finished school and was offered two jobs. The first was close to home and paid a pretty good salary. The second one paid a lot more money but was about 1,000 miles away in a different province of Canada. If you were asked for advice, which job would you tell your friend to take?

(Circle one answer)

The job close to home which paid a pretty good salary	1
The job in another province which paid a lot better	2
I'm not sure	3

55/0

- 7 -

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19. What if his choice was between a job close to home which paid a pretty good salary and a job in the United States which paid a lot better? Which would you tell him to take then?

(Circle one answer)

The job close to home which paid a pretty good salary	5
The job in the U. S. which paid a lot better	6
I'm not sure	7

56/8

20. In which Canadian provinces--including your own--do you think you might like to live at some time in the future?

(Circle all those where you think you might like to live)

Alberta	0
British Columbia	1
Manitoba	2
New Brunswick	3
Newfoundland	4
Nova Scotia	5
Ontario	6
Prince Edward Island	7
Quebec	8
Saskatchewan	9
None. I hope to live outside of Canada in the future X	

57/y

58/

21. In which Canadian provinces would you definitely never want to live?

(Circle all those where you would never want to live)

Alberta	0
British Columbia	1
Manitoba	2
New Brunswick	3
Newfoundland	4
Nova Scotia	5
Ontario	6
Prince Edward Island	7
Quebec	8
Saskatchewan	9
None. There is no province where I definitely wouldn't want to live X	

59/y

60/

-8-

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22. Where do you think you'll actually be living ten years from now?

(Circle one answer)

In this province	1
In another Canadian province	2
(Which one? _____)	
In another country	3
(Which one? _____)	
I'm not sure	4

61/0

62/
63/

23. A. Out of every ten Canadians how many would you guess speak English as their first language?

NUMBER: _____

64/

B. Out of every ten Canadians how many would you guess speak French as their first language?

NUMBER: _____

65/

C. Out of every ten Canadians how many would you guess speak a language other than English or French as their first language?

NUMBER: _____

66/

(MAKE SURE YOUR NUMBERS ADD UP TO 10)

24. Besides the English and the French, what other groups of people do you know about who live in Canada?

67/

68/

69/

79/1
80/4

-9-

25. On the whole, would you say that English-speaking Canadians and French-speaking Canadians are pretty much alike or pretty much different?

DO NOT
WRITE
IN THIS
SPACE
BEGIN
DECK 2

(1-4)

5/0

I'd say they are alike in most ways 1
 I'd say they are different in most ways 2
 I'm not sure 3

26. On which of the following things would you say that French-Canadians and English-Canadians are definitely alike and on which are they definitely different? (Circle one answer for each part of the question)

	DEFINITELY ALIKE	DEFINITELY DIFFERENT	I'M NOT SURE	
(a) the types of food they eat	1	2	3	6/4
(b) their friendliness to strangers	5	6	7	7/8
(c) their hair and clothing styles	1	2	3	8/4
(d) the language they speak	5	6	7	9/8
(e) the types of music they like	1	2	3	10/4
(f) the types of jobs they hold	5	6	7	11/8
(g) the amount of money they have	1	2	3	12/4
(h) the importance they attach to religion	5	6	7	13/8
(i) the importance they attach to having a good time	1	2	3	14/4
(j) the importance they attach to making a lot of money	5	6	7	15/8
(k) the kind of government they want Canada to have	1	2	3	16/4
(l) the type of country they want Canada to be in the future	5	6	7	17/8
				18/
				19/

-10-

DO NOT
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27. Who have more in common--French-Canadians and Americans or French-Canadians and English-Canadians?

(Circle one answer)

French-Canadians and Americans	5	
French-Canadians and English-Canadians	6	
I'm not sure	7	

20/8

28. How well do you speak French right now?

(Circle one answer)

I know hardly a word of French	1	
I know a few French words and phrases but I don't really speak French at all	2	
I speak a little French, but not enough to carry on a conversation	3	
I can carry on a conversation in French, but not very easily	4	
I speak French without any trouble at all	5	

21/0

29. How useful would it be to you right now to be able to speak French--or speak it better?

(Circle one answer)

Very useful: I could use it every day	1	
Quite useful: I could use it often but not every day	2	
Slightly useful: I could use it sometimes but not very often	3	
Not useful at all: I don't think I'd ever use it	4	

22/0

30. Thinking ahead to the future--say ten years from now--how useful do you think it would be to you then to be able to speak French?

(Circle one answer)

Very useful: I could use it every day	6	
Quite useful: I could use it often but not every day	7	
Slightly useful: I could use it sometimes but not very often	8	
Not useful at all: I don't think I'd ever use it	9	

23/5

-11-

DO NOT
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31. In which of the following ways would a better speaking knowledge of French definitely be helpful to you--either now or in the future?
(Circle one answer for each part of the question)

	WOULD BE HELPFUL IN IN THIS WAY	WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL IN THIS WAY	
(a) In talking with my friends	1	2	24/0
(b) In making new friends	4	5	25/3
(c) In going out on dates	7	8	26/6
(d) In getting better grades in school	1	2	27/0
(e) In finding a job	4	5	28/3
(f) In getting ahead in the line of work I hope to enter	7	8	29/6
(g) In getting around to more places in my community	1	2	30/0
(h) In traveling to different parts of Canada	4	5	31/3
(i) In reading or watching television	7	8	32/6
			33/

32. Do you have any close friends who are French-speaking--that is, who speak French at home?

(Circle one answer)

Yes	1	34/0
No	2	

33. Are there any French-speaking students in your class at school (or in the class you were in when you last attended school)?

(Circle one answer)

Yes	4	35/3
No	5	
I don't know	6	

34. Do any French-speaking families live within about a half mile of where you live?

(Circle one answer)

Yes	1	36/0
No	2	
I don't know	3	

-12-

DO NOT
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SPACE

35. About how often do you hear French spoken in your community--other than in French classes at school?

(Circle one answer)

Practically every day	1
Once or twice a week	2
Occasionally--but not as often as once a week	3
Never	4

37/0

36. Here are some statements other people your age have made about speaking two languages. Would you agree or disagree with them? (Circle one answer for each part of the question.)

	I'D AGREE WITH THAT	I'D DISAGREE WITH THAT	I'M NOT SURE	
(a) French and English should be required subjects in all Canadian schools	1	2	3	38/0
(b) It would be a good idea to have road signs printed in both English and French all over Canada	5	6	7	39/4
(c) As far as I'm concerned, Canada should have just one official language--English	1	2	3	40/0
(d) As far as I'm concerned, Quebec should have just one official language--French	5	6	7	41/4
(e) It would be a good thing if all Canadians could speak both French and English	1	2	3	42/0
(f) There is no reason why an English-speaking Canadian should have to learn French if he is never going to use it.	5	6	7	43/4

37. Right now, how good would you say relations are between English-Canadians and French-Canadians--would you say good, fair or poor?

(Circle one answer)

Good	1
Fair	2
Poor	3
I'm not sure	4

44/0

-13-

DO NOT
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38. Right now would you say that English-French relations in Canada are getting better, getting worse, or staying about the same?

(Circle one answer)

Getting better	1
Getting worse	2
Staying about the same	3
I'm not sure	4

45/0

39. Over the next ten years, do you think English-French relations in Canada will get better, get worse, or stay about the same as they are now?

(Circle one answer)

Get better	6
Get worse	7
Stay about the same as they are now	8
I'm not sure	9

46/5

40. How important do you think each of the following things is in helping a young person to get ahead in Canadian life today? (Circle one answer for each part of the question.)

	VERY IMPORTANT	SLIGHTLY IMPORTANT	UNIMPORTANT	
(a) Get good grades in school	1	2	3	47/0
(b) Know the right people	5	6	7	48/4
(c) Come from the right family	1	2	3	49/0
(d) Get a university education	5	6	7	50/4
(e) Come from the right religious group.	1	2	3	51/0
(f) Be born in Canada	5	6	7	52/4
(g) Be able to speak both French and English	1	2	3	53/0
(h) Have a nice personality	5	6	7	54/4
(i) Work hard	1	2	3	55/0
(j) Have parents with a lot of money ...	5	6	7	56/4

-14-

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41. What type of work does your father do? (If your father is not living please put down the type of work he did during most of his lifetime)

OCCUPATION OR
TYPE OF WORK _____

57/
58/

42. What occupation or line of work do you hope to get into eventually?

OCCUPATION OR
LINE OF WORK _____

59/
60/

43. After you have finished all your schooling, how good do you think your chances will be of finding a good job somewhere in this province?

(Circle one answer)

Definitely good	1
Probably good	2
Fair	3
Probably not so good	4
Definitely not so good	5
I'm not sure	6

61/0

44. After you have finished all your schooling, how good do you think your chances would be of finding a good job somewhere else in Canada?

(Circle one answer)

Definitely good	1
Probably good	2
Fair	3
Probably not so good	4
Definitely not so good	5
I'm not sure	6

62/0

-15-

DO NOT
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SPACE

45. In which province do you live?

(Circle your province)

Alberta	0	63/y
British Columbia	1	
Manitoba	2	
New Brunswick	3	
Newfoundland	4	
Nova Scotia	5	
Ontario	6	
Prince Edward Island	7	
Quebec	8	
Saskatchewan	9	

46. Which other Canadian provinces have you either lived in or visited?

(Circle all the other
provinces in which
you have lived or
visited.)

Alberta	0	64/y
British Columbia	1	
Manitoba	2	
New Brunswick	3	
Newfoundland	4	
Nova Scotia	5	
Ontario	6	
Prince Edward Island	7	
Quebec	8	
Saskatchewan	9	
None. I have never been in any other Canadian province	X	65/y

79/2
80/4+8

-16-

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BEGIN
DECK 3

47. Please indicate your sex.

(Circle one)

Male 1 (1-4) 5/0
Female 2

48. How old were you on your last birthday?

(Circle one answer)

Thirteen 3 6/y
Fourteen 4
Fifteen 5
Sixteen 6
Seventeen 7
Eighteen 8
Nineteen 9
Twenty 0

49. Are you currently attending school?

(Circle one answer)

Yes: full-time 1 7/0
Yes: part-time 2
No: not at all 3

50. Are you currently working?

(Circle one answer)

Yes: full-time 1 8/0
(What is your occupation?)

Yes: part-time 2
No: not at all 3

9/
10/

51. By next summer, how many years of schooling will you have completed--
counting from the first grade of elementary school?

NUMBER OF YEARS: _____

11/
12/

52. By next summer, how many years altogether will you have studied
French in school?

NUMBER OF YEARS: _____

13/
14/

-17-

DO NOT
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SPACE

53. After next summer, how many more years do you expect to attend school altogether--including high school, college, university, technical school, business college, or anything else?

NUMBER OF YEARS: _____

15/
16/

54. Were you born in Canada?

(Circle one answer)

Yes 1 17/0
No 2

55. Were your parents born in Canada?

(Circle one answer)

Yes: both parents were 6 18/5
No: my father was but my mother wasn't... 7
No: my mother was but my father wasn't... 8
No: neither parent was 9

56. From which country outside of Canada did your father's ancestors originally come?

COUNTRY: _____

19/

Check here if you don't know

20/

57. From which country outside of Canada did your mother's ancestors originally come?

COUNTRY: _____

21/

Check here if you don't know

22/

-18-

DO NOT
WRITE
IN THIS
SPACE

58. People your age often disagree with their parents. How often do you disagree with your parents on the following things?
(Circle one answer for each part of the question.)

	WE DISAGREE....			23/0
	OFTEN	SOMETIMES	NEVER	
(a) School	1	2	3	
(b) What I do in my spare time	5	6	7	24/4
(c) Politics	1	2	3	25/0
(d) The line of work I want to go into	5	6	7	26/4
(e) Religion	1	2	3	27/0
(f) Who I go out with on dates	5	6	7	28/4
(g) The amount of time I study	1	2	3	29/0
				30/

59. What language do you most often speak at home?

(Circle one answer)

English	1	31/0
French	2	
Other (Which one?)	3	

60. How many years, altogether, did your father attend school?

(Circle one answer)

He never attended school	1	32/0
1 - 4 years	2	
5 - 7 years	3	
8 years	4	
9 - 11 years	5	
12 years	6	
13 - 15 years	7	
16 years or more	8	
I'm not sure	9	

-19-

DO NOT
WRITE
IN THIS
SPACE

61. How many years, altogether, did your mother attend school?

(Circle one answer)

She never attended school	1	33/0
1 - 4 years	2	
5 - 7 years	3	
8 years	4	
9 - 11 years	5	
12 years	6	
13 - 15 years	7	
16 years or more	8	
I'm not sure	9	

62. To which religious group do you belong?

(Circle one answer)

Catholic	1	34/0
Protestant	2	

(Which denomination?)

Other

(Which one?)


63. What was your family's total income (before taxes) last year?
(If you don't know exactly, please guess.)

(Circle one answer)

Under \$2,000	0	35/y
\$ 2,000 - 2,999	1	
\$ 3,000 - 3,999	2	
\$ 4,000 - 4,999	3	
\$ 5,000 - 5,999	4	
\$ 6,000 - 6,999	5	
\$ 7,000 - 7,999	6	
\$ 8,000 - 9,999	7	
\$10,000 - 14,999	8	
\$15,000 or more	9	

64. Here is a blank map of Canada. It has no place names on it at all. Your job is to write in five words or phrases that you think best describe Canada. You can put down anything you want, and write anywhere on the map, but you can only put on five things.

Which five places or things do you think best describe Canada?



DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE						
36 /	37 /	38 /	39 /	40 /	41 /	42 /
79 / 3						80 / 4 + 8

NORC 488
3/65

NORC 488
3/65

CANADIAN FACTS LIMITED

et

CENTRE NATIONAL DE RECHERCHE D'OPINION PUBLIQUE

Etude d'Opinion de la Jeunesse du Canada

Vous êtes l'un des quelques 2,000 jeunes qui ont été sélectionnés au Canada pour prendre part à cette étude.

Le but de l'étude est de connaître ce que les habitants du Canada pensent de leur pays et de certains événements actuels.

Il est important que vous répondiez aux questions exactement comme bon vous semble. Pour aucune question, il n'y a de bonne ou de mauvaise réponse, et personne de votre connaissance ne verra jamais les réponses que vous avez rédigées. CE N'EST PAS UN TEST.

Il est possible de répondre à la plupart des questions en entourant d'un cercle un des chiffres imprimés à côté des réponses à chaque question. Par exemple:

Dans quel groupe d'âge êtes vous?

(entourez une réponse)

Moins de 25 ans ①

25 à 39 2

40 ou plus 3

N'écrivez rien, s'il vous plaît, dans la marge à droite de chaque page. Les chiffres dans cette marge sont là pour nous aider à additionner les réponses quand elles reviendront dans nos bureaux.

TOURNEZ LA PAGE, S'IL VOUS PLAÎT, ET COMMENCEZ AVEC LA QUESTION 1

MERCI.

N'ÉCRIVEZ PAS DANS CET ESPACE S'IL VOUS PLAÎT										
1/	2/	3/	4/	5/	6/	7/	8/	9/	10/	11/

-2-

1. Comme vous le savez, le Canada a maintenant un nouveau drapeau. Certains pensent encore qu'il vaudrait mieux avoir un drapeau faisant penser au passé historique du Canada, alors que d'autres sont heureux d'avoir un drapeau complètement nouveau. Si vous aviez encore le choix, quel genre de drapeau aimerez-vous mieux?

(entourez une réponse)

Un drapeau qui vous fait penser au passé du Canada	1	12/0
Un drapeau complètement nouveau	2	
Je ne suis pas sûr	3	
L'un ou l'autre, cela me serait égal	4	

2. Lequel, à votre avis, la plupart des habitants du Canada de votre âge aimeraient mieux, si le choix était encore possible?

(entourez une réponse)

Un drapeau qui fait penser au passé du Canada	6	13/5
Un drapeau complètement nouveau	7	
Ils seraient probablement divisés moitié-moitié	8	
Je ne suis pas sûr	9	

3. Supposez que l'on vote sur cette question dans les dix provinces du Canada. Comment voterait-elle à votre avis? (Entourez une réponse pour chaque province)

	ELLES VOTERAIENT POUR		
	UN DRAPEAU QUI FAIT PENSER AU PASSE DU CANADA	UN DRAPEAU COMPLETEMENT NOUVEAU	JE NE SUIS PAS SUR
Alberta	1	2	3
Colombie Britannique ...	5	6	7
Ile du Prince Edouard ..	1	2	3
Manitoba	5	6	7
Nouveau Brunswick	1	2	3
Nouvelle Ecosse	5	6	7
Ontario	1	2	3
Québec	5	6	7
Saskatchewan	1	2	3
Terre Neuve	5	6	7
			24/

-3-

4. Supposez que l'on vote sur des tas d'autres questions concernant l'avenir du Canada. Pensez-vous que les habitants du Canada seraient d'accord sur la plupart des questions, ou bien qu'ils auraient tendance à ne pas être d'accord?

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE MARGE

(entourez une réponse)

Ils seraient d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points .. 1	25/0
Ils seraient d'accord sur la plupart des points 2	
Ils seraient d'accord sur la moitié et ne seraient pas d'accord sur l'autre 3	
Ils ne seraient pas d'accord sur la plupart des points .. 4	
Ils ne seraient pas d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points 5	
Je ne suis pas sûr 6	

5. Et les gens de l'Est du Canada et ceux de l'Ouest--est-ce qu'ils seraient d'accord sur la plupart des questions concernant l'avenir du Canada, ou bien est-ce qu'ils ne seraient pas d'accord?

(entourez une réponse)

D'accord sur pratiquement tous les points 1	26/0
D'accord sur la plupart des points 2	
D'accord sur la moitié et pas d'accord sur l'autre 3	
Pas d'accord sur la plupart des points 4	
Pas d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points 5	
Je ne suis pas sûr 6	

6. Et les Catholiques et les Protestants--seraient-ils d'accord ou non sur l'avenir du Canada?

(entourez une réponse)

D'accord sur pratiquement tous les points 1	27/0
D'accord sur la plupart des points 2	
D'accord sur la moitié et pas d'accord sur l'autre 3	
Pas d'accord sur la plupart des points 4	
Pas d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points 5	
Je ne suis pas sûr 6	

7. Et les Canadiens de langue française et les Canadiens de langue anglaise--seraient-ils d'accord ou non sur l'avenir du Canada?

(entourez une réponse)

D'accord sur pratiquement tous les points 1	28/0
D'accord sur la plupart des points 2	
D'accord sur la moitié et pas d'accord sur l'autre 3	
Pas d'accord sur la plupart des points 4	
Pas d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points 5	
Je ne suis pas sûr 6	

-4-N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE MARGE

8. Et les gens nés au Canada et ceux nés hors du Canada--seraient-ils d'accord ou non sur l'avenir du Canada?

(entourez une réponse)

D'accord sur pratiquement tous les points	1
D'accord sur la plupart des points	2
D'accord sur la moitié et pas d'accord sur l'autre ...	3
Pas d'accord sur la plupart des points	4
Pas d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points	5
Je ne suis pas sûr	6

29/0

9. Et les gens des familles riches et les gens des familles pauvres seraient-ils d'accord ou non sur l'avenir du Canada?

(entourez une réponse)

D'accord sur pratiquement tous les points	1
D'accord sur la plupart des points	2
D'accord sur la moitié et pas d'accord sur l'autre ...	3
Pas d'accord sur la plupart des points	4
Pas d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points	5
Je ne suis pas sûr.....	6

30/0

10. Et les gens des grandes villes et ceux des campagnes--seraient-ils d'accord ou non sur l'avenir du Canada?

(entourez une réponse)

D'accord sur pratiquement tous les points	1
D'accord sur la plupart des points	2
D'accord sur la moitié et pas d'accord sur l'autre ...	3
Pas d'accord sur la plupart des points	4
Pas d'accord sur pratiquement tous les points	5
Je ne suis pas sûr	6

31/0

11. Quels sont, à votre avis, les trois pays les plus amis du Canada?

MEILLEUR AMI: _____

34/

DEUXIÈME MEILLEUR AMI: _____

35/

TROISIÈME MEILLEUR AMI: _____

36/

-5-

12. Certaines personnes pensent que les habitants du Canada et les Américains se ressemblent beaucoup, alors que d'autres pensent qu'ils sont bien différents. Quel est votre avis?

(entourez une réponse)

A mon avis, ils se ressemblent sur la plupart des points ... 1	37/0
A mon avis, ils sont différents sur la plupart des points... 2	
Je ne suis pas sûr 3	

13. Dans la liste suivants, sur quels points à votre avis les habitants du Canada et les Américains se ressemblent-ils beaucoup et sur quels points sont-ils très différents?
(Entourez une réponse pour chaque partie de la question.)

	SE RESSEMBLENT BEAUCOUP	SONT TRES DIFFERENTS	JE NE SUIS PAS SUR	
(a) les sortes de nourriture qu'ils mangent	1	2	3	38/4
(b) leur amabilité envers les étrangers	5	6	7	39/8
(c) leur façon de s'habiller et de se coiffer	1	2	3	40/4
(d) la langue qu'ils parlent	5	6	7	41/8
(e) les genres de musique qu'ils aiment	1	2	3	42/4
(f) les sortes d'emplois qu'ils occupent	5	6	7	43/8
(g) l'argent qu'ils possèdent	1	2	3	44/4
(h) l'importance qu'ils attachent à la religion	5	6	7	45/8
(i) l'importance qu'ils attachent à avoir du bon temps .	1	2	3	46/4
(j) l'importance qu'ils attachent à gagner beaucoup d'argent	5	6	7	47/8
(k) le genre de gouvernement qu'ils ont	1	2	3	48/4
				50/

14. A votre avis, quels sont ceux qui ont plus de choses en commun-- les Canadiens de langue anglaise et les Américains, ou bien les Canadiens de langue anglaise et les Canadiens de langue française?

(entourez une réponse)

Les Canadiens de langue anglaise et les Américains	1	51/8
Les Canadiens de langue anglaise et les Canadiens de langue française	2	
Je ne suis pas sûr	3	

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE MARGE

-6-

15. Quel est, à votre avis, le gouvernement qui s'occupe le mieux des gens?

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
 CETTE MARGE

(entourez une réponse)

Le gouvernement de votre ville ou village	1
Le gouvernement de votre province	2
Le gouvernement du Canada	3
Je ne suis pas sûr	4

52/0

16. Quel est, à votre avis, celui qui s'occupe le moins des gens?

(entourez une réponse)

Le gouvernement de votre ville ou village	6
Le gouvernement de votre province	7
Le gouvernement du Canada	8
Je ne suis pas sûr	9

53/5

17. Pour quel gouvernement vaudrait-il mieux travailler--si le salaire était le même pour chaque emploi?

(entourez une réponse)

Le gouvernement de votre ville ou village	1
Le gouvernement de votre province	2
Le gouvernement du Canada	3
Je ne suis pas sûr	4

54/0

18. Supposez que vous avez un ami qui vient de terminer ses études et à qui on a offert deux emplois. Le premier se trouve près de chez lui avec un salaire assez bon. Le second est beaucoup mieux payé, mais se trouve à environ 1,000 milles dans une autre province du Canada. Si votre ami vous demandait conseil, quel emploi lui diriez-vous de choisir?

(entourez une réponse)

L'emploi proche de chez lui avec un assez bon salaire	1
L'emploi dans une autre province qui est beaucoup mieux payé	2
Je ne suis pas sûr	3

55/0

-7-

19. Et si votre ami avait le choix entre un emploi près de chez lui avec un assez bon salaire et un emploi aux Etats Unis beaucoup mieux payé. Quel emploi lui conseilleriez-vous de prendre?

(entourez une réponse)

L'emploi près de chez lui qui est assez bien payé 5

L'emploi aux Etats Unis qui est beaucoup mieux payé .. 6

Je ne suis pas sûr 7

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE MARGE

56/8

20. Dans quelles provinces du Canada--y compris la vôtre--pensez-vous aimer vivre dans l'avenir?

(entourez toutes celles
où vous pensez aimer
vivre)

Alberta 0

57/y

Colombie Britannique 1

Ile du Prince Edouard 7

Manitoba 2

Nouveau Brunswick 3

Nouvelle Ecosse 5

Ontario 6

Québec 8

Saskatchewan 9

Terre Neuve 4

Aucune. J'espère vivre hors du Canada dans l'avenir . X

58/

21. Dans quelles provinces du Canada voudriez-vous certainement ne jamais vivre?

(entourez toutes celles
où vous ne voudriez
jamais vivre)

Alberta 0

59/y

Colombie Britannique 1

Ile du Prince Edouard 7

Manitoba 2

Nouveau Brunswick 3

Nouvelle Ecosse 5

Ontario 6

Québec 8

Saskatchewan 9

Terre Neuve 4

Aucune. Il n'y a pas de province où je ne voudrais certainement jamais vivre X

60/

-8-

22. Où pensez-vous réellement vivre dans dix ans?

(entourez une réponse)

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE MARGE

Dans cette province	1
Dans une autre province du Canada	2
(Laquelle? _____)	
Dans un autre pays	3
(Lequel? _____)	
Je ne suis pas sûr	4

61/0

62/
63/

23. (a) Parmi dix habitants du Canada, combien, pensez-vous, parlent l'Anglais comme première langue?

NOMBRE: _____

64/

(b) Parmi dix habitants du Canada, combien, pensez-vous, parlent le Français comme première langue?

NOMBRE: _____

65/

(c) Parmi dix habitants du Canada, combien, pensez-vous, parlent une autre langue que l'Anglais ou le Français comme première langue?

NOMBRE: _____

66/

(VERIFIEZ QUE LE TOTAL SOIT ÉGAL À 10)

24. À part les Canadiens français et les Canadiens anglais, quels autres groupes de gens connaissez-vous, qui vivent au Canada?

67/

68/

69/

79/1
80/4+8

-9-

25. En général, diriez-vous que les Canadiens anglais et les Canadiens français se ressemblent beaucoup, ou bien diriez-vous qu'ils sont très différents?

(entourez une réponse)

Je dirais qu'ils se ressemblent sur la plupart des points .. 1

Je dirais qu'ils sont différents sur la plupart des points . 2

Je ne suis pas sûr 3

N'ECRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE MARGECOMMENCEZ
DECK 2
(1-4)

5/0

26. Dans la liste suivants, sur quels points à votre avis les Canadiens anglais et les Canadiens français se ressemblent-ils certainement, et sur quels points sont-ils certainement différents? (Entourez une réponse pour chaque partie de la question.)

	SE RESSEMBLENT CERTAINEMENT	SONT TRES DIFFERENTS	JE NE SUIS PAS SUR	
(a) les sortes de nourriture qu'ils mangent	1	2	3	6/4
(b) leur amabilité envers les étrangers	5	6	7	7/8
(c) leur façon de s'habiller et de se coiffer	1	2	3	8/4
(d) la langue qu'ils parlent ..	5	6	7	9/8
(e) les genres de musique qu'ils aiment	1	2	3	10/4
(f) les sortes d'emplois qu'ils occupent	5	6	7	11/8
(g) l'argent qu'ils possèdent .	1	2	3	12/4
(h) l'importance qu'ils attachent à la religion	5	6	7	13/8
(i) l'importance qu'ils attachent à avoir du bon temps	1	2	3	14/4
(j) l'importance qu'ils attachent à gagner beaucoup d'argent.	5	6	7	15/8
(k) le genre de gouvernement qu'ils veulent pour le Canada	1	2	3	16/4
(l) ce qu'ils veulent que le Canada soit dans l'avenir .	5	6	7	17/8
				18/ 19/

-10-

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE MARGE

27. Quels sont ceux qui ont plus de choses en commun--les Canadiens français et les Américains, ou bien les Canadiens français et les Canadiens anglais?

(entourez une réponse)

Les Canadiens français et les Américains 5
 Les Canadiens français et les Canadiens anglais 6
 Je ne suis pas sûr 7

20/8

28. Comment parlez-vous Anglais en ce moment?

(entourez une réponse)

Je connais à peine un mot d'Anglais 1
 Je connais quelques mots d'Anglais et quelques phrases mais je ne parle pas vraiment Anglais 2
 Je parle un peu Anglais, mais pas assez pour tenir une conversation 3
 Je peux tenir une conversation en Anglais, mais pas très facilement 4
 Je parle Anglais sans aucune difficulté 5

21/0

29. Aujourd'hui, comment vous serait-il utile de parler Anglais, ou de le parler mieux?

(entourez une réponse)

Très utile: je pourrais l'utiliser tous les jours 1
 Assez utile: je pourrais l'utiliser souvent, mais pas tous les jours 2
 Pas très utile: je pourrais l'utiliser quelquesfois, mais pas très souvent 3
 Totalement inutile: je ne pense pas que je l'utiliserais un jour 4

22/0

30. Si vous considérez l'avenir-disons, dans dix ans-comment vous serait-il utile, à ce moment-là, de parler Anglais couramment?

(entourez une réponse)

Très utile: je pourrais l'utiliser tous les jours 6
 Assez utile: je pourrais l'utiliser souvent, mais pas tous les jours 7
 Pas très utile: je pourrais l'utiliser quelquesfois, mais pas très souvent 8
 Totalement inutile: je ne pense pas que je l'utiliserais un jour 9

23/5

-11-

31. Dans la liste suivante, à quels points de vue une meilleure connaissance de l'Anglais vous serait-elle sûrement utile—soit maintenant, soit dans le futur?
 (Entourez une réponse pour chaque partie de la question.)

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE MARGE

	CE SERAIT UTILE A CE POINT DE VUE	CE NE SERAIT PAS UTILE A CE POINT DE VUE	
(a) pour parler avec mes ami(e)s	1	2	24/0
(b) pour avoir de nouveaux(elles) ami(e)s	4	5	25/3
(c) pour sortir avec des personnes de l'autre sexe	7	8	26/6
(d) pour obtenir des meilleures notes en classe	1	2	27/0
(e) pour trouver un emploi	4	5	28/3
(f) pour progresser dans le domaine où j'espere travailler	7	8	29/6
(g) pour aller dans plus d'endroits dans ma ville, ou mon village ...	1	2	30/6
(h) pour voyager dans différentes parties du Canada	4	5	31/3
(i) pour lire ou regarder la télévision	7	8	32/6
			33/

32. Est-ce que vous avez des bons amis qui parlent Anglais--c'est à dire, qui parlent Anglais chez eux?

(entourez une réponse)

Oui	1	34/0
Non	2	

33. Est-ce qu'il y a des étudiants qui parlent Anglais dans votre classe (ou bien dans la dernière classe où vous étiez)?

(entourez une réponse)

Oui	4	35/3
Non	5	
Je ne sais pas	6	

34. Est-ce qu'il y a des familles de langue anglaise habitant à environ moins d'un demi mille de votre maison?

(entourez une réponse)

Oui	1	36/0
Non	2	
Je ne sais pas	3	

-12-

35. Combien de fois entendez-vous parler Anglais autour de vous?
 (entourez une réponse)

Pratiquement tous les jours 1
 Une ou deux fois par semaine 2
 Parfois, mais moins d'une fois par semaine 3
 Jamais 4

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE MARGE

37/0

36. Voici quelques opinions que d'autres jeunes de votre age ont exprimées concernant la possibilité de parler deux langues.
 Seriez-vous d'accord ou non avec eux?
 (Entourez une réponse pour chaque partie de la question.)

	JE SERAIS D'ACCORD	JE NE SERAIS PAS D'ACCORD	JE NE SUIS PAS SUR	
(a) Le Français et l'Anglais devraient être des sujets obligatoires dans toutes les écoles du Canada	1	2	3	38/0
(b) Ce serait une bonne idée si les panneaux routiers étaient rédigés en Anglais et en Français partout au Canada. 5	.	6	7	39/4
(c) En ce qui me concerne, le Canada ne devrait avoir qu'une seule langue officielle: le Français .. 1	.	2	3	40/0
(d) En ce qui me concerne, le Québec ne devrait avoir qu'une seule langue officielle: le Français .. 5	.	6	7	41/4
(e) Ce serait une bonne idée si tous les Canadiens pouvaient parler Français et Anglais 1	.	2	3	42/0
(f) Un Canadien de langue française ne devrait pas avoir à apprendre l'Anglais s'il ne va jamais s'en servir	5	6	7	43/4

37. Comment sont, en ce moment, les relations entre les Canadiens français et les Canadiens anglais? A votre avis, sont-elles bonnes, assez bonnes, ou mauvaises?

(entourez une réponse)

Bonnes 1
 Assez bonnes 2
 Mauvaises 3
 Je ne suis pas sûr 4

44/0

-13-

38. Direz-vous que les relations franco-anglaises, en ce moment sont en train de s'améliorer, deviennent plus mauvaises, ou restent les mêmes?

(entourez une réponse)

Elles s'améliorent	1	45/0
Elles deviennent plus mauvaises	2	
Elles restent à peu près les mêmes	3	
Je ne suis pas sûr	4	

39. Pensez-vous que, dans les dix prochaines années, les relations franco-anglaises au Canada vont s'améliorer, deviendront plus mauvaises, ou bien resteront à peu près comme elles sont maintenant?

(entourez une réponse)

Vont s'améliorer	6	46/5
Deviendront plus mauvaises	7	
Resteront à peu près comme elles sont maintenant	8	
Je ne suis pas sûr	9	

40. A votre avis, quelle est l'importance des points suivants, par la façon dont ils aident un jeune à réussir dans la vie au Canada aujourd'hui? (Entourez une réponse pour chaque partie de la question.)

	TRES IMPORTANT	ASSEZ IMPORTANT	SANS IMPORTANCE	
(a) Avoir de bonnes notes en classe	1	2	3	47/0
(b) Connaître les gens qu'il faut	5	6	7	48/4
(c) Appartenir à une famille influente	1	2	3	49/0
(d) Avoir une éducation à l'université	5	6	7	50/4
(e) Appartenir au bon groupe religieux	1	2	3	51/0
(f) Etre né(e) au Canada	5	6	7	52/4
(g) Etre capable de parler Anglais et Français	1	2	3	53/0
(h) Avoir une personnalité sympathique	5	6	7	54/4
(i) Travailler dur	1	2	3	55/0
(j) Avoir des parents qui ont beaucoup d'argent	5	6	7	56/4

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE MARGE

-14-

41. Quel genre de travail votre père fait-il? (Si votre père ne vit plus, indiquez s'il vous plaît le genre de travail qu'il a fait pendant la plus grande partie de sa vie.)

OCCUPATION OU

GENRE DE TRAVAIL: _____

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE
MARGE

57/
58/

42. Dans quelle occupation, ou dans quel domaine, espérez-vous éventuellement travailler?

OCCUPATION OU

DOMAINE DE TRAVAIL: _____

59/
60/

43. Lorsque vous aurez terminé toutes vos études, comment seront, à votre avis, vos chances de trouver un bon emploi quelque part dans cette province?

(entourez une réponse)

Certainement bonnes	1
Probablement bonnes	2
Assez bonnes	3
Probablement pas très bonnes	4
Certainement pas très bonnes	5
Je ne suis pas sûr	6

61/0

44. Lorsque vous aurez terminé toutes vos études, comment seront, à votre avis, vos chances de trouver un bon emploi autre part au Canada?

(entourez une réponse)

Certainement bonnes	1
Probablement bonnes	2
Assez bonnes	3
Probablement pas très bonnes	4
Certainement pas très bonnes	5
Je ne suis pas sûr	6

62/0

-15-

45. Dans quelle province habitez-vous?

(entourez une réponse)

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE MARGE

Alberta	0
Colombie Britannique	1
Ile du Prince Edouard	2
Manitoba	3
Nouveau Brunswick	4
Nouvelle Ecosse	5
Ontario	6
Québec	7
Saskatchewan	8
Terre Neuve	9

63/y

46. Dans quelles autres provinces du Canada avez-vous déjà habité ou lesquelles avez-vous déjà visitées?

(entourez toutes les autres provinces
ou vous avez déjà habité ou que
vous avez visitées)

Alberta	0
Colombie Britannique	1
Ile du Prince Edouard	2
Manitoba	3
Nouveau Brunswick	4
Nouvelle Ecosse	5
Ontario	6
Québec	7
Saskatchewan	8
Terre Neuve	9

64/y

Aucune. Je ne suis jamais allé(e)
dans une autre province du Canada I

65/y

79/2
80/4+8

-16-

47. Indiquez votre sexe s'il vous plaît.

(entourez une réponse)

Masculin 1

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE MARGE
COMMENCEZ
DECK 3

(1-4)

5/0

Féminin 2

48. Indiquez votre âge lors de votre dernier anniversaire.

(entourez une réponse)

Treize ans 3

6/y

Quatorze ans 4

Quinze ans 5

Seize ans 6

Dix sept ans 7

Dix huit ans 8

Dix neuf ans 9

Vingt ans 0

49. Est-ce que vous allez à l'école en ce moment?

(entourez une réponse)

Oui: à plein temps 1

7/0

Oui: à mi-temps 2

Non: pas du tout 3

50. Avez-vous en ce moment un travail rémunéré?

(entourez une réponse)

Oui: à plein temps 1

8/0

(Quelle est votre occupation?)

Oui: à mi-temps 2

9/0
10/

Non: pas du tout 3

51. L'été prochain, combien d'années d'écoles aurez-vous terminé?
(En comptant à partir de la première année de l'école élémentaire.)

NOMBRE D'ANNÉES _____

11/
12/

52. L'été prochain, combien d'années, au total, aurez-vous étudié l'Anglais?

NOMBRE D'ANNÉES _____

13/
14/

-17-

53. Après l'été prochain, pendant combien d'années au total pensez-vous encore faire des études? (en comptant l'école supérieure, le collège, l'université, les écoles techniques, les cours commerciaux, ou n'importe quoi d'autre)

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE
MARGE

15/
16/

NOMBRE D'ANNÉES: _____

54. Êtes-vous né(e) au Canada?

(entourez une réponse)

Oui	1	17/
Non	2	

55. Est-ce que vos parents sont nés au Canada?

(entourez un réponse)

Oui: mon père et ma mère sont nés au Canada	6	18/
Non: mon père est né au Canada, mais pas ma mère	7	
Non: ma mère est née au Canada, mais pas mon père	8	
Non: ni mon père, ni ma mère ne sont nés au Canada	9	

56. De quel pays d'origine, hors du Canada, venaient les ancêtres de votre père?

PAYS: _____ 19/

Faites une croix ici si vous ne
savez pas.

20/

57. De quel pays d'origine, hors du Canada, venaient les ancêtres de votre mère?

PAYS: _____ 21/

Faites une croix ici si vous ne
savez pas.

22/

-18-

58. Les jeunes de votre âge souvent ne sont pas d'accord avec leurs parents. Quand est-ce que vous n'êtes pas d'accord avec vos parents sur les points suivants? (Entourez une réponse pour chaque partie de la question.)

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE
MARGE

	NOUS NE SOMMES PAS D'ACCORD...		
	SOUVENT	QUELQUES FOIS	JAMAIS
(a) L'école	1	2	3
(b) Ce que je fais de mon temps libre	5	6	7
(c) La politique	1	2	3
(d) Le domaine de travail où je veux entrer	5	6	7
(e) La religion	1	2	3
(f) Qui je fréquente	5	6	7
(g) Le temps que je passe à étudier	1	2	3

59. Quelle langue parlez-vous le plus souvent chez vous?

(entourez une réponse)

Anglais	1	31/0
Français	2	
Autre (laquelle?)	3	
(_____)		

60. Combien d'années, au total, votre père est-il allé à l'école?

(entourez une réponse)

Il n'est jamais allé à l'école	1	32/0
1 - 4 ans	2	
5 - 7 ans	3	
8 ans	4	
9 - 11 ans	5	
12 ans	6	
13 - 15 ans	7	
16 ans ou plus	8	
Je ne suis pas sûr	9	

-19-

61. Combien d'années, au total, votre mère est-elle allée à l'école?
 (entourez une réponse)

Elle n'est jamais allée à l'école	1
1 - 4 ans	2
5 - 7 ans	3
8 ans	4
9 - 11 ans	5
12 ans	6
13 - 15 ans	7
16 ans ou plus	8
Je ne suis pas sûr	9

N'ÉCRIVEZ
PAS DANS
CETTE
MARGE

33/0

62. A quel groupe religieux appartenez-vous?

(entourez une réponse)

Catholique	1
Protestant	2
(Quelle dénomination?)	
, _____)	
Autre	3
(Laquelle?)	
_____)	

34/0

63. L'année dernière, quel était le revenu total de votre famille?
 (avant impôts). Si vous ne savez pas exactement, donnez s'il vous plaît une estimation.

(entourez une réponse)


Moins de \$2,000	0
\$2,000 - 2,999	1
\$3,000 - 3,999	2
\$4,000 - 4,999	3
\$5,000 - 5,999	4
\$6,000 - 6,999	5
\$7,000 - 7,999	6
\$8,000 - 9,999	7
\$10,000 - 14,999	8
\$15,000 ou plus	9

35/y

-20-

6h. Voici une carte blanche du Canada. Aucun endroit n'y est indiqué. Inscrivez cinq mots ou phrases qui décrivent le mieux le Canada à votre avis. Vous pouvez inscrire ce que vous voulez et écrire n'importe où sur la carte, mais vous ne pouvez mettre que cinq choses.

Quels sont les cinq endroits ou choses qui décrivent le mieux le Canada à votre avis?



N°ÉCRIVEZ PAS DANS CET ESPACE					
36/	37/	38/	39/	40/	41/
42/	42/	42/	79/3	80/48	

Studies of the
Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and
Biculturalism

3

The Department of External Affairs and Biculturalism

Gilles Lalande



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Studies of the
Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and
Biculturalism

3

The Department of External Affairs and Biculturalism

Diplomatic Personnel (1945-1965)
and Language Use (1964-1965)

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The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism received from the government a general mandate "to inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution; . . ."* The Commission was also given specific responsibility "to report upon the situation and practice of bilingualism within all branches and agencies of the federal administration—including Crown corporations—and in their communications with the public and to make recommendations designed to ensure *the bilingual and basically bicultural character of the federal administration; . . .*"** [Italics added.] It was in pursuance of this latter part of its mandate that the Commission charged us with inquiring into and reporting upon the situation which prevails in this respect in the Department of External Affairs.

With a view to carrying out this responsibility, we set ourselves the task of confirming or refuting the following *working hypothesis*: the Department of External Affairs is an organization with a bilingual and basically bicultural character, as evidenced by the composition of its personnel (especially its diplomatic personnel), by the administration of this personnel, and by the criteria that ensure to all those who form part of it equal opportunities for participation and advancement.

This study is divided into two principal parts, preceded by an introduction dealing with what is called "the setting." While tracing concurrently the history of the Department and the development of its organization, the introduction throws light on the setting in which the foreign service officer (the particular object of our study) has developed, and clarifies our method of research. Part 1 of the study is by far the more

* A Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa, 1965), 151.

***Ibid.*

ambitious. It deals with the composition and evolution of the foreign service officer group, as well as with departmental policies and methods of recruitment. The importance of recruitment led us to devote an entire chapter to this aspect of the study. In it the socio-economic and cultural characteristics of foreign service officers are analyzed. At this stage we were able to submit our working hypothesis to a first, although only partial test. The other chapters deal with the training, postings, and advancement of foreign service officers. The second part is concerned exclusively with the use of French as a working language within the Department in Ottawa and in posts abroad, with particular emphasis on the Canadian Embassy in Paris.

These two parts are distinct from each other, both by their subject and by the methods used in studying the various questions involved. We thought it useful to have a general explanation of the methodology at the basis of our work precede the two parts—without precluding our right to furnish more precise information where appropriate, as we went along.

It would be hard to judge what repercussions the countless difficulties that beset us have had on the present study. It is all the more important to put them on record here. First, it took the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism five months to give final approval, with the consent of the Privy Council and the Treasury Board, to the plan of work we had submitted. The large amount of data that we had to gather in Ottawa was scattered and fragmentary. In addition, the computer centre at the University of Montreal, through lack of experience, seriously slowed down the pace of our work.

But it was at the Department of External Affairs that the most serious difficulties arose. Despite the recommendations of the divisions responsible, the Department has as yet done nothing to arrange and facilitate access to the public documents, even very old ones, that refer to its activities or that have been entrusted to its keeping. Not always without ill will, the authorities of the Department gave us numerous examples of their general distrust of outsiders, including researchers of good standing, who desire to consult the official records, even the least confidential ones, dealing with Canadian foreign policy.¹

Despite the Commission's terms of reference, the Department refused us access to all its working files, even those of a general nature, on the ground that some contained confidential information² and others secret documents.³ It was only after a long struggle that we were able to secure authorization to look over the documents produced by the Department for the Glassco Commission, although such papers were essential to our study. Still, such a concession was granted to us with the following restrictions: we could have access to these documents only in the presence of a representative of the Department, and note-taking was forbidden.⁴ As for the other files, we were not allowed to go through them if they bore a label restricting their use, particularly if the word "confidential" appeared on the cover. Even the personal records of the officers were denied us, although they are partially reproduced in the general index of the Personnel Division. The Department did not even agree to pass on to us information concerning the social origin of its officers, asserting that such information was confidential. Some officers, it was stated, would be opposed to allowing persons outside the Department to know that their father was, for example, a doctor or a car dealer.⁵ Yet it is quite obvious that

these details were of prime interest for our study. As if such limitations were not sufficiently embarrassing to us, the authorities appointed a representative of the Department to examine and tone down all the documents intended for us, even those that were only of historical interest.⁶

Nothing hindered our study so much, however, as the pitiful condition of all the pre-1961 documents relating to the administration of personnel. The records concerning the period from the beginnings to 1952 were in a deplorable state. No other public body has given us proof of so many errors, omissions, and inaccuracies. In addition, it is a well-known fact that the Personnel Division of External Affairs has always lacked officials trained in personnel administration.⁷ The foreign service officers who are attached to that division remain there all too briefly to acquire a desirable level of expertise. And because they are swamped with work, they cannot concern themselves with any question outside the scope of their daily occupation.⁸ Our patience was thus often tried and the time wasted cannot be reckoned. For example, a questionnaire relating to the use of French as a working language was not dispatched to its addressees until 26 days after we had delivered it to the Department.

However our task has not been entirely frustrating. We are pleased to have been authorized to hold personal interviews with the officers of the Department. With very rare exceptions, all received us cordially. The unflagging helpfulness of Mr. Christian Hardy, the head of postings in the Personnel Operations Division, and of one of his assistants, M. Léopold Amyot, was a source of continual encouragement to us.

We also wish to record our gratitude to His Excellency M. Jules Léger, Canadian Ambassador to France; Mr. John Halstead, Minister at the Canadian Embassy in Paris; and to M. René Garneau, Canadian Ambassador to Switzerland. Their co-operation was very valuable and their hospitality greatly enriched our stay in Europe. We would like them to convey our thanks to all their assistants. In particular we are thankful to Mr. N. A. Robertson for the time that he put at our disposal when we were staying in Geneva.

The frequent representations made on our behalf by Professor Michael Oliver and Dr. Meyer Brownstone of the Commission to the authorities of the Department of External Affairs helped us to surmount awkward difficulties. We thank them for their unfailing support. The valuable advice of Dr. John Johnstone, professor at the University of Chicago and adviser to the Commission, greatly assisted us in drawing up the two questionnaires and the plan for interviewing the officers of the Department.

I personally wish to express my deep gratitude to my collaborators: to MM. Louis Cartier and Denis Laforte, both students in Political Science at the University of Montreal; to Professor Paul Noble, of the Department of Economics and Political Science at McGill University; and to Mlle Renée Lescop (now Mme Jean-Louis Baudoin), who was my first assistant. Their co-operation in this study has been invaluable.

A study of the diplomatic and consular personnel of a country is hardly conceivable without reference to its institutional context. On the one hand, knowledge of the institutions of external policy makes it possible for us to place the diplomatic personnel in a general perspective; on the other, a study of the organizational structure of the department responsible, and more particularly of its evolution, permits us to place this personnel in a concrete setting. Such a study would likewise be incomplete without reference to the administrative structure of the department responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. The institutional context and the administrative structure constitute what we shall call the "general setting." The organization of personnel constitutes the "particular setting."

A. Institutional Context

In 1909 there was set up "a department of the Government of Canada, to be called the Department of External Affairs, presided over by a minister of the Crown referred to by the name of Secretary of State for External Affairs."¹ This minister, during the first three years of the Department's existence, was officially secretary of state for Canada. In practice, however, the chief of the executive body of the federal government, that is the prime minister, acted in the capacity of minister for External Affairs from 1909 to 1912. In 1912 a law transferred to the prime minister formal authority over external affairs and the responsibility for this Department before Parliament. This situation lasted until April 1946, when Parliament, by an amendment to the law of 1912, separated the functions of prime minister and minister for External Affairs.

The prime minister therefore presided over the destinies of the Department of External Affairs during its entire formative period. Although it may be that we have not learned as yet everything possible about this situation, it is certain that, as a result, the Department of External Affairs has been brought so close to the office of the prime

minister as often to confuse their distinctive characters.² It has conferred upon the under-secretary of state for External Affairs and his immediate assistants an importance that was long overly great,³ and encouraged the prime minister to make costly inroads into External Affairs personnel. It has prompted the head of the government to play an active role, to say the least, in the Department's policy with regard to personnel. It has helped turn the attention of External Affairs personnel to questions which are not normally in their field.⁴ Finally, it has delayed significantly the very development of the structure of the Department of External Affairs, both on the formal plane, that is, the administrative structure, and on the plane of the organization of its personnel, or personnel structure.

B. Administrative Structure

Unlike those other federal departments and agencies which are concerned with domestic affairs, the Department of External Affairs only exists as a result of the contacts which Canada maintains with other countries and its interest in what takes place beyond its borders. Consequently, although an integral part of the federal organization, the Department has a special administrative structure that continuously reflects the government's purpose in preserving an awareness of Canada abroad.

The Department of External Affairs is composed of two principal elements: a central administration and a network of diplomatic and consular posts abroad. These two elements are the essential instruments of Canada's foreign policy. The central administration groups together in Ottawa the vital organs of the Department; it is, so to speak, the centre and nervous system of the whole organism. The missions abroad serve both as listening posts and as channels of communication between the Department and foreign governments. These two elements form one whole. The central administration is the complement of the posts abroad; they in their turn cannot be conceived of without the central administration. Their interdependence is so close that the pulsations of the one always have repercussions on the other, and the development of the one inevitably involves the extension of the other—especially when the general conditions of international life lend themselves to such interaction.

1. International background

Since World War II international relations have evolved considerably. First, the extraordinary conditions of the war itself brought members of the family of nations much closer together on a permanent basis. The development of a postwar international organization consolidated these contacts by giving them various institutional forms. Then the appearance during the last two decades of a multitude of new independent states has multiplied and diversified relations between members of the international community, all the more so because the rapid transformation of techniques during the same period revitalized traditional diplomatic methods.

Canada did not escape this wave of progress in international relations. Indeed the coincidence between the emergence of a foreign policy in Canada and the

beginning of World War II is striking. Until 1939 diplomatic relations between Canada and countries abroad were extremely loose. The administrative structure of the Department was embryonic, if not non-existent. It was thus the war that created the need for Canada to increase its connections with other countries and to extend its diplomatic relations. This extension in turn made it necessary to give the Department a well defined administrative structure which, from the beginning, grew at an astonishing rate. This growth is the major phenomenon of the history of the Department during the last two decades. For the purposes of this study, it therefore appears indispensable to trace this startling evolution from the twin points of view of posts abroad and the central administration.

2. *Historical sketch*

a) *Posts abroad*

Canada was represented abroad long before it obtained the right to appoint its own diplomatic officers. It had officials in some foreign countries, particularly commercial agents (later called trade commissioners) and immigration officers, long before the creation of the Department of External Affairs in 1909. By 1925 the three Canadian offices abroad, those of London (office of the high commissioner), Paris (office of the commissioner-general), and Geneva (permanent delegation), still enjoyed only semi-diplomatic status.

Following the Imperial Conference of 1926, Canada was finally able to appoint its first diplomatic officer abroad—a minister to the United States. The Canadian Legation which was opened in Washington in 1927 became the first of our diplomatic missions. The second was the one in Paris (through the transformation in 1928 of the commissioner-general's office which Canada had maintained there since 1882). The high commissioner's office in London also acquired diplomatic status on July 1, 1927, even before the government of the United Kingdom, in conformity with the resolutions of the 1926 Imperial Conference, had dispatched a high commissioner (in 1928) to represent it in Ottawa. Finally a third mission, a legation, was opened in Tokyo in 1929. To these four diplomatic missions should be added the previously mentioned Canadian delegation to the League of Nations in Geneva. (Since 1925 Canada had been represented in Geneva by a "Canadian advisory officer to the League of Nations.")

The depression of the 1930's was to prevent the rapid expansion of Canadian representation abroad anticipated after the enactment of the Statute of Westminster in 1931. In 1937, however, in response to a Belgian initiative, Canada opened a new legation in Brussels. The following year, the territorial jurisdiction of this mission was extended to Holland by the formula of double accreditation. On the eve of World War II Canada had altogether only six diplomatic missions abroad (seven, counting the one in Holland).

The war brought about the closing of missions in Paris, Brussels, The Hague, and Tokyo. Conversely, it caused a sudden increase of Canadian representation in Commonwealth countries, and in three other main directions: Latin America; our allies in adversity, the U.S.S.R. and China; and finally certain occupied countries whose governments had been forced into exile, either in London or in Cairo. On September 11, 1939, the day following its declaration of war on Germany, Canada decided to set up diplomatic

missions (high commissioners' offices) in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Ireland. In addition, a Canadian minister was accredited for the duration of the war to the Belgian, Dutch, Czechoslovak, Greek, Norwegian, Polish, and Yugoslav governments-in-exile in London. In 1942 missions were opened in Brazil, Argentina, the U.S.S.R., and China, while the Canadian minister in Buenos Aires was accredited to the government of Chile.

With the coming of the war Canada had embarked upon a new course of action: the establishment of consulates. The first consulate was opened at Godthaab, Greenland in 1940. In 1941, a temporary vice-consulate was opened in St. Pierre and Miquelon. In March 1943, Canada inaugurated its first permanent consulate (New York), and raised its most important Canadian missions abroad—the legation in Washington first, followed by those in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile—to the rank of embassy.

In 1944, embassies were opened in Mexico and Peru, and normal diplomatic relations were resumed with now liberated France by the establishment of an embassy in Paris. In 1945, Canada undertook to open diplomatic missions in European countries with whose governments-in-exile relations had been established during the war. It also opened a consulate in Lisbon and an embassy in Cuba, bringing to 22 the total of its diplomatic missions. This was three times more than in 1939.

In the postwar period, Canada's diplomatic network continued to expand at an accelerated pace. The establishment of well defined relations with its wartime allies was clearly a matter of priority in 1946. In that year consulates were opened in Caracas, Venezuela, and Portland, Maine. In 1947, 1948, and 1949, 18 new diplomatic missions were added to the existing network. In 1950, the number of posts abroad totalled 42. A second surge followed in 1953-4. In 1953 alone, new posts were opened at Bogota, Caracas (consulate elevated to embassy), Colombo, Djakarta, Los Angeles, Madrid, Montevideo, Seattle, and Vienna. In 1954, Canada dispatched diplomatic officers to the Lebanon, Egypt, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Israel. During this brief period Canada likewise raised the status of its mission in Japan, established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, and set up four separate delegations within the international commissions for supervision and control in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Altogether, by the end of 1954, the diplomatic network comprised 28 embassies, seven high commissioners' offices, nine legations, three permanent delegations and 11 consulates—a total of 58 posts abroad. To these must be added the Canadian missions in Indochina.

Since 1957 Canada has been extending its representation in African countries south of the Sahara. As in the case of the Asian countries, the Commonwealth acted as a catalyst. A high commissioner's office was first opened in Ghana in 1957. Three years later one was opened in Nigeria. When the Belgian Congo attained its independence in 1960 the office of the Canadian trade commissioner in Leopoldville became a consulate general. At about the same time the opening of an embassy in Central America (Costa Rica) heralded the extension of the Canadian diplomatic network to Latin America, through the medium of multiple accreditations.

Canada continued its immense effort to extend its representation throughout the world during the years 1961-6. Its diplomatic network spread to Iraq, Tunisia, the Sudan,

Cyprus, Sierra Leone, and countries of Central and South America. By multiple accreditations, Canada entered into diplomatic relations with the majority of African countries, in particular those of French-speaking Africa. The years 1964 and 1965 saw the opening of several new posts, among them the consulates at Bordeaux and Marseilles. In the same period the federal government announced its intention to open six new posts in French-speaking Africa during the next two years. On January 1, 1966, Canada could point to a total of some 115 missions, approximately 85 of which were posts where Canadian diplomatic officers were in residence.

We believe it is quite obvious from this historical sketch that the growth of Canadian representation abroad has been spectacular. The considerable increase in the number of Canadian diplomatic and consular missions between 1939 and the beginning of 1966 is worthy of particular note. Of further interest is the fact that in 1966 the number of such missions greatly exceeded the number of positions to which diplomatic officers from the Department of External Affairs were appointed. Does this not indicate either that a certain number of Canada's official missions abroad are not within the control of the department entrusted with the conduct of international relations, or that the Department of External Affairs has not yet at its disposal the resources of personnel that would enable it to assume entire responsibility for these posts? In any case, it is certain that this proliferation of posts abroad has had repercussions on the other part of the administrative structure of the Department--the central administration.

b) Central administration in Ottawa

From the point of view of organization, the history of the central administration of the Department begins in 1941.⁵ Towards the end of that year, the new under-secretary at that time, N. A. Robertson (who had just succeeded Dr. O. D. Skelton on the latter's death), gave the Department its basic structure. As we shall see later, the organization chart of the Department in 1966 is only the amplification of this original form. The 1941 chart comprised four distinct branches placed under the authority of the under-secretary and called "divisions": the Diplomatic and Commercial Division, the Legal Division, the British Commonwealth and European Affairs Division, and the American and Far Eastern Affairs Division. Each of these branches was directed by an officer who had the title of assistant under-secretary: L. B. Pearson, later succeeded by Hume Wrong, head of the Commonwealth Division; Hugh Keenleyside, head of the American Affairs Division; J. E. Read, the Department's legal adviser, head of the Legal Division; and Laurent Beaudry, head of the Diplomatic Division.

The Diplomatic Division was concerned with questions of protocol, diplomatic immunity, immigration, and consular problems. The Passport Office was also one of its responsibilities. The Legal Division, which included a section dealing with problems arising from a state of war (notably prisoners of war, internees, and property), concerned itself chiefly with treaties and other legal questions. The two divisions of Commonwealth and American Affairs assumed responsibility for political questions. In addition to these four principal divisions, the central administration of 1941 included an Administrative Branch clearly responsible for all administrative questions: personnel, salaries, supplies, and so

on. A few auxiliary services, in particular the library, the translation bureau, the cipher section, and the archives and records section, made up the rest of the organization. In this relatively simple structure, the heads of divisions and supporting units were directly responsible to the under-secretary.

From its inception, this organization had to adapt itself to the multiple and urgent needs engendered by the war. Since no one was prepared for such an upheaval, the Department was forced to improvise. In 1942, an economic section which was soon to become the Economic Division took shape within the American and Far Eastern Affairs Division. Shortly afterwards a so-called special section broke off from the Legal Division and was given the name of Special Division.⁶ In 1945, even before the end of the war, the Department reorganized its structure for the first time. Because of the new circumstances which would be created by the imminent victory of the Allies, it was felt necessary to prepare Canada for its role in the international organization soon to be established. To the two Political divisions of the 1941 plan was added a new one, simply called the First Political Division. The British Commonwealth and European Affairs Division and the American and Far Eastern Affairs Division thereupon became the Second and Third Political Divisions. Both kept their respective areas of jurisdiction, while extending them to the Middle East and Africa, and to Latin America. The First Political Division was entrusted with political problems outside the sphere of the two other political divisions, particularly questions related to peace settlement and international organization. The economic section was confirmed as a division. Finally a new unit, the Information Division, made its appearance.

The outstanding feature of this reorganization is the fact that officially for the first time responsibility for the supervision of the divisions was divided between the under-secretary (N. A. Robertson) and his two associates (J. E. Read and Hume Wrong).⁷ Below the under-secretary were the Diplomatic Division (head, L. Beaudry), the Economic Division (head, H. F. Angus), the Information Division (head, T. W. MacDermott) and the Administrative Branch (head, W. D. Matthews). The deputy under-secretary and legal adviser, who was head of the Legal Division, was given the task of supervising the Special Division (head, A. Rive). Upon the other deputy under-secretary, Hume Wrong, devolved the responsibility for the First Political Division (head, C. A. S. Ritchie), the Second (head, G. P. de T. Glazebrook), and the Third (head, R. M. Macdonnell). As for the auxiliary services mentioned earlier, they remained as before. The Passport Office continued to be under the Diplomatic Division. To the Legal Division was added a Treaty Section.

Apart from the delegation of the under-secretary's responsibilities, it would appear that this reorganization did not modify the essential lines of the 1941 structure. As in all subsequent modifications, the approach was empirical. Generally speaking, the change in the Department's organization reflected both the evolution of postwar diplomatic life and the reaction of Canada to international events. Indeed, on the one hand, the central administration adopted methods and equipment that were more and more technical; and, on the other, it enlarged its sphere of interest in proportion as the international responsibilities of Canada increased. Frequent and significant modifications of structure might thus be expected.

In the late 1940's modifications involved various shifts among the divisions: the absorption of the Treaty Division by the Legal Affairs Division in 1947; the creation in May 1947 of a Consular Division with jurisdiction over the Passport Office following the adoption of the Canadian Citizenship Act in January 1947; and the creation of a Personnel Division separate from the Administrative Branch in October 1947. Towards the end of 1947, the Department had also re-established the titles of British Commonwealth and European Affairs Division and American and Far Eastern Division. The First Political Division took the title of International Organization Division and the Diplomatic Division became the Protocol Division. In January 1948 a European Affairs Division and a Commonwealth Division replaced the former joint Division of Commonwealth and European Affairs. During the same year a "great reshuffle" in the Registry Section heralded a change that was to involve all the administrative services of the Department.⁸

Administrative consolidation was the hallmark of 1949. The Department tackled the long neglected task of systematizing its standards in respect of personnel. The recently formed Personnel Division set up various committees to study the development of a formal structure, the evaluation of merit, and promotion policy. The Administrative Branch, raised to the rank of a division when it was detached from the Personnel Division in 1947, was reorganized with sections specializing in financial questions and supplies and properties (particularly those owned by the Department abroad). In June 1950 the two sections of the Administrative Division became the Finance Division, and the Organization and Personnel Division. In August 1949, four months after the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, a new unit appeared: the Defence Liaison Division. In September 1950 a Press Bureau was established, distinct from the Information Division.⁹ Then in November 1950 the Research and Historical Division was set up.¹⁰ The tendency of the large work units to ramify was already clearly apparent.

This evolution continued during the next two years. In December 1951, the former Supplies and Properties section was detached from the Organization and Personnel Division. In August 1952, the American and Far Eastern Division gave place to two distinct divisions, the American and the Far Eastern. On August 15, 1952, the Defence Liaison Division was in its turn split into two new units, Defence Liaison (1) and Defence Liaison (2). On November 14, 1952, the head of the Protocol Division was given the title "Chief of Protocol."¹¹ In March 1953, a section called Political Coordination was established for information purposes abroad.¹² The special feature of this new section, which was not a subdivision, was that it was responsible directly to the under-secretary.

In July 1955, the communications subdivision of the Organization and Personnel Division became the Communications Division. At the end of that year, in view of the continued growth in the number of diplomatic missions, the Department created a semi-autonomous Inspection Service, "on a permanent footing,"¹³ in the spirit of the Political Coordination section. On January 9, 1956, the Commonwealth Division, rebaptized Commonwealth and Middle Eastern Division, added matters concerning French North Africa and Spanish Africa to its responsibilities. However, the Suez crisis in the autumn of 1956 immediately brought about the formation of an autonomous Middle Eastern Division. On March 31, 1958, the Research and Historical Division also changed

its name to Historical Division. Because of their political implications, the foreign aid programmes previously administered by the Department of Trade and Commerce were given to the Department of External Affairs in October 1958. At that time an Economic Division (2), in charge of external aid, was created.¹⁴ The other Economic Division, henceforth called Economic Division (1), kept the responsibility of following Canadian commercial policy. Finally on April 1, 1959, the Organization and Personnel Division changed its name to Administrative Services Division.

The last stage in the evolution of the structure of the central administration covers the period from 1960 to 1966. On June 17, 1960, the Political Coordination section and the Press Bureau merged to form the section called Liaison Services, whose functions corresponded roughly to those of its component elements.¹⁵ On August 2, 1960, the American Division was in its turn split into a U.S.A. Division and a Latin American Division. On December 9 of that same year, following the government's decision to create an External Aid Office responsible for carrying out all foreign aid programmes, Economic Division (2) lost its *raison d'être* and disappeared. In fact, its responsibilities and some of its personnel were transferred to the new agency. Finally, on December 23, the African section of the Commonwealth Division was transferred to the Middle Eastern Division, which then became the African and Middle Eastern Division. Particularly characteristic of the years 1961, 1962, and 1963 was the tendency to raise the status of sections or subdivisions to that of divisions.

There was only one important addition during 1961: the creation on June 1, 1961, of a Disarmament Division, no doubt at the prompting of Howard Green, the secretary of state for External Affairs. During 1962, three changes occurred: on June 1, 1962, the Passport Office, previously under the jurisdiction of the Consular Division, was raised to the status of Passport Division; in July, a Registry Division was detached from the Establishment and Organization Division; and in October the Department appointed a director of library services (hitherto the library was only an auxiliary branch of the Historical Division). On September 27, 1963, the Liaison Services became the Press and Liaison Division, to help clarify the image of the Department abroad.¹⁶

The year 1964 marked the beginning of a new series of developments. To apply certain recommendations of the Glassco Commission (Royal Commission on Government Organization), the Department set up on February 21 a research office responsible for examining the administrative services of the Department.¹⁷ In September 1964, in conformity with a report presented by administrative consultants,¹⁸ the Personnel Division of 1947 was divided into two units: Personnel Operations Division (postings) and Personnel Services Division (management). A new administrative section known as the Organization and Methods Unit was also set up, with the prime responsibility of keeping the establishment of the Department up to date.

In summary, it is apparent from this brief historical sketch that the administrative structure of the central administration has experienced a development at least comparable to that of posts abroad; as in the latter case, the number of divisions and services has increased considerably. There were four divisions in 1941, and nearly 30 by the end of 1965. Moreover, between 1941 and 1966 each section assumed dimensions impossible to imagine at the beginning of World War II.

What is most striking is the apparently capricious way in which the Department adapted its structure. Several of the numerous units and divisions within the organization were ephemeral; others were not really able to play their role, which had obviously been improvised. Consequently it is not surprising that the final result—the organization chart of 1966—is not exactly a triumph of rational organization. The fundamental structure of the central body has remained essentially what it was a quarter of a century ago.¹⁹ From the European Affairs and British Commonwealth divisions of 1942 to the European and Commonwealth divisions of 1966, and from the Administrative Services of 1946 to the numerous administrative divisions of today, the line is direct. One should note the Department's concern to adapt its central administration to the great changes in international conditions during the last generation, and to the repercussions that these conditions have had on its task and methods of work. These adaptations, however empirical they may have been, were not without influence on most questions relating to personnel, especially on conditions peculiar to the organization of personnel or what we have called the "particular setting."

C. Personnel Organization

Beyond the administrative structure of the Department, which forms as it were the general setting for its personnel, is the personnel administration proper, whose structure constitutes the particular setting. This structure represents the system governing the classification of the Department's officers, their positions, and postings. We shall now turn to a description of the personnel organization, with particular stress on its development.

1. The first period: 1909-51

The Department has experienced two essentially different systems of personnel organization. The first extends from the Department's creation until 1951; the second, from 1951 to the present day. During the first period, from 1909 to 1951, the positions to be filled were neither defined clearly nor classified accurately. The only limits to the total number of foreign service officers and their levels of employment were those imposed by the budget. The organization of personnel was to all intents and purposes unstructured.

Since 1951 however all positions, particularly those of foreign service officers, have been identified, defined, and classified according to criteria in use throughout the federal public service. The number of positions established as necessary determines at each level the limit on the number of officers in the employ of the Department during a given fiscal period. Theoretically an officer of a previously determined level corresponds to each position. The regime is that of a predetermined or "provisionally fixed" establishment. This regime requires the Department to justify at least once a year, before the Public Service Commission (formerly the Civil Service Commission), any increase in personnel necessitated by an extension of its obligations.²⁰ Personnel organization has thus

acquired a structured form that not only influences but often determines recruitment and promotion policies.

However unchanging these two regimes may have been in their essentials, they have nonetheless undergone some modifications. Especially during the first period, from 1909 to 1951, several slight changes were made. One can distinguish at least three successive stages: from 1909 to 1925, from 1925 to 1944, and from 1944 to 1951.

a) From 1909 to 1925

At its inception in 1909 the Department of External Affairs had a very limited number of personnel: an under-secretary of state for External Affairs, two principal clerks, and four other clerks—seven employees in all. To this group was added an assistant under-secretary in 1912 and a legal adviser in 1913.²¹ According to the concise terms of the 1909 Act to create a Department of External Affairs, the under-secretary, who was “the deputy head of the Department to hold office during pleasure,” was an officer appointed by the governor-in-council. Such other officials, clerks, and employees requisite to the efficient administration of the Department’s business, in pursuance of Article 3(2) of this Act were “appointed in the manner authorized by law.” Until 1925, however, the only categories of officers in the Department were those of under-secretary of state for External Affairs, assistant under-secretary, and legal adviser.

b) From 1925 to 1944

In 1925, with the assent of the Civil Service Commission, the Department created a new category or class of officer, that of counsellor. Then in 1928, when the establishment of the first missions abroad made it imperative for Canada to institute its own diplomatic service, the Department adopted what in its essentials was an organization similar to that of the Foreign Office in London and of the British diplomatic service. To the existing class of departmental advisers were added those of third, second, and first secretary.²² The Department thus adopted the first system of classification for its foreign service officers. The establishment from top to bottom was henceforth to consist of certain higher positions, mainly those of under-secretary, assistant under-secretary, legal adviser, and the categories of counsellor, first secretary, second secretary, and third secretary. All the career officers recruited between 1928 and 1942 belonged to one of these classes. The other officers, in particular the ministers at the Washington, Paris, and Tokyo legations, as well as the high commissioner in London, constituted a special category, that of head of mission.

World War II caused the first changes in this system of classification. On April 1, 1940, at the Department’s request, the Civil Service Commission agreed to the establishment of a category above that of counsellor, which grouped together the assistant under-secretary, the legal adviser, and the permanent Canadian delegate to Geneva.²³ This category was formally recognized by being put on a salary scale between that of counsellor and under-secretary. It was decided, however, not to give it a special name, no doubt in order not to deviate from the general structure adopted in 1928, which had at least the merit of following international standards.

In January 1941, the sudden death of Dr. O. D. Skelton, the under-secretary of the Department since 1925, was the prelude to important changes. On June 24, 1941, when N. A. Robertson, the assistant under-secretary and acting under-secretary since January 31, was made the new under-secretary, the Department for the first time appointed two assistant under-secretaries of state, L. B. Pearson and Hugh Keenleyside. In 1942 the Department created a new category of foreign service officer, that of special wartime assistant, to which belonged all the diplomatic officers recruited between 1942 and 1944.

c) *From 1944 to 1951*

The year 1944 marked the first stage in the modernization of the Department's establishment. The system of general nomenclature in operation since 1928 was replaced in September 1944 by a system of grades. The traditional designations of counsellor and of first, second, and third secretary, hitherto in force both abroad and in the central administration, were excluded from official terminology. Instead the more prosaic terms of foreign service officer grade 1 at the lowest level, and foreign service officer grade 6 at the highest level were substituted. It should however be noted that this new terminology in no way affected the officers in the higher posts of the Department and those who belonged to the special category of head of mission. But the impetus was given. The departmental establishment was taking on a new appearance.

Already a new class of officer, that of deputy under-secretary of state had appeared in July to fill the intermediate and still unnamed category between the under-secretary and the former counsellor. Thus the two holders of the position of assistant under-secretary in 1941 (who were subsequently transferred abroad) were succeeded on July 1, 1944, by two deputy under-secretaries, of whom one, Hume Wrong, was designated as associate under-secretary and the other, J. E. Read, combined the functions of legal adviser with that of deputy under-secretary.

The conversion of the Department to a graduated scale in the classification of foreign service officers was probably due to the approach of the end of the war and the return to normal conditions. Starting in 1944, in fact, some special wartime assistants left the Department to resume civilian life. The Department, for its part, was getting ready to take in the flow of manpower it urgently needed. It was therefore normal to think of defining the categories of officers in relation to those in use in the rest of the federal public service. The new regime came into being unostentatiously: the transition began with the promotions granted at the end of 1944. Those of 1945 confirmed the movement by clearly revealing the new structure of classes. Those wartime assistants who had chosen to remain in the Department were changed during 1944, 1945, and 1946 into graded officers, often by order-in-council, later by means of special examination. Finally all recruits, with the exception of heads of missions, upon joining the Department were henceforth precisely designated one or other of the new grades.

This transformation into the terminology of grades was an operation spread over a period of several years. It was only in 1948-9 that the relationship between the former categories and the new classes of officers was spelled out officially. The text of

the estimates for the year ending March 31, 1949 includes the following comment: a foreign service officer grade 5 corresponds to the former rank of counsellor; grade 4 covers the first secretaries, while the second secretaries now belong to grades 3 and 2; the third secretaries are henceforth officers grade 1. In the future, reference would be made only to the new classes of foreign service officers, in addition of course to the under-secretary of state for External Affairs, the deputy, associate or assistant under-secretaries of state, and the heads of missions.

At the upper echelon the terminology was never to become rigid. Sometimes the designation of deputy under-secretary of state prevailed, sometimes that of associate or assistant under-secretary of state. The title of assistant under-secretary of state proved the most lasting, especially after the creation on April 1, 1947, of the two permanent positions of assistant under-secretary of state. At the level of the graded officers it soon became apparent that the organization in its new form left too little latitude. On April 1, 1948, as in 1940, the Department had recourse to introducing a new class—officer grade 7, between the class of assistant under-secretary of state and that of officer grade 6. Yet this was only a temporary measure, for the rapid increase in numbers, added to the growing needs of the Department, revealed the major weakness of the system: the fact that only officers were classified or graded. A review of departmental positions was essential.

In 1949, two years after the creation of a Personnel Division, the Department tackled the immense job of making an inventory of all the positions in Ottawa and in the missions abroad. An Establishment Committee²⁴ was given the task of defining and classifying the positions in the Department.²⁵ The committee was also concerned with establishing, for each of the positions reviewed, the type of personnel required. Thus, for example, it could decree that the position of head of the Economic Division in the central administration, bearing the employment number "Ext. 11," should be filled by a foreign service officer grade 6, and it could do the same for each of the positions identified in the Economic Division, and for all positions in the other divisions and posts abroad.

The work of the Establishment Committee produced both a catalogue of all departmental positions and a systematic classification of the position of each officer.²⁶ In other words, it gave the Department a true establishment, a so-called "fixed" or predetermined establishment. After making some slight modifications, the Civil Service Commission and the Treasury Board approved the proposed establishment in 1951.²⁷ Nothing was changed in the distribution of foreign service officers between grades 1 to 7 (this had been in existence since 1948), or in the various categories of the non-classified officers (the members of the under-secretary's office and the heads of missions). But the Department now knew the exact number and qualifications of the personnel required.²⁸

2. *The second period: 1951 to the present*

The organization of the Department's diplomatic personnel discussed above is basically the same today, although some formal changes have been made.

The work of redefining the establishment carried out between 1949 and 1951, fundamental and valid though it was, failed to tackle the problem of the classification of officers at the higher level. Before and even after the action taken in 1951, there were, for all practical purposes, two types of classification for diplomatic and con-

sular officers: 1) that of the graded officer (all of them career officers), which was based on a convenient and simple hierarchy from grades 1 to 7; and 2) that of the non-classified officer, differentiated officially only by salary. Thus, on September 1, 1952, this second group comprised at one and the same time an officer (the under-secretary) whose annual salary was \$15,000; three officers (two ambassadors and a high commissioner) whose salary was \$12,000 each; 19 officers earning \$10,000 each; three between \$9,000 and \$10,000; 14 between \$8,000 and \$9,000; two between \$7,000 and \$8,000; and one between \$6,500 and \$7,000.

This regime obviously had several major disadvantages. The non-classified officers, except those working in the office of the under-secretary, were discriminated against. Thus the heads of posts, once they were appointed by order-in-council, received a salary that was more or less pegged indefinitely at a certain level. Those who had previously been graded officers had to give up the advantages of classification by the very fact of their appointment, and incurred the risk of being rarely or never reclassified at the end of their tour abroad. It was necessary to correct this situation and to readjust at least the level of salaries of heads of missions, so as to take into account on an individual basis the loss of earning power during the previous years. The same applied to the grade 7 officers, whose salaries were no longer equivalent to those of their opposite numbers in the other departments of the federal administration. Still to be corrected was the even graver anomaly of the gap existing between the non-classified and the graded officers. On October 1, 1952, a major operation solved all these problems.

a) *The operation of October 1, 1952*

This operation achieved many objectives at once. It created three new classes of officers at the higher echelon of the Department—grades 8, 9, and 10.²⁹ It abolished the class of assistants to the under-secretary of state. The effect of the operation—except in the case of Léon Mayrand, who had reached the level of assistant under-secretary—was to reclassify or confirm the 21 senior officers of the Department in grades 7, 8 and 9, and to determine for each of them an appropriate salary. Finally it reclassified four other officers at the highest level, grade 10, retroactive to October 1, 1952.

Several objectives were obviously envisaged by this operation.³⁰ It attempted first to bring all the foreign service officers into the same system of classification, by eliminating the parallel structure of the non-classified officers. The proof of this is that as far as the reclassification of senior officers is concerned, it applied primarily to the heads of missions, and in a secondary way to the other non-classified officers, that is, the assistant under-secretaries of state. This was the most contentious part of the whole operation. One may wonder whether this reclassification or recertification of certain officers “at appropriate levels” was carried out according to objective criteria, and if so what those criteria were.³¹

The official documents of the Department probably never were so discreet as in this matter. No mention or allusion was made to any aspect of this question, either in the Department's annual *Report* or in the “Circular Documents” within the Department, which are intended to keep officers informed on subjects of common interest. This means that the Department left the public and Parliament, particularly the Standing Committee

on External Affairs, in total ignorance of an important change in the organization of its personnel; and that furthermore it neglected at that time to inform its officers not only of the name and level of those officers who were reclassified, but of the very fact that three new ranks (8, 9, 10) had been added to the existing range of six or seven grades under which the majority of them had entered the Department. It must be acknowledged that the subject was a delicate one to discuss, since it was a matter of explaining to the officers the decision to keep at their respective levels all officers in grades 5 (with two exceptions), 4, 3, 2 and 1; whereas most officers in grades 6 and 7 were being reclassified into grades 7 and 8. Moreover, if one goes no further than to register the reaction of Hume Wrong to the suggestion of his being reclassified into grade 10,³² one may presume that this part of the operation of October 1, 1952, might indeed have stirred up some polemics within the Department.

However the operation may have been conducted, its great merit was to bring all foreign service officers under one classification system. Indeed, while respecting the traditional procedure of appointing heads of posts by order-in-council, it finally ensured the integration of most non-classified officers into a scale that included both career and non-career officers. The latter were thereby allowed to "cover" or fill posts at a level corresponding to their salary and in the same classifications as the career officers. Thus, since October 1, 1952, with the exception of the under-secretary and, from time to time, of an officer belonging to a very special category such as that of the head of the Canadian team in the GATT negotiations (known as the Kennedy Round), all foreign service officers have belonged to one or other of the 10 grades or categories laid down in the External Affairs establishment.

D. Conclusion

This survey reveals the ground covered by the Department in its organization of personnel. After an initial phase extending in our estimation from the beginnings in 1909 to 1925, we distinguish an important stage extending to 1951. Until 1951 the diplomatic and consular officers were merely classified by rather vague categories. A given officer belonged to the corps of counsellors, the corps of third secretaries or else to the group composed of heads of missions. The 1944 conversion of these principal corps or categories into classes or grades ranging from 1 to 7 did not modify in any way the essential factor of this regime which was to ignore classification by position. Thanks to the review of duties and positions carried out between 1949 and 1951, the present organization of personnel covers the classification of positions and, at the same time, the classification of all Canadian diplomatic and consular officers by seniority. In comparison with the past, the organization today appears very coherent. Its shape is clearly outlined. Its norms are both efficient and flexible, which is most important for an organization that endeavours to follow in its personnel structure the development of its administrative structure.

Some may wonder why the exclusive object of our study is the foreign service officer. Why have we limited ourselves to this group of officers, whose numerical importance represents barely 20 per cent of the total personnel of the Department of External Affairs? Our answer to this question lies entirely in our basic assumption—that the foreign service officer is the pivotal element of the Department of External Affairs. Indeed it is around him that the Department has developed since 1909. It is he who has given the Department the spirit that is characteristic of External Affairs. It is he who presides over all its main working units. Finally it is he who originates most of the important decisions taken in External Affairs.

No unit in the Department of External Affairs is complete without a foreign service officer. All the Canadian embassies and the vast majority of other Canadian missions abroad are directed by foreign service officers. All divisions in the central administration are either managed or supervised by them, directly or indirectly. One may even say that all the other officials of the Department must first be defined in relation to the foreign service officer. At the heart of all developments in the Department, the foreign service officer is, almost by definition, the only indispensable element. His triple role as pivot, motivator, and director fully justifies this study.

Nonetheless, we are aware that the recent evolution in the working methods of diplomacy has diminished the importance of the role of the diplomatic officer in Canada as elsewhere. We certainly recognize that new categories of specialized officers (administrative and technical officers, in particular) have already taken over much of the execution of certain tasks in External Affairs. But this in no way invalidates our assumption since, at the same time as these new classes of officials occupy areas previously dependent on diplomatic officers, the latter are assigned principally to posts of direction or supervision in the Department; so much so that this trend presents an additional reason for devoting our study exclusively to the foreign service officer.

We claim further that within the Department of External Affairs the body of foreign service officers forms a relatively homogeneous and to a certain extent closed group. In

our view it constitutes a social group in the full sense of the term,¹ a group whose elements are clearly integrated and which has all the particular characteristics of a *career system*.² This group is currently composed mainly of officers who began at the bottom of the scale and who all had initially a more or less identical preparation. The group trains its own recruits. It uses them according to a particular principle, that of rotation of personnel. It reserves all its most important positions for career officers. It has its own criteria for assessing its members. More than anywhere else in the federal public service, this group has its own outlook, its own particular way of doing things and its own code of behaviour. Finally its still relatively small numbers, which even recently gave it the air of a family, add to its unity.³

The corps of foreign service officers therefore forms "a collective unit that is real but partial, and directly observable"⁴ in the sense that Gurvitch gives to the term "group." It belongs moreover to the higher administration, and it plays or can play a considerable role in the elaboration of the country's external policy. There are very few studies on this particular group of officials or on the federal public service as a whole. The most recent, John Porter's *The Vertical Mosaic*,⁵ gives scant attention to External Affairs within an otherwise brilliant analysis of the federal bureaucratic elite. The work of James Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible*,⁶ which is admirable in many respects, scarcely touches on a study of the personnel of the Department of External Affairs. As a matter of fact, the recent M.A. thesis of Gary Caldwell⁷ represents the first serious attempt to investigate the recruitment of foreign service officers between 1946 and 1964. There is of course the book by H. Gordon Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad*, now a classic, which traces the history of the Department's establishment up to 1945 and discusses in general terms the social origins of the earlier foreign service officers.⁸ Given the scantiness of this information and the paucity of documentation from the Department itself, there was certainly a place for a study designed to provide a more precise description of the Canadian foreign service officer, both as to his origins and characteristics at the time of his entry into the Department, and his career progress. That is why we undertook this study.

We shall endeavour hereafter to portray as faithfully as possible the corps of foreign service officers from 1945 to 1965, following the essential stages in the career of every officer, that is, his recruitment, training, postings, and advancement. We deem it necessary, however, to clarify first of all the question of the structure or "establishment" of the officers in the Department in order to place the group in perspective. But at this stage we must make clear what we mean, for the purposes of this study, by the term "foreign service officer."

The meaning of "foreign service officer" is far from unanimously agreed upon. According to the most current interpretation, a foreign service officer is a career officer. This is the definition accepted by the Department of External Affairs, at least implicitly, when it touches upon the Canadian diplomatic establishment in its publications. It is also the meaning given to the term in certain research works.⁹ This meaning is, to say the least, questionable. It does not encompass the whole truth, since it embraces only the officers recruited through competitive examination; but we shall see later that a sizable proportion of foreign service officers are recruited by less direct means. Moreover, this

restrictive sense has the disadvantage of presupposing a definition of a career officer, which is by no means an easy task to accomplish and which in any case appears to us at present somewhat premature.¹⁰

We believe that it is closer to reality to use the term "foreign service officer" in the much wider sense given to it by the Public Service Commission—that relating to a wide variety of positions in the Department of External Affairs. This meaning in no way precludes the distinctions which may have to be made during the course of this study, and it permits us to take into account all the officers in whom we are interested while conforming to the usage of the Public Service Commission, which shares with the Department the recruitment of officers. Before approaching the important subject of recruitment let us first state in its broadest terms the question of the establishment of foreign service officers.

We shall not return here to the question of the organization of personnel. Our purpose is merely to acquaint the reader with the actual numbers in the Department of External Affairs. It is here that the term "establishment" takes on its true significance, that is, the total number of foreign service officers in the Department at a given moment, and their distribution throughout the various classes or categories provided for by its personnel organization. We believe it important to stress first the continual growth in the number of External Affairs diplomatic and consular officers from 1945 to the present.

We shall depart here from the method used in discussing the organization of personnel. Rather, we shall compare the personnel at 10-year intervals, 1945-6 to 1965-6, taking first the numbers in the budgetary estimates or the establishment, then the actual numbers. The numbers in the estimates are those which appear yearly in the budget, having been approved by the Public Service Commission and the Treasury Board. The actual numbers are those of the officers in the employ of the Department, whose names appear on the official lists of its Personnel Division.¹ We shall concern ourselves here with the evolution of the actual number of officers at five-year intervals, from 1955 to 1965, adding three other dates, chosen with a view to showing the effects of the operation of October 1, 1952.

First we must establish a grouping of the corps, categories, or grades of officers in order to present and compare statistics. We shall therefore study separately the under-secretary's unit and divide the officers into three groups: the higher, middle, and lower ranks. The under-secretary's unit—familiarly called "the second floor," from the fact that all its members have their offices on the second floor of the East Block at Ottawa, or "killers' row," for reasons that may be appreciated later on—is comprised of the under-secretary himself, his deputy, and his assistants, who are the assistant under-secretaries of state. The higher ranking officers include the unclassified heads of missions under the old system, or those who still appear as such in the Department's budgetary estimates—in particular the director of the Historical Research Division (1955-6), the president of the Canadian section of the International Joint Commission

and the chief negotiator for GATT (1965-6). They also include the officers in the corps of counsellors up to 1945-6 and all the foreign service officers who since 1945-6 have belonged to grades 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. The middle-ranking officers cover the corps of first and second secretaries prior to 1945-6, and subsequently those of grades 5 and 4; the lower-ranking officers include the former third secretaries and subsequently the officers of grades 3, 2, and 1.

A. The Departmental Establishment

Table 1 (departmental establishment) shows a considerable increase in the establishment between 1946 and 1966. In fact, from 67 in the budgetary estimates of March 31, 1946, the total number of diplomatic and consular officers rose to 311 as of March 31, 1956, and to 415 as of March 31, 1966—a rate of progression of 1 to 6. It will be noted that this progression involved two different rates, one rapid, since it was of the order of 1 to approximately 4.5 during the first decade; the other moderate in comparison, of the order of 1 to approximately 1.3 during the second decade. This differentiation is similar to the overall rate of expansion of the Department.

Table 1. Establishment of foreign service officers in the Department, 1946, 1956 and 1966, by rank

Fiscal year ending:	Total no.	Senior level			
		Office of under-sec.	Others	Intermediate level	Junior level
March 31, 1946	67	3	28	21	15
March 31, 1956	311	6	70	72	163
March 31, 1966	415	6	124	126	159

This table also reveals different rates of progression by groups or categories. Thus, by comparison with the rate of growth which was 1 to about 4.5 between 1945-6 and 1955-6, that of the lower-ranking officers for the same period was 1 to more than 10, that of the middle-ranking officers was in the relationship of 1 to slightly more than 3, while the growth rate of the higher-ranking officers was 1 to somewhat less than 3. The number of officers in the unit of the under-secretary progressed in the same period only from 1 to 2. These trends are not only conflicting, but also indicate a curious, erratic movement in the decade 1956-66. The most curious contrast is between the unchanging number of officers in the under-secretary's unit on the one hand, and the sustained increase in the number of officers as a whole, on the other. On March 31, 1966, the under-secretary's unit comprised, according to the budget, the under-secretary himself, his deputy, and four assistants—a total of six. This was the total strength 10 years earlier on March 31, 1956. As indicated above, the number of higher-ranking officers, other than those in the under-secretary's unit, moved in that period from 70 to 124, an increase of 77 per cent, and middle-ranking officers from 72 to 126, an increase of 75 per cent. The fact that the

number of lower-ranking officers, on the other hand, remained at around 160, while the number in the other ranks increased, would appear at first suspicious. If examined closely, however, it would seem that this state of affairs can be explained by the transfer to administrative officers of certain positions previously reserved for diplomatic officers, and by the more recent tendency to create new positions at the middle level rather than at the lower. This tendency is inspired by precedents created at the Treasury Board, where new positions are being established at the level of what is called "operational positions."

To these various elements of disparity between the postwar decades must be added the curious distribution of officers by groups or categories. On March 31, 1946, as indicated in Table 1, the 67 diplomatic and consular officers were divided as follows: 31 officers at the higher rank, 21 at the intermediate, and 15 at the lower.




Diagram 1. Hierarchical pyramids of the establishment of foreign service officers, March 31, 1946, 1956 and 1966

Translated into graphic form (Diagram 1), this distribution is exactly that of an inverted pyramid. It brings two things to mind. First, this is an unusual form of personnel organization; second, such an inverted pyramid reveals either a fundamental flaw in the organization, or unusual (although not evident) conditions. The first proposition is a matter of common sense—any healthy organization should have more personnel at the base than at the top. Can it be different here, one may ask? Perhaps, at least in part. This Department numbers as many semi-autonomous units as diplomatic missions abroad and

one may argue, all things considered, that as a result of these missions External Affairs needs more people in charge than any other federal or provincial department.

Therefore, one can accept *a priori* the dimensions of the upper part of the pyramid; moreover this feature is confirmed in the pyramids of 1955-6 and 1965-6. But what is much less orthodox is the restricted dimension of the base of the pyramid, as in 1945-6, for example. This anomaly, corrected in 1955-6 and in 1965-6, is probably due to the drying up of recruitment at the base (or that of officers called "juniors") during World War II; or else to the almost exclusive recruitment during that period of officers in the higher brackets, called special wartime assistants. Evidence of this fact is that with the return to normal conditions in 1944-5, the base of the pyramid was broad enough to support the upper layers. The first consequence of the operation of October 1, 1952 was to thicken the layer of the higher-ranking officers, as shown by a comparison of the 1945-6 and 1955-6 pyramids. In short, the inverted pyramid of 1945-6 reflected, as we have suggested, conditions which were not apparent and which were peculiar to the last years of World War II.

It is the generally massive form of the pyramid with which we are concerned here. We believe that this shape corresponds roughly to what is expected, and that it is normal to the extent that it corresponds to the establishment for the foreign service officers alone, and not for the whole Department. As noted in our Introduction to Part 1, the foreign service officer, the pivot of the Department, is nevertheless only one of the elements that constitute it, or one part of its total personnel. If the foreign service officer forms the nucleus of any one cell in the Department, one must clearly recognize that this nucleus is surrounded by an average of four or five "particles"—the employees of the other groups. This amounts to saying that the pyramid of the diplomatic establishment of External Affairs may well be irregular or massive, since it really represents only a part of the total establishment which, because of the hierarchical principle of organization, presumably gives a better balanced pyramid. It may be expected that the excessive importance of the group of high-ranking officers will have repercussions on the departmental policies of advancement or promotion; and that the plethora of officers whose diplomatic status requires that they should belong, at least nominally, to the upper layers will singularly complicate the task of identifying among them the group which exercises real influence or which belongs to the power elite. But before broaching this question, we must examine closely the problem of the actual number of personnel.

B. Actual Numbers in the Department

Table 2 presents the totals and the distribution patterns of officers in External Affairs between 1949 and 1965. We have taken these numbers, that is the actual number of officers in the employ of the Department at six given moments in the postwar period, starting at the end of 1949, with the object of bringing out the distinctive features of their evolution.

Although the dates in Table 2 (the actual numbers) do not coincide with the dates in Table 1 (the numbers allowed for in the budget), it nevertheless seems to us interesting to

compare them with each other and also with Diagram 1. The distribution pattern of diplomatic and consular officers as of December 27, 1949 confirms the tendency, noted in Diagram 1, towards a normal pattern for an establishment. The narrow base presented by the lower strata of the departmental establishment—and presumably of the actual number of officers as of March 31, 1946—gave place on December 27, 1949 to a much broader layer of officers which supported, logically enough, relatively fewer middle- and higher-ranking officers. Table 2 reveals that between December 27, 1949 and July 1, 1965 it was the middle-ranking officers that increased the most proportionately. From 35 officers in 1949 their number rose to 117 on July 1, 1965, an increase of 3 to 1. The lower-ranking officers, during the same period, increased from 117 to 155. But the actual number of higher-ranking officers likewise followed closely the number provided for in the budgetary estimates. From 1949 to 1965 the total number of officers in the higher brackets of the Department always exceeded that of the middle-ranking officers. It even tended to draw gradually closer to the lower-ranking group, in absolute figures. But the apparent gap between the total number of officers provided for and the actual total requires a special explanation.

Table 2. Actual number of foreign service officers in the Department 1949-65, by rank

	Total no.	Senior level	Intermediate level	Junior level
Dec. 27, 1949	201	49	35	117
Sept. 1, 1952	227	58	42	127
April 1, 1953	233	57	42	134
July 1, 1955	257	66	54	137
July 1, 1960	324	94	82	148
July 1, 1965	395	123	117	155

One is bound to notice first that the actual number of officers is invariably below the number of officers provided for in the establishment. This is surely a situation that can be called normal. The number of officers provided for in the budget is the ceiling on the number and level of officers serving in the Department. The actual number expresses the extent to which the Department has succeeded in reaching these limits or this ideal, which in a certain sense is a minimum.² At first glance it may appear more surprising to find a very marked difference between the establishment for any given year and the actual number of officers in the Department. Thus the number of officers provided for on March 31, 1956—163 lower-ranking officers and 72 middle-ranking officers (Table 1)—is well above the actual number of officers on July 1, 1955, namely 137 and 54 officers respectively. Why these disparities despite the nine-month gap between them? To this question there are at least two plausible answers. The first is that the date of July 1 in Table 2, falling as it does right in the middle of the annual arrival of recruits to the Department, may easily distort the relationship that we are trying to establish between the estimated and actual numbers. The second likely reason may be a deliberately slow

policy of advancement for the lower-ranking officers during the first half of the decade 1950-60, a situation that was reinforced by a shortage of recruits during that period. One must point out, moreover, that these disparities had almost disappeared by 1965-6, when, as Tables 1 and 2 indicate, the actual number of officers had for all practical purposes caught up with the number of officers provided for.

It should further be remarked that this somewhat abnormal state of affairs hardly ever appeared at the level of the higher-ranking officers where, in 1955-6 as in 1965-6, the difference was almost negligible. Paradoxically the Department, with the blessing of the cabinet, succeeded more readily in filling its needs at the higher level than it did at the middle and lower levels. At the rank of head of mission, in particular, the cabinet often finds means to bring in from outside the Department a certain number of officers, as it has the right to do.

1. Increase in actual numbers

As Table 2 clearly shows, the number of officers with the Department increased steadily between 1949 and 1965. Generally speaking, the total number of External Affairs diplomatic and consular officers doubled in 15 years.

One must make clear however that the figures in this table do not correspond exactly with those that originate in the Department or other official sources of information. For instance, the Department reported for the end of 1949, under the heading "diplomatic personnel (including heads of missions),"³ 239 employees or officers, whereas our table gave only 201 on December 27, 1949. And in its annual *Report* for 1962, the Department declared that it had 444 diplomatic officers on December 31, 1962, whereas our figure, based on the official lists of its Personnel Division, is only 395 as of July 1, 1965. These lists record by class and rank the name of each foreign service officer, among other information. To account for such a discrepancy there can be only one of two explanations: either the methods of presenting the facts or the definitions of terms are different. It so happens that our understanding of the terms "diplomatic personnel" and "corps of foreign service officers" is different from that of the Department.

It will be recalled that we took care to stress from the outset that this study dealt exclusively with only true diplomatic officers, namely those of the traditional prewar staff and the postwar foreign service officers. We do not deny that members of personnel such as the Department's information officers or administrative officers often acquire, through a posting abroad, certain privileges traditionally reserved for foreign service officers. We also admit that various other officers, for example, junior executive officers, management analysts, engineers, solicitors or personnel administrators who often discharge important responsibilities in the Department, sometimes receive salaries equal to those of many foreign service officers. We maintain however that in no case should these "officers" be included officially among the diplomatic personnel, for administrative reasons. In particular we fail to see the advantage that the Department and the Public Service Commission may derive from combining in one group foreign service officers and external affairs officers, who are of two different categories. (External affairs officers correspond to a category of officials that was established after the regrouping in 1956 of

information, consular, and certain other administrative officers.) We prefer to distinguish these categories of officers according to the norms current in most diplomatic services.

As for the figures of December 27, 1949, it appears that the actual number of officers in the Department at that time included 201 foreign service officers and 38 other "officers," the latter representing 16 per cent of all officers, or of what the Department designates under the name of "diplomatic personnel." On April 1, 1965, the number of external affairs officers had increased to 135 and foreign service officers to 377—a proportion equal to one-quarter, which is remarkable. It would be interesting to know whether it was this rapid increase which prompted the Department to put the other officers on a footing of equality with the foreign service officers. In any case, it is certain that this phenomenon, if it continues, might have important repercussions on the numerical representation of French-speaking Canadians in the Department of External Affairs.

2. *The two main linguistic groups*

The time has come to take an overall look at the numerical representation of linguistic groups among foreign service officers. We shall do this in Table 3.

Table 3. Actual number of foreign service officers in the Department 1949-65, by rank and linguistic group

	Total no.		Senior level		Intermediate level		Junior level	
	E*	F**	E	F	E	F	E	F
Dec. 27, 1949		158	43	36	13	26	9	96
Sept. 1, 1952		180	47	44	14	30	12	106
April 1, 1953		187	46	43	14	31	11	113
July 1, 1955		201	56	51	15	43	11	107
July 1, 1960		248	76	75	19	67	15	106
July 1, 1965		311	84	102	21	89	28	120
								35

Source: Personnel Records Basic Documents No. 1, "Composite List of Officers of External Affairs."

*English. **French.

This table reveals that the increase in the total number of English-speaking officers and French-speaking officers has been more or less parallel throughout the period studied. Between December 27, 1949 and July 1, 1965, the number of Francophones* went up from 43 to 84, an increase of 95 per cent; the number of Anglophones rose from 158 to 311, an increase of 96 per cent. In fact the proportion of French-speaking officers was on July 1, 1965 what it was on December 27, 1949, that is, 21 per cent. Between these two

*The terms "Francophone" and "Anglophone" are used from time to time throughout this study as synonyms for "French-speaking (person)" or "English-speaking (person)."

points, the proportion had reached a low point of 19.7 per cent on April 1, 1953 and then climbed to a peak of 23.4 per cent on July 1, 1960. Furthermore, the pattern is roughly similar in both the lower-ranking and the middle-ranking brackets.

The situation is quite different in the higher spheres, that is among the officers attached to the under-secretary's office and the officers of grades 6 to 10. At that level a distinct, continuous, and gradual decrease in the proportion of French-speaking officers may be observed. Thus on December 27, 1949, 13 French-speaking officers out of a total of 49 (that is, 26 per cent) were included in the higher spheres of the Department. By September 1, 1952, this proportion had diminished to 24 per cent; it was down to 22 per cent on July 1, 1955, and to 20 per cent in 1960. On July 1, 1965, French Canadian representation at the higher echelons was no more than 16 per cent.

Moreover, this relative weakness of French-speaking representation is more pronounced than appears at first glance. It so happens that a considerable proportion of the French-speaking officers in the Department's higher echelons, contrary to the case of the Anglophone element, have not been career officers.⁴ On April 1, 1953, for example, seven of the French-speaking officers at that level, that is 50 per cent of the Francophone group, were officers appointed by order-in-council or officers from outside the Department. In 1955, their proportion was about 33 per cent; in 1960, 31 per cent; and in 1965, 33 per cent. Throughout these years, the proportion of English-speaking officers never exceeded 11 per cent; it was only 8 per cent on July 1, 1965. This situation can of course be expected to have important repercussions on the possibilities for members of the two linguistic groups to belong to the decision-making levels of the Department or to its power elite. But the time has not yet come to examine this problem. It appears more useful to establish first, as clearly as possible, what we shall call the underrepresentation of Francophones among foreign service officers.

3. Under-representation of French-speaking officers

Are French-speaking officers adequately represented in the foreign service officer group? Have they ever been adequately represented? Such are the questions to which we should like to make a first, tentative reply. We should expect that the personnel of the Department of External Affairs, and more particularly its diplomatic and consular ranks, would reflect as closely as possible the numerical and proportional distribution of the Canadian population by mother tongue,⁵ the more so because External Affairs recruits its French-speaking officers, as we shall see, on a national basis. The Census of Canada for 1951 and 1961 gave 29.0 per cent and 28.1 per cent respectively as the proportions of Canadians whose mother tongue was French.⁶ Since we have established earlier that the proportion of the Department's officers whose language was French tended to stabilize around 21 per cent between 1949 and 1965—although it did reach 23.4 per cent at its maximum in 1960—it will readily be agreed that the gap between the average of 21 per cent and the 28.1 per cent and 29.0 per cent as given in the census is important and significant. Even if, for purposes of narrowing the gap, one used the 23.4 per cent maximum of 1960, one would still have to conclude that the total French-speaking representation among foreign service officers between 1949 and 1965 was never on the

same level as the proportion of the Canadian population whose mother tongue was French. This permanent under-representation of French-speaking Canadians would be further aggravated if we sought to take into account the other officers, particularly the external affairs officers and the administrative officers, as the Department does in its "diplomatic personnel."⁷ But there is no need to go that far, since the primary reason for this situation lies in the whole question of the recruitment of foreign service officers.

We have already noted the fact that the Department's actual number of officers tends to lag behind the officers provided for in the estimates. We have also seen that the proportion of French-speaking officers in the diplomatic establishment of External Affairs has always been markedly inferior to the numerical importance of the French-language population in Canada. We believe that these two facts, among others, arise from the Department's policy of recruitment. One may ask whether this policy is subject to conditions which inevitably bring about such consequences and, if so, whether these conditions are to be attributed to the Department itself or to some other federal agency which is responsible for the recruitment of foreign service officers.

A. Responsibility for Recruitment

In every public service, the ultimate responsibility for recruitment rests with the government. In Canada, however, the federal government in 1910 entrusted the administration of the personnel of the federal public service to an independent organization, the Civil Service Commission, which was thus allowed to influence recruiting policies.

The great majority of Canadian federal officials are recruited today in accordance with the terms of the Public Service Employment Act. This rule prevails both for the personnel of the Department of External Affairs and for that of other federal departments. It applies to the majority of foreign service officers as well as to all other categories in the Department. The fact remains that the federal government, with certain reservations, can and does independently appoint a certain number of diplomatic officers to the Department of External Affairs. Whether these appointments are exceptional or made by virtue of certain provisions in the Public Service Employment Act in no way alters the fact that the government acts and can act as it wishes in recruiting foreign service officers. Let us admit that in practice the successive governments in Ottawa have so far

displayed prudence, preferring to leave to the Public Service Commission the task of ensuring the major portion of recruiting for the Department.

We saw earlier, while discussing the problem of budgeting for staff, that the Public Service Commission and the Treasury Board possess in practice a kind of right of veto, particularly over the number and level of officers. The Public Service Commission moreover exercises general authority at present over all the principal aspects of the officers' careers. It is this body that organizes the competitive examinations for recruitment to the Department, ensures the publicity for and the administration of these examinations and makes official the lists of successful candidates. It is the Public Service Commission that gives sanction to the reclassification of certain of the Department's employees, or the integration into the category of foreign service officer of officials employed by other federal departments. In all these roles, however, it has the support and assistance of the Department of External Affairs.

The Department is in fact associated with all the important steps in the process whereby foreign service officers are selected. It is the Department that makes direct contact, to the extent that it deems suitable, with the *milieux* where it judges it should recruit. It is the Department that drafts the texts of certain of the written examinations and that ensures the marking of the candidates' papers. In addition, representatives of the Department sit *ex officio* on all the selection boards for foreign service officers that are set up by the Public Service Commission. One can even assert that in practice it is these representatives that have the most influence, often a deciding one, on the selection of recruits. When the Department was small, the under-secretary himself (in particular Dr. Skelton, with the Department from 1925 to 1941), took an active part in the recruitment of foreign service officers by competitive examination. Not only did he prepare the written papers himself, he also presided in person over the boards for the oral tests, in order to ensure the maintenance of certain standards, and especially to remove immediately the elements that he judged undesirable. Today the under-secretary, if he so desires, can still exercise a profound influence on the choice of recruits, through the person who usually represents the Department on the panels—the head of Personnel Operations Division. It is quite normal for External Affairs to follow closely the recruiting of officers, since it is the Department that in the end is the most concerned in the recruiting operation and it is therefore the Department, more than the Public Service Commission, that usually lays down the policy for recruiting foreign service officers.

B. *Aims of the Recruitment Policy*

It is important to realize at the outset that all those who constituted the corps of foreign service officers from 1945 to 1965 entered the Department between 1922 and 1964. We will presume for the moment that the majority of these officers were recruited through examination. This will permit us tentatively to identify the examination with the recruiting policy. It would be more to the point to refer here to the "policies" rather than the "policy" of the Department in the matter of recruitment, in view of the many different circumstances that have marked the examinations since 1925, especially as

these policies have involved a number of aspects of varying importance which have remained up to now more or less unexplained.

Of these unexplained aspects certain are due either to general principles—what one may call the “theory of recruitment”—or to the aims and objectives that the Department may have had in mind in recruiting foreign service officers. Others relate to the form that the examinations have taken and to the actual standards of recruitment. Some aspects are clearly discernible on the posters and in the official publications of federal government agencies. Others are buried in the writings or official declarations of key people in the Department. Still others have never been formulated. Let us try to clarify the matter by trying first to specify the aims of recruitment.

1. General objectives

What aims and objectives has the Department pursued in recruiting its officers? The Department itself has taken a long time to reply to this question, at least publicly. It does not seem that such a question has ever been raised in the Department except in terms of expanding the services or the structure. Moreover Treasury Board and the Civil Service Commission refused, until 1965, to consider any request for an increase of diplomatic personnel based on assessments made by the Department of its long-term requirements.

Until the creation of a Personnel Division in 1947, the absence of any public reference by the Department to its recruiting aims can readily be understood. There had been too few regular examinations before World War II to make the formulation of recruiting aims necessary. On the other hand, the abnormal conditions of the war had prompted the Department to formulate one objective only: to recruit a greater number of individuals.¹ The surprising thing, however, is that this essentially quantitative requirement should have remained the same until the present day. In 1953 the Department first brought this aim into the open, that is to say, it furnished reasons for increasing its personnel.² This was made abundantly clear at the end of 1964, in the aphorism “get more people.”³ On both these occasions the Department tacitly acknowledged that it was still at its starting point, and that there could be no question of its proposing any other aim for recruiting.⁴ Moreover, the Department had already proved during a first attempt made in 1958, that it had no intention of going beyond generalities on the subject.⁵ Yet a French Canadian, making a plea for recruitment, pointed out in 1962 that recruitment should help the Department “to represent the principal linguistic and cultural elements of Canada.”⁶ Officially the Department has never stated that it was pursuing any other aim than that of increasing the number of its officers. This observation in no way prejudices the facts themselves or the actions of the Department in this matter. It simply makes it clear that the Department’s aims regarding recruitment as a whole fall far short of its relatively clear intentions on certain aspects of recruitment, particularly methods of recruiting.

2. Methods of recruitment

The Department of External Affairs has always considered that the great majority of its career officers should be recruited through competitive examination.⁷ It is true,

however, that up to the beginning of World War II a certain number of officers had been appointed by order-in-council, and that since then the Department has recruited some of its higher-ranking officers, in particular several heads of missions, by this means. Also, in the years immediately following the war a certain number of officers, recruited during the years 1942, 1943, and 1944 as special wartime assistants, had their appointments confirmed, for all practical purposes *pro forma*, by special examination.⁸ The same thing happened in the majority of cases, when certain employees either of the Department or of other federal agencies were reclassified as foreign service officers. But the principle of normally recruiting foreign service officers through examination has nonetheless been preserved since the beginning.

3. Levels of recruitment

The Department's rule has always been to recruit diplomatic officers at the lowest rank. Until 1944, as we have seen, this level was that of third secretary. Since 1944 foreign service officers of grades 1 and 2 have all been recruited at the lowest rank. However, the recruitment of reclassified officials mentioned above has generally taken place at intermediate levels, and sometimes at higher levels by order-in-council. But rarely in the postwar period, except during the time of rapid expansion from 1946 to 1948 and once since (in 1956), has the Department held special examinations like those of its early years of recruiting, in particular in 1925 for a counsellor and in 1928 for first secretaries. The mere fact that the last time it deviated from the general rule, the Department considered it necessary to offer an explanation to its officers, suggests that it intends to continue to recruit at the bottom and by means of competitive examination.⁹

4. The competitive examination

Before World War II the Department's competitive examination was held irregularly. This annual examination was re-established in 1937 after a lapse of several years, and suspended again in 1942 for the duration of the war. From 1944 to 1966, however, it was held each year, except in 1950.

Since 1928 the examination has consisted of three essential stages: 1) the written test, 2) the assessment of the candidate's record, and 3) the oral test. Every successful candidate must pass the oral test. An assessment of his record, which formerly determined whether the candidate would be summoned to the oral examination, now follows the oral or takes place at the same time. The written test has always consisted of at least an essay, a précis, and a test of general knowledge. The latter contains many varied questions: taken all round, it covers a very wide range of subjects, from contemporary history to international law. Since 1955, the Civil Service Commission (now the Public Service Commission) has added a so-called "objective" test, compulsory for all candidates for the public service, and aimed at maintaining minimum standards.¹⁰ Since 1963, the written examination has also included a test which allows the Department to estimate the knowledge that a candidate may have of the second official language of Canada, either

English or French—whichever is not his customary language. The written test has become a sifting operation which is intended to exclude from the start the obviously incapable candidates. The oral examination, reinforced by an assessment of the candidate's record, has acquired an importance that often determines the classification and therefore the selection of the recruits.¹¹

The object of the competitive examination is to establish by merit a list of eligible candidates, bearing in mind that war veterans who pass the examination must be placed automatically ahead of others. A candidate's name must always appear on this list, which is published in the *Canada Gazette* by the Public Service Commission, before External Affairs can offer him employment. The listed candidate must have previously met certain standards in school or university training.

5. Educational standards

The minimum requirement for the general examination has always been a university degree.¹² In 1955, however, this requirement was stretched by adding the words "a university graduate or undergraduate in his final year of study."¹³ But what degree? Since 1928 it has been the bachelor of arts, to which the French *licence* generally corresponds. In 1958 the Department finally declared explicitly "that a degree higher than the Bachelor of Arts was not required."¹⁴

Since the beginning of recruitment by competitive examination, the bachelor of arts of high standing, that is the "honours degree," or the specialized B.A. of the English-language universities in Canada, has always been preferred. The field of specialization is generally one or other of the social sciences.¹⁵ One may say that a good training in social sciences, or more exactly in arts and sciences, has long been the standard of excellence applied to candidates for the competitive examination.¹⁶

If this examination has tended to favour the undergraduates trained in the faculties of arts and sciences of Canadian universities, this does not mean that the Department has failed to show an interest in candidates whose training was different from the B.A., or better still, superior to it. On the contrary, the announcement of the 1928 examination was quite explicit: it clearly stated that preference would be given to specialized students or to those having done higher or postgraduate study in political economy, political science, or international law. Announcement of the 1948 examination went further, by adding geography, history, economics, and law. In time, however, this preference gradually lost its importance until 1958 when it was stated as follows: "the majority of successful candidates in the past have taken at least one year of graduate studies."¹⁷

Although a representative of the Department was able to declare in 1956, before the Standing Committee on External Affairs, that "the majority [of the officers] have had qualifications going beyond the Bachelor of Arts degree,"¹⁸ the impression remains that higher or postgraduate studies are an extra not required of candidates at the competitive examination.¹⁹ It is significant that on several occasions during the postwar years, spokesmen for the Department have sought to reassure members of the House on the "reasonable level" of the examination requirements in respect of university degrees.²⁰ Significant too is the fact that it was possible to write in 1949: "Diplomas

are important only insofar as they are a pledge of culture, a sign of a certain intellectual skill.”²¹ However every candidate at the examination, at whatever level he may be, must satisfy certain general criteria of an objective nature.

6. Basic criteria

These so-called basic criteria apply to all those seeking to become foreign service officers. By whatever door a candidate considers entering External Affairs, he must necessarily be a British subject and have lived in Canada for at least 10 years. Indeed this last requirement is the condition that distinguishes candidates for the foreign service from those for other departments in the federal public service.²² Until the end of World War II, only men could be candidates for the position of foreign service officer. Physical health was among the fundamental criteria.²³ However, a knowledge of the two official languages of Canada has never been a prior requirement for the examination.²⁴ Finally, from the beginning, all candidates for the competitive examination have had to be between 23 and 31 at the grade 1 level and between 31 and 35 at the grade 2 level. These basic criteria are the only reliable indications we have of the Department’s recruiting policy during the period with which our study is concerned.

7. Philosophy of recruitment

With the exception of these basic criteria, it appears that the aims of the Department in recruiting have not been as precise or explicit as they might have been. On the basis of certain general statements and within certain limits, even the rules of recruitment for foreign service officers have been susceptible of many interpretations. To explain this state of affairs, one might undoubtedly cite extenuating circumstances, such as the rapid expansion of the service since the 1940’s. But in our opinion the fundamental reason is that the Department’s recruiting policy has been subordinated to a general philosophy, no less real for being implicit, of what a diplomatic officer is.²⁵ This conception or ideal, very well identified by the Glassco Commission,²⁶ is that of the “generalist” or all-round man. It is important to note here once more that this philosophy still remains what it was 40 years ago.

It was O. D. Skelton who once defined the ideal diplomatic officer as “someone of all-round ability, capable of performing in widely different assignments at short notice, rather than a highly skilled specialist.” No official of the Department has ever since, to our knowledge, questioned this definition. On the contrary, whenever the occasion presented itself, this approach has triumphed.²⁷ Such a philosophy implies that the diversity and mobility characteristic of the work of the officers make it inevitable that the persons recruited “are not too highly specialized but . . . are well trained.”²⁸ This no doubt indicates that the process of recruiting foreign services officers tends to reveal the candidates who have “personality,” “flexibility of mind,” are “adaptable to contrasting circumstances,”²⁹ and possess “deeper intellectual qualities of maturity, of mental alertness, of initiative and judgment, and of facility in learning”;³⁰ or conversely that the

examination is intended to permit the evaluation of the candidate's "potential" or personality rather than to discover certain distinct intellectual qualities he may have.³¹ "Broadly speaking, what we want," admitted the under-secretary of state for External Affairs in 1954, "are people who have been trained to think, people who have a broad grasp of public affairs. . . ."³²

This general philosophy of recruitment has considerably influenced the recruiting policy of the Department, if it has not simply served in its stead. It is no doubt an improvement over the Department's avowed aim of finding more people. It has more or less directly slanted the annual quest for officers towards candidates with "good minds," who, as the reader may have noted, coincide with the "ideal" man, one who has a good grounding in the humanities. In addition, it has aided the integration of the new recruits by rendering them more sensitive to the spirit of the Department.³³ Finally it has had the side effect of broadening immeasurably the already wide scope of the individual board members in their assessment of candidates.

It is obvious that the Department of External Affairs and the Public Service Commission have never wanted to recognize officially the need to form a group of officers that would be bilingual and bicultural. The fact that no regulation specified what knowledge of French or English a candidate must possess is extremely eloquent. It is possible nevertheless that these two agencies have endeavoured implicitly, that is to say without a clearly defined policy, to recruit officers from the two linguistic groups of Canada and insofar as these efforts have been successful it may be said that the federal administration is bilingual and basically bicultural.

C. Results of the Recruitment Policy

1. Introduction: our research methods

Before undertaking to investigate the External Affairs recruits themselves or to translate into reality the Department's recruiting policy, we feel it necessary to explain why and how our research was conducted. By so doing, we shall give the reader facts indispensable to the understanding of the rest of our text.

The subject of the first part of our research is the corps of foreign officers from 1945 to 1965. By this group we mean any person who was in the employ of the Department, either as a diplomatic or consular officer, or as a foreign service officer, at any time between 1945 and 1964 inclusive.

This group of officers includes all those recruited by the Department, either by competitive examination or otherwise, during the period specified. It also includes all those who were recruited between 1922 and 1944 and were serving in the Department in 1945. It automatically excludes all those who for one reason or another had left the Department before 1945. This group forms a total of 570 diplomatic or foreign service officers and represents the whole body of postwar foreign service officers up to 1965.

We have chosen 1945 as the beginning of the period under investigation because that year, as well as marking a return to normal conditions at the end of the war, was the real

starting point of the development of the Department's personnel. We could not go beyond 1964, because we gathered our data during the summer of 1965. Since we include the majority of the officers recruited between 1922 and 1964, the conclusions of our study may legitimately claim to be of general application.

a) Objectives

The main aim of the first part of our study is to carry out as thorough an investigation as possible, within the scope of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, into the basic character of the corps of foreign service officers between 1945 and 1965. We intend to compare the policy of the Department of External Affairs in the matter of personnel with the results of that policy in practice. We believe that the character of the group will emerge either from the statistics that we were able to collect, or from the reports of interviews that were conducted among a sampling of foreign service officers. Our second objective is to determine the eventual effect of the linguistic or linguistic-cultural factor on the basic character of the group.

b) Type of study

The first part of our study, concerning the recruitment of foreign service officers, will be essentially descriptive. It will present information on the officers themselves, particularly on their origins and characteristics, from a socio-economic as well as a cultural point of view. At times this information will be completed or qualified by data collected during the interviews. We shall apply throughout our study this parallel and complementary presentation of data in dealing with our four focal points: recruitment, training, postings, and advancement.

c) Research methods

The methods used in this section are of three types: the gathering of information, the sorting of material, and the analysis of data.

We first drew up a list of the 570 officers from two sources: the first was the series of biographies published between 1949 and 1963 by the Department of External Affairs;³⁴ the second source consisted of various lists, often in manuscript form, which originated with the administrative services of the Department and which were concerned with the diplomatic personnel before 1949.

To collect information, we examined the available records. We should like to make clear that the term "records" designates here various documents, usually of a public character, and not generally the files of individuals or the files of the Personnel Division of the Department. Such records as we were able to examine were chiefly the cards maintained in the card system of the Personnel Division for the officers on the staff of the Department in 1965. The other records were in various places. The card system of the Personnel Division which has been in existence only since 1961 assembles all non-confidential information on officers which is useful to the Department. It covers only the officers serving the Department at any given time. For the officers who had left the Department at the time of our inquiry, we used either the old biographies or certain

individual files kept by the Public Archives of Canada (files from which all confidential material had previously been removed), or else publications such as *The Canadian Who's Who*. From these varied sources comes the basic material for this part of our study: place and date of birth, mother tongue, religion, marital status, academic training and professional experience before joining the service—all of which give the socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the officers. Information on the method and year of recruitment, career development, and the rate of promotion was also obtained from such sources.

Finally, we obtained a number of details through interviews. These interviews were carried out at the end of the summer of 1965 to gather opinions or personal views concerning departmental recruitment or to document the other main subjects of this study. In all these interviews we used the written questionnaire of the "semi-structured" type (see Appendix A, 171).

Within certain limitations, the choice of officers interviewed was left to chance. These limitations corresponded to a double concern: to balance numerically the officers of the two main linguistic groups; and, by drawing lots, to find for each of the French-speaking officers (whose total was considered to form an initial nucleus for sampling purposes) an opposite English-language officer of the same rank. In this manner we collected a sample composed of 24 English-language officers and 19 French—about a quarter of all the foreign service officers at the central administration of the Department in September 1965. The officers were divided as follows: 17 officers of grade 3, seven of grade 4, nine of grade 5, six of grade 6, and four of grade 7. Because of its size and of the rotation system as applied to foreign service officers, this sample seemed to us fully representative of the corps as it was at the time of our investigation.

For very obvious reasons, particularly the limited time at our disposal, it has not been possible to use all the information obtained during these interviews. We used this information in a way that was both selective and complementary and, as in the section of our text dealing with recruitment, almost always under the general heading of "bilingual and bicultural." We did however take care clearly to identify interview material every time we used it.

The sorting of the material involved several successive stages: entering the information on individual cards, grouping these cards by classes or years of recruitment, transcribing all data onto tables for each year of recruitment from 1922 to 1964, and finally codifying and mathematically programming them for statistical analysis. The compilation of the statistical data was done on our behalf by the computer centre of the University of Montreal.

Individual cards carried all the information assembled on each officer: surname and first name, place and date of birth, linguistic group, religion, marital status, school and university training, languages spoken, career before entering the Department, career in the Department, career after leaving the Department, and other activities. The tables arranged all this information under three main headings:

1. Socio-economic characteristics: sex, age, place of birth, marital status, religion, and professional origin;
2. Cultural characteristics: bilingualism, university degree, and universities attended;
3. Information of a professional character: mode of recruitment, age and grade on entry into the Department, grade in 1965 or year of leaving, reasons for leaving.

The codification of the data consisted of transcribing into mathematical language all the data entered in our tables. To each piece of information we attributed a number corresponding to a pre-established code or system of categories. Thus the place of birth "Ontario" became no. 1 in its category, and the method of recruitment known as "transfer" became no. 2 in its particular category.

The last stage, the programming, involved identifying the simple and multiple correlations which appeared to us interesting to obtain from the electronic computer. When this operation was completed we finally had available all the material for our analysis.

d) Analysis

How was this impressive mass of mathematical data to be analyzed? A selection had to be made, of course. We retained all the purely statistical data and all the correlations between the variables that could add to our understanding of the corps of foreign service officers. We also established divisions within the long period during which the officers in the sample entered the Department, that is from 1922 to 1964. We then determined the specific stages of our analysis.

We organized the total data in the most logical way possible so as to find answers to three essential questions: 1) how are officers recruited? 2) at what level are they recruited? and 3) who are recruited? We considered these data first of all in themselves, that is, in respect of what they generally represented and of how they had evolved; then in relation to the two principal linguistic groups to which all officers of the Department belong. To do this, we made preliminary distinctions within each of these variables as follows:

1. *Methods of recruitment*, which reflect the degree of rational organization and effectiveness attained by a bureaucracy, were divided into the following four categories:
 - a) competitive examination
 - b) transfer
 - c) reclassification
 - d) appointments outside the service.
2. *Levels of recruitment* were reduced to five categories corresponding to the familiar terms junior, intermediate, and senior, and to the following corresponding grades:

a) officer grade 1 and third secretary	}	junior
b) officer grade 2 or 3 and second secretary		
c) officer grade 4 and first secretary	}	intermediate
d) officer grade 5 and counsellor		
e) officer grade 6 and above, and head of mission		senior
3. *Place of birth*, which revealed the geographical origin of the officers, was reduced to one or other of the five principal provinces or regions of Canada, or to one of the three countries or groups of countries that appeared to us the most representative. In the first case we included Ontario, Quebec, the Atlantic provinces, the Prairies, and British Columbia; and in the second, Great Britain, the United States, and other countries.

4. *Age at entry*, calculated by subtracting the year of birth from the year of entry into the service, comprised seven categories:
 - a) from 20 to 25 years
 - b) from 26 to 30 years
 - c) from 31 to 35 years
 - d) from 36 to 40 years
 - e) from 41 to 45 years
 - f) from 46 to 50 years
 - g) 51 years and over.
5. *Sex.*
6. *Religion*—the subjects interviewed were divided into seven groups according to how they listed their religious adherence, or non-adherence:
 - a) Roman Catholics
 - b) members of the Anglican Church of Canada
 - c) members of the United Church of Canada
 - d) other Protestants (Protestants, Presbyterians, Methodists, Episcopalian, Lutherans, members of Christian Church, Christian Scientists, Baptists)
 - e) Jews
 - f) others (Greek Orthodox, Mennonites, Mormons, etc.)
 - g) atheists and agnostics.
7. *Marital status*—three categories:
 - a) married
 - b) single
 - c) others (widowed or divorced).
8. *Professional origin* was reduced to seven principal classes: armed forces, education (teaching, research, and school administration), public service, journalism (written and spoken), law, business, and politics; an eighth class included those who had passed directly from university or other studies to the Department.
9. *University training* was mainly established by two factors: the last university degree and the universities attended. The last university degrees obtained, representing a first indication of the officers' university training, were grouped into the following categories:
 - a) doctorates or Ph.D.s
 - b) masters' degrees or M.A.s
 - c) licences
 - d) bachelor of arts degrees or B.A.s
 - e) others (high school diploma, self-taught, etc.).

The universities attended, which at least in Canada provide a recognized means of estimating a degree, were first grouped according to whether they were foreign or Canadian. The universities of these two groups were then distributed according to broad geographical divisions corresponding to the regions from which the officers came. The foreign universities were divided as follows: British, American, Francophone (French, Swiss, and Belgian), and others. The Canadian universities were classified according to whether they were in Quebec or in one of the following regions: Ontario, Atlantic




Diagram 2. Distribution of foreign service officers by year of recruitment

provinces, Prairies, or British Columbia. Two special categories were created—one for those who had attended no university and another for those who had attended no Canadian university.

We then mapped out divisions within the period covered in the first part of our study, 1922 to 1964, and particularly from 1939 on. The principle that guided us here was the fact that the number of officers recruited each year by the Department has varied a great deal—from a maximum of 46 in 1947 to a minimum of 1 in 1951. The annual average between 1922 and 1964 was 21.9. Diagram 2, which shows the annual recruitment of foreign service officers from 1944 to 1964, makes this point clear. It indicates at least two very different phases: one from 1940 to 1944, in general rather weak; and the second from 1945 to 1950, active in the first half, relatively depressed although still sustained in the latter part. The year 1951, as may be seen, marked a break or pause in the recruitment. The phase from 1952 to 1964 may be subdivided into two roughly equal parts: the first, from 1952 to 1957, heavy and sustained recruitment except in 1953 and 1954; the second, 1958 to 1964, jerky and even chaotic, relatively poor by comparison with the first, except for the last two years. Of the 570 officers in the Department from 1945 to 1965 only 26, that is 4.6 per cent, a tiny portion, were recruited before 1940. It therefore seemed to us reasonable to merge this group with that of 1940 to 1944, and thus to establish four main periods for the purpose of our analysis: 1) from 1922 to the end of 1944; 2) from 1945 to 1950 inclusive; 3) from 1951 to 1957 inclusive; and 4) from 1958 to 1964 inclusive.

These phases, it will be agreed, correspond to a certain extent to the historical development of the administrative structure of the Department. They tend also to meet the requirements of clarity and balance that an analysis dealing with such a long period

should meet. In any case they make it easier to examine recruitment and to obtain an overall view of this area of concern at the outset.




Diagram 3. Distribution of foreign service officers by period of recruitment

2. General view

a) Recruitment over the years

The year 1945 marks a fundamental division in recruitment; it separates the officers into two principal groups. The first comprises officers who were in the Department in 1945, whatever the year of their recruitment or entry into the Department; they represent the group of the period that we shall call 1922 to 1944. Two of the 16 special wartime assistants are exceptions because they returned permanently to the Department after 1945, and are not included here.³⁵ The second group is made up of officers who entered the Department after 1945, whatever the period of time that they remained in the service; it constitutes the postwar group, which is divided into three sub-groups corresponding to the periods 1945-50, 1951-7, and 1958-64.

Of the 570 officers who constituted the foreign service corps between 1945 and 1965, 71 (12.4 per cent) were recruited before 1945, and 499 (87.6 per cent) after that date. This simple statement clearly shows the youth of the officers as a whole. The 71 officers recruited before 1945 correspond to the group 1922-44; the 499 others fall into three groups in the proportion of 175 (or 30.7 per cent) for the period 1945-50, 161 (or 28.2 per cent) for the period 1951-7, and 163 (or 28.5 per cent) for the period 1958-64 (Diagram 3). These 570 officers can be divided in a different way, according to whether they belong to one or other of the principal linguistic groups in Canada.

b) Recruitment by the two main linguistic groups

Of these 570 officers, 446 or 78.3 per cent belong to the Anglophone group, and 124 or 21.7 per cent to the Francophone group (Diagram 4). This is an average distribution

corresponding nearly exactly to the distribution of the real diplomatic personnel of the Department in 1949 and 1965, noted above. Like the latter, this distribution is only the composite result of a rather uneven development.




Diagram 4. Distribution of foreign service officers by linguistic group

The division of the corps of foreign service officers by linguistic group produces notably different results depending on the time periods. In the small group of 71 officers in the period 1922-44, 19 or 26.7 per cent were French-speaking and 52 or 73.3 per cent English-speaking. But the proportion of Francophones, as revealed by Diagram 5, dropped during the most fruitful period of recruitment, that is 1945-50. It rose again, on the average, to 25.4 per cent or to its initial level, from 1951 to 1957, then slipped again to 20.2 per cent from 1958 to 1964. Obviously the proportion of the English-speaking officers fluctuated in the opposite direction, reaching as high as 83.5 per cent in 1945-50, decreasing to 74.6 per cent in 1951-7, and then moving up to 79.8 per cent in 1958-64.

Of the four periods, the last three are by far the most important from the point of view of the numerical representation of the two groups in the Department. Indeed percentages of the two groups for the first period, 1922-44, scarcely affected the figures of the average distribution. These three periods have the advantage also of including all the recruitment carried out by the Department from 1945 to 1964. They show in particular that between 1945 and 1965 the Department recruited 499 foreign service officers, divided according to years as follows: 1945-50—175, 1951-7—161, 1958-64—163; and they emphasize the fact that 394 of these 499 officers recruited, that

is 79 per cent, belonged to the English-speaking group, whereas 105, or 21 per cent, were French-speaking. Diagram 5 reveals moreover that the recruitment of these 105 Francophones was carried out at the rate of 29 for 1945-50, 42 for 1951-7 and 34 for 1958-64. Neither the diagram nor these figures disclose, however, *how* these 499 officers and the 71 others of the period 1922-44 were actually recruited; at *what level* they were recruited, or *who* they were, that is what their socio-economic and cultural characteristics were. It is precisely these questions that we shall attempt to answer in the rest of this chapter.




Diagram 5. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by period of recruitment and linguistic group

3. Detailed analysis: recruitment and recruits

*a) Methods of recruitment**

How were the 570 officers who constituted the corps of foreign service officers from 1945 to 1965 recruited? Were they recruited by examination, as the official policy of the

*This information is complete for all but one of the officers.

Department requires? If so, has that always been the case? If not, in what other way or by what other methods (and in what proportions) did these officers enter the Department? We shall endeavour to answer all these questions as precisely as possible, from three points of view: 1) the inclusive or general situation, 2) the evolution of recruitment, and 3) the linguistic groups.




Diagram 6. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by method of recruitment (569 out of 570)

General situation. Diagram 6, "recruiting methods," clearly establishes the preponderance of the competition, general or special, as a means of entering the foreign service. In fact, of the 569 officers whose method of recruitment we know, 466 or 81.9 per cent entered the Department by competitive examination between 1922 and 1964 inclusive. The 103 other officers, that is 18.1 per cent, were divided between the three secondary methods of recruitment, that is, transfer, reclassification, and order-in-council. Twenty-five of these 103, or 4.4 per cent, owed their recruitment to transfers from equivalent grades in the hierarchy of other departments or federal agencies; 29, or 5.1 per cent, entered the foreign service after a promotion from a lower grade in the Department of External Affairs, or following a reclassification. Finally 49 officers out of 569, or 8.6 per cent, entered the Department by order-in-council and without having previously been in the federal public service.

What is surprising at first is that the proportion of appointments by order-in-council, or so-called "political" appointments, should be as high as 8.6 per cent. (The




Diagram 7. Distribution of foreign service officers by period and method of recruitment (569 out of 570)

appointments by order-in-council which are involved here cover only those from outside the service.) This method of appointing officers goes against the very principle of the "career system." It should also be pointed out that the other two methods of recruitment, transfer and reclassification, accounted together for a higher number of admissions without an examination than the method of appointment by order-in-council, namely 9.5 per cent against 8.6 per cent. But these two methods of appointment are so closely akin to the examination that they can be considered as an extension of it. (In fact, certain reclassifications or transfers outwardly take the form of a competition. We shall consider them here for what they are, and not for what they appear to be.) Both reclassification and transfer concern persons already employed by the federal government, which is not the case for appointments by order-in-council. Both are subject to supervision by the Public Service Commission, a condition which obviously does not apply to political appointments. One can thus presume that the individuals recruited by transfer or reclassification satisfy the minimum criteria required of officers recruited by examination. But whether recruitment has been carried out by examination or by

reclassification, or whether it has been by transfer or order-in-council, it is certain that the relative importance of these various methods of recruitment has changed with time.

Development. When we distribute by period the 569 officers who were recruited by methods we know (Diagram 7), it is quite clear that each of the four methods of recruitment has enjoyed a popularity varying with the years. The examination, for example, has become increasingly important in the course of time. Reclassification, unheard of before 1945, still occupied second place in 1951-7. Transfers played a far from negligible part between 1945 and 1950. But it is perhaps orders-in-council that really constituted the most stable method of recruitment during the four periods. Indeed, the most distinctive characteristic of recruitment before 1945 is that the two principal methods of recruitment were examination and orders-in-council (94 per cent). The relatively weak position of the examination as a method of recruitment (70 per cent) at that time reflects fairly well both the intermittent character of the External Affairs competitive examination between 1929 and 1939, and the small number of candidates admitted at these examinations. On the other hand, the relatively high favour of recruitment by order-in-council (24 per cent) probably shows the concern of the then under-secretary, Dr. Skelton, to surround himself with experienced colleagues or officers trained in certain Canadian universities.

The three postwar periods have more in common with each other in this respect than they have with the period 1922-44. The striking thing about them is undoubtedly the preponderance of the direct examination. In fact this method of recruitment remained throughout these three periods at 80 per cent or more: from 81 per cent during the period 1945-50, it rose successively to 82 per cent and 87.7 per cent during the periods 1951-7 and 1958-64. This is all the more important because it is an indication of the rational approach and openness reached by the Department after the war, at the administrative level. The competitive examination, which any candidate meeting certain basic criteria can try, ensures in principle the democratization of the group of officers; in addition, by selecting candidates essentially on the basis of competence, it ensures the efficiency or at least the technical competence of the officers as a group.³⁶

The other three methods of recruiting have fared unevenly since 1945. Transfer and reclassification, relatively slight when taken separately, are nonetheless important in relation to the direct examination. Transfers alone accounted for more than 12 per cent of the officers recruited by examination from 1945 to 1950, and transfers and reclassifications combined accounted for nearly 25 per cent of the 112 officers recruited by examination during the same period, and nearly 20 per cent for 1951-7. However the proportion recruited by transfer has diminished constantly since the end of the war. From 8 per cent of the total in 1945-50, it fell successively to 3.1 per cent during 1951-7, and to 1.2 per cent between 1958 and 1964. As for staff increase as a result of reclassification, its proportion was maintained until 1958-64, when it fell drastically. The number of appointments by order-in-council, however, has increased continuously since the end of the war. There were seven between 1945 and 1950, 11 between 1951 and 1957, and 14 between 1958 and 1964. In terms of percentages, this means that of the total number of officers recruited, 4 per cent were recruited by order-in-council in 1945-50, 6.8 per cent in 1951-7 and 8.6 per cent in 1958-64. The growing importance of the

order-in-council as a method of recruitment is no doubt related to the impressive number of new posts opened by Canada abroad since the war. It is also, we believe, partly related to the concern for ensuring some representation of the country's two principal linguistic groups among the Department's officers.

Comparisons between Francophones and Anglophones. We know the method of recruitment for 445 of the 446 English-speaking officers and for the 124 French-speaking officers who comprised the body of foreign service officers from 1945 to 1965.

Of the 445 Anglophones, 367 were recruited by examination, 22 by transfer, 22 by reclassification, and 34 by order-in-council. Of the 124 Francophones, 99 were recruited by examination, 3 by transfer, 7 by reclassification and 15 by order-in-council. When translated into percentages, this breakdown is interesting.

Table 4. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers, by method of recruitment and linguistic group

Method of recruitment	English	French
Competitive examination	82.5	79.8
Transfer	4.9	2.4
Reclassification	4.9	5.7
Order-in-council	7.6	12.1

The above table reveals that the proportions of officers recruited by examination and by reclassification are roughly similar for the two linguistic groups. About 80 per cent of the Department's officers, whether French- or English-speaking, were recruited by examination and about 5 per cent by reclassification. The English-language officers recruited by transfer were twice the proportion of the French, but more Francophones than Anglophones were recruited by order-in-council. If, in the case of transfers, the weak representation of French-speaking Canadians (a proportion of one to two) in the majority of the other federal departments can be readily understood, it is less easy to account for the very clear advantage of Francophones over Anglophones in the appointments by order-in-council. That 12 per cent of all the French-speaking officers recruited between 1945 and 1965 should have been "political appointments" is very unusual. But more surprising still is the fact—or the coincidence—that of all the officers appointed by order-in-council, 15 out of 49, or 30 per cent (which is within a few tenths of a point of being the proportion of Francophones in the Canadian population) were French-speaking personnel. Can it therefore be said that the order-in-council is the only method of recruitment by which an effort was made to reflect the linguistic composition of the Canadian population? Or could it be that the Department of External Affairs, or more particularly the secretary of state for External Affairs, or the prime minister (who was himself responsible for External Affairs until 1946 when he entrusted the primary responsibility to another member of his cabinet) resorted to such appointments by order-in-council to compensate for the thin recruitment of French-speaking officers through competitive examination? Before replying to these questions, let us see how the methods of recruiting members of the two linguistic groups have developed over the years.

Table 5. Percentage distribution of method of recruitment of foreign service officers, by period of recruitment and linguistic group

Method of recruitment	1922-44		1945-50		1951-57		1958-64	
	E	F	E	F	E	F	E	F
Competitive examination	66.7	78.9	83.6	69.0	81.5	83.3	88.4	85.3
Transfer	5.9	5.3	8.2	7.0	4.2	—	1.6	—
Reclassification	—	—	6.1	10.3	7.6	9.5	3.1	—
Order-in-council	27.4	15.8	2.1	13.7	6.7	7.2	6.9	14.7

The striking features of Table 5 are first, certain dissimilarities between the two linguistic groups and second, the contrast within the English-speaking group between the period 1922-44 and the subsequent periods.

It is surprising to note that for the period 1922-44 recruiting by examination was relatively higher among French-speaking than among English-speaking officers. In fact, of the 49 thus recruited by examination no less than 15 were Francophones. It is no less surprising to discover, by contrast, that never again was recruiting by order-in-council as relatively frequent (27.4 per cent) among English-speaking officers as it was during that early period. Of the 17 officers appointed by order-in-council, 14 were Anglophones. These two facts are the more interesting because the situation differed radically from that after the war when Anglophones were enlisted more frequently by direct examination and its corollaries, transfer and reclassification; and Francophones, more often by competitive examination, as transfer and reclassification declined. In the case of the French-speaking group, however, appointments by order-in-council were as frequent in the postwar period.

It will be noted in Table 6 that the proportion of appointments by order-in-council was more stable among Francophones than among Anglophones. It is open to question whether this stability was not more apparent than real. The question may also be raised whether there does not exist a certain relationship between recruiting by competitive examination and by order-in-council. During the particularly clear situation existing in the period 1922-44, the decline in recruitment through examination among the Anglophones was counteracted by an increase in recruitment through order-in-council, and conversely the relative ease in recruiting by order-in-council resulted in a certain slowing down in recruitment by examination. Fluctuations in the results of recruitment

Table 6. Percentage distribution of the two principal methods of recruitment of foreign service officers, by period of recruitment and linguistic group

Period of recruitment	Competitive examination		Order-in-council	
	E	F	E	F
1922-44	69	31	82	18
1945-50	85	15	43	57
1951-57	74	26	73	27
1958-64	80	20	65	35

by examination were expressed in inverse ratio to recruitment by order-in-council, and *vice versa*. Thus when the recruitment of Anglophones by examination during the period 1945-50 was particularly fruitful, the recruitment of Anglophones by order-in-council fell sharply to the proportion of 43 per cent. And when the proportion of Anglophones recruited by examination dropped in 1951-7 from 85 per cent to 74 per cent, the proportion of Anglophone officers appointed by order-in-council climbed from 43 per cent to 73 per cent. Similarly, the ups and downs in recruiting Francophones by examination have been consistently expressed by inverse fluctuation, although not strictly proportional as in the case of Anglophones, to appointments made by order-in-council. In any case without doubt the proportion of appointments by order-in-council of French-speaking officers was, according to the period in which they were made, either very close to the proportion of Francophones in the Canadian population at the time (27 per cent between 1951 and 1957) or else notably higher (57 per cent for the period 1945-50 and 35 per cent for 1958-64).

From the above observations, the following main conclusions or assumptions may be drawn:

1. Two methods of recruiting officers in our sample group were particularly important—direct competitive examination and order-in-council.
2. Examination, always the principal method of recruitment, became more important over the years.
3. Examination is also the method which has had the most significant influence on the proportional distribution of officers in the two linguistic groups, and consequently on the over-all numerical under-representation of Francophones.
4. There is a relationship between examination and order-in-council, expressed by fluctuations in an inverse ratio to the proportional recruitment of officers of the two linguistic groups.
5. The methods of recruitment by transfer or reclassification appear to have had more importance, numerically speaking, for the English-language than for the French-language group.

*b) Levels of recruitment**

The second question that we shall try to answer about recruitment is at what levels foreign service officers in the 1945-65 group were recruited. We shall assume at the outset that there is a direct relationship between the method and the level, and we shall attempt to confirm what this relationship is. We shall then ask ourselves whether this relationship remained fixed over the years, and whether it applied equally to the officers of the two main linguistic groups.

It will be recalled that we proposed to distinguish between three principal levels of recruitment, namely the lower, middle, and higher levels. It will also be remembered that we established the following relationship between these various levels and the classes or grades on entry.

*This information is complete for all but one of the officers.

<i>Levels</i>	<i>Grades or echelons</i>
Junior	Grade 1, 2 or 3 officer or ex-third and second secretary
Intermediate	Grade 4 or 5 officer or ex-first secretary and counsellor
Senior	Grade 6 and higher officer, or ex-head of mission and special assistant to the under-secretary

General situation. Of the 569 officers whose grade we know at the time they entered the service, 468 (82.3 per cent) were recruited at the lower level, 36 (6.3 per cent) at the middle, and 65 (11.4 per cent) at the higher. As Diagram 8 shows, the 468 officers of the lower level were divided into two groups: 422, or 74.2 per cent who entered at grade 1 or as third secretary; and 46, or 8.1 per cent of the total, who entered at grade 2 or 3 or as second secretary. Those at the middle level were divided into grade 4 officers or first secretaries, numbering 26 or 4.6 per cent, and grade 5 officers or counsellors, numbering 10 or 1.7 per cent. Finally the 65 others form on the diagram a block of officers of the higher level, representing 11.4 per cent of the 569 officers whose level of recruitment we know.




Diagram 8. Distribution of foreign service officers by level of recruitment and grade on entry (569 out of 570)

One's immediate thought is, on the basis of our hypothesis, to link the lower level or the junior grades of recruitment with the direct examination, and the higher level with the order-in-council. Besides, of the 466 officers recruited by examination, 440 entered

the Department at the lower level, 20 at the middle and 6 at the higher. However, it is obvious that the number of officers recruited by examination (466) does not correspond to, and is notably greater than, the number recruited (422) at the level of grade 1 or third secretary.

It is equally evident that the number of officers recruited by examination is in fact slightly less than the 468 officers recruited at the lower level. Is this not the same as saying that the officers recruited by examination did not necessarily enter the Department at a lower level and that, conversely, examination is not the sole means of recruiting officers at the lower grades? It also appears clear that the number of officers recruited by order-in-council, that is 49, remained far below the number recruited at the higher level, that is 65. In other words, all the officers recruited by order-in-council did not necessarily enter the Department at a higher level and, conversely, the order-in-council is not the sole means of recruiting officers at the higher grades. These remarks lead one to expect that the other two methods of recruiting, by transfer and reclassification, have been used at more than one level and even at all levels. But let us see what are the facts of the situation.

Of the 468 officers whom we know were recruited at the lower level, 441 entered by examination: 411 at the lowest grade, namely 1 or its equivalent, and 30 at grade 2 or 3 or their equivalent. As a result of reclassification, 23 others entered: 11 at grade 1, and 12 at grades 2 and 3; three entered at grades 2 and 3 by transfer; and finally only one entered by order-in-council at the grade of second secretary.

Among the 36 officers recruited at the middle level, 20 were recruited by examination, eight by transfer, four by reclassification, and four by order-in-council. Of the 65 recruited at the higher level, 44 were recruited by order-in-council, 14 by transfer, five by examination, and two by reclassification.

It is therefore obvious that the four methods of recruitment operated at all levels. However, whereas examination and reclassification have been identified with the lower levels, a fact which apparently accords with the Department's official recruiting policy (and which moreover was confirmed on two occasions recently, once in 1955 and again in 1958),³⁷ transfer and order-in-council corresponded more to the middle and higher levels of recruitment. But has this always been the case?

Development. As Diagram 9 indicates, recruitment of officers at the different levels has undergone variations over the years. It is noticeable that recruitment at the lower level occupied a growing place as generations of officers succeeded each other: whereas before 1945 the proportion of officers recruited at this level was 66.2 per cent, this percentage reached 79.4 per cent in 1945-50, 85.7 per cent in 1951-7, and 88.3 per cent in 1958-64. One suspects that this tendency is not unrelated to the parallel advance of the examination as the principal method of recruitment. But what is more, this growth worked also to the advantage of the lowest grade, 1; thus among the officers recruited before 1945, 59.1 per cent of the juniors were grade 1 officers or third secretaries. During 1945-50, 1951-7, and 1958-64, this percentage increased successively to 64.8, 79.5, and 86.5. It follows that the recruitment of grade 2 and 3 officers, whose numbers had reached 28 in 1945-50, that is 16 per cent of the 175 officers recruited, also slipped to 10 (or 6.2 per cent) and 3 (1.8 per cent) respectively, during 1951-7 and 1958-64.




Diagram 9. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by period and level of recruitment (569 out of 570)

The increase of recruitment at the lower level likewise brought about a decrease in the recruitment of officers at the middle level. This recruitment, relatively important before 1945, decreased from 11.2 per cent for the period before 1945 to 9.6 per cent in 1945-50, then to 5.7 per cent in 1951-7 and 1.2 per cent in 1958-64 (Diagram 9). This drop is all the more significant because the level, which covers grades 4 and 5, is that of the specialist or expert "recruited outside the establishment" from whom the Department can "take advantage of an experience and a point of view that enlarge its horizons and that may correct possible narrowness in a team whose members tend to have the same training, the same professional interests, and also the same preoccupations."³⁸ But it is nonetheless true that because of the rapid expansion of the Department since the war, "several secretaries [officers] were recruited at the middle and higher levels by special examinations"³⁹ between 1946 and 1948, and that in 1955, "in view of its needs," the Department offered "a few positions at higher than FSO-1 rank to persons with the special qualifications required."⁴⁰

As for recruitment at the higher level, the first point to be noted is its particular numerical importance in the 1922-44 group, which was 22.5 per cent or 16 of the 71 officers recruited; and second, the relatively stable and far from negligible proportion that

it maintained among the officers recruited during the periods 1945-50, 1951-7 and 1958-64. As for methods of recruitment, it should be emphasized that between 1945 and 1950, only seven of the 19 officers recruited at the higher level were recruited by order-in-council, while during the period 1951-7, 11 out of 13, and during 1958-64, 14 out of 17 were so recruited. It remains for us to see, however, to which levels officers were recruited, by language and by period.

Table 7. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers, by level of first post and linguistic group

Level of first post	English	French
Junior level	82.3	81.4
Intermediate level	6.7	4.8
Senior level	11.0	13.8

Comparisons between Francophones and Anglophones. We know at what level the 445 English-speaking officers and the 124 French-speaking officers in our group of 569 entered the Department. Of the 468 officers recruited at a lower level, 367 were English-speaking and 101 French-speaking officers. Of the 36 at the middle level, 30 were English-speaking and 6 French-speaking officers. Of the officers recruited at the higher level, the figures were 48 and 17. An increase in the number of French-language officers at the higher level and of English-language officers at the middle and lower levels may be noted.

Table 7 reveals that the rather slight superiority of English-speaking officers at the lower and middle levels was offset by the larger proportion of French-speaking officers at the higher level. This is scarcely surprising when one remembers the breakdown by linguistic group of the relative importance of recruiting methods (Table 4). Moreover, by comparing Tables 4 and 7 one can readily see that recruitment at the higher level was carried out more by order-in-council (political appointments) among French-speaking officers and almost as much by transfer as by order-in-council among English-speaking officers. As we shall see later these circumstances were to have varied and serious consequences. However we shall first examine the rate of change that these differences indicate.

Table 8 shows several tendencies in the levels at which foreign service officers were recruited between 1922 and 1964. On the one hand there is a trend in both linguistic groups for recruitment to be carried out more and more at the lower level, and, as a corollary, less and less at the middle level. On the other hand, in both groups there is the tendency towards irregularity of recruitment at the higher level in the successive waves of officers. We note, in fact, among the English-speaking officers, a marked falling off of recruitment at the higher level, beginning with the quota from 1945 to 1950, then a stabilization at about 9 per cent. On the French-speaking side, there is an increase in the recruitment at that level between 1945 and 1950, by comparison with the preceding period, then a very clear falling-off between 1951 and 1957, followed by a climb back,

Table 8. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers, by level of first post, period of recruitment, and linguistic group

Period of recruitment	English			French		
	Junior level	Inter-mediate level	Senior level	Junior level	Inter-mediate level	Senior level
1922-44	63.4	11.6	25.0	73.7	10.5	15.8
1945-50	80.8	10.2	9.0	72.4	6.8	20.8
1951-57	85.6	6.0	8.4	88.0	4.8	7.2
1958-64	89.1	1.5	9.4	85.2	—	14.8

between 1958 and 1964, to the level of the prewar group. Let us examine how these tendencies can be reconciled with those in Table 5 for the methods of recruitment by linguistic group.

Comparing Tables 5 and 8 we notice that recruitment by way of an examination of English-speaking officers in 1922-44 must have been carried out partly at the middle and/or higher level. We further note that orders-in-council probably operated either at the middle or lower level—the two levels where the political character of appointments is by tradition not pronounced. In the group of French-speaking officers for the same period it appears that examination was used chiefly at the lower level and that the majority, if not all, the orders-in-council affected the higher level.

The most striking characteristics of the groups in the periods 1945-50, 1951-7, and 1958-64 are first the almost perfect identification in the last period between examination and recruitment at the lower level for both linguistic groups; and secondly the coincidence between the percentages of orders-in-council and recruitment at the higher level during the same period (1958-64) for the Francophones. It is furthermore indisputable that the period 1945-50 was the most fruitful one after the war for recruitment at a level other than the lower one. Indeed for Anglophones the difference between the percentages of recruitment at the higher level and recruitment by order-in-council suggests that during this period reclassification and transfer took place at the middle and higher levels. Does this mean the same thing for the 21 reclassified or transferred English-speaking officers as it does for the five French-speaking officers? We doubt it very much. What appears to us more significant however is the fact that this difference was maintained, although at a much lower level, during the periods 1951-7 and 1958-64, in the case of the English-speaking officers. This phenomenon may signify that recruitment of English-speaking officers at the higher level during 1922-44 was continued in the form of reclassifications or transfers during the postwar period, especially between 1951 and 1957 and between 1958 and 1964, whereas for all practical purposes such a trend did not exist in the case of the French-speaking officers.

From the above observations, the following main conclusions or assumptions may be drawn:

- Whereas recruitment at the lower level is most often by examination and reclassification, recruitment at the middle and higher levels is mostly by transfer and order-in-council.

2. Proportionally, officers have most often been recruited for the junior level, but after the war junior recruitment became an ever increasing element in the total recruitment of officers.
3. Proportionally more French- than English-speaking officers were recruited for the higher level, and more by order-in-council than by transfer or reclassification.
4. Recruitment at the higher level of English-speaking officers, generally, was as often by transfer and reclassification as by order-in-council, and this recruitment was largely carried out during the formation of the Department, namely between 1922 and 1950.

*c) Place of birth**

The officers' place of birth is one of the first facts which can help us in our attempts to characterize foreign service officers, and which we can use to shed a little light on the recruitment policy of the Department of External Affairs. The place of birth of each officer does not, of course, necessarily add to our knowledge of the whole corps of officers. It may well be accidental, so to speak. It does not necessarily signify that an officer has roots in a particular region of Canada or account for his education or training. It is nevertheless true that the place of birth is, by definition, the starting-point; because of this, it is worth considering it before the other socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the officers are examined. Moreover, the place of birth generally indicates an individual's geographic origin; it permits us to take a first step towards assessing how far the corps of foreign service officers is geographically representative.

Table 9. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers, by place of birth; and the Canadian population by region, 1941, 1951, and 1961

Region or country	Place of birth of all officers	Place of birth of officers born in Canada	Canadian population by region		
			1941	1951	1961
Ontario	31.8	36.8	32.9	32.8	34.1
Quebec	25.7	29.6	28.9	28.9	28.8
Atlantic provinces	7.2	8.4	9.8	11.5	10.4
Prairies	15.3	17.6	21.5	18.1	17.4
British Columbia	6.7	7.6	7.1	8.3	8.9
Great Britain	6.5	—	—	—	—
United States	2.3	—	—	—	—
Others	4.5	—	—	—	—

It is a well-known fact that the Public Service Commission holds its annual competitive examination for External Affairs in "university centres across Canada and at posts abroad,"⁴¹ and that as a result "all parts of Canada are represented by the officers in the department."⁴² We shall assume here as a working hypothesis that the composition of

*This information is complete for 556 of the 570 officers.

the corps of foreign service officers between 1945 and 1965, as shown by place of birth, generally reflects the distribution of the population of Canada by regions. For the purposes of our analysis, we shall group the place of birth into eight regions: Ontario, Quebec, the Atlantic provinces, the Prairies, British Columbia; and Great Britain, the United States, and other countries. We shall first comment on the group as a whole from 1945 to 1965. This will be our over-all view. We shall then assess the importance of the variations that may be revealed in the four periods covered by our study. If our hypothesis is confirmed, we shall see to what extent the representativeness of the corps of foreign service officers relates to the distribution, within each of the Canadian regions, of the two principal linguistic groups in Canada.

General situation. Of the 556 officers whose place of birth we know, 177 or 31.8 per cent were born in Ontario, 143 or 25.7 per cent in Quebec, 85 or 15.3 per cent in the Prairies, 40 or 7.2 per cent in the Atlantic provinces, 37 or 6.7 per cent in British Columbia, 36 or 6.5 per cent in Great Britain, 13 or 2.3 per cent in the United States, and 25 or 4.5 per cent in other countries. The striking feature of this breakdown is first the relatively high proportion, about 13 per cent, of officers born abroad; then, secondly, those officers born in Canada were generally representative of the five regions. As Table 9 shows, only Ontario had a slight advantage over the other Canadian regions. This advantage, to the extent that it existed, was acquired chiefly at the expense of the Atlantic provinces, the Prairies, and British Columbia.

It is nonetheless a fact that, whether we consider the place of birth of all the officers or only those born in Canada, the percentages shown in Table 9 above indicate that more than half of all the officers were born in the two central provinces, Ontario and Quebec. But has this always been the case for the four groups who constituted the corps of foreign service officers in the years 1922-44, 1945-50, 1951-7, and 1958-64?

Development. Diagram 10 highlights the unusual feature of the period 1922-44, from the point of view of the distribution of officers according to place of birth. Whereas for the groups of 1945-50, 1951-7, and 1958-64 the highest proportion were born in Ontario and Quebec, those who entered the service in 1922-44 included a slightly larger number and proportion of officers born in Quebec. If one distinguishes between the officers who joined the Department before 1940 from those who entered between 1940 and 1944, one will notice in the first case a higher percentage (38.4 per cent) of officers born in Ontario, and in the second a higher percentage (32.5) born in Quebec. This suggests that the abnormal style of recruitment before 1940 (abnormal because of both the relatively infrequent use of the examination as a method and the relatively high level of recruitment) favoured candidates born in Ontario; and as a corollary, that the regularization or normalization in the style of recruitment from 1937, but especially from 1939, worked particularly in favour of candidates born in Quebec. The largest percentage of recruits (11.6 per cent) born in the Atlantic provinces were hired between 1922 and 1944.

The salient features of the three subsequent periods contrast with those of the period 1922-44. The first, 1945-50, established the unchanging order, so to speak, of the postwar years: 1) Ontario, 2) Quebec, and 3) the Prairies. In the second, 1951-7, more officers originated in the Prairies, the Atlantic provinces, and especially Quebec, than




Diagram 10. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by place of birth and period of recruitment (556 out of 570)

mainly in Ontario. In the third, 1958-64, the number of officers born in British Columbia increased spectacularly at the expense of Ontario, Quebec, and especially the Atlantic provinces. Diagram 10 reveals also the relative stability of the percentage of officers born abroad, which scarcely moved after 1945 from what it was for the period 1922-44 (14.4 per cent). It should be noted that of the officers recruited before 1940, none was born abroad; it is in the group who entered the Department in the latter part of the 1922-44 period, that is between 1940 and 1944, that the largest proportion of officers born abroad (23.2 per cent) appeared.

The striking point about this diagram is undoubtedly the gradual diminution in the representation of Ontario among the officers recruited since 1945: from 36.3 per cent for 1945-50, this representation slipped to 31.4 per cent between 1951 and 1957, then to 28.6 per cent between 1958 and 1964. Another striking consequence is the national character of recruitment in the postwar period compared to what it was before 1945. Diagram 10, in addition, brings into relief the greater relative stability, in the postwar period, of the percentage of officers born in Quebec. What is certain in any case is, generally speaking, the representativeness of the corps of foreign service officers. Now we must determine the breakdown by language within this regional representativeness.

Comparisons between Francophones and Anglophones. Of the 556 whose place of birth we know, 124 were Francophones and 432 Anglophones. Of the former, 96 or 77.5 per cent were born in Quebec; 11 or 8.8 per cent in Ontario; 4 or 3.2 per cent in the Atlantic provinces; 6 or 4.8 per cent in the Prairies; and 7 or 5.6 per cent abroad. British

Columbia was therefore the only Canadian region not represented in the group of French-speaking officers. Of the 432 English-speaking officers, 166 or 38.4 per cent had Ontario as place of birth; 47 or 10.9 per cent, Quebec; 36 or 8.3 per cent, the Atlantic provinces; 79 or 18.3 per cent, the Prairies; 37 or 8.6 per cent, British Columbia; 67 or 15.5 per cent, abroad.




Diagram 11. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by place of birth and linguistic group (556 out of 570)

It is obvious that the distribution of officers according to place of birth differed noticeably from one linguistic group to the other. Among the French-speaking officers the predominance of those born in Quebec, however expected it might be, is striking. But the fact that 22.5 per cent of Francophones were born outside Quebec is also noteworthy. Among the Anglophones, on the other hand, the striking thing is the relatively even balance between regions, a balance moreover which seems to conform to the distribution of the total population. One may ask however how faithfully the regional proportions of French- and English-speaking officers reflect the distribution of Francophones and Anglophones within those regions.




Diagram 12. Distribution of foreign service officers by linguistic group, period of recruitment, and place of birth (556 out of 570)

Diagram 11 reveals that of the four regions of Canada, three had contributed a proportion of officers that was not too far removed from the distribution of their Francophone and Anglophone populations. These were Ontario, the Atlantic provinces, and the Prairies; the first two each had a percentage of French-language officers which corresponded to the percentage of their Francophones; for the Prairies, the proportion of

French-language officers exceeded by far the 4 or 4.5 per cent approximately of the Francophone population. The proportion of officers born in Quebec deviated widely from the distribution of the French- and English-speaking populations in this province. Indeed, as against an Anglophone population equivalent to between 17 and 18 per cent (17.6 in 1961) of the total population of Quebec, there was an English-speaking group equal to at least 32.9 per cent of all the officers born in Quebec. We are justified in saying that among the Quebec-born officers the English-language personnel had a highly favoured position, considering the size of the English-language group in that province; or, in other words, that the composition of the Quebec representation among the officers of the Department between 1945 and 1965, contrary to the situation in most other regions, did not conform to the linguistic composition of Quebec as a whole. This is moreover true for each group making up our 556 officers and for each period, as Diagram 12 shows. Of the officers recruited, the proportion of Francophones was below the average at 68 per cent (15 out of 22 officers) in 1922-44, and still more, at 52 per cent, during the period 1945-50—the slack period of recruitment (by examination) for French-speaking officers. But it has been the same during more recent periods, those of 1951-7 (75 per cent) and 1958-64 (71 per cent). Diagram 12 shows the variability over the years of the linguistic dimension of the representation for other regions, Ontario reaching more or less its norm both in 1945-50 and 1951-7, and the Prairies far exceeding their average in 1951-7 and 1958-64.

From the previous considerations, the following conclusions or assumptions may be drawn:

1. The various regions of Canada were represented in the corps of foreign service officers more or less proportionately to the size of their populations.
2. Regional representation increased as the initial numerical advantage of Ontario diminished.
3. In a general way, regional representation reflected the composition of the provinces (or groups of provinces) according to the two principal linguistic groups, except for Quebec where the proportion of Anglophones was very distinctly above that of the province.
4. As far as recruitment goes, for each of the four periods under study the proportion of Francophone officers born in Quebec was lower than the proportion of Francophones in the province.

*d) Age on entry**

Age on entry is a characteristic which is related in large part both to the method and level of recruitment. It is the detail which one might say best reflects the policy or the practice of the Department in these two respects. Age on entry is an important characteristic to the extent that it often conditions several other factors, particularly marital status, scholastic or university training, and prior professional experience.

For the purposes of this study, let us recall that we defined age on entry as being the difference between the year of birth and the year of entry into the Department. We wish

*This information is complete for 564 of the 570 officers.

to point out however that the seven age groups first established (20-5 years, 26-30 years, 31-5 years, 36-40 years, 41-5 years, 46-50 years, and 51 years and over) were regrouped, for the purpose of analysis, into four broader categories: the 20-30 age group, the 31-5 group, the 36-50 group, and the 51 and over group.

General situation. Diagram 13 makes clear that 396 officers out of 564, or 69.4 per cent, entered the Department between the ages of 20 and 30; 61 or 10.7 per cent between 31 and 35; 56 or 9.8 per cent between 36 and 50; 51 or 9.2 per cent at 51 or over. Of the 396 officers recruited between 20 and 30, 161 or 28.2 per cent were between 20 and 25 years old, and 235 or 41.2 per cent between 26 and 30. Of the 56 officers recruited between 36 and 50, 19 or 3.3 per cent were between 36 and 40 years old; 17 or 3.0 per cent between 41 and 45; and 20 or 3.5 per cent between 46 and 50.




Diagram 13. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by age at the time of recruitment (564 out of 570)

This breakdown of officers by age at the time of recruitment appears to coincide with what we already know about methods and levels of recruitment. The increased importance of the examination and of the annual competitive examination in particular is naturally shown here by the high percentage of the youngest age groups. On the other hand, the special examinations, reclassifications, transfers, and orders-in-council have probably resulted in raising the average age of officers at the time of entry. The first question that comes to mind is whether changes in methods of recruitment over the years, and perhaps still more in levels of recruitment, have brought about variations in the age at entry.

Development. Let us first look at these changes from a general point of view. Diagram 14 reveals essentially two things: first, the growing proportion of officers recruited from the 20-30 age group; and secondly, the increase in this proportion between 1945 and 1950 at the expense of the group 51 years and over and, during the periods 1951-7 and 1958-64, especially but not exclusively at the expense of the 31-5 and 36-50 age groups. These two tendencies appear at first to confirm indirectly what we observed in the section on methods of recruitment—that direct examination and order-in-council have

been and remain the two principal methods of recruitment for foreign service officers. By reason of the importance attached to the examination, these tendencies are also an indication that the persons recruited by the Department are becoming increasingly younger.

If we examine more closely the evolution of the group recruited between the ages of 20 and 30, we notice a very marked difference between the 20-5 and 26-30 sub-groups. Whereas the relative share of the first sub-group increased from 10 per cent of officers recruited between 1922 and 1944 to 41 per cent of those recruited between 1958 and 1964, the share of the second sub-group (26-30 years) was maintained from the beginning at the high level of 43 to 44 per cent. In fact, the increase in number and percentage of the recruits aged 20 to 25 years was spectacular. From seven recruited in the period from 1922 to 1944, their number rose to 28 between 1945 and 1950, 59 from 1951 to 1957, and 67 between 1958 and 1964. In terms of percentages their share was 10, 16, 36.6, and 41 per cent respectively. The corresponding figures for the recruits of the sub-group 26-30 years were 31 (43.6 per cent), 70 (40 per cent), 62 (38.5 per cent), and 72 (44.1 per cent) during the corresponding periods.




Diagram 14. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by period of recruitment and age on entry (564 out of 570)

Stability in the recruitment of officers in the 26-30 age group seems to correspond to a preference on the part of the Department.⁴³ On the one hand, the Department has fixed unalterably at 30 the age limit for candidates at the competitive examination, because "after that age it is a little more difficult perhaps to break a man in to Civil Service procedure."⁴⁴ On the other hand, the Department believes the prestige of a diplomatic career sufficiently great to attract candidates who are almost 30, even into the lowest

echelon of the service. It is possible too that this preference simply expresses the Department's concern not to be unfair to the application of war veterans.

More and more candidates are being recruited from among those aged 20 to 25 years. The motives behind this fact have been less openly proclaimed—probably “the fact that the service is seeking its recruits primarily from those who are about to receive their first university degree” provides one motive.⁴⁵ But this emphasis was implicit in the change of regulations around 1953, whereby candidates at the general examination no longer had to be “at least 23” but rather “less than 31.” In fact, the first recruit of less than 22 was admitted to the Department in 1952, the second in 1954, and the third and fourth in 1956. Until 1965 only two candidates of 21 had passed the examination and there was still a relatively small number of officers recruited at 22 years of age. This indicates that the rise of the 20-5 age group was brought about chiefly by recruits of 23, and still more by recruits of 24 and 25 years of age.

Diagram 14 also reveals the stability of the 31-5 age group during the first two periods. Among officers recruited during 1922-44, the strength of this group expressed both the rarity of recruitment by examination (and still more of recruitment at the lower level), and conversely the popularity of recruitment by order-in-council. For 1945-50, one is very clearly aware of a relatively large entry of grade 2 and 3 officers by examination, and officers of a level above grade 4 by special examination, reclassification, or transfer. The limits of this age group moreover correspond exactly to the age limits required in the examination for grade 2 officers. The group of those aged 36-50 years were subject to the same conditions as those in the 31-5 age group during the first two periods, probably as the result of the so-called secondary methods of recruitment, that is, transfer and reclassification. It is also noteworthy that the relative importance of the 31-5 and 36-50 age groups was identical during the last three periods, as the 20-30 year group grew more important. Finally, what is strikingly obvious is the remarkable numerical and proportional stability of the officers recruited at the age of 51 and over during the four periods. Since 36 of the 51 officers recruited at the age of 51 and over were appointed by order-in-council, one may certainly conclude that this is an important means of entry into the Department. A similar situation may be expected when the relationship between age on entry and linguistic group is analyzed.

Comparisons between Francophones and Anglophones. It appears from Diagram 15 that in the aggregate there was a higher percentage of French-language officers recruited among the groups aged 26-30, 41-5, and 51 and over; conversely more English-language officers were included in the groups aged 20-5, 31-40, and 46-50. It is nevertheless true that the percentage gaps were slight at the level of the groups aged 20-5, 41-5, and 46-50. The proportional advantage of the French-language officers in the 26-30 age group is the more interesting, since it suggests the hypothesis (to be verified later) that French-speaking officers enter the Department after studying longer than do English-speaking officers.

Looking at these basic categories from another angle, we observe that 74.1 per cent of the French-language officers were recruited between 20 and 30 years of age, as opposed to 69 per cent of the English-language officers. The corollary is that the proportion of Anglophones recruited between 31 and 50 (21.8 per cent) was higher than that of the Francophones (15.3 per cent). And if we wonder why the proportion of young recruits




Diagram 15. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by linguistic group and age on entry (564 out of 570)

(20-30 years old) is higher among French-language officers, it seems to us that such a situation corresponds more to the level at which these officers were recruited than to the method of recruitment itself. It would appear indeed that a higher percentage of the English-language officers recruited by examination were brought in at middle or higher levels. Furthermore, it is undeniable that it is the method of recruitment itself that can best explain the higher proportional representation of English-language officers in the 31-50 age group. Transfers, special examinations, and certain reclassifications usually concern individuals of this category. One might say that the same implicit relationship between the two linguistic groups exists at the level of 51 years and over, where the 13 French-speaking and the 38 English-speaking officers may be compared with the 15 French- and 34 English-speaking officers, referred to earlier, who entered the Department by order-in-council.

We note in Diagram 16, first, a parallel increase in the proportion of English- and French-language recruits in the 20-5 year range during the four periods, despite the temporary fall in the recruitment of Francophones in 1945-50; and secondly, among the 26-30 year olds, maximums at the two extreme periods, taking into account a slight rise in 1958-64. From this we may conclude that the English-speaking officers made a more sustained proportional contribution to the rejuvenation of the officers' group. In the case of those recruited between 31 and 35 years of age, a tendency to decrease is noticeable among both language groups, except in the case of the French-language officers for 1945-50. The same thing applies to the 36-50 age group. The spurt in the recruitment of Francophones in the medium age groups in 1945-50 appears to coincide with the




Diagram 16. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by linguistic group, period of recruitment, and age on entry (564 out of 570)

numerical weakness of Francophone entries into the Department in the 20-30 age group in that period. For the group of officers recruited at 51 years and over, we must recognize that the percentages of the English-speaking group have been more stable than those of the French. However, the more irregular behaviour of the proportional distribution of the French-speaking recruits is perhaps not unrelated to the numerical weakness of this linguistic group as a whole.

From the previous considerations, the following conclusions or assumptions may be drawn:

1. A growing proportion of officers has been recruited from the 20-30 age group.
2. The increase of those entering between 20 and 30 years of age resulted particularly from the increase in number and percentage of the officers 20 to 25 years old.
3. The proportion of officers recruited at 51 and over remained relatively stable.
4. In the French-speaking group, the highest percentages of officers recruited were at the levels of 26-30 years and 51 years and over, that is, at ages either no longer very young or else advanced.

5. In the English-speaking group, the highest proportions were in the age groups 20-5, 31-5, 36-40, and 46-50 years, that is, at the youngest and medium ages.
6. The evolution of the proportional distribution of officers according to age at the time of recruitment was on the whole more regular among the English-speaking than among the French-speaking officers.

e) *Sex*

For a fortuitous reason that we shall make clear later on, sex is the only characteristic which helps us to understand the Department's recruitment policy from the beginning until 1964 inclusive—although of course from a particular angle. Let us begin however with the facts.

General situation. Of the 570 foreign service officers in the Department from 1945 to 1965, 537, or 94.2 per cent, were men and 33, or 5.8 per cent, were women. It will be readily agreed that the disproportion is considerable. There can be only two explanations: either Canadian women are little interested in a diplomatic career, which is probable but impossible to verify in view of the absence of official statistics as to the number of women candidates who wrote the various External Affairs examinations; or neither the Canadian cabinet nor the Department of External Affairs—the former by appointment through order-in-council, the latter through competitive examination and the conditions that it offers successful candidates—seeks to attract women or succeeds in keeping them.⁴⁶ The second proposition, it seems to us, can obviously be more readily examined.

Development. As in Great Britain, the diplomatic service in Canada was closed to women until the end of World War II. No woman was therefore among the 71 officers recruited between 1922 and 1944. Beginning in 1945 women were able to register by the same right as men for the External Affairs examinations conducted by the Civil Service Commission,⁴⁷ but in practice the priority granted to veterans continued to function against them until at least 1948.

In fact several women officers were actually in the Department's establishment before the exclusion was removed officially in 1945. As mentioned earlier, the Department had suspended in 1942 all recruiting examinations for officers for the duration of the war; between 1942 and 1944 it had recruited by order-in-council some 16 special wartime assistants—all men, of course. But at the same time, no doubt to meet pressing needs, the Department recruited about 11 women who, although possessing the same basic qualifications as the majority of these wartime assistants, were designated as grade 4 clerks. These women were in practice junior officers by the same right as their colleagues of the opposite sex.⁴⁸ Moreover several of them were reclassified in 1947 and became the first women to hold officially the title of foreign service officer. It was in 1948 that a woman first entered the Department by way of the annual competitive examination.

Between 1945 and 1950, six women entered the Department as officers, five in 1947 and the sixth in 1948. These six women represented 3.5 per cent of the 175 officers recruited during that period. Fifteen other women joined this first group from 1951 to 1957, and 12 others from 1958 to 1964; they constituted respectively 9.4 per cent and 7.3 per cent of the total number of officers recruited during those two periods. Because the Department recruited no women until 1945 (and could not have done so, according

to the regulations in force), it is a foregone conclusion, from the point of view of this study, that these 33 women represent the entire result of the Department's policy on the recruitment of women, from the beginning to 1965.

It is noteworthy that 10 of these 33 women, or 30.3 per cent, became foreign service officers by reclassification, and that the 23 others, or 69.7 per cent, were recruited through examination. On the other hand, none came to the Department by transfer. Up to December 31, 1964, none had entered either by order-in-council or "political appointment." On the other hand, the distribution of women between those who were reclassified and those who entered by examination contrasts sharply with the corresponding distribution of male officers. Less women than men were recruited by examination: seven women out of 10, or more precisely 69.2 per cent, as against eight men out of 10, or 82.5 per cent. In contrast, proportionally 10 times more women than men (30.4 per cent against 3.2 per cent) became foreign service officers by reclassification. This considerable gap is perhaps related to the linguistic factor among women officers.




Diagram 17. Distribution of foreign service officers by linguistic group, period of recruitment, and sex

Comparisons between Francophones and Anglophones. Of the total of 33 women, 28 (that is 84.8 per cent) were English-speaking officers and five (that is 15.2 per cent) French-speaking (Diagram 17). Twenty-eight represents 6.3 per cent of the total English-language contingent; five represents 4.0 per cent of the total French-language group.

The 28 Anglophone women officers were recruited at the rate of six during the period 1945-50, and 11 during each of the periods 1951-7 and 1958-64. Of the five Franco-phone women officers, three entered the Department in 1955, one in 1956 and one in 1959. In the English-speaking group, 20 of the 28 women entered the Department by examination and eight by reclassification; in the French group, three by examination and two by reclassification. The first Anglophone woman officer recruited by examination belonged to the 1948 group, and the first Francophone to the 1955 group.

It is evident that, except for the period 1951-7, there was on the whole no balance between female English- and French-speaking officers. The low point undoubtedly occurred in 1945-50. This situation was partly the result of the war period, during which the extraordinary recruitment to the Department (special wartime assistants and clerks grade 4) consisted, as we know, almost entirely of English-speaking persons. The first five women officers, all English-speaking, entered the Department by reclassification in 1947; this is the more significant since it coincided with the drive to recruit English-speaking men, both by transfer and by reclassification—a drive that has never since been equalled. The major effect of this total absence of Francophone women from the beginning right up to 1955 was to produce in the Department, by December 31, 1964, a sort of exclusively English-speaking female elite. This situation has no doubt been reinforced, either by the lack of female French-speaking candidates at the annual examinations, or by the lack of appeal or encouragement offered by the Department or the Public Service Commission to Canadian women whose language is French.

From the previous considerations, the following conclusions or assumptions may be drawn:

1. For a score of more or less explicit reasons, the Department of External Affairs over the years has recruited few women as foreign service officers.
2. A large proportion of the women officers of the Department were recruited by reclassification.
3. Recruitment by reclassification of Anglophone women coincided with the period during which Anglophone men were proportionally the more numerous, and preceded by a "generation" the recruitment of Francophone women officers.
4. The competitive examination has brought into the ranks of the Department very few Francophone women officers.

f) Religion*

Religion or religious affiliation appears nowhere in the recruitment policy of the Department of External Affairs or of the Public Service Commission. It constitutes in no

*This information is complete for 443 of the 570 officers, or 77.7 per cent.

way a criterion or a condition of admission to the foreign service. In a country like Canada, religion remains nevertheless one of the characteristic social traits of a great number, if not the majority, of officers. That is why we turn our attention to it here.

General situation. Four religious denominations are mainly represented among the 443 officers whose religious affiliation we know. They are Roman Catholics, numbering 141 (or 31.8 per cent), Anglicans, 120 (or 27.1 per cent), members of the United Church, 81 (or 18.3 per cent), and "Protestants,"* 76 (or 17.2 per cent). Among other denominations the Jews, comprising 15 officers (or 3.4 per cent), are the most numerous. Mennonites, Mormons, and Greek Orthodox number only four individuals altogether (or 0.9 per cent), and atheists or agnostics six (or 1.3 per cent).

By comparison with the importance of these various religious denominations in Canada it is readily apparent that the dominant Roman Catholic group is distinctly under-represented.⁴⁹ On the contrary, the Anglicans and the "Protestants," proportionally speaking, far exceed their numerical importance in the Canadian population. The Anglicans in particular, who include here all members of the Church of England and all Episcopalians,⁵⁰ are strongly favoured; the "Protestants," who for the purposes of this study cover Baptists, Presbyterians, Methodists, Lutherans, and Christian Scientists are also well represented although to a lesser extent. The Jews have a place which is proportionally more than double that of this religious group in Canada. Has the representation of these different religious denominations varied among the groups making up the corps of foreign service officers between 1945 and 1965? We will now examine this question.




Diagram 18. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by religious affiliation and period of recruitment (443 out of 570)

* "Protestants" is used here as a generic term intended to group together adherents of denominations other than the Anglican Church and the United Church.

Development. Diagram 18 shows that with the exception of the United Church, our four principal religious denominations experienced ups and downs in the course of the years. The group of Roman Catholics, very well represented among the officers recruited between 1922 and 1944, slipped to 28.2 per cent during the period 1945-50, later becoming stabilized at about 30 per cent. The group of Anglicans, on the other hand, which shot up between 1945 and 1950 has diminished steadily ever since. The United Church group has displayed a remarkable and unique stability throughout the four periods. Finally, the group of "Protestants" was the only denomination to increase continuously.

It is clear that the numerical advantage of the Anglicans may be largely attributed to the number of persons of this denomination recruited in 1945-50. It is no less apparent that the steady drop in the Anglicans' place during the last three periods (a drop that recalls broadly speaking the decrease, pointed out earlier, in the proportion of officers born in Ontario) occurred chiefly to the advantage of two groups, the United Church and the "Protestants." This diversification that may well result from the preponderance of the competitive examination as a method of recruitment after the war tends to confirm indirectly the assertion that, in an administration becoming more rationalized, religion plays a less and less important part.⁵¹ But is there no place here for some shading of opinion as to the degree of rationalization that the Department has attained, in view of the relatively constant numerical and proportional importance of certain denominations, in particular the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, and the United Church? To check this, one has only to examine the problem from the point of view of what linguistic group the officers belong to.

Comparisons between Francophones and Anglophones. Of the 443 officers whose religion we know, 116 are French-speaking and 327 English-speaking. Among the Francophone officers, remarkably enough, all 116 are Roman Catholics. Among the Anglophone officers, 120 out of 327 (or 36.7 per cent) are Anglicans, 81 (or 24.7 per cent) members of the United Church, 76 (or 23.2 per cent) other "Protestants," 25 or (7.6 per cent) Catholics, 15 (or 4.5 per cent) Jews, four (or 1.2 per cent) of other religious denominations, and six (or 1.8 per cent) atheists or agnostics (Diagram 19). The total number of Roman Catholics among French-speaking and English-speaking officers is 141 or 31.7 per cent of the 443 officers. This means that Roman Catholics form the largest religious group among the officers.

One must admit that the contrast could not be greater between the two linguistic groups. The Francophones are perfectly homogeneous, even monolithic, from the religious point of view. The Anglophones, on the other hand, are eminently pluralistic. The fact that the 116 French-speaking officers are all Roman Catholics is almost enough in itself to explain why the Roman Catholic group was most evident numerically and proportionally from 1945 to 1965. In contrast, the general numerical weakness of French-speaking officers in the Department, or the insufficiency of recruitment, together with the low proportion of Roman Catholics among English-speaking officers, clearly account for the under-representation of the Roman Catholic group, considering the importance of this religion in Canada.

The preponderance of Anglicans (36.7 per cent) among the Anglophones in the Department is perhaps significant in two respects. The first is that the Anglican Church,




Diagram 19. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by linguistic group and religious affiliation (443 out of 570)

which has a very structured organization, maintains close ties with Great Britain.⁵² Moreover 16 of the 120 officers who stated that they belonged to this church were born in Great Britain. The second is that the Anglicans have deep roots in the upper class in Canada, particularly among the economic elite, of whom some 25 per cent perhaps are members of the Anglican Church.⁵³

The special feature of the group of officers affiliated with the United Church—"a 'church' of the *status quo* and respectability" according to S. D. Clark,⁵⁴—is that one half of its members (40 out of 80) were born in Ontario. The group of "Protestants" is divided into several sub-groups. There is first the one including the officers who identify themselves as Protestants without referring to a particular church, and who represent 11.6 per cent of the whole group of English-speaking officers. Then there are the Presbyterians who, despite the important place they occupy in the political, bureaucratic, and economic elite of the country, form only 6.1 per cent of the Anglophones; and the Baptists who, with their six members, are situated at about the same level as the other small Protestant denominations: Lutherans, Christian Scientists, members of the Christian Church, and Methodists. From the regional point of view, 40.7 per cent of the group of

Protestants come from Ontario and 22.3 per cent from the Prairies. Finally the Jewish group, also exclusively an English-language group, stands apart from all the other religious denominations (except the Roman Catholics) in that it draws 40 per cent of its members from Quebec.

From all the previous considerations, the following conclusions or assumptions may be drawn:

1. Four religious groups, Roman Catholics, Anglicans, members of the United Church, and other "Protestants," were particularly well represented in the corps of foreign service officers from 1945 to 1965.
2. Recruitment by examination seems largely responsible for the growing religious pluralism among English-speaking officers.
3. The group of Roman Catholics, which is identified in large part with French-speaking officers and with the province of Quebec, has been clearly under-represented since 1945.
4. The other three groups, which were listed entirely by English-speaking officers, were either over-represented (Anglicans and "Protestants"), or well represented in proportion to their importance in the Canadian population (United Church). About 40 per cent of these three groups originated in Ontario.
5. The Jews, of whom 40 per cent came from Quebec, constituted the largest of the over-represented religious groups, considering their numbers in the country as a whole.

g) *Marital status**

Marital status is one of the rare characteristics on which our information does not correspond exactly to the situation at the time of recruitment. In fact, what we shall call here "marital status" refers either to the most recent marital status or, in most instances, that of July 1965 in the case of officers at that time still on the Department's payroll; or, in the case of others, the last marital status officially known.

General situation. Of the 561 officers whose marital status we know, 421 (or 75 per cent) are married, 136 (or 24.2 per cent) are single, and four are either widowed or divorced. Of the married officers, however, we had no way of knowing how many might be separated.

That most officers are married seems to indicate *a priori* that in the Department marriage is a status symbol. In any case it is a status recognized if not implicitly encouraged by the Department, with the evident aim of meeting the requirements of the diplomatic service. Indeed the salary and allowances paid by the Department, particularly to its officers on duty abroad, take strict account of the marital status of each person, the more so because marriage adds to the officers' stability, and tends to eliminate certain risks that diplomatic departments prefer not to run.⁵⁵ It is probable that the over-all proportion of married officers mentioned above would be still higher if it did not include the quota of officers, for the most part still young, recruited between 1958 and 1964.

Development. Diagram 20 confirms first that single persons were the most numerous among the officers recruited between 1958 and 1964. This is probably because the

*This information is complete for 561 of the 570 officers.




Diagram 20. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by marital status and period of recruitment (561 out of 570)

Department recruits a growing proportion of its officers, especially Anglophones, at the 20-5 year age level. Diagram 20 also reveals that the groups of married and single officers moved, proportionally, in opposite directions. Married officers, who formed 89.7 per cent of the group recruited between 1922 and 1944, slipped gradually to 57.1 per cent between 1958 and 1964. Single officers followed an ascending scale, rising from 5.8 per cent (1922-44) to 42.3 per cent in 1958-64. Taking into account the relatively provisional character of the distribution of the officers in the latter group, it seems to us that marital status was related to both the method and level of recruitment. The development and prevalence of the examination system beginning in 1945, by presumably lowering the age of recruits, are probably reflected in the progressive increase in the percentage of unmarried recruits. The fact that recruiting at the lower level was more and more common could not have failed to reinforce this tendency. Among those recruited during 1922-44 and 1945-50, on the other hand, the infrequency of examinations and the relatively great importance attached to recruitment at the middle and higher levels probably resulted in raising the proportion of married officers at the expense of single ones.

Comparisons between Francophones and Anglophones. Of the 561 officers whose marital status we know, 437 are Anglophones and 124 Francophones. Among the former, 324 (or 74.1 per cent) are married, 110 (or 25.1 per cent) are single, and three (or 0.7 per cent) are widowed or divorced. Among French-speaking officers, 97 (or 78.2 per cent) are married, 26 (or 20.9 per cent) are single, and one (or 0.8 per cent) is widowed.

Over a period of years the percentage of married officers has been maintained at a much more stable rate on the French side than on the English. Thus, although officers in the two linguistic groups recruited between 1922 and 1944 started at the same level (90 per cent), this proportion slipped successively to 85, 77, and 52 per cent for 1945-50, 1951-7 and 1958-64, in the case of English-language officers; whereas among the Francophone group it fell during the same three periods to 80, 76, and 73 per cent respectively. The group aged 26-30 years—at which most Francophones were recruited—was certainly not irrelevant to this situation, although the apparent inclination of Francophones to marry is not without a sociological or cultural foundation.

From the previous considerations, the following conclusions or assumptions may be drawn:

1. Most officers are married.
2. The gradual increase, after the war, of the proportion of unmarried recruits, is probably due first to the preponderance after 1945 of the competitive examination as a method of recruitment; and secondly, to the lower average age of entry, particularly among English-speaking officers.
3. The proportion of married officers is consistently higher among French-language officers.

*h) Professional origin**

It seems to us important to know the work or occupation of the officers before they were recruited to External Affairs. By what we shall call "professional origin," we mean the sphere of activity of the officers at the time of their entry into the Department. For the purposes of this study, we have grouped the earlier activities of the officers into eight categories, which constitute as many areas of recruitment.

They are: 1) the *army*, those who at the time of their recruitment, or a little while before, were active members of the armed forces; 2) *education*, those who were engaged in teaching at the university or high school level, or else in research or in school administration; 3) *public service*, those who were officials with the federal government or a provincial government; 4) *journalism*, those who were engaged in newspaper, radio or television journalism, as well as press attachés and executive secretaries of public organizations; 5) *law*, those who were lawyers or members of other professions; 6) *business*, those who worked in commerce, industry, or finance; 7) *politics*, those who were professional politicians at the federal or provincial level; 8) *studies*, those who were completing their studies or who were recruited directly by the Department on leaving university and who consequently had not yet had a permanent job.

General situation. Of the 556 officers whose occupation before joining the Department we know, 139 (25 per cent) came from the student world, 120 (or 21.6 per cent) from the army, 112 (or 20.1 per cent) from the public service, 86 (or 15.5 per cent) from education, 32 (or 5.8 per cent) from journalism, 32 (or 5.8 per cent) from business, 28 (or 5 per cent) from law, and seven (or 1.2 per cent) from politics. It is therefore clear that the privileged areas of recruitment were, in order of importance: the

*This information is complete for 556 officers out of 570.

student world, and the world of veterans, public servants, and educators; and that the secondary professional areas were journalism and business, law and politics. Within each of the four periods from 1945 to 1965 into which the corps of foreign service officers are grouped, were all these areas represented and, if so, what was their order of importance?

Development. We note first that with the exception of the political sector, from which no officer was recruited during the first two periods (1922-44 and 1945-50), officers came from all categories or sectors. The very absence of the political sector, even in the group of 1951-7, reveals that none of the political appointments or those made by order-in-council concerned individuals who were politicians at the time of their recruitment. Furthermore, even if all sectors were represented in all four groups, each group or period appears to be identified with one or, in exceptional cases, two of the four privileged sectors—studies, army, government, and education.

For the period 1922-44, for example, education was in the privileged position. Twenty-seven of the 70 officers (38.5 per cent) recruited during that period came from teaching. Between 1945 and 1950, 53.1 per cent came from the army. From 1951 to 1957, the world of students or of those "without a profession" (32.6 per cent) and the public service sector (28.7 per cent) shared first place. Finally, from 1958 to 1964, the student group or those "without a profession" unquestionably occupied the privileged position.

A careful examination of developments in each sector of recruitment reveals that the public service sector has remained the most stable. The average was around 15 per cent (14.2 per cent of officers recruited between 1922 and 1944, 19 per cent in 1945-50, and 15.5 per cent in 1958-64). On the other hand, the numbers drawn from the army, education, and the ranks of students varied. Standing at 14.2 per cent before 1945, the army slipped from 53.1 per cent (1945-50) to 7.8 per cent (1951-7), then to 3.7 per cent (1958-64). Its peak corresponded obviously to the demobilization years after the war when war veterans enjoyed priority. Education showed proportionally a remarkable stability from 1945 onwards, levelling off at about 12 per cent. The relative importance of education among the group of officers recruited between 1922 and 1944 (38.5 per cent) probably reflects an affinity between the leadership of the Department at the time and the professional milieu of education before 1945, particularly among professors at certain universities.⁵⁶ Lastly, the student group, almost absent from the 1945-50 group, shot up beginning in 1952 to 32.6 per cent (1951-7), then to 50 per cent (1958-64).

It is evident that the growing importance of the student sector was linked both with the gradual reduction in age of the recruits trying the examination after the war, and with the marked upward swing at that period of recruitment by examination. If there was no direct relationship between the student sector and the competitive examination during the period 1945-50, it is because the majority of the personnel thus recruited came from the army. Likewise, the majority of the officers who came from the education sector between 1922 and 1944 were recruited by examination. On the other hand, it should be noted that although never more than 10 per cent of officers came from the secondary sectors of recruitment, that percentage was relatively steady in all periods. But do such conclusions apply without distinction to the officers of the two principal linguistic groups?




Diagram 21. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by linguistic group and sector of recruitment (or professional origin) (556 out of 570)

Comparisons between Francophones and Anglophones. Diagram 21 reveals that officers of the two linguistic groups were recruited from each sector or category of professional origin but most frequently from the army, education, the public service, and the student sector. It is in the order of importance of these sectors that differences appear. The army (24.4 per cent) and the student world (23.0 per cent) furnished more Anglophone officers, whereas the French-language officers had most often been students (31.7 per cent) or members of the public service (21.1 per cent). We already know that the rise in popularity of the competitive examination had worked to the detriment of the French-speaking officers. We are now in a position to deduce, from the importance of the student category among both groups, that this situation was due to the fact that the army constituted a privileged sector of recruitment for English-speaking officers; that is, the priority of war veterans has probably handicapped the representation of French-speaking officers in the Department.

It should be noted that the relative importance of the education and public service sectors, especially when combined, is roughly the same for the two groups. The same applies to journalism and politics. In contrast, law and business occupied much more important positions than the other sectors—the first among French-speaking and the second among English-speaking officers.

It is interesting to pursue further this examination of the relative importance of the sectors of recruitment, by period and linguistic group. In regard to the quota recruited between 1922 and 1944, what strikes one first is that relatively more English-speaking

officers were in the sectors of education (42 per cent against 30 per cent) and public service (18 per cent against 5 per cent); and that French-speaking officers had more often been in the sectors of journalism (15 per cent against 4 per cent) and law (20 per cent against 6 per cent). Only in the education sector—which, as we know, is the privileged sector of recruitment in this period—has the numerical advantage of the Anglophones probably been increased by the fact that English-speaking recruits came predominantly from a university background, while the majority of French-speaking officers came from a secondary school background.

In the period 1945-50, it was from the army that the lion's share (57 per cent) of English-speaking officers were recruited; the army and the public service (34.4 per cent and 27.4 per cent) had yielded proportionally most French-language officers. Journalism and law remained relatively important sources of Francophones throughout this period. The high percentages in these sectors of recruitment (reflecting low numbers in the case of the Francophones) represent indirectly the shortage of French-speaking officers recruited by examination.

During the period 1951-7, the order of importance of public service and the student world, as significant sources of recruits, was reversed between the two linguistic groups—the first predominating among the Anglophones, the second among the Francophones. The army, education and business were relatively more important among the Anglophones, whereas journalism and law remained proportionally strong and relatively steady sources of French-language officers. In 1958-64, when the student sector was the prime source of officers for both linguistic groups, we note that among the Francophones a marked number also came from the public service (24.2 per cent) but none from the army, journalism, or business. Law, however, continued to be a moderately important sector for recruiting Francophones (6.1 per cent).

From these considerations, the following conclusions or assumptions may be drawn:

1. The four main professional sectors of recruitment were the student world, the army, public service, and education.
2. In each of the four periods one or two sectors yielded the most recruits, namely education (1922-44), the army (1945-50), the student world and public service (1951-7), and the student world alone (1958-64).
3. The progressive rise of the student sector in the periods after the war and of the army between 1945 and 1950 corresponded to the ascendancy of the competitive examination as the principal method of recruitment.
4. Both by their numerical advantage and their professional seniority, English-speaking officers predominated in the education sector during the period 1922-44.
5. In the postwar period public service and law were relatively stable sectors of recruitment for French-language officers.

i) *School or university education**

The kind of school or university education received by officers is important from two points of view. It provides first a general idea of their intellectual quality and secondly it

*This information is complete for 548 of the 570 officers, with one exception—in the case of one person (among the 548) we do not know the name of the university where the last degree was obtained.

brings out, much more clearly than we have been able to do up to now, certain essential differences between the two principal linguistic groups of officers. We shall assess here, for each group, the level of university training as revealed by the last university degree obtained and the universities attended. But let us begin by clarifying the situation as a whole.

Of the 548 officers whose school or university attendance we know, 535 (or 97.6 per cent) have studied at a university, or to be more exact have a university degree, and 13 (or 2.4 per cent) have at best a high school diploma. This distribution is hardly surprising, since all officers recruited by examination, that is the great majority, must have a university degree. The astonishing thing is rather that university graduates predominate even among the officers appointed by order-in-council (political appointments).

Among the 535 officers who have studied at a university, 72 (or 13.4 per cent) have a doctorate or Ph.D., 95 (or 17.8 per cent) have a *licence* or professional degree, most often in law, 168 (or 31.4 per cent) have an M.A. or master's degree, and 200 (or 37.4 per cent) have a B.A. or bachelor of arts degree.⁵⁷ Of the 535 degrees, divided into four categories, 169 (or 31.6 per cent) are from foreign universities, 365 (or 68.2 per cent) from Canadian universities, and one is from an unidentified university. What is the situation of the two principal linguistic groups as far as school and university training is concerned?




Diagram 22. Percentage distribution of English-speaking foreign service officers with a degree by last university degree obtained (419 out of 446)

(i) English-speaking officers

General situation. Among the 548 officers whose school or university training we know, 427 are English-speaking officers. Of the latter, 419 (or 98.1 per cent) have a university degree and eight (or 1.9 per cent) have a high school diploma. In the case of those whose degree is evidence of university training, 48 (or 11.4 per cent) have a Ph.D. or a *doctorat d'université*, except one who has an honorary doctorate; 57 (or 13.6 per

cent) have a *licence*, in most cases a *licence* in law; 137 (or 32.7 per cent) have an M.A., and 177 (or 42.1 per cent) have a bachelor of arts or B.A., either an honours B.A. or a general B.A. (Diagram 22).

Of the 419 English-language officers who are university graduates, 136 (or 32.5 per cent) obtained their last university degree in universities abroad, particularly at Oxford (52), Harvard (13), Cambridge (10), or else at the University of London or the London School of Economics (11). Thirty of these were Rhodes scholars. Nine of the 136 obtained their last university degree in continental Europe, 8 in French-language universities—Paris (5), Geneva (2), Montpellier (1); the ninth had a degree from Hamburg. The 283 remaining officers (or 67.5 per cent) obtained their last university degree in Canada, principally at the following universities: Toronto (82), McGill (43), British Columbia (34), Queen's (33), Alberta (17), Manitoba (13), Dalhousie (13), and Western Ontario (10). Among the 283 officers who obtained their last university degree in Canada, 72 had previously spent time studying abroad, especially in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany. Conversely, 122 of the 136 officers who obtained their last university degree abroad have a degree from a Canadian university, in particular from Toronto (39), British Columbia (16), McGill (16), Manitoba (11), Alberta (9), Western Ontario (7), Queen's (5), and McMaster (5).

It would appear therefore that 405 of the 419 officers holding a university degree attended a Canadian university: 195 of them (or 48.2 per cent) studied in Ontario universities, 68 (or 16.8 per cent) in Quebec, 60 (or 14.8 per cent) in the Prairies, 51 (or 12.6 per cent) in British Columbia, 29 (or 7.2 per cent) in the Atlantic provinces. It would also appear that the Canadian universities most attended by English-language officers were in order, Toronto (120), McGill (59), British Columbia (50), Queen's (38), Alberta (26), and Manitoba (24). One can also say that 208 of the 419 English-language officers holding a university degree attended a university abroad: in the United Kingdom, particularly Oxford (67), London or the London School of Economics (22), and Cambridge (12); in the United States, in particular Harvard (14), Columbia (9), and Princeton (4); or in continental Europe, especially Paris (12), French provincial universities (6), Swiss universities (9), and the University of Hamburg (4).

Development. Diagram 23 shows that the group of officers recruited between 1922 and 1944 had proportionally the most university training. In fact 24 per cent of this group had a Ph.D. or a doctorate and 38 per cent an M.A. or master's degree. This diagram also shows that the number and proportion of *licences*, especially in law, for which the length of study (in the Anglophone universities of Canada) is normally longer than in the case of a master's degree, increased noticeably in the postwar group as compared with the 1922-44 group—although barely exceeding the 15 per cent level. Finally the diagram reveals a rise in the proportion of officers possessing a bachelor of arts degree (B.A.)⁵⁷ in relation to those with an M.A. Not without significance is the fact that during the period 1945-50, when recruitment by examination rose sharply and priority was given to war veterans, the entry of officers whose last degree was the B.A. approached the 50 per cent level for the first time. The return to this average between 1958 and 1964 tends to confirm the opinion of those who thought they could detect a fall in the level of university training attained by the officers of the Department,⁵⁸ and consequently in the standards of recruitment for foreign service officers.⁵⁹




Diagram 23. Percentage distribution of English-speaking foreign service officers by period of recruitment and last diploma or university degree obtained (427 out of 446)

One may even ask whether the percentage breakdown of the last university degrees within the 1945-50 and 1958-64 groups is not a sort of norm in respect of the level of university training of English-speaking officers recruited since 1945.

With regard to the institutions where the university degrees of English-speaking officers were obtained, one notes invariably that the highest degrees, particularly the Ph.D. and M.A., tended to be identified with a foreign rather than a Canadian university. This is a phenomenon which presumably reinforces the numerical representation of Anglophones in the Department. On the other hand, throughout the four periods from 1945 to 1965, at least 73 per cent—90 per cent at its maximum, between 1951 and 1957—had obtained their B.A. at a Canadian university.

As for the officers who obtained their last university degree in Canada, the highest proportion in all periods attended universities in Ontario. This percentage generally oscillated around 50 per cent. The English-language universities of Quebec, notably McGill, from which 27.5 per cent of the 1922-44 officers graduated, contributed from 12 to 17 per cent of the postwar numbers. The universities of the Prairies moved up from 13 per cent (1922-44) to 15 per cent (1945-50), then to 18 per cent (1951-7), but slipped back to 7.2 per cent between 1958 to 1964. Those of the Atlantic provinces fell from 13.4 per cent in the first period to 8.4 per cent in the last. The universities of British Columbia, not represented in the group of officers recruited between 1922 and 1944, increased from 10 per cent (1945-50) to 19.2 per cent (1958-64).

In all four periods the majority of English-language officers who had obtained their last university degree in Canada came from four universities: Toronto, McGill, Queen's, and British Columbia.⁶⁰ Toronto was at all times the most important: its share, which was 30 per cent or more during the first three periods, nevertheless slipped to 20.4 per cent during 1958-64. McGill, which produced 24 per cent of the officers in 1922-44, levelled off

subsequently at about 15 per cent. Queen's increased sharply from 3.4 per cent (1922-44) to 14 per cent (1945-50), before settling down at about 12 per cent; and the University of British Columbia by itself accounted for the rise referred to above, from 10 per cent (1945-50) to 19.2 per cent (1958-64).

With respect to the officers whose last university degree was obtained abroad, it is the British universities which definitely supplied the largest proportion of each period. The percentage oscillated between a low point of 47.1 per cent for 1922-44 and 61.5 per cent for 1945-50, the latter corresponding to a period which brought a greater number of Canadian university graduates to the Department. Oxford remained predominant among British universities with never less than one-third of the total. The American universities, which recorded 47 per cent for 1922-44, maintained their position, moving during the postwar period from 33 per cent (1945-50) to 41 per cent (1958-64). For the 1922-44 group, it was Harvard that led (19 per cent), followed by Columbia (9.5 per cent). Subsequently, however, the number of officers coming from American universities rose considerably. The Francophone universities of France and Switzerland appeared for the first time among the English-language officers in the 1951-7 group (13.5 per cent). They still formed 7.6 per cent of the 1958-64 group. But it is noteworthy that the proportion of English-language officers who had attended a Francophone university in Canada or abroad, either to obtain a degree or for a period of study, remained around 10 per cent for all periods.

(ii) French-speaking officers

General situation. Among the 548 officers whose school or university training we know, 121 are French-speaking officers. Of the latter, 116 (or 95.8 per cent) have a university degree and five (or 4.2 per cent) have at best a high school diploma. In the case of those whose degree is evidence of university training, 24 (or 20.7 per cent) have a doctorate (of which one is a *doctorat d'Etat*), 31 (or 26.7 per cent) have an M.A. or a master's degree, 38 (or 32.8 per cent) have *licence*, and 23 (or 19.8 per cent) have a bachelor of arts degree or B.A. (Diagram 24). Of the total of doctorates and *licences*, 14 and 29 respectively are in law.

This breakdown of French-speaking officers according to university degree recalls our hypothesis about the age of entry: that French-language officers enter the Department after longer studies than English-language officers. On the one hand, the number and relatively high percentage of Francophone officers who have a doctorate obviously suggest that their studies have been more advanced and therefore longer than those of their Anglophone colleagues. On the other hand, the *licences*, whose number is relatively high (particularly in law) among French-speaking officers, and which in the majority of cases actually constitute a first university degree, largely cancel out the effect that doctorates might have on the prolongation of their studies. In fact, in the case of the majority of Francophones who entered the Department at a relatively late age, it is not so much university studies in themselves that may have caused this late entry as their abnormally long high school studies.

Of the 116 French-speaking officers who are university graduates, 34 (or 29.5 per cent) obtained their last university degree in a university abroad, principally the




Diagram 24. Percentage distribution of French-speaking foreign service officers by last university degree obtained (121 out of 124)

University of Paris or the Sorbonne (11) and Oxford University (10). In fact, only 16 of these 34 officers, or 47 per cent, obtained their last university degree in Francophone universities as against 18 in Anglophone universities, either in the United Kingdom or in the United States; seven of them were Rhodes scholars. The 81 other officers (or 70.5 per cent) obtained their last university degree in Canada, either from the Francophone universities of Montreal (29), Laval (26) and the bilingual University of Ottawa (12), or from English-language universities (14), mainly McGill (6).

Among the 81 officers who obtained their last university degree in Canada, 23 had previously spent some time studying abroad: 12 in French-language institutions, namely the University of Paris (9), the Académie de droit international at The Hague (1), the Institut des hautes études internationales in Geneva (1) and the University of Louvain (1); nine in Anglophone universities, among them Oxford and the London School of Economics (5) and the University of Washington (3); and two in the Free University of Berlin. Conversely, of the 34 officers who obtained their last university degree abroad, 29 have a degree from a Canadian university, in particular the University of Montreal (13), Laval (7), McGill (4) and Manitoba (2).

One can therefore say that 110 of the 115 French-language officers holding a university degree from an institution whose name is known, attended a Canadian university: 76 of them (69 per cent) studied in Francophone universities of Quebec, 10 others (or 9 per cent) studied at McGill, 19 or (17 per cent) in Ontario universities—13 (or 12 per cent) at the bilingual University of Ottawa—and the remainder in other universities in the east or west of the country. Taken individually, the Canadian universities most attended by French-language officers were Montreal (42), Laval (33), Ottawa (13), and McGill (10). It should also be noted that 57 of these 115 officers attended a university abroad: notably 24 in France, 16 in the United Kingdom and 10 in the United States.

Development. Diagram 25 clearly shows, on the one hand, that the proportion of French-language officers with doctorates was never again as high (36.8 per cent) as among the group of officers recruited between 1922 and 1944 and, on the other, that the relative decrease of doctorates in the subsequent groups was largely compensated for by




Diagram 25. Percentage distribution of French-speaking foreign service officers by period of recruitment and last diploma or university degree obtained (121 out of 124)

the sustained increase in master's degrees or M.A.s and *licences*. The stability in the number and proportion of the latter, in particular, can easily be explained, since the *licence*, and especially the *licence* in law, constitutes in the Francophone universities of Canada a first university degree. On the other hand, the increase in the number and percentage of *maîtrises* or M.A.s tends to indicate both a diversification in the training of officers, particularly through the appearance of the social sciences, and the actual increase in the proportion of officers having a second university degree.

It would then appear that one cannot claim *a priori* that the French-language officers of the 1922-44 or subsequent groups were insufficiently prepared as far as university training is concerned, although one may admit that the high proportion of first degrees or *licences* constitutes an element of relative weakness. But such an assertion would be easier to prove for the first group (1922-44) than in the case of the one immediately following it. In fact, three of the seven doctorates and the two master's degrees of the period 1922-44 came from abroad (Paris, London School of Economics, and Oxford), whereas in the period 1945-50 the three doctorates, eight *licences*, and three of the seven M.A.s came from Canadian universities. This automatically leads one to reflect on the unfortunate consequences of this tendency on the part of Francophone representation in the Department, especially when one recalls the low recruitment of Francophones during the period 1945-50. As for 1951-7 and 1958-64, it may be interesting to point out that during the first period, seven of the eight doctorates but only two of the 10 M.A.s came from abroad; whereas during the second the proportions were only two of the six doctorates and six of the 12 M.A.s. By contrast, it should be noted that for all periods first degrees were mainly obtained at Canadian universities, although less so for the group of 1922-44.

In regard to the universities which granted these degrees, one notes two tendencies over the years: on the one hand, in the case of Canadian degrees, a movement in the direction of the totally or partially Anglophone universities (McGill, Toronto, Carleton, Ottawa);

and on the other hand, in the direction of foreign universities other than the London School of Economics and Oxford, particularly American universities. This broadening of the base of university training for the French-language officers, both in this country and abroad, is confirmed by the over-all picture with regard to universities, whether Canadian or foreign, and whether it is a question of the last university degree or of a mere study visit.

From all the previous considerations, the following conclusions or assumptions may be drawn:

1. The breakdown of officers according to their last university degree expresses to a large extent essential differences between the systems that are basic to the education of officers of the two principal linguistic groups.
2. There is a fairly close balance in the proportion of officers of the two groups who obtained their last university degree abroad.
3. The foreign universities attended by English-speaking officers, or at which they took their last degrees, were largely in the United Kingdom or the United States and, secondarily, in the case of Francophone countries, in France and Switzerland.
4. The foreign universities which French-speaking officers attended or at which they took last degrees were divided between those in France and the Francophone countries of Europe, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and the United States, on the other.
5. The English-speaking officers who attended or took their last degrees at Canadian universities attended English-language universities across the country.
6. French-speaking officers generally attended or took a degree in Canada at Franco-phone universities although 25 per cent attended English-speaking or bilingual universities.
7. The effect of the increasing use of the competitive examination as the principal method of recruiting during the postwar period has been to increase noticeably the proportion of officers having only a first university degree, namely the B.A. on the English side and the *licence* on the French.
8. The increased recruitment after the war of French-speaking officers who had attended Anglophone or bilingual universities resulted in an increase of Francophone officers with an M.A., and a much more diversified university training than in the past.

D. Bilingual and Bicultural Aspects of Recruitment

Having answered the three fundamental questions of this chapter on recruitment—how, at what level, and who—the moment appears opportune to return to the general hypothesis of this study, and more particularly to its first part, where the statement is made that “The Department of External Affairs is an organization with a bilingual and basically bicultural character, as evidenced by the composition of its personnel (especially by its diplomatic personnel). . . .”

We believe that we have established, in analyzing our data—particularly data on the socio-economic characteristics of foreign service officers (age on entry, place of birth,

marital status, professional origin)—that there are in varying degrees marked differences between the French-speaking and English-speaking elements in the Department, when each is considered as a group. It is perhaps under the heading of religion that the line of demarcation may have been most evident to the reader. We also believe that, while taking into account variations over the years, we have established the fact that the Department itself (and by extension the Public Service Commission) has tended to treat these two groups somewhat differently with regard, for instance, to the method of recruitment and consequently to the level of recruitment. But that is certainly not enough to lead to the conviction that the Department of External Affairs is a “basically bicultural” organization. It may be that such a character can be established by school or university training. But we have noted that as far as university training is concerned, the tendency is not towards cultural “purity” in the education of officers, whether French or English, but rather towards launching Francophones into the Anglo-American cultural universe, on the one hand, and maintaining the cultural status quo of Anglophones, on the other. However, “basically bicultural” the Department of External Affairs may be, this current trend is at best a phenomenon which is in process of losing its force and which will eventually peter out.

It remains true, however, that the corps of foreign service officers, as shown by the actual composition of diplomatic personnel, has always been composed of elements of the two principal linguistic groups, thanks to the conditions of recruitment laid down by External Affairs. In fact, that argument, at least at this point in our study, is the only one which can be cited to support the first part of our general hypothesis. It in no way eliminates, of course, the permanent under-representation of French-speaking officers in the corps of foreign service officers—a fact which constitutes what one might call *the problem*, or one of the major problems, of the Department.

E. Views and Solutions

It appeared to us of interest to try to ascertain, through interviews, what views the officers themselves might have on the problem of recruitment by the Department (both in general terms and from the particular angle of recruitment of French-speaking officers), and on possible solutions.

1. Personal views

To the great majority of the officers in our sample group,* the competitive examination seemed to be the most reliable and the fairest method of recruitment. On Francophone representation in the Department, the French-speaking officers were reluctant to admit, in as much as they were personally involved, that at the time of their recruitment, the Department might have ensured a certain quota to French-language personnel or a certain proportional representation. This reaction was also prevalent, at

*See 37-9.

least among the youngest officers, at the mere thought that the Department, with the object of ensuring this kind of balanced distribution between the two principal linguistic groups, might have applied to Francophones different criteria from those applied to Anglophones. Among the older or senior officers interviewed, two tended to think that the Department might have used different standards: the first mentioned "the presumably different scholastic or university training of the candidates," the second "the very nature of the majority of examinations," which were felt better attuned to the "Anglo-Saxon" mentality. A third officer felt that the Department did not have to concern itself with the application of different norms to Francophones, considering "the effectiveness of the departmental mechanism for the integration of officers" which, according to him, comes into play as soon as an officer is recruited. Finally, another officer was of the opinion that the Department both applies and does not apply different criteria to French-language candidates because, in practice, "it is the French Canadian members of the panels who choose the French-language officers, since their English-speaking colleagues are incapable of assessing the qualities or personalities of the French Canadians." All the French-speaking personnel interviewed readily acknowledged that for some years the Department has been deliberately making serious efforts to balance the groups of officers recruited, so that the two principal linguistic groups in Canada might be better represented proportionally. Two of them thought that it would be fairer to speak here of "interest," rather than of concern for ensuring a minimum French Canadian quota, and they added that this interest stemmed exclusively from the requirements of the present political situation.

On the other hand, of the 24 English-speaking officers interviewed, 20 (or 83 per cent) were of the opinion that in the year in which they were recruited, the Department "was consciously trying to obtain a certain quota of French Canadians." Thirteen of them believed that "slightly different standards had been used" in the case of their Francophone colleagues. At the same time, the other four officers (or 17 per cent) considered that at the time of their recruitment the Department did not deliberately seek to ensure a certain French Canadian quota and that the criteria of selection then applied were the same for officers of the two groups. In 1965, however, in answer to a question bearing on "recruitment now," 23 of the 24 thought that the Department "was consciously trying to obtain a proportional number of French Canadians in its annual recruitment," and the twenty-fourth replied that he was not sure. Of these 24 officers, half believed it possible that "slightly different standards," or more exactly "slight differences in the same standards," were being employed, but not generally for all French-speaking candidates. Eight judged that the criteria were the same and four were not too sure. To the question, "Is proportional representation a legitimate goal [in the recruitment of officers]?" asked of 20 of the 24 Anglophone officers, 16 (or 80 per cent) replied yes, or favoured the general principle. But the question remained as to what needed to be done in practice to translate this principle into reality.

2. Possible Solutions

Several French-speaking officers expressed the following point of view: so long as the current political crisis in Canada has not been resolved, whatever the efforts undertaken

by the Department and whatever the criteria used, it would never succeed in recruiting a sufficient number of Francophone officers. Among those more aware of the "problem" of recruiting French-speaking officers, several showed flexibility concerning the rule establishing the competitive examination as the only fair means of access to the Department. Candidates not interested in entering by way of an examination, notably professors, should be recruited individually, according to one. There would be room, according to another, for a few specialists recruited from outside, although such recruits would have to become familiar with the methods of the Department. A third said he had no objection to bringing new blood into the Department from outside at the level of head of mission. Another declared himself favourable to recruiting French Canadians at the higher levels to the extent that this recruitment corresponded with real needs and provided that the recruits were of good quality. But one of those interviewed demanded that the French-speaking officers already in the Department be first treated fairly by the Department, before some other French Canadians were recruited from outside.

On the other hand, 17 of the 24 English-speaking officers of the sample group declared themselves against a special campaign aimed at recruiting only French Canadians at intermediate levels. Among these 17 officers, eight were opposed in principle to all recruitment at the higher level; seven considered that all recruitment at such a level should be limited to specialists; two appeared to have no objection to the recruitment of non-specialists at the upper level. Almost all 17, however, were worried by the career blockage and the demoralization which, according to them, would result from the recruitment of "all rounders" at higher levels. The officers of the highest ranks, those of grades 6 and 7, based their opposition on efficiency. Of these 17 officers, four were opposed to a "special appeal on ethnic grounds," while four or five others expressed the fear that such a campaign, by blocking the careers of other officers, would provoke animosity towards the Francophone group. The majority of the 17 said they would have no objection to a special campaign to recruit French Canadians at the levels of grades 1 and 2, that is, at the bottom of the scale. This method was in their opinion the only satisfactory way of attaining a more balanced representation of the main linguistic groups.

Of the 24 English-speaking officers, seven (30 per cent) declared themselves favourable, or at least not opposed, to a special campaign to recruit only French-speaking officers to the intermediary levels. These seven officers, however, believed that this campaign, if it took place, should be "on a relatively small scale" and that, even so, there was a risk that it would provoke "career blockages and thereby harm morale." The majority were of the opinion that the solution to the problem still consisted in encouraging a greater number of worthwhile French Canadians to apply for entry into the Department by way of the annual examination.

Training constitutes the first step in the professional life of officers in the Department, at least of those recruited by examination. This step immediately follows recruiting. Whereas the responsibility for recruiting is shared by the Department of External Affairs and the Public Service Commission, the general direction and form that training takes depend on the Department alone.

In the broad sense of the term, training includes the whole range of professional instruction received by the officers. It therefore includes the lectures, visits, and courses offered by the Department as well as assignments to specific jobs. For the purposes of this study, however, we shall defer the analysis of assignments (or appointments) to the chapter dealing with postings. We shall devote the major part of our observations here to the formal training which officers receive when they join the Department. But since the Department's policy has always been formulated *a posteriori* (that is, it proceeds from the facts and from actual practice), we shall not distinguish, as we did for recruitment, between aims or policy and policy results but shall rather contrast the Department's training policy with the officers' views on such a policy.

A. Training Policy

In its essential lines the training policy of the Department of External Affairs dates back to 1948. Only minor points have been called into question since that time.¹ This policy aims at enabling the new foreign service officers to acquire "practical experience and training in the various duties performed by officers"² of the Department. It comes through "actual desk work on the day-to-day problems confronting the Department of External Affairs,"³ and following the French precept that "*c'est en forgeant qu'on devient forgeron*,"⁴ it takes the form of on-the-job training.⁵

1. General training

In principle, general training extends to the end of the first posting abroad. The initial phase (which varied in length from 24 to 12 months between 1948 and 1965)⁶ always consists of a period in the central administration during which the Department arranges for each person to work successively (from 3 to 6 months) in a geographical, functional, and administrative division.⁷ At the end of the training period a series of lectures is given by senior officials of the Department or of other departments—a series which “reminds the junior officer of his university days which accounts for the familiar expression ‘University of the East Block’ to describe this aspect of his training.”⁸ (The headquarters of the Department are in the East Block on Parliament Hill in Ottawa.)

Originally (in 1948) the curriculum of the “University of the East Block” included only “a series of lectures given by senior officers on the formulation of policy and the main Departmental responsibilities.”⁹ Over the years it has come to include as circumstances require, either “talks . . . on the work of the other governmental departments and agencies with interests abroad,” or “talks by officers of the Department who have recently served abroad as a Third Secretary,” or else meetings with heads of posts who have served abroad or who “have specialized knowledge of particular nations or areas of the world.”¹⁰ In 1958, the Department added to this programme certain extra-curricular activities, such as brief excursions or visits to the International Service of the CBC, the National Film Board, and the Chalk River plant of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. For some years the Department has given a certain number of its recruits the opportunity to visit the United Nations General Assembly in New York and observe on the spot the permanent Canadian delegation at work. Nevertheless, the essential concern of this first part of the training programme continues to be “to initiate young diplomats, before their posting, in the practice of diplomacy, more particularly Canadian diplomacy,”¹¹ by enabling them to acquire “a general knowledge of the routine of the Department before they settle down into any particular field.”¹² As the under-secretary of state for External Affairs himself put it in 1958, “It is an *ad hoc* way to look at the problem of training.”¹³

In theory, the first posting abroad gives the Department an opportunity to further the professional training of its officers.¹⁴ In practice, however, this period only prolongs their apprenticeship in the diplomat’s profession, by enlarging their experience socially and vocationally.¹⁵

2. Linguistic training

During the period we are examining, knowledge of the two official languages of Canada was never made a prerequisite by the Civil Service Commission for recruits to External Affairs. We must therefore ask ourselves whether the Department itself in its training programme has sought to make good, where necessary, the linguistic deficiencies of its diplomatic personnel.

Until about 1957, the matter was scarcely considered in any general way, except in terms of “encouragement”¹⁶ and simple “wishes.”¹⁷ Although English had always been in practice the working language of the Department, a departmental spokesman could

state that "the officers we post to countries where French is a working language, have a good working knowledge of it when they arrive."¹⁸ It was moreover readily acknowledged that "for the time being the individual must himself undertake the improvement of his French or English."¹⁹ However, in the opinion of some, the very fact that every foreign service officer was considered bilingual in principle, or at least prepared to become so voluntarily, may have hindered the implementation of a real programme of linguistic training.²⁰

Beginning in 1958 the Department undertook to promote French instruction on a limited scale for those of its Anglophone officers who wished to become bilingual; weekly courses each lasting two hours were offered at the "elementary" and "advanced" levels. These courses have never been obligatory.²¹ Their essential aim was "to provide those attending with sufficient experience in conversational French to use it socially and to transact simple official business at posts abroad."²² While scarcely going beyond similar aims expressed on the same subject in 1948,²³ the courses made it possible for the Department to assert in 1960 that "these have had considerable success."²⁴ As far as French-speaking officers were concerned, it was presumed that they knew English sufficiently well at the time of their recruitment.²⁵

In 1963, within the framework of its "revised and broadened" training programme introduced towards the end of 1962, the Department first offered "certain foreign service officers [obviously unilingual Anglophone officers] advanced training in the French language . . . at Laval University."²⁶ Since 1964, and especially since 1965, the Department has provided within certain limits²⁷ a linguistic training programme which for the first time was addressed to its French-speaking as well as its English-speaking officers. The obligatory part of this programme, introduced at the beginning of 1966, included an initial three-month period of elementary but intensive courses, in either French or English, for recruits whose knowledge of the other language was virtually non-existent. The optional part of such a programme included a series of courses of indeterminate length and in principle lasting for one or two hours a day, intended for those who appeared to need them after six months of regular work in the central administration. This programme apparently formed part of a plan for the progressive bilingualization of the federal government departments.

3. Regional specialization

Since about 1954 the Department has offered some 15 of its officers, most of them already bilingual, the opportunity to study full time, with a view to acquiring a regional specialization—one of four so-called "difficult" foreign languages, namely, Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, or Russian. These studies whose average duration extended from one year (for Russian) to three years (for Chinese), undoubtedly represent for these officers an advanced and privileged form of training. During the first 10 years of this programme, the Department assigned a more or less equal number of French- and English-language officers to the study of Arabic, Chinese, and Japanese. Those officers assigned to the study of Russian were more or less in proportion to their numerical importance in the Department—English-language officers (6); French-language officers (2).

4. Mid-career training

Finally, since 1949 the Department has provided for its officers certain postings which constitute, what one might call, mid-career training. The majority of these courses, lasting on the average one year, took place in defence colleges, such as the National Defence College at Kingston,²⁸ the NATO Defence College, the Imperial Defence College in London²⁹ or, since 1964, the École nationale d'administration in Paris.

The first three assignments to the École nationale d'administration were granted to two English-language officers in 1964 and 1965, and to one French-language officer in 1965. The only two assignments to the NATO Defence College were offered to one French- and one English-speaking officer. At the National Defence College in Kingston, the proportion of French-speaking officers posted was 27 per cent, a level higher than the average proportion of Francophone officers in the Department. On the other hand, all the officers sent to the Imperial Defence College except one, that is nine altogether, were English-speaking officers.

B. Bilingual and Bicultural Aspects of Training

It is appropriate for us to return here briefly to the general hypothesis of this study and more particularly to the part which reads as follows: "The Department of External Affairs is an organization with a bilingual and basically bicultural character, as evidenced by . . . the administration of [its] personnel, and by the criteria that ensure to all those who form part of it equal opportunities for participation. . . ." The question for us is whether the Department's training policy, in the sense that "training" is understood in this chapter, did take into account the fact that the corps of foreign service officers has always been composed of elements belonging to the two principal linguistic groups in Canada.

We are compelled to acknowledge at once that the spirit presiding over the general training programme of young officers in the Department—the so-called on-the-job training—provides little fertile ground for developing a "bilingual and basically bicultural character" in the corps of foreign service officers. What is also certain is that the Department has no official policy whereby its French-language officers may start by learning as they work³⁰ in sectors of the central administration where the conditions of work (personnel, nature of the work, language used) are the least removed from their basic characteristics and their school and university training.³¹ It must further be noted that the lectures of the "University of the East Block" were throughout the period under review given almost exclusively in English.

The interest shown by the Department since 1949 in extending a knowledge of the two official languages among its officers might be considered in principle as an indication that it is conscious of its "bilingual and basically bicultural character." But when one looks at the situation more closely, one quickly realizes that this concern is more a linguistic than a cultural one. In fact, even on the linguistic level, the programme offered at the federal school of languages in Hull, particularly as far as the written language is concerned, leaves much to be desired.

As for the special training programme, it appears clear that the Department officially intended to take into account the bilingualism of officers assigned to the study of foreign languages. But considering the chronic lack of objective criteria for measuring the degree of bilingualism of its officers, it is not impossible that in practice the Department has paid little attention to its plan of assigning only officers already bilingual to special training leading to a regional specialization. It is also evident that the Department has taken into account its "bilingual and basically bicultural character" in its postings to the various defence colleges, although it has done so in a markedly different way according to the institution. Thus, at the lower level, that of the National Defence College at Kingston, the proportion of Francophones has been about 27 per cent, but at the higher level, that of the Imperial Defence College, 8 of the 9 officers who attended it, or 89 per cent, were English-speaking.³²

It will perhaps be agreed that it is difficult for us, if not impossible under the circumstances, not to question the assertion of the Department that its administration of personnel reflects its "bilingual and basically bicultural character." This does not necessarily mean that the views of the officers in training themselves agree exactly with our conclusion. In fact, it may well be that what we hear from the officers may somewhat modify this conclusion, which is still tentative at this stage in our study.

C. Views on Training and Improvement

The views of the officers of our sample group on training and improvement in the Department may be classed under the following heads: 1) the nature of the programme, 2) its meaning, and 3) the future evolution of the various existing programmes.

1. Nature of the training programme

All the officers of the sample group recognized immediately that training in the Department derives from the philosophy of on-the-job training. The principal idea, one French-language officer maintained, was "to throw you right in, initiate you into the job, and mould you gradually."³³ Several French-speaking officers, however, questioned the very existence of a real training programme. "There is no real training by supervisors," declared several English-speaking officers. A proof to the contrary may be taken from the fact that a certain division of the central administration has found itself obliged to resort to a system of unofficial training, whereby each recruit is placed under the supervision of a junior officer, grade 3. This *ad hoc* system functions, as one of those interviewed admitted, to the extent that the supervisor appointed "is a good teacher and is not overloaded with work."

The officers of senior rank in our group freely admitted that recruits today received more attention than in the past, which naturally resulted in their exercising less responsibility at the beginning. Training was certainly more "systematic," it was thought, in the sense that officers in training were less often moved from one division to another, and that the series of lectures at the East Block university was both longer and more varied. But it was seriously doubted whether this training was in any way better, since

certain of the lectures were considered to be "*causeries dont le bénéfice à tirer est assez mince,*" and at worst "*une perte de temps.*"

All officers of the group were aware that the present training programme of the Department included language courses. The English-language members considered that this positive element was a contrast with the beginning. In 1949 French was taught by a volunteer, "after hours," on a "hit and miss" basis; in 1957-8, classes were held at inconvenient hours of the day, and therefore were somewhat casual. The French-language officers tended for the most part to note without wild enthusiasm the existence of the present French course, which they judged generally to be somewhat too superficial.

2. Meaning of training and improvement

In more or less identical terms, all the officers recognized that the general training programme helped to familiarize the personnel with the administrative machinery of the Department in particular, and of the governmental set-up in general. Where opinions differed, however, was on whether this programme had the same value or significance for French-language as for English-language officers.

Because of the limited scope of the training programme itself, the great majority of English-speaking officers thought that Francophone officers got the same benefit as they did from training in the Department. Four out of 24 were even of the opinion that the lectures of the East Block university on public administration could not help but be more profitable to French-language officers whose school and university training, according to them, was generally more theoretical than their own.

For their part, the French-language officers of the group showed less unanimity in evaluating the merit or significance of the Department's general training programme. While declaring that on-the-job training was the best training that the Department could give, one added that this was the approach which nevertheless better allowed the English-speaking officers to acquire rapidly the habits of work "*qui sont conformes à leur formation.*" Another French-speaking officer asserted that the lectures of the East Block university were of more advantage to French Canadians in that they helped them to understand federal administrative institutions. A third Francophone officer thought that these lectures were probably more profitable to English Canadian officers, because of the previous knowledge of federal institutions that the latter usually possessed and because the lectures were given in English. Several French-speaking officers realized that the language courses were of more advantage, at least indirectly, to Anglophones than to Francophones. (A French-language officer in service abroad, who was not part of our sample group, wrote to us to say that these courses "will make it possible on occasion to justify the delaying of a promotion which might (indeed ought to) have been given to a French-speaking officer.")³⁴

Among the officers of our group, eight received additional training from the Department, or were offered what might be called the opportunity to improve their position. Of the eight, four were French-speaking and four English-speaking. Of the former, three acquired specialization in schools of foreign languages and the fourth spent a period at the National Defence College in Kingston. Of the English-speaking, one studied

a foreign language part time while serving, one attended a famous European university, and the two others did a tour of duty at the National Defence College and the Imperial Defence College respectively.

Almost all the officers of our group said that they would willingly accept such academic training from the Department. Few conceded however that the programmes studied at the defence colleges had an intrinsic value. According to one, attendance at one or other of the defence colleges had a "*légèrement négatif*" effect on an officer's career, by keeping him remote or completely absent from the central administration. The majority of those interviewed, moreover, clearly tended to deprecate the courses at the National Defence College. Among the Anglophones, four thought that a period spent at the NDC was a bad omen for an officer because, according to one of them, the Department had not yet made up its mind as to what the NDC had to offer. A French-speaking officer, stating an extreme view, called the NDC "*une école d'anglicisation*." You had the impression, a third said, that the Department conceived of its courses at the NDC as "*une politique de cure ou de vacances*." But another Francophone said that he would perhaps agree to go there for a year, "*pour lire*."

The Imperial Defence College had a better rating among the majority of officers. Making allowance for the fact that officers appointed to the IDC were usually older and consequently of a higher rank than those attached to the National Defence College, we note that several, including at least six English-speaking officers of our group, considered a stay at the Imperial Defence College as a "favourable sign" or mark of preference.

3. Future development of training

Should the Department enlarge or develop its training programme? On this question more English- than French-language officers had views to express. In fact at least five Anglophone officers advocated "substantive training," that is, a form of university training designed for all recruits. One considered it illusory to suppose that young people recruited by the Department possessed all the knowledge required in areas as specialized as economics or defence. Another maintained that training should involve specific preparation aimed at further enlightening officers on the problems of countries in process of development. Two officers were of the opinion that a foreign service institute for training purposes should be set up in Canada. On the other hand, five other Anglophone officers declared themselves categorically opposed to any kind of "academic" programme, deeming that it was not up to the government or the Department to provide for the university training of officers.

Paradoxical though it may appear, the French-language officers gave the impression of having reflected less than their Anglophone colleagues on the general organization of the Department's training programme. Only one of them, for example, put forward the following point of view: he did not see why the Department should provide more advanced training, seeing that "*ce n'est pas le rôle du ministère de se transformer en école*." A Francophone, coming from outside Quebec, maintained that the contingencies of work in the Department rendered any attempt at systematized training impossible. Several Francophone officers, however, did not seem to be opposed to the idea of a national

school of administration. Another, considering that training should not be "part time," suggested that the Department require recruits to attend for one year a "school of diplomacy," where they would be offered courses in contemporary history, international law, certain area studies, and languages.

All or almost all the officers interviewed had some suggestion to make for improving the present training programme. At least nine of these officers, eight of them on the English side, thought that it should include a trip across Canada, in order to study and get to know the country. Seven English-speaking, but no French-speaking officers, proposed a didactic type of training to initiate officers into the working methods and administrative procedures of the Department. Five others favoured a regime of increased supervision of the work of officers in training. One French-speaking officer demanded more responsibilities for young personnel. At least one French- and one English-language officer suggested that officers be given the opportunity to work—as the former said, in "*des directions intéressantes*," and as the latter put it, in "action divisions." Another Francophone thought that longer stays in the various divisions of the Department and periods spent in other federal departments, particularly Manpower and Immigration, Finance, and Trade and Commerce, would add greater depth to the training programme.

What use does the Department make of its officers? Once recruited, where do they go within the departmental organization? To what sectors are they posted? To what posts abroad or to what countries are they appointed or transferred? The term "postings" as used in this chapter refers essentially to the precise tasks to which the Department assigns its officers. A posting is a method of training and in fact is the second part of the training programme in its broadest sense, that is, improvement. It is also an instrument of advancement and represents in a sense the first promotion. Although training and advancement are linked to postings, we propose to treat the whole subject of postings here in an entirely distinct way.

For this third theme of our study, we shall proceed as in Chapter II: we shall compare the policy or aims of the Department with the policy results. We believe it will be useful, as a preliminary, in order to clarify the operation of the Department, first to set forth briefly how the various responsibilities relating to postings are allotted among the personnel and, secondly, to identify, within the group of officers, the only truly professional ones, those known as "career officers."

A. Distribution of Responsibilities

The administration of personnel, as well as all other aspects of the administration of the Department, is the responsibility of the under-secretary who theoretically holds all power under the secretary of state for External Affairs. It is he who superintends the nominations of the senior diplomatic personnel. It is he who chooses all his immediate colleagues, particularly the assistant under-secretaries, and who confirms or suggests the replacement of heads of divisions in the central administration. It is the under-secretary who ratifies all promotions of officers and who often determines who will be promoted among the senior personnel of the Department.

The personality of the under-secretary obviously counts for a great deal in the exercise of his responsibilities. Some of those appointed to the office intervene more in one or other aspect of postings. Others will insist on exercising, as of "divine right," all authority in a particular aspect of the "use" made of the officers by the Department. Others will prefer to trust the judgement of their advisers or will rely on *ad hoc* administrative structures. It may be predicted, however, that the more the Department and the corps of foreign service officers grow and the more complex the whole administrative structure becomes, the more the under-secretary will have to rely on those of his own advisers who enjoy his confidence.

The under-secretary has in fact always had an adviser, at least officially, in the sector of personnel administration. Until the creation of the Personnel Division in 1947, this assistant was director of administrative services (chief administrative officer) in the Department. But since then it has usually been the assistant under-secretary who has carried out this function. Some acknowledge however that since 1947-8, the assistant under-secretary, on whom the Personnel Division depends and who has often been at the same time responsible for the other administrative divisions of the Department, has been in fact the key person in the Department as far as personnel administration is concerned. The under-secretary being perforce absorbed by questions of high policy, the assistant under-secretary (personnel) has much more latitude than appears at first sight. To begin with, he has at his disposal an immense quantity of information on departmental officers and, as he enjoys the full confidence of the under-secretary, it is he who is the best placed for taking the initiative in the vast field of personnel administration.¹

The assistant under-secretary (personnel) is assisted in his functions by the head of personnel, and by the Personnel Division, whose work consists in part of making "periodic recommendations for the assignment of middle-rank and junior officers."² In the 1950's these recommendations were submitted to the Posting Committee, which later became the Personnel Planning Board, both of which included the under-secretary, the assistant under-secretary (personnel), and the head of personnel.³ These bodies later came under the authority of the head of the Personnel Division (postings).⁴ The preparation of recommendations for postings at a junior level devolved upon the assistant to the head of the Personnel Division (postings), or the "number 2" in personnel, also known as "posting officer." The truth of the matter is, however, that the formal authority of the head of personnel has been limited to the lower level of the middle-ranking officers, and consequently, for all questions of some importance relating to the posting of officers, it is the under-secretary himself, and more and more often the assistant under-secretary (personnel), who have been able to exert influence or who have actually held power in the Department.

Therefore before examining policies and policy results, and in order to make possible an appraisal of the Department's conduct in relation to the posting of officers, it may be useful to know how far the two principal linguistic groups have participated both in the tandems (under-secretary and assistant under-secretary) and in the triumvirates (under-secretary, assistant under-secretary, and head of the Personnel Division) who exercised power on matters of personnel in the Department between 1945 and 1965, or who were in a position to do so.

B. Sharing Power by Linguistic Groups

In raising for the first time the theme of "power," we shall adhere strictly to the objective method consisting of identifying the persons who occupy the official positions having control over personnel. These positions are the under-secretary and especially the assistant under-secretary (personnel) at the higher and middle levels, and the head of the Personnel Division at the middle and lower levels.

With the exception of a brief period of three and a half months during which the first French-speaking under-secretary of the Department, Jules Léger, himself contributed to settling a great number of personnel problems that had accumulated during an interim of nine months, only English-speaking officers occupied the key post of assistant under-secretary (personnel) from January 1, 1945 to July 6, 1962.⁵ At the level of head of the Personnel Division, only one French-speaking officer, Marcel Cadieux, filled this post (for 27 months) up to July 1964. During the following periods: 1) from January 1, 1945 to January 1, 1949; 2) from September 21, 1951 to August 16, 1954; and 3) from October 20, 1958 to July 6, 1962—that is, altogether for nearly 11 years out of 20—none of the three departmental positions controlling personnel was occupied by a French-speaking officer. If, in addition, one considers the tandems rather than the triumvirates, one becomes aware that 1) from January 1, 1945 to January 1, 1949; 2) from September 21, 1951 to August 20, 1954; and 3) from December 3, 1954 to July 6, 1962—that is for nearly 15 years out of 20—no French-speaking officer occupied either of the two senior posts. It is also noteworthy that in 20 years only three Francophones (notably Marcel Cadieux) occupied positions of control and influence in the placing of personnel. Yet it should be noted that according to an informal rule the assistant to the head of personnel, or the "number 2" in the Personnel Division, usually an officer of middle rank, was a French-speaking officer whenever the head of personnel was English-speaking and vice versa; this occurred at first irregularly, then almost automatically from 1956-7. This suggests that it has always been unofficially the responsibility of one of these French-speaking officers (at their respective levels) to look after the reasonable placement of the officers of their own linguistic group,⁶ taking into account the general policy of the Department and the fact that all officers are not necessarily career officers.

C. Definition of the Career Officer

It would be logical to think that every officer making a career in the Department is a career officer or, in other words, that every foreign service officer is a career officer. Even so one would have to agree beforehand on the meaning of the term "career." Can one compare the career of an officer recruited by examination—a career extending over some 30 years and marked by numerous assignments and promotions—with that of an officer recruited by order-in-council, whose experience is limited to one or two posts abroad and who remains at a fairly stable level through all his years of service; or, for that matter, with the career of an officer recruited by special examination or "parachuted" into the Department from outside by transfer?

Obviously, the method of recruiting an officer has a bearing on the type of career he is likely to have in the Department. When an officer is recruited by competitive examination or one of its appendages (transfer or reclassification), it follows almost automatically that this officer will be a career officer, as opposed to the officer who is recruited by order-in-council. But what essentially determines whether a foreign service officer is a career officer or not is the use that the Department makes of him. This is so evident that we shall define the career officer as one who during his years of service in the Department receives at least one posting of normal duration in the central administration.* In other words, we shall regard as career officers all those whose assignment pattern conforms to the general way in which departmental officers are posted—that is, the rotation of personnel and the alternation of assignments between central administration and abroad.⁷ This way of distinguishing between career and non-career officers is so important, in our view, that it determines the possibilities open to both categories of officers of occupying a top position in the Department and consequently of exerting some influence on the general policy regarding postings.⁸

D. Aims of the Posting Policy

The use that the Department makes of its officers is determined among other things by the postulate that "what the Department needs above all is good general political officers,"⁹ and it emanates from the general law, which is to "meet the requirements of the service."¹⁰ Only for career officers, as indicated above, is this use subordinate to the principle of rotation of personnel.

1. Career officers

Starting from these general determining factors, the Department attempts to arrive at the "best possible correlation between needs and resources."¹¹ In contrast to what one might imagine, however, "there are no fixed slots for French- or English-speaking officers."¹² This seems to be the deliberate policy of the Department—"to emphasize the bilingual and bicultural character of the country."¹³

From this point of view "if it is desired that French Canadian officers enter fully into the varied work of the Department, their experience must be diversified so that at all levels and in all fields they are prepared to make their proper contribution."¹⁴

Starting with this as a general background, the Department at the same time regards the general qualifications of officers as "a principle which guides the Department in assigning officers"¹⁵ and "a factor determining posting proposals."¹⁶ Other factors are special qualifications,¹⁷ rank,¹⁸ and to a certain extent "posting preferences,"¹⁹ as well as the family situation of the officers, if need be.²⁰ In assigning and transferring officers, the Department also bears in mind considerations such as previous postings,²¹ the predetermined length of postings abroad and, if necessary, the "re-Canadianizing" of

*See 103-5.

those who have been away from the central administration for some time.²² However, on account of the general and permanent departmental shortage of foreign service officers, "there is simply no way that the Department in its present circumstances can guarantee that a man will go to the job for which he was trained."²³

2. *Non-career officers*

All foreign service officers who are not career officers are recruited by order-in-council. Their assignment or the use that is made of them is determined either directly by the prime minister or by the cabinet, usually on the recommendation of the secretary of state for External Affairs, or indirectly as a result of proposals made to the secretary of state by senior officials of the Department or by the under-secretary himself.

To some extent non-career officers do not fit into the systematic organization of the Department's resources; nor does any policy, in the strict sense of the word, apply to them. But since all or nearly all of these officers are at the head of mission level, it is perhaps in respect to them that the Department might have an unofficial placement policy, taking into account the "bilingual and basically bicultural character" of the corps of foreign service officers. There has always been, both within²⁴ and without²⁵ the Department, a veiled resistance to giving Canadian representation abroad an appearance other than that of an integrated "biculturality." This resistance, as old as it is tenacious, transcends the linguistic affiliation of the officers who since 1945 have occupied one of the three posts in the Department commanding influence over the placement of personnel.²⁶ But it is even more important to know how such principles or conditions of use have been translated into reality.

E. *Results of the Posting Policy*

We shall examine the policy results on two planes: 1) assignments to the central administration, and 2) postings abroad. We should like to remind the reader, however, that this analysis concerns only those officers who, on December 31, 1964, had completed five years of service in the Department. In fact, such a period of service appeared to us to constitute a minimum from the career point of view. The application of this limitation to the 570 officers who made up the corps of foreign service officers from 1945 to 1965 eliminates no less than 208 individuals, thus giving us a new basis of mathematical reference: 362, of whom 276 (76.3 per cent) are English-speaking and 86 (23.7 per cent) French-speaking.

1. *Assignments in central administration*

For reasons that will appear clearer in section F (p. 109) of this chapter we have grouped, for purposes of analysis, all the divisions of the central administration into the following six categories:

<i>Categories</i>	<i>Divisions</i>
Political divisions—class A	European Far Eastern
Political divisions—class B	African and Middle Eastern Commonwealth Latin American U.S.A. (Former names of divisions: First Political, Second Political, Third Political, American and Far Eastern, European and Common- wealth)
Functional divisions—class A	Economic Defence Liaison (1) United Nations
Functional divisions—class B	Press and Liaison Protocol Consular Disarmament Defence Liaison (2) Historical Information Legal Passport (formerly included in Diplomatic and Consular divisions)
Administrative divisions—class A	Personnel
Administrative divisions—class B	Administrative Other administrative divisions

The 362 individuals who make up the group we are studying received 1,478 postings, or in other words were posted a total of 1,478 times in the divisions of the central administration—an average of 4.1 postings per officer. Of these 1,478 postings, 1,158 concerned English-speaking officers (276), for an average of 4.2 per individual, and 320 concerned French-speaking officers (86), for an average of 3.7 per individual. It is therefore obvious that English-language officers were more often transferred, or returned on the average slightly more often to posts in the central administration.

As for the breakdown by linguistic group of these assignments in the central administration, Diagram 26 clearly shows variations in the following categories: functional divisions classes A and B, and administrative divisions class B. It should be noted, however, that as one approaches the present period, postings to the administrative divisions, except perhaps to the Personnel Division, have been less and less frequent. It is also important to point out first, that postings of Anglophones to the functional divisions of class A, presumably in the economic and defence sectors, were proportionally higher than those of Francophones; and second, that postings of Francophones were




Diagram 26. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by linguistic group and postings in central administration

proportionally higher than those of Anglophones in the functional divisions of class B, presumably in the information, legal, and consular sectors.

2. Postings abroad

In the same way as we grouped the postings of officers within the central administration into a number of categories, we have arranged posts abroad into the following blocs or groups: Western Europe, embassy in Paris, United States consulates, embassy in Washington, Commonwealth countries excluding London, high commissioner's office in London, United Nations, NATO, other international organizations, Communist bloc, Latin America, Middle East, Scandinavia, and Africa.

The 362 individuals who make up the group we are studying received 1,233 postings, that is, were assigned a total of 1,233 times to posts abroad—an average of 3.4 postings per officer. Of these postings, 928 concerned the 276 English-speaking officers, for an average of 3.4 per individual, and 305 concerned the 86 French-speaking officers, for an average of 3.5 per individual. We deduce from this that French-speaking officers were more often transferred or were appointed on the average a little more often to posts abroad than were English-speaking officers.

As for the breakdown by linguistic group of these postings abroad, Diagram 27 shows that French-speaking officers were more often assigned to Latin America and Western Europe; and English-speaking officers more often to Commonwealth countries, the Communist bloc, the United Nations, and other international organizations. The former probably corresponds to the relatively proportional representation of French-language officers in the political divisions of classes A and B of the central administration. The




Diagram 27. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by linguistic group and postings abroad

latter appears to follow from the preponderance of English-speaking officers in the functional divisions of class A of the central administration. The relative numerical advantage enjoyed by Anglophones in the high commissioner's office in London has its counterpart in that enjoyed by Francophones in the embassy in Paris; and the advantage enjoyed by English-speaking officers in the embassy in Washington is in large part counterbalanced by the relatively high proportion of French-speaking officers in the Canadian consulates throughout the United States.

It would be interesting to pursue the examination of officers' postings abroad, in particular establishing the level of each. However such an undertaking would clearly go beyond the limits of this study. We propose by way of illustration to examine officers' postings to the five diplomatic missions regarded as "the great missions" or the most important Canadian posts abroad, namely Washington, London, Paris, NATO, and the UN (New York), limiting ourselves to heads and deputy heads of missions or their second in command, the latter sometimes called minister, as in Washington, London, and Paris, or counsellor, as at NATO or the United Nations.

The most important missions. Among the 362 officers comprising our group, there have been 28 appointments at the level of ambassador, high commissioner, and permanent Canadian representative in the five most important missions abroad. Twenty-two of these appointments (78.5 per cent) concerned Anglophones and six (21.5 per cent) Francophones. The English-speaking took all of six appointments in each of Washington and London.²⁷ The French-speaking held all four in Paris. In the United Nations (New York), seven out of eight were held by Anglophones, and at NATO (Paris) three were held by Anglophones and one by a Francophone.

Among these 362 officers, 102 had received appointments to the five missions at the level of deputy head or second in command. Of these appointees, 89 (87.2 per cent) were Anglophones and 13 (12.8 per cent) Francophones. In Washington, 23 were Anglophones and three Francophones; in London, 22 were Anglophones and six Francophones; in Paris, curiously enough, none of the 20 was a Francophone. At the United Nations (New York), out of a total of 15, all appointments were likewise held by English-speaking officers. Finally, at NATO (Paris) there were nine English-speaking appointees and four French.

It would be difficult not to notice that as far as the five most important missions abroad are concerned, certain posts appear to be reserved for English-speaking officers, such as those of ambassador at Washington, minister at the embassy in Paris, and counsellor at the UN; the only one for Francophones being the ambassador to France. Under such conditions one can well imagine that the projection abroad of a bicultural Canada, or of a "bilingual and basically bicultural" Department of External Affairs may at times suffer. But there would appear to be a two-fold reason for this situation. Specifically, the very importance of the functions involved more or less obliges the departmental authorities (and the cabinet) to confide the posts, with some exceptions, to officers whose competence is recognized by the Department—in fact, to those at the highest level who have a share of the power in personnel administration. More generally, there is the shortage resulting from the difficulty of recruiting Francophone career

Table 10. Distribution of appointments as heads of missions, by country or region and linguistic group*

Country or region	No. of appointments			Career officers						Non-career officers					
	T	O		T	E	F	T	O		T	E	F			
	T	A	L	A	A	L	No.	%	No.	%	A	A	L		
Europe	104	71	33	82	64	62	18	17	22	7	7	15	14		
Far East	17	17	0	10	10	59	0	0	7	7	41	0	0		
Latin America	60	29	31	40	20	33	20	33	20	9	15	11	19		
Commonwealth	46	44	2	33	33	72	0	0	13	11	24	2	4		
Africa and Middle East	37	30	7	35	28	76	7	19	2	2	5	0	0		
Indochina Commissions**	22	20	2***	22	20	91	2	9	0	0	0	0	0		
International organizations	30	25	5	27	22	73	5	17	3	3	10	0	0		
United States (Washington)	6	6	0	6	6	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Total	322	242	80	255	203		52		67	39		28			

*Excluding the consulates general, consulates, and occasional diplomatic missions directed by officers responsible to the Department of Trade and Commerce, but including acting chargés d'affaires.

**International commissions for supervision and control in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

***These two postings concern the same person, Léon Mayrand, Canadian Commissioner in Laos on two different occasions.

officers. The secretary of state for External Affairs (or the cabinet), it is true, has often sought to reduce this shortage by appointments through order-in-council or "political appointments" but this slows down the promotion of a fair number of Francophones who are already heads of missions. Moreover, such a practice has hardly made itself felt during the period under review at the level of the five most important Canadian missions abroad. Table 10 which reports the total or actual situation prevailing in the Department between October 1, 1945 and December 31, 1965, rather than the limited situation of our group of 362 officers, admirably confirms this point of view.

With regard to the number of appointments, we note that 242 of the 322 officers appointed as heads of posts (or 75.2 per cent) were Anglophones, and 80 (or 24.8 per cent) were Francophones. Three other main points are evident: 1) the total absence of French-speaking officers in the Far East and in Washington, 2) the virtual absence of French-speaking officers in the Commonwealth countries and on the three international control commissions in what was once French Indochina, and 3) the relative over-representation of French-speaking officers in Europe, and more particularly in Latin America.

As far as the appointees are concerned, Table 10 shows that 203 of the 242 Anglophones (or 84 per cent) were career officers, and 39 (or 16 per cent) non-career officers; and that 52 of the 80 Francophones (or 65 per cent) were career officers, and 28 (or 35 per cent) were non-career officers. Also remarkable is the total absence of

Francophone career officers at posts in the Commonwealth countries, which some people consider, in the traditional perspective of Canadian external policy, have a potential that few others can equal. Moreover, it would also appear that there have never been French-speaking heads of posts of any sort (whether career or non-career officers) in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Finland, South Africa, Israel, Iran, Japan, Indonesia, China (until 1949), Burma (through the intermediary of the high commissioner's office in Malaysia); nor during recent years (except in the Cameroons) in the Francophone countries of Africa (through the intermediary of the missions in the Commonwealth countries).

F. Bilingual and Bicultural Aspects of Postings

Let us return to the general hypothesis of this study, that "The Department of External Affairs is an organization with a bilingual and basically bicultural character, as evidenced by . . . the criteria that ensure to all those who form part of it equal opportunities for participation . . .".

If "it is upon the head of post that the main burden falls for fulfilling the representational role,"²⁸ we must agree, after examining the facts, that the representation of Canada in several foreign countries is clearly not bicultural, unless we concede that "it is enough if the service in general properly reflects the essential qualities and broad interests of the country," and that "there must be no exaggerated insistence . . . that the character of each mission be representative of Canada. . . ."²⁹ In fact it is only in Switzerland, partially a French-language country, that the rule of alternation between a French-language and an English-language ambassador has functioned completely up to now.

If the Department seeks "in Ottawa and abroad a balanced and integrated representation of both cultural elements,"³⁰ and if, in fact, "because of our practice of rotation, our officers form a team,"³¹ it is surprising, to say the least, that the law of numbers has not permitted a single French-language career officer to be head of a mission in the great majority of countries where Canadian interests are judged the most important. It will readily be recognized that this cannot have been without effect on the development of the career of French-language officers as far as foreign service is concerned, and on "their opportunities for participation" on an equal footing with their English-language colleagues—unless we admit at the outset that "if the Department adopts the policy of disseminating French Canadian officers throughout the service, one must foresee a number of consequences. . . ."³² In any case what is certain is that the Department practises neither the rule of proportional representation in the assignment of its officers, nor the rule of alternate representation in appointments at the rank of head of post abroad, and that, with some exceptions, particularly in the Personnel Division, it does not use its French-speaking officers as French Canadians.³³ It is not beyond possibility that these practices find an echo in the views or attitudes of officers of the two linguistic groups on the subject of their careers, or on the use that the Department makes of them.

G. Views on Postings

In this section we shall discuss the views of officers on three main points: 1) type of career or career pattern, 2) lobbying for postings, and 3) preferences in posts abroad.

1. Type of career

Among the 24 English-language officers of our sample group, seven of the eight relatively junior officers agreed that "there had been a pattern in their assignments," while eight of the 16 relatively senior officers thought that "they had had a fair amount of concentration in one field," during at least half of their career in the Department. Of the nine others, four acknowledged that "there had been some leaning at one stage of their career."

Of the 19 French-language officers of our sample group, 17 replied to our questions. Four of the nine relatively junior officers, without considering themselves specialists, recognized that they were involved in a particular circuit or in a field of specialization. The five others, in the absence of any consistency or guiding principle in their postings so far, called themselves "*généralistes*" (generalists). Several accepted at once the theory that "pure accident" lay behind their postings. Among the eight relatively senior men, two recognized the existence of a guiding principle in their various postings; two others (one of them because he had been associated with the Personnel Division) thought that either the Department had made use of them up to now as "French Canadians," or ethnic considerations had played an important part in their postings. A fifth saw a certain link in the fact of having had two successive postings in English-speaking countries. The three others, however, could see no link between their postings. It is noteworthy that the majority of those interviewed considered this state of affairs as normal and in conformity with departmental practice, although two attributed it specifically to the "absence of planning" for careers.

2. Lobbying

Of the 24 Anglophones, 13 (particularly among the relatively junior officers) acknowledged that "they lobbied on one or two occasions." Nine others said that they never lobbied for a posting.

Among the 17 French-language officers, with the exception of relatively junior officers whose postings represented a certain concentration or specialization and who spoke in terms of "*hasard contrôlé*" and of those relatively senior men who admitted that they had unofficially indicated their preferences to the Department, all the others stated that they refused to do any lobbying. Some went so far as to give the impression that they made it a point of honour to "solicit" nothing from the Department. One expressed a distinct aversion to solicitation. Another frankly judged such steps to be useless, while yet another maintained that "*l'attitude la plus sage est de se taire*." Curiously enough, seven out of 14 English-language officers to whom the question was put said that in their opinion "French Canadians lobbied more," and two others added that they thought this was the general feeling among English-speaking officers.

3. Preferences

With regard to postings abroad, 20 of the 24 English-language officers said they were attracted by Western Europe, particularly London and Paris. Thirteen agreed they were equally attracted by one part or another of the Afro-Asian world, in particular Japan and India. Six mentioned as favourites Washington, five the United Nations, four Eastern Europe, and three Latin America. A remarkable feature is that no English-language officer referred in his reply to the countries of the Commonwealth *per se* or to the Commonwealth as an entity. Ten of the 24 called "unattractive" the majority of postings to Afro-Asian countries, for health or family reasons. Nine found no attraction whatever in Latin America. The majority of these Anglophones thought that French Canadians had a marked preference for Western Europe, and particularly for the French-speaking countries, but also for the other "Latin" countries. Twelve believed that French Canadians were more interested than they were in postings to Latin America, and several declared that it was the opposite for assignments to Commonwealth and Afro-Asian countries.

The French-language officers were less ready than their English-language counterparts to reveal their preferences. The majority of the relatively junior officers did not see any difference between the preferences of French Canadians and English Canadians in the matter of postings abroad. Among the relatively senior members, some thought there might be a reluctance to be posted to Commonwealth countries. It was readily agreed that English-language officers would have a slight preference for the Commonwealth countries, and some feeling against Latin America and the countries of French Africa.

With regard to their feelings towards the divisions of the central administration, the French-language officers for the most part agreed at once that the differences between the two linguistic groups were not very great. One said, "The two groups have the same tendencies and much prefer the political to the administrative divisions."³⁴ Similarly, 18 of the 24 English-language officers denied that the preferences of the two groups differed. Of the six others, five thought that the French Canadians were more interested in the European Affairs Division; the other, that they inclined towards the Latin American, the African and Middle Eastern, or the Information divisions. Two of these six thought that English-language officers were more interested in the Defence Liaison (1) Division. One thought they favoured the Economic Division and one the Commonwealth Division. Five of the 24 believed that more than 20 per cent or "a more than proportionate number" of posts in the European Division were held by French-speaking officers. Four shared this opinion in the case of the Legal Division, two in the case of the Information Division, and one each in the case of the Latin American and Personnel Operations divisions. Two of these officers considered that French-speaking officers tended to receive postings in the geographical or "academic" divisions, as opposed to the functional or "action" divisions of the Department. Several Anglophone officers thought that, speaking generally, "a more than proportionate number" of posts were occupied by Anglophones in the Economic, Defence Liaison (1), and sometimes the United Nations divisions. Whatever the merits of these views may be, the realities that underly them are intimately related to the actual advancement of the officers of the Department.

Advancement constitutes the last of the four major themes of this study. As we have seen, advancement is in practice inseparable from postings. In fact it expresses, as does the latter, the Department's appreciation of its officers and is concrete evidence of the degree of success attained by officers of both linguistic groups in External Affairs.

We shall not deviate from our method of analysis, including in particular a comparison of policy aims and results. As in the preceding chapter, however, we shall append to the analysis of the policy results some considerations pertinent to the theme of this chapter as it relates to the "bilingual and basically bicultural character" of the Department. Before entering upon a review of the Department's policies in the matter of advancement we shall discuss the organization and development of the relevant structures.

A. Administrative Structure

We shall not deal again with the importance of the three people whom we identified in Chapter IV as those generally exerting the most influence on the administration of personnel. We should like to point out, however, that until August 1951 when the Department adopted a regime of "provisionally fixed" establishments, it was the officials holding these positions (particularly the under-secretary and the assistant under-secretary (personnel)), who regulated advancement and who made it possible "to arrange individual promotions on a basis that resulted in abnormally rapid promotion."¹ After 1951 they were the ones who most frequently superintended the work of the various bodies set up to ensure the promotion of officers from an administrative point of view.

1. Boards

In 1948, following the creation of a Personnel Division, a Promotions Board was established, whose task was "to consider and make recommendations concerning the

promotions of all officers of the Department up to the rank of FSO-6.”² It was the first administrative body of this type. Quite distinct from the Personnel Planning Board, the Promotions Board aimed at correcting and preventing any discrimination in the advancement of officers.³ Under the chairmanship of the deputy associate under-secretary this board or committee comprised three other senior officers: the assistant under-secretary (personnel), the director of administrative services (until then responsible to the under-secretary for all aspects of personnel administration) and the head of the Personnel Division.

In July 1952 the Promotions Board was transformed into the Officers’ Promotions and Ratings Board, whose competence extended to foreign service officers up to and including grade 7. This new committee was actually made up of six members: the assistant under-secretary (personnel) who was its chairman, three other assistant under-secretaries, the head of the Personnel Division and the head of the Legal Division. No doubt reflecting the introduction at that time of a system for rating officers,* the committee’s object was to standardize, and if necessary to revise the ratings already used in the Department to evaluate the merit of officers.⁴ Gradually this committee tried to determine the progress as well as the performance of officers.⁵ That this committee had wide powers is beyond doubt, since it was clearly laid down that “while a certain proportion of the ratings prepared by supervisors are in the end confirmed, the Committee will make upwards or downwards adjustments if, in its best judgement, they are warranted.”⁶

By reason of the considerable expansion of the departmental establishment from the 1950’s on, this single committee created three new committees, between 1958 and 1964, entrusted with the responsibility for three groups of foreign service officers: senior (grades 6 to 10), intermediate (grades 4 and 5), and lower (grades 1, 2 and 3). These committees are still called either a Ratings Review Board or a Promotions Board, depending on whether they review the officers’ rating cards or the lists of candidates eligible for promotion. Their functions as a whole remain basically similar to those of the Officers’ Promotions and Ratings Board of 1952-8.

Each of the committees is presided over by one of the key persons in the Department concerned with personnel: the under-secretary, helped by his assistants, for officers at the higher level; the assistant under-secretary (personnel), assisted by four heads of divisions, notably the head of the Defence Liaison (2) Division, for officers at the middle level; and the head of the Personnel Operations Division, assisted by at least one other division head and two or three deputy heads, for officers at the lower level. The head of the Personnel Operations Division (postings) is the only one of the three who sits on all three committees, although he is not entitled to vote at the higher echelon. The other committee members are chosen, either by virtue of their position—for example, the under-secretary’s assistants—or by reason of their experience and knowledge of personnel problems.⁷ From 1948 to the present, all promotions (and ratings) committees have included at least one French-speaking officer among their members (one out of four in 1948, one out of six in 1952, one out of six in 1954, and two out of seven in 1958).

*See 115-16.

These are the only periods for which the composition of these committees is officially known.

B. Aims of the Advancement Policy

The departmental policies on the promotion of officers by grades seem to have followed more or less closely the changes in the method of accounting for departmental manpower.⁸ However, one thing is certain: only after the creation in 1952 of grades 8, 9, and 10, did a common policy for advancement take on a more or less uniform character. From then on, this "new policy,"⁹ whatever its aspects, was subject to the principle according to which the number of promotions is determined by the number of vacancies created within the establishment or within those positions provided for at the various levels.¹⁰ Its effect has been to encourage the adoption of an official list of criteria for promotion.

1. Criteria

The alpha and omega of advancement in the Department of External Affairs is merit. This is so true that departmental authorities have gone so far as to declare that "entrants to the external service of Canada do so on a career basis under the merit system."¹¹ But what significance has the word "merit" in External Affairs, and how does one set about evaluating it?

Under the former system of personnel administration, the meaning of the word "merit" was suggested for the first time in 1948, when the point was made that absence of merit, with its consequence of delayed advancement, could be corrected only when officers could "demonstrate ability to better the quality of their work and their capacity to assume increased responsibility." Obviously the implication was that merit was being measured by general assessment of the officers' performance. Since 1952, that is, since the application of the establishment system for officers, merit is determined primarily by points on individual rating reports under essentially four headings: 1) efficiency in the present position or the work factors of earlier years, 2) personal factors, 3) representational factors (i.e., how he represents Canada abroad), and 4) the ability to express himself or self-expression. The officers' rating reports also bear a general rating that corresponds to the over-all assessment of an officer, therefore of his "possibilities" or potential.¹² It is the general rating that has always been the more influential for advancement, if not in terms of grades, at least in terms of positions or responsibility. In fact this general rating, which carries with it and expresses in a cumulative way the reputation of an officer, is usually very closely connected with the services which he renders to his immediate superiors and, consequently, with his capacity or effectiveness in the context of his work. During the course of his career, an officer's general rating is increasingly dependent on the general confidence inspired by his personality. It is important to underline that this general rating, which in theory is the only one that can be modified by the Ratings Review Board, is not necessarily the average of the points given under each of the particular headings of the rating reports.

Important as it may be, merit has never been officially the only criterion of advancement or promotion in External Affairs. In 1948, for example, the Department added age and length of service, taking care to state that merit had more weight than these other two factors.¹³ In 1952, the Department substituted the term "seniority" for "length of service," but insisted that merit was still considered as a more important criterion than age and seniority, while acknowledging that age and length of service might weigh more at the lower than at the higher level.¹⁴ In 1958 this trio of basic criteria took the form of "merit, seniority and other relevant factors,"¹⁵ the latter including the age and attitude of an officer at the time of his posting. On the occasion of this last modification, the Department emphasized that the principal task which devolved upon the promotions committee was "to weigh merit against seniority," adding that the seniority in question here was not of a general nature, but rather "seniority in his grade." Finally in 1964, the Department confirmed that "both merit (in terms of rating) and time-in-grade"¹⁶—the latter expressing henceforth a minimum seniority at the various echelons—were taken into consideration in establishing the lists of candidates deserving, or eligible for, promotion. It was added, however, that the promotions themselves were not necessarily accorded in the order in which the officers' names appeared on the lists, but only after considerations of "seniority in grade, length of service in the Department, age and other factors."¹⁷ It has always been the under-secretary's privilege to ratify or modify, if he so wishes, the promotion lists that the various committees submit to him before they become official. Although the under-secretary usually trusts the good judgement of the committees, the fact is that he, like the secretary of state himself, can determine the balance that he wants among the officers of the Department, particularly at the higher level, taking into account the use that he may want to make of them. For obvious reasons, certain consequences of this discretionary power of the under-secretary have in the past been given no publicity whatsoever.

2. *Publicity*

It will be recalled that the "operation of October 1, 1952,"¹⁸ which was in some respects a disguised exercise in officers' promotion, received at the time a minimum of publicity. But there is no doubt that generally speaking both the establishment of an administrative structure for personnel purposes and the successive defining of departmental policies on advancement have had the benefit of wide internal publicity. One might say that at regular intervals, in 1948, 1952, 1958, and 1964, the Department restated the rules and procedures regarding the advancement of officers by means of Circular Documents. The same is not true however of certain other items in personnel administration, particularly the composition of the promotion committees and even the promotion lists of senior officers.

Although the names of the members of departmental promotion committees have often been known unofficially by a fair number of officers of the central administration, and sometimes also by officers abroad, it is nonetheless true that in 1948 the Department ceased to divulge the composition of these committees to its officers as a whole. And it must be stated that, with certain exceptions (for example in January, 1954), the

Department neither posted nor published regularly, until about 1961, the promotion lists of its officers of grades 7, 8, 9, and 10.¹⁹ If this omission had the practical advantage of eliminating any possibility of appeal from officers not promoted—a procedure which in any case has never been encouraged by the Department—it perforce resulted in the relative immunity of the under-secretary and consequently of his real power, as well as that of the members of his unit and his immediate colleagues, the assistant under-secretaries.²⁰ Be that as it may, it is much more important to see how the promotion policies of the Department were translated into action, both in respect of grades and positions.

C. Results of the Advancement Policy

We shall examine officers' advancement here from two points of view: first, grades or rates of promotion; second, positions occupied or access to positions of responsibility.

1. Rates of promotion

Advancement in terms of grades is measured by an officer's rate of promotion, or by the time required by him to pass from one grade to another, for example from foreign service officer grade 2 to foreign service officer grade 3. This rate of promotion was arrived at by dividing the number of promotions by the length of time in the Department, for those who had not yet climbed all the rungs; and, for those who had gone all the way up, by dividing the number of promotions by the time taken to pass from grade 1 to grade 10. In both cases we have considered that the duration of an officer's career is the period extending from his recruitment to his leaving the Department or up to December 31, 1965—whichever applies.

For the purposes of this section, we have established the following relationship between the old (pre-1944) set of grades and the new:

Third secretary	— Foreign service officer grade 1
Second secretary	— Foreign service officer grades 2 and 3
First secretary	— Foreign service officer grade 4
Counsellor	— Foreign service officer grade 5
Head of mission	— Foreign service officer grade 6 and above.

In the case of a double grade promotion, as implied above at the level of second secretary, or in the case of a promotion whose date was unknown to us, we decided to fix the latter at the middle of the period of time extending from the date of the previous promotion or former grade to the date of the promotion or grade immediately following. For the presentation of our results, we shall return to the pattern used in Chapter II, that is, first the over-all or general situation, second the development over the years, and third the particular situation of the linguistic groups.

*a) The general rate**

Of the 554 officers whose rate of promotion in the Department we know, 108 (or 19.5 per cent) received no promotion in terms of grades or echelons. This relatively high figure, surprising at first glance, includes some 30 officers too recently recruited to have earned a promotion, and also the great majority of the non-career officers, for the most part recruited by order-in-council at a level and salary generally fixed and practically unchangeable. The 446 other officers, who received at least one promotion, may be divided into three groups or categories by average rate of promotion (Diagram 28):




Diagram 28. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by average rate of promotion (per month)

Those who were promoted rapidly, after 12 to 30 months on the average: 93 or 20.9 per cent;

Those who were promoted at a medium rate, after 31 to 48 months on the average: 244 or 54.7 per cent;

Those who were promoted slowly, after 49 months or over: 109 or 24.4 per cent.

Diagram 28 shows, what one might call, the normal distribution of the average rates of promotion for the officers who have served in the Department from 1945 to 1965. It reveals that more than half the officers appear to have been promoted at a medium rate (31-6, 37-42, 43-8 months); and that an average of one officer in four has been retarded in his advancement, which seems to us a not unduly large proportion. On the other hand, the fact that 20.9 per cent of the 446 officers promoted should have had a rapid or accelerated advancement is worth closer scrutiny. We note that 90 per cent of the officers who were promoted rapidly (93) were not with the Department for more than 10 years; in fact 74 officers (or 79.5 per cent) served less than five years and nine officers (9.6 per cent) served in the Department for periods of between five and 10 years.

*This information is complete for 554 of the 570 officers.

This immediately gives the impression that young or new officers are promoted more rapidly than those with longer service in the Department. An examination of the changes in the rates of promotion over the years clearly bears this out.

b) Development over the years

Diagram 29 brings out two main points. First it shows trends in the rates of promotion throughout our four periods; and, secondly, it shows the distribution of the rates of promotion within each period.




Diagram 29. Percentage distribution of foreign service officers by period of recruitment and rate of promotion

The diagram shows that the proportion of officers promoted at a medium rate increased significantly from the 1922-44 period (47.1 per cent) to the 1951-7 period (70.6 per cent), while the proportion of officers promoted either rapidly or slowly decreased. Equally remarkable is the gap which appears to exist in the trends shown by these three types of advancement between the third and fourth periods. In the 1958-64 period, there was a sharp rise in the number of officers promoted rapidly, as compared with a considerable drop in the number of officers promoted at a medium rate and the virtual disappearance of slow promotion. However, since nothing in what we know of the Department's promotion policy leads us to believe that such a reversal indicates new norms in the general way of handling advancements, we have to admit that the rate of officers' advancement had a rapid beginning but fell off somewhat over a period of years. It is precisely in order to find out to what extent this initial impetus slackened that we must examine the distribution of the rates of promotion within each of the first three periods.

The proportion of officers promoted rapidly increases as one goes back in time. This proportion, 9.4 per cent for 1922-44, was almost treble the figure for 1951-7 (3.9 per

cent) and about double the figure (5.5 per cent) for 1945-50. This is undoubtedly because there was no personnel structure before 1947.²¹ It must be noted also that the proportion of officers promoted slowly decreased from 43.5 per cent in 1922-44 to 25.5 per cent in 1951-7, a fact which is chiefly explained by a phenomenon in operation in the Department since 1950, that is the "debasement" of promotions due to a general acceleration in the rate. This phenomenon implies an appreciable reduction in the time, that is the time-in-grade, required before an officer would be eligible for a promotion, which varies among echelons. For example, whereas after the adoption of the regime of 10 grades in 1952 a grade 1 officer had to remain at this level for at least 18 months, and even then had to win his promotion to grade 2 by his own persistent efforts, in 1965 he could pass automatically from grade 1 to grade 2 twelve months after entering the Department. It is the progressive whittling down of this earlier requirement that explains the continuing decrease in the proportion of officers promoted slowly between 1922-44 and 1951-7 and still more between the latter period and 1958-64; or conversely an increase if we go back in time. But what of these considerations within the setting of the two main linguistic groups?

Table 11. Distribution of promotions of foreign service officers, by grade, year and linguistic group

Year	Grade																	
	1-2		2-3		3-4		4-5		5-6		6-7		7-8		8-9		9-10	
	F	E	F	E	F	E	F	E	F	E	F	E	F	E	F	E	F	E
1946	1	1	1	5	0	3	1	2	0	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1947	4	19	6	11	2	4	1	7	1	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1948	0	11	3	6	0	4	0	4	0	2	0	3	—	—	—	—	—	—
1949	0	11	1	6	4	5	1	2	0	0	0	4	—	—	—	—	—	—
1950	2	7	0	5	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
1951	4	16	1	14	2	9	1	8	0	2	0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—
1952	2	9	2	9	1	7	6	3	3	7	0	4*	0	0	0	0	0	0
1953	2	11	1	11	0	8	0	3	1	5	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
1954	2	13	2	26	2	10	2	9	0	4	1	5	1	6	1	2	0	0
1955	8	18	5	11	2	11	2	9	5	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0
1956	7	15	2	10	3	17	0	7	1	6	2	4	0	2	1	2	0	0
1957	1	18	3	12	1	14	0	10	0	7	0	5	1	5	0	0	0	0
1958	10	17	4	15	6	14	2	8	2	6	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0
1959	7	17	9	21	1	4	1	9	1	8	2	7	1	0	0	2	0	0
1960	3	11	2	10	2	12	3	18	1	8	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	0
1961	6	15	3	4	5	15	3	8	1	6	0	4	0	3	0	0	0	0
1962	1	13	12	22	7	17	2	6	0	8	0	7	1	1	1	3	0	0
1963	3	11	5	9	0	12	3	5	0	9	1	10	1	4	2	1	0	0
1964	3	21	6	17	4	8	4	9	1	8	3	6	0	5	0	2	0	2
1965	3	12	4	16	8	10	4	15	5	9	0	11	0	6	1	4	0	1
Total	69	266	72	240	52	185	36	143	22	107	11	79	5	37	6	16	1	3
%	21	79	23	77	22	78	20	80	17	83	12	88	12	88	27	73	25	75

*These promotions have nothing to do with "the operation of October 1, 1952."

c) Comparisons by linguistic group

Of the 446 officers who had received at least one promotion and whose over-all rate of promotion we know, 351 are Anglophones and 95 Francophones. Among the first group, 75 (or 21.4 per cent) had a rapid rate, 191 (or 54.4 per cent) a medium rate, and 85 (or 24.2 per cent) a slow rate of promotion. Among the second group, the comparative figures are 18 (18.9 per cent), 53 (55.8 per cent) and 24 (25.3 per cent). We conclude from this that the two groups were promoted at more or less the same rate.

But in view of the changes in this over-all rate during the course of the years we must modify this statement. We notice that the rates for the two linguistic groups varied according to periods; for example, during 1951-7 they followed very close, almost identical lines. They were also very similar during 1958-64. But during the first two periods they deviated, although in different directions. Among the group of officers recruited between 1922 and 1944, the distribution worked both in favour of the English-speaking group promoted rapidly and against it in the case of slow rates. In 1945-50, it operated against the Francophones at both the slow and the medium rates. But since these modifications affect relatively small numbers, particularly as regards the various groups of French-language officers, we propose to examine not only the three over-all rates of advancement but also the real distribution (as in the chapter on Postings) of the promotions themselves between 1946 and 1965, by grade and linguistic group.

Table 11 is particularly revealing. It shows first that without necessarily respecting the numerical balance between the two linguistic groups in granting promotions—which would be odd, to say the least, in a régime which so openly proclaims the universal rule of merit—the Department nonetheless managed to maintain, at the lower echelons and in the first stage of the middle levels, the respective proportions of the two groups. No doubt this is because the rule of automatic promotion after a short period normally affects this level. But the table shows that it was not quite the same at the second stage of the middle echelon (grade 5), and still less so at the first stages of the higher level (grades 6, 7, and 8), where the average proportion of promotions granted to Francophones was notably less than the numerical proportion of that group in the Department. The chief reason for this is that the Department recruited too few French-language officers during the war, particularly from 1942 on, especially in the postwar period from 1945 to 1950. Still, such an explanation does not take into account the cumulative effect of the departure of several French-language officers in mid-career, particularly those who had reached the higher echelon. But however inhibiting these factors may have been, Table 11 nonetheless indicates that the Department granted Francophones more than 25 per cent of the promotions at the level of grades 9 and 10. This percentage surpasses the numerical importance of the group, and may be considered to indicate a desire to give certain Francophone officers a share in control or to open the higher echelons of the Department to them.

2. Access to the elite groups

Advancement in terms of posts occupied or of responsibility is measured by the access or degree of access which officers have to the elite or mid-elite groups of the Department—

in the sense in which H. D. Lasswell understands these terms.²² We will make a distinction between the elite proper or the power elite,²³ and the two mid-elites—the bureaucratic and the diplomatic.

For the purposes of this study, the elite of the Department will comprise all the officers who between 1945 and 1965 occupied one or other of the following positions: under-secretary of state for External Affairs, deputy or associate under-secretary of state, and one of the assistant under-secretary of state posts. It therefore corresponds in all points to the under-secretary's unit, or to that small group which "acts, in effect, as a kind of departmental executive committee, dealing with both policy and administration. . . ."²⁴ The bureaucratic mid-elite, which follows immediately in importance, will be made up of all officers who during the same period occupied one of the posts of head of division in the central administration; and the diplomatic mid-elite will include all officers who, having been head of a mission from 1945 to 1965, formed part of neither the bureaucratic mid-elite nor the power elite of the Department.

We should like to remind the reader, however, that for reasons already advanced in Chapter IV we have eliminated from our calculations the officers whose career in the Department lasted less than five years. This eliminates in practice the small number of officers at the level of the elite and mid-elite who were recruited after 1960, or who for various reasons left the Department before completing five years of service.

a) The power elite

The strength of the group that constitutes the power elite in the Department results less from its position at the summit of the hierarchy than from its proximity to the executive branch of government, in particular to the secretary of state for External Affairs and the prime minister. This proximity ensures its members the best chance of effectively exerting an influence on the majority of decisions relating to foreign policy. No representative of Canada abroad, whether he be an ambassador, a high commissioner or any officer who, by application of the principle of rotation, might have been required to give up his temporary association with the elite of the Department, can be compared from this point of view to an actual member of the elite at any given time. To be one of the elite in the Department of External Affairs, an officer has to belong at a given moment to the unit of the under-secretary. It also means that the elite of the Department is essentially "successive" and, by definition, subject to perpetual renewal.

During the period under review this elite has been made up of successive teams, whose composition and numerical importance have varied in different periods. In 1945, for example, it was composed of an English-speaking under-secretary of state, and two English-speaking deputy under-secretaries. In 1965, it was made up of a French-speaking under-secretary, an English-speaking deputy under-secretary, and four English-speaking assistant under-secretaries. Altogether, 30 officers formed part of the elite from January 1, 1945 to December 31, 1965. All of them, without exception, were career officers, 25 (or 83 per cent) being English-speaking and five (or 17 per cent) French-speaking officers. The 25 represent 9 per cent of the 276 English-speaking officers who, on December 31, 1965, had had at least five years of service in the Department, and the five represent 5.8 per cent of the 86 corresponding French-speaking officers. Of the 30 officers who were

members of the elite group, 28 (23 Anglophones and five Francophones) belonged to it at one period only; the two others, both English-speaking, entered it a second time. Even if by force of circumstances the majority of these 30 officers occupied, at one period or another, one of the two, three, or four posts of assistant under-secretary of state for External Affairs prior to or instead of the posts of deputy under-secretary or under-secretary, it is definitely more important to centre our attention here upon the latter two posts, and particularly upon the post of under-secretary of state for External Affairs.

The under-secretary of state. We had occasion to point out in Chapter IV the importance of the post of under-secretary. It is at this point, however, that we feel it appropriate to attempt to measure the breadth of his power and responsibilities. Of all the officers of the Department, the under-secretary has the greatest number of responsibilities. Answerable only to the minister, not only does he direct the affairs of the Department, but he has every possibility to exercise control as he sees fit over all aspects of the organization of External Affairs. His personal influence exceeds that of all his colleagues put together, since it is he who chooses them or finally approves their




Diagram 30. Holders of the post of under-secretary of state for External Affairs, 1945-65

appointment. It is he who makes and unmakes the elite that he heads. It is he who sets the tone throughout the organization, and who is usually the first to concern himself with the domestic political repercussions that may result from the appointment of members of the two main linguistic groups at the higher echelons, at least for those appointments that are publicized outside the Department. Hence the great importance, for our purposes, of knowing who held this important position between 1945 and 1965, and of knowing to which of the two linguistic groups he belonged.

Diagram 30 shows that there were eight appointments to the post of under-secretary from 1945 to 1965, if the appointment of N. A. Robertson, who was in office at the beginning of 1945, is taken into account. Of these eight appointments, two concerned the same person, Mr. Robertson, who was under-secretary from June 1941 to October 1946 and from October 1958 to June 1964. One appointment ended abruptly at the beginning of 1954 with the death of Hume Wrong, who had been appointed in September 1953. Diagram 30 also reveals that the first five incumbents were Anglophones and that in August 1954, for the first time a Francophone, Jules Léger, became under-secretary. He was followed by an Anglophone, then by a Francophone. It would be difficult from this account to assert that the rule of alternation worked at the level of under-secretary during the period covered by our study. What seems to us particularly important to emphasize, however, because it partly coincides with the weakness in the recruitment of French Canadians, is the marked absence of Francophones at this high level before the second half of 1954. Of course, as a compensation, they occupied one of the other elite positions in the Department—assistant under-secretary, deputy or associate under-secretary of state for External Affairs.

The deputy under-secretary. Diagram 31 shows that the post of deputy under-secretary which, according to the official organization charts,²⁵ is placed in the same rank as that of the assistant under-secretaries, was at times divided into two positions and at times unoccupied between 1945 and 1965. The diagram also shows that there were nine appointments to this post, if one includes those of J. E. Read and Hume Wrong, who were in office at the beginning of 1945; and that two of these nine appointments went to Francophones.

It is also clear from the diagram that the rule of alternation did not function at this level either, although the appearance of a French-speaking officer as deputy under-secretary or associate under-secretary during the period when there was no French-language representative at the highest level of the Department, might indicate a concern for ensuring some kind of French Canadian representation in the power elite. However, it should be noted that the holder of this office, Laurent Beaudry, had become assistant under-secretary in August 1935 and that, in spite of his relative inactivity for reasons of health between April 1943 and April 9, 1948, the date of his resignation, it was nevertheless considered necessary to elevate him to the rank of deputy under-secretary on September 17, 1946 and to associate under-secretary on April 1, 1947.

As Diagrams 30 and 31 do not include information on the assistant under-secretaries, they fail to reveal that between 1948 and 1965 there was almost always at least one French-speaking officer among the departmental elite. Up to 1954, this French-speaking officer was at the level of assistant under-secretary—Léon Mayrand from April 1949 to




Diagram 31. Holders of the posts of deputy under-secretary and associate under-secretary of state for External Affairs, 1945-65

May 1951, Jules Léger from June 1951 to October 1953, and Jean Chapdelaine beginning in January 1954. It should be noted too that on two occasions—the first when Jules Léger was unexpectedly appointed to the post of under-secretary in August 1954, with Jean Chapdelaine as assistant under-secretary until December 1955; the second, towards the end of M. Léger's term, from December 1956 to October 1958, with Marcel Cadieux—this French Canadian representation was even doubled. But from the point of view of the period as a whole, it is still true that the proportion of French-language officers in the elite, including the post of under-secretary of state, slipped from 25 per cent (1 out of 4) in 1945 to 20 per cent (1 out of 5) in 1949, then to 16 per cent (1 out of 6) from 1958 to 1965.

A good many people recognize that *one* place in the elite is reserved for French-language officers, and that whoever holds this position implicitly assumes the role of head, if not "protector," of the French-speaking officers in the Department. It will be readily agreed however that this rule, which although tacit is nonetheless real, has very

serious limitations. In practice it can work against the French-speaking officers when "their" representative, through lack of energy or interest, chooses not to protect them more than he really has to. More seriously, it can do considerable harm to the advancement of other Francophones when such a representative succeeds in holding this position more or less indefinitely. In the latter case, such a rule may even bring about the departure of officers who might otherwise have wished to pursue their career in the Department; it may also be the underlying reason for the palliative which consists of filling the resulting gaps with non-career Francophones. It is therefore probable that this rule is partially responsible for the under-representation of French Canadians in the bureaucratic mid-elite throughout the period under review and, conversely, for their over-representation in the diplomatic mid-elite.

b) The bureaucratic mid-elite

In terms of influence, the bureaucratic mid-elite clearly takes precedence over the diplomatic mid-elite. It derives its strength essentially from its proximity to the power elite and the resulting link between the two. It is situated at a crucial level in the organization of the Department.²⁶ At one time or another all those who have become the head of a division in the central administration have belonged to the bureaucratic mid-elite.

From 1945 to 1965, 61 officers made up the bureaucratic mid-elite. These represent 10.5 per cent of the 570 officers who formed the corps of foreign service officers from 1945 to 1965 or, if one prefers, 16.5 per cent of the 362 officers who by December 31, 1965 at the outside had had a career of at least five years in the Department. Among these 61 officers, 54 (or 88.5 per cent) belonged to the English-speaking group and 7 (or 11.5 per cent) to the French-speaking group. The former represent 12.1 per cent of the 446 Anglophones who were part of the Department's personnel between 1945 and 1965, or 19.5 per cent of the 276 English-speaking officers who served for at least five years in the Department. The latter group (7 French-speaking officers) represent 5.7 per cent of the 124 Francophones in the Department between 1945 and 1965, or 8.1 per cent of the 86 Francophones who served for at least five years in the Department.

Contrary to what we have already noticed at the elite level, there is obviously no rule giving French-language officers a more or less fixed representation, either in number or percentage, in the bureaucratic mid-elite of the Department. In fact, on September 1, 1965, among the 20 foreign service officers occupying a post as head of a division, there were still only two Francophones. In addition, neither headed one of the divisions considered important by Anglophones. The reason, according to the officers interviewed and those of the sample group, is that contrary to what has always been true of the elite level, there was no political pressure with respect to the distribution of heads of divisions.²⁷ We shall naturally find the counterpart of this situation at the level of the diplomatic mid-elite.

c) The diplomatic mid-elite

Between 1945 and 1965, 56 officers belonged to the diplomatic mid-elite of the Department; 35 (or 62.5 per cent) were Anglophones and 21 (or 37.5 per cent)

Francophones. The former represent 7.9 per cent of the 446, or 12.7 per cent of the 275 Anglophones belonging to the groups described earlier; the latter represent 16.9 per cent of the 124, or 24.4 per cent of the 86 Francophones belonging to corresponding groups. The over-representation of Francophones, which is particularly evident here, makes up numerically for their under-representation both at the level of the bureaucratic mid-elite and the departmental elite. This over-representation is largely due to the sizable influx of non-career French-language officers. This influx has been the means, on the one hand, of obviating the unfortunate consequences of the low recruitment of Francophones during the 1940's and the inability of those recruited to gain access in proportion to their numbers to positions of major responsibility; and, on the other hand, of ensuring for the Department of External Affairs the "bilingual and basically bicultural character" which should be that of the federal administration, according to the mandate of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

D. Bilingual and Bicultural Aspects of Advancement

As in Chapter IV, let us turn our attention to that part of our general hypothesis according to which "The Department of External Affairs is an organization with a bilingual and basically bicultural character, as evidenced by...the criteria that ensure to all those who form part of it equal opportunities for participation and advancement." With respect to advancement by grades, we consider that we have already demonstrated that the Department generally allows all its officers to advance at an equal rate of promotion. We believe also that we have shown, or at least strongly suggested, that advancement in terms of positions occupied and of participation in the departmental elite and mid-elite works manifestly to the disadvantage of the Francophone group. If we wish to find out whether the Department has a bicultural character in this particular respect, it is perhaps again to the officers, and more especially to their views on certain aspects of the system of promotion, that we should turn.

E. Views on Promotion

We shall set forth the views of the officers on this score under three main headings: 1) satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their own advancement; 2) expectations of advancement; and 3) understanding of the criteria of advancement.

1. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction

Of the 24 Anglophones in our sample, two declared themselves "very satisfied" with their advancement in terms of grades (or of their rate of promotion), 16 were "generally satisfied" and six "satisfied but with reservations." According to several, time-in-grade had lengthened in recent years and there was a bottleneck at the level of grades 4 and 5. Generally speaking, the opinion was that advancement in terms of grades was not fast

enough. As for advancement in terms of position or responsibility, six of the 24 (five of them members of the bureaucratic mid-elite) declared themselves "very satisfied" and the 18 others "generally satisfied."

Of the 19 Francophones, 17 replied to the same questions. Of the nine most recent recruits, one was "very satisfied" with his advancement in terms of grades, five were "satisfied," and three "more or less satisfied." Of the eight others who had been in the Department longer, three (of whom two were or had been associated with the Personnel Operations Division) declared themselves "very satisfied," three "satisfied," and two "more or less satisfied." As for advancement in terms of responsibility, six of the nine officers of the first group (junior) were "satisfied" and three "more or less satisfied," while the eight officers of the second group (senior) were either "satisfied" or "very satisfied." The satisfaction of the Francophone officers in the matter of advancement was generally due to the fact that the majority had filled positions abroad which in the departmental establishment were higher than those to which they were in fact entitled at the time of their appointment. By comparison with postings in the central administration "where you feel you are marking time," as one of the Francophone officers said, "the postings that I have had abroad have allowed me to assume responsibilities and show initiative."²⁸

2. Expectations

The majority of the lower- and middle-ranking Anglophones of our sample, declaring that their career was as yet too short or wishing not to appear pretentious, were reluctant to admit that they might reach the level of the elite. In fact, only one declared that he was confident of becoming under-secretary one day. Another, while believing that he had the ability, said that he did not have the required personality for the job. At least one junior officer, and perhaps one or two others as well as one of the middle rank, foresaw the possibility of rising to the level of assistant under-secretary. The majority, however, said they were confident of reaching the level of head of one of the important divisions of the central administration or of a middle-ranking diplomatic mission abroad. The majority of the senior officers of this group, who were already members of the bureaucratic mid-elite, declared that they foresaw the day when they would become an assistant under-secretary.

The vast majority of the Francophones of our sample were optimistic on the subject of advancement. Of the eight relatively senior men, seven went so far as to admit that they thought they could rise as high as assistant under-secretary of state, but the eighth was distinctly sceptical about his chances, "*à moins d'y mettre une somme formidable de travail.*" Although showing themselves confident of eventually reaching the level of the under-secretary's unit, at least four of the first seven officers were quite hesitant. One readily declared that he was not interested. Another wondered whether he would be willing to make "*tous les sacrifices personnels nécessaires.*" A third thought that he would prefer "*rester indéfiniment*" abroad. Among the nine relatively junior Francophones, the majority spoke much more in terms of positions of responsibility and of fulfilling personal ambitions rather than of "top flight" positions in the upper reaches of

the service. The majority showed a marked reluctance to live in Ottawa, except two who would willingly remain in the central administration "with financial advantages equivalent to those that officers usually obtain when living abroad."²⁹

3. Criteria of advancement

In the opinion of the Anglophones of our sample, the criteria for advancement in the Department were as follows: 1) intellectual capacity, 2) judgement, 3) articulateness, 4) energy and efficiency, and 5) personality. Several pointed out that the importance of "judgement" increased as the officer rose towards positions of responsibility. They added that in the foreign service (or diplomatic service), in comparison with the academic world, emphasis was placed more on judgement, flexibility, and personality; and in comparison with the business world, more on flexibility and some aspects of personality. The very great majority insisted on the fact that "personal compatibility between superior and subordinate will definitely affect ratings and consequently promotions, particularly in small and medium-sized missions."

For their part, all the Francophones recognized that the quality of work and the degree of efficiency were at the basis of the promotion system. The quantity of work done or the production, said one officer, must be "*considérable, précise et utile.*" It is the "publish or perish" of the American university milieu. "*Le bon jugement*" and "*la capacité d'adaptation,*" the latter sometimes slipping in under the guise of personality, were two of the basic qualities on which there was virtual unanimity. One maintained that what ensured the advancement of officers was "their ability to carry out a variety of tasks" and "their usefulness to their immediate superiors."³⁰

A very large majority of Francophones interviewed mentioned the importance of personal connections in the matter of advancement. Of the nine members of the relatively junior group, eight, with certain qualifications, termed "the backing of very influential senior officers"³¹ a very important criterion and one likely to accelerate the rate of promotion. One of the relatively senior group believed that he had benefited from the personal support of certain French-speaking officers in the Department. On the other hand, another underlined the scruples that influential French-speaking officers might have in "protecting" French Canadians, for fear of being accused of "*favoritisme ethnique.*" A third cited "*l'influence des gens pour lesquels on travaille.*" Finally, the four or five others declared that "*des groupes ou sociétés d'aide mutuelle,*" "*des confréries,*" or systems of protection existed within the Department; two of them spoke of an "old boys' network," which one of them said was natural, but likely in process of disappearing.

On the subject of the qualities or conditions required to reach positions of responsibility, the French-speaking officers mentioned the following: "Superior intelligence, considerable capacity for hard work, certain special qualities of personality, ambition and tact, a thorough knowledge of the machinery and functioning of the federal administration."³² According to the officers of the senior group, one must also be endowed with a strong political sense and have proved one's staying power in the central administration, or else be one of the "league." In addition, it was added, if the candidate for one of the senior positions in the central administration were French Canadian, he had also to be *very* competent and endowed with a strong personality.

The Anglophones of our group deemed the following qualities particularly important to reach the senior positions: superior intellect, superior judgement and decisiveness, superior efficiency and capacity for work, executive ability, good political sense, and acceptability to the minister. Among these 24 officers, six judged that, all things being equal, French-speaking officers reached positions of control in the Department "a little faster than English Canadians"; 20 of the 24 believed that considerations of ethnic balance entered into promotions to positions of authority within the Department, and that it was necessary to have at least one of the top six positions in Ottawa filled by a French Canadian. This incidentally is an attitude which seems to be deeply rooted in the Department,³³ and which permits us to suggest that the Department of External Affairs, in the advancement of its officers in terms of positions and of responsibility, has practised up to now what one can only call "political biculturalism."

The second part of our study deals with the use of French as a working language in the Department of External Affairs. It may be considered an extension of the first part as it derives from the same general assumption.

However this part is distinctly more limited in scope. It does not aim at determining the entire place occupied by French in External Affairs, including the place given to English translated into French, or in other words to French as a language of translation; rather it is concerned with French as an original working language or as a language in which work is drafted. We had several reasons for limiting this second part in such a way. The first is that the Commission has itself conducted an inquiry into the problems of translation throughout the federal public service. The second is the severely limited time at our disposal for undertaking anything more than a study of the personnel of External Affairs. The third, and a more fundamental reason, is that we wanted to place this secondary but important subject within our own conception of biculturalism in Canada, namely the coexistence of two cultures whose languages are only the instruments with which to express different ways of thinking and reacting. In short, our conception of this part of our study was more "biculturalist" than "bilingualist." It looked beyond biculturalism in the direction of what can be termed "biculturality," a distinction somewhat similar to that between "nationalism" and "nationality."

A. Use of Questionnaires

Our survey took as its starting point two direct-reply questionnaires distributed at the end of August 1965 through the internal services of the Department to all working units of External Affairs. Questionnaire No. 1 was addressed to the divisions or units of the central administration, and Questionnaire No. 2 was sent to all Canadian missions abroad under the Department of External Affairs. The text of these two questionnaires will be found in Appendix B,¹⁷⁷ The information supplied by the second questionnaire was

completed in September 1965 by an on-the-spot investigation into the use of French in the Canadian Embassy in Paris.

The object of the two questionnaires was to obtain precise information as to the amount of French used both among the various working units and within each of them separately. They were also intended to bring to light the factors likely to explain the situation peculiar to each unit and the general bilingual and bicultural situation within the Department. Each of the questionnaires comprised four main sections:

1. The first section emphasized the use of French insofar as it depended upon the will of each working unit or upon the conditions special to it (question 2 of both questionnaires).
2. The second concerned the use of French insofar as it depended upon the will of others or was imposed from outside on each of the working units (questions 6 and 7 of the first questionnaire and questions 7 and 8 of the second questionnaire).
3. The third made a count of the bilingual and non-bilingual personnel of these various working units (question 3 of both questionnaires).
4. The fourth dealt with factors, other than the unilingualism of the personnel, that might prevent the use of French as a working language (questions 4 and 5 of the first questionnaire, and 4, 5 and 6 of the second).

Question 1 of both questionnaires formed a section of its own because it sought to identify first of all the units that used French as a working language and those that did not.

1. Type of questionnaire

All the questions contained in these two questionnaires related to facts or customs. The majority were what is called "closed" questions. Only question 5 of both questionnaires was open-ended or "free." At the invitation of the head of the Personnel Operations Division, the heads of divisions or of posts abroad were to answer the questions themselves, or at least to make sure that the replies were given under their personal responsibility. In fact almost all the questionnaires were returned duly filled in and bearing the signature either of the head of post or of his deputy. Several heads of missions attached commentaries of a general or a particular nature to their reply.

2. Sorting the data

The divisions of the central administration and the posts abroad were grouped by categories. For the central administration, we simply retained the three main traditional categories of departmental organization, namely the geographical, functional, and administrative divisions. Among the 28 divisions, services, or smaller units in the Department in September 1965, six were geographical divisions (African and Middle Eastern, Commonwealth, U.S.A., European, Latin American, and Far Eastern); 12 were functional (Economic, Legal, Consular, Passport, Information, Defence Liaison (1), Defence Liaison (2), United Nations, Protocol, Press and Liaison, Disarmament, and Historical); and nine were administrative (Personnel Operations, Personnel Services,

Administrative Services, Communications, Finance, Organization and Methods, Supplies and Properties, Registry, and Administrative Improvement Unit). The twenty-eighth working unit, Inspection Service, was inactive at the time. For posts abroad, we established the following seven categories:

- a. *Africa and Middle East*: Ankara, Beirut, Cairo, Leopoldville, Pretoria, Teheran, Tel Aviv, and Yaoundé.
- b. *Commonwealth*: Accra, Canberra, Colombo, Dar-es-Salaam, Georgetown, Karachi, Kingston, Kuala Lumpur, Lagos, London, New Delhi, Nicosia, Port of Spain, Rawalpindi, and Wellington.
- c. *Europe*: Athens, Berlin, Berne, Bonn, Bordeaux, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, Dusseldorf, The Hague, Hamburg, Helsinki, Lisbon, Madrid, Marseilles, Moscow, Oslo, Paris (embassy), Prague, Rome, Stockholm, Vienna and Warsaw.
- d. *Far East*: Djakarta, Manila, Phnom Penh, Saigon, Tokyo, and Vientiane.
- e. *Latin America*: Bogota, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Havana, Lima, Mexico City, Montevideo, Port-au-Prince, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, San José, Santiago, Santo Domingo, and Sao Paulo.
- f. *United States*: Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York (2), San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington.
- g. *International organizations*: Permanent delegation to the Disarmament Conference (Geneva), GATT, NATO, OECD, the UN (Geneva), the UN (New York) and UNESCO.

The next step consisted of tabulating the replies to each unit or category by figures or percentages, or by options (in the case of questions with a range of replies). Then we proceeded to the compiling of statistics and where necessary of averages.

3. Presentation of results

We had to take into account two essential facts in the presentation of results: first, the credibility of the replies, and secondly, the extremely low figures or totals obtained.

Several units replied in such a way, and often in so contradictory a way, that we hesitated at first to give them all the credibility to which they were entitled. Again, the admitted percentages of the amount of French used were generally so low that it seemed to us useless, if not downright impossible, to limit ourselves to interpreting only the mathematical results. We therefore chose to interpret qualitatively as well as quantitatively each of the replies submitted by a description of the results followed on occasion by a commentary. We then made a synthesis of these descriptions and commentaries in a summary covering each of the questionnaires. The analysis and presentation of our results therefore took the form of a diptych, of which the first tablet portrayed the central administration and the second the posts abroad, together with a detailed account of the use of French in the Canadian Embassy in Paris.

It is obvious that the first questionnaire was not equally well suited to all working units (see Appendix B, 177). Being concerned with the use of written French in the central administration, it was no doubt much better adapted to the condition in divisions known as "productive" (such as the political divisions and the majority of the functional divisions) than to support divisions such as Registry and Communications. Certain divisions were in agreement with this conclusion. The Administrative Improvement Unit did not feel obliged to reply to the questionnaire.¹ The Press and Liaison Division had certain reservations of a general nature that appeared to us well founded.² Other units, while interpreting this or that question more or less freely, replied to most or all of the questionnaire.

A. Questions and Answers

Question 1: Is French used as a working language in your division (unit or service)?

Of 27 divisions, services or smaller units, 18 replied "yes":

4 political divisions out of 6—African and Middle Eastern, European, Far Eastern, and Latin American

10 functional divisions out of 12—Consular, Defence Liaison (1), Economic, Historical, Information, Legal, Passport, Press and Liaison, Protocol, and United Nations

4 administrative divisions out of 9—Administrative Services, Finance, Personnel Operations, and Personnel Services.

Nine divisions, services, or smaller units replied "no":

2 political divisions—Commonwealth and U.S.A.

2 functional divisions—Defence Liaison (2) and Disarmament

5 administrative divisions—Administrative Improvement Unit, Communications, Organization and Methods, Registry, and Supplies and Properties.

Commentary. Of all the divisions, services, and smaller units of each category, the administration sector uses French least. More than 50 per cent of the administrative divisions (five out of nine) never use French as the working language. The only two political divisions that do not do so are concerned with countries where English is the dominant language or the language of the administration.³ In two functional divisions English is the exclusive working language: in Disarmament, presumably because English has become the universal language of disarmament,⁴ and in Defence Liaison (2), because the particular ties of Canada in the field of security are limited to English-speaking countries and the federal agencies with which Canada deals are for all practical purposes unilingual.⁵

Question 2(a): If yes, how often?

This question could be answered in three ways:

- 1) "most of the time," that is, more than half the time
- 2) "about half the time"
- 3) "occasionally, but less than half the time," that is, a percentage between 1 and 49.

The Communications Division replied "about half the time," after having previously indicated that it never used French. The error no doubt arose from a confusion between written French used as a working language in that division and the French which it merely transmits abroad. Consequently the reply of the Communications Division was rejected.

Of the 18 valid replies, 17 replied "occasionally," which indicates that in almost all the divisions French is used less than 50 per cent of the time. The Passport Division replied "all the time as necessary" instead of "most of the time."

Question 2 (b): If yes, what percentage of the production of your division would you estimate was in French: in 1964, during the first six months of 1965, during the quarter April-June 1965?

The 17 replies received did not all correspond to the 18 divisions that replied "yes" to Question 1. Protocol and Personnel Operations did not reply to this question. Commonwealth estimated its proportion as 0.01 per cent after indicating in reply to Question 1 that it did not use French.

The striking feature about the 16 valid replies is that none of the percentages quoted exceeded 20 per cent. Only the Press Liaison Division, with a Francophone head of division, and the European Division, with a bilingual head and in a unit where French Canadian officers are traditionally well represented, reached this proportion of 20 per cent. The norm was around 1 per cent (Administrative Services) or 2 per cent (Far Eastern and Defence Liaison (1)), or at best 13 per cent (Consular, Finance). The Latin American and African and Middle Eastern divisions yielded 5 per cent each, while the United Nations, Legal, and Personnel Operations divisions estimated that 10 per cent of their work at the beginning of 1965 was drafted in French.

For the period from January 1964 to June 1965, we calculated that the average percentage of the work of the central administration written in French was as follows: 4.4 per cent in the political divisions, 3.4 per cent in the administrative, and 6.4 per cent in the functional.

All the replies received, except those from the African and Middle Eastern Division, listed percentages for the three periods mentioned earlier. The African and Middle Eastern Division, which apparently did not use French before April 1965, reported that 5 per cent of its work was drafted in French during the quarter, April-June 1965. In the majority of the other divisions, the tendency to an increase was either non-existent (Far Eastern, Finance, Consular, Passport, United Nations, Press and Liaison, Historical, Defence Liaison (1)); or minimal (Legal: 5 per cent, 5-10 per cent, 5-10 per cent; Administrative Services: 1 per cent, 1-2 per cent, 1-2 per cent; Latin American: 4 per cent, 5 per cent, 5 per cent). The most substantial increases recorded were Personnel Services Division: 8 per cent, 10 per cent, 10 per cent; European Division: 15 per cent, 20 per cent, 20 per cent; Economic Division: 2 per cent, 4 per cent, 6 per cent.

For the period January 1964 to June 1965, we calculated that the use of French in the central administration had increased on the average as follows: from 3.5 per cent (1964) to 5.3 per cent (April-June 1965) in the political divisions; from 3.0 per cent (1964) to 3.6 per cent (April-June 1965) in the administrative divisions; from 6.0 per cent (1964) to 6.8 per cent (April-June 1965) in the functional divisions.

Commentary. The rates of increase in the use of French are to our mind infinitely less important than its generally low level. The weakness of the administrative sector confirms one of the observations made on Question 1. The average low level of the use of French in the political divisions is quite obviously attributable to the total absence of French in two political divisions (U.S.A. and Commonwealth), and its virtual absence in three others (African and Middle Eastern, Far Eastern, and Latin American). In fact it is the European Division that disproportionately pushes up to 4.4 per cent the average over-all proportion of this category. The average of 6.4 per cent in the functional sector is attributable to three divisions, Press and Liaison, Passport, and Information which, by their very nature, have dealings with the Canadian public. The over-all average of 4.7 per cent for the three periods under scrutiny probably gives a more accurate idea of the place that French really occupies as a working language in the central administration of External Affairs.

Question 2(c): If yes, during the past two months, how frequently would you say French has been used by your division in five types of written communication? (The communications listed are those intended for: (1) the personnel of one division; (2) other divisions of the Department; (3) other government departments in Ottawa; (4) Canadian posts abroad; (5) the Canadian public.) (See Appendix B, 177.)

The Disarmament Division responded to this question despite its negative reply to Question 1. Of the 15 valid replies, the four political divisions that replied "yes" to Question 1 generally said "occasionally but less than half the time," with regard to each of the five types of communication enumerated. Only the Latin American Division

reported that the communications "whose circulation did not go beyond its personnel," as well as those "whose circulation extended to other divisions of the Department" and "those going to other departments in Ottawa," had "never" been drafted in French.

With the exception of the Personnel Services Division, which in this respect resembled the political divisions, the majority of the four administrative divisions replied either "never," or "occasionally, but less than half the time," on the subject of the five types of communication mentioned. As a general rule, the "never" replies referred to communications other than those "intended for Canadian posts abroad" and "the Canadian public."

Among the functional divisions, Consular, Disarmament, Economic, Historical, Protocol, and Defence Liaison (1) replied that communications whose circulation did not go beyond their personnel were never drafted in French. Of the 11 functional divisions, five (Disarmament, Passport, United Nations, Historical, and Defence Liaison (1)), replied "never" to communications circulating in other divisions and four (Disarmament, United Nations, Historical and Defence Liaison (1)), replied "never" to communications circulating in other government departments. There was virtual unanimity about "occasionally, but less than half the time" in the case of those sent to missions abroad or addressed to the public.

Commentary. One can see from these replies that the general tendency in both the administrative and functional divisions as well as in the Latin American Division is to reserve the use of French for certain contacts with posts abroad, and for communications addressed to the French-speaking Canadian public. Even then, the reply "occasionally but less than half the time" is no more than a general indication (from 1 to 49 per cent). It does seem however that the nearer one gets to the working unit, which is the division, the more English becomes the exclusive working language.

Question 2(d): If yes, what percentage of the telegraphic communications sent by your division to Canadian diplomatic missions abroad would you estimate was in French—in 1964, during the first six months of 1965, and during the quarter April-June 1965?

With few exceptions, the percentages quoted by the 17 divisions replying were extremely low. The replies from eight divisions were "nil": Far Eastern, Latin American (in 1964), Personnel Services, Administrative Services (in 1964 and during the term April-June 1965), Supplies and Properties, Passport, United Nations, and Defence Liaison (1). Replies were 1 per cent for the following: African and Middle Eastern, Consular, Economic (in 1964); 2 per cent for the following: Historical, Economic (during the first six months of 1965), Personnel Operations (in 1965), and Latin American (in 1965). The replies submitted by the European and Information divisions gave around 20 per cent; those of the Press and Liaison Division increased from 5 per cent at the beginning of 1965 to 10.7 per cent during the period January-June 1965.

Commentary. It will be observed that the replies to this question generally confirmed those to 2(b). The average percentages stand at around 4 per cent for the political and functional divisions, but fall to 0.33 per cent in the case of the administrative divisions.

Question 2(e): If yes, what percentage of the other communications sent by your division to Canadian diplomatic missions abroad would you estimate was in French—in 1964, during the first six months of 1965, during the quarter April-June 1965?

The 17 replies to this question showed a slight increase by comparison with those of 2(d) above, except in the case of the following two groups: Far Eastern, Supplies and Properties, Passport, United Nations, and Historical, which reported 0 per cent; and secondly, the Legal, Economic, and Consular, which remained respectively at 5 per cent, 3 per cent and 1 per cent. The increase remained very minor in Personnel Services (from 0 to 1 per cent), Administrative Services (from 0 to 1 per cent), Latin American (from 3 to 5 per cent), Personnel Operations (from 3 to 10 per cent), and Defence Liaison (1) (from 0 to 2 per cent). The Information Division reported that 15 per cent of its non-telegraphic communications addressed to Canadian posts abroad were drafted in French in 1965. The European Division and the Press and Liaison Division with 36.3 per cent were again the leaders.

The over-all averages established at around 5 per cent the use of French in the non-telegraphic communications of the political and functional divisions, and at 1.33 per cent the use of French in the administrative divisions.

Question 3: How many of your External Affairs staff are bilingual and how many are not bilingual?

This question was preceded by the following note giving a deliberately restrictive definition to the term "bilingual": "Bilingual officers and bilingual clerical and administrative staff are defined as persons who can perform their duties adequately in both official languages."

All the divisions (or services and smaller units) of the central administration, except the Administrative Improvement Unit, that is 26 out of 27, replied to this question. All did not however observe the restriction applied here to the term "bilingual." The Latin American Division, for example, took upon itself to set up three categories of bilingual persons:

- a) those completely bilingual;
- b) those who experience a certain difficulty in writing correctly in French but who speak it fluently;
- c) those who do not speak French well but who understand it."

The Finance Division established a category of "partially" bilingual officers. The Communications Division stated that it was impossible for it to determine the degree of bilingualism of its personnel.⁶ The Far Eastern Division, which replied correctly to the question by reporting one bilingual officer out of seven, nevertheless added that its officers were "all a little bilingual" in the sense that "we can all read easily, speak fairly fluently, and are probably capable of writing at least the first draft of a reply to a letter coming from a member of the public." The majority of the other divisions seem to have accepted our restriction on the term "bilingual."

However interesting they may be, such attitudes allow us to do little more than report the figures given with the strongest possible note of caution.⁷ According to our replies, the degree of bilingualism in the central administration would be as follows:

	<i>Bilingual</i>	<i>Non-Bilingual</i>
Foreign service officers	61	76
External affairs officers	16	37
Clerical and administrative personnel	235	474

Question 4: At present, which of the following factors would you say definitely inhibit the use of French as a working language in your division? (The factors were listed as follows: (1) lack of bilingual officers; (2) lack of bilingual clerical or administrative personnel; (3) lack of appropriate technical equipment; and (4) other factors.)

All divisions except the Administrative Improvement Unit replied to this question. Of 27 divisions, 16 put forward one or other of the first two of the four reasons suggested, namely the lack of bilingual officers and the lack of bilingual clerical or administrative personnel. The Commonwealth and Finance divisions gave as an additional reason "the lack of appropriate technical equipment in Ottawa." Communications, Supplies and Properties, Registry, Personnel Services, Passport, Protocol, and Historical divisions admitted that as far as they were concerned factors other than the lack of bilingual personnel and of technical equipment restricted or hindered the use of French as a working language.

Commentary. There seems to be a flagrant contradiction here between "the lack of bilingual personnel" cited by several divisions and the number of bilingual officers and bilingual clerical and administrative personnel reported above (Question 3). This contradiction may be more apparent than real, if one takes into account the inclination, noted among various sectors of the Department, to give a rather extended definition to the term "bilingual." It is curious to note that the decisive reason mentioned in support of the answer "no" to Question 1, in a division such as that of the Commonwealth, should here give way to the lack of bilingual personnel and of technical equipment. It is not without interest to note also that, except for the Finance Division, none of the administrative divisions gave as a reason for the limited use of French the lack of appropriate technical equipment.

Question 5: What other factors, if any, restrict the use of French as a working language in your division? (Please elaborate.)

Of 27 divisions, 25 replied to this "free" question. Four divisions (Administrative Services, Finance, Consular, and Passport) indicated that no factor other than those already mentioned in the preceding question restricted the use of French as a working language.

Three of the administrative divisions—Communications, Registry, and Personnel Services—which had not indicated "the lack of appropriate technical equipment at

Ottawa," mentioned American technical jargon as a limiting factor.⁸ The African and Middle Eastern Division was the only other one to do the same, but it also added other reasons.

The three other factors most often mentioned were: 1) the dictates of efficiency and rapid work, 2) need to work in English, and 3) the habit of using English. In 13 of the 25 replies received—five originating in the six political divisions—efficiency was cited. Thirteen divisions out of 25 (including eight functional divisions out of 12) insisted that their work necessitated the use of English. Six divisions (Latin American, African and Middle Eastern, Personnel Services, Disarmament, Information, and Protocol) mentioned their habit of using English. One division at least placed the responsibility in certain cases upon French-speaking officers.⁹ Several put the use of French in the Department back in the general context of federal public administration,¹⁰ or agreed that they did not see the use of French in their work.¹¹ The Economic Division and several administrative divisions alluded to the pressure under which work must be carried out in the Department.¹² The United Nations Division underlined the preferences of its clientele,¹³ and the Protocol Division alleged that federal officials were anglicized.¹⁴ The final word came from the Personnel Operations Division: "After all, the principal factor is that one writes to be understood. If the addressee cannot at least read a simple note, what is the use of writing it in French . . . ?"

Commentary. The replies to this question surpass the others both in variety and importance. They throw into relief the fundamental reasons why French is little used in External Affairs as a working language. They tend in particular to impute to others the responsibility for this state of affairs at the departmental headquarters in Ottawa. They therefore render extremely complex the task of evaluating in any exact way the situation as a whole.

Question 6: Do the diplomatic missions abroad with which you are dealing communicate with you in French?

Out of the 26 divisions replying, seven said "no." Two were political: Commonwealth and U.S.A.; three were administrative: Communications, Organization and Methods, and Registry; two were functional: Defence Liaison (2) and Passport. The technical nature of the work of the last two apparently makes the use of English necessary in all posts abroad.

Question 7(a): If yes, how often?

Eighteen of the 19 replies received said "occasionally, but less than half the time" the lowest degree. Only the Press and Liaison Division replied "about half the time."

Question 7(b): If yes, please list the missions which most frequently send communications to you in French.

The four political divisions that had replied "yes" to Question 6 mentioned Paris three times, Berne and Lisbon twice, and Havana, Beirut, Brussels, Athens, Port-au-Prince, Yaoundé, Ankara, Buenos Aires, Rome, Rio de Janeiro, and Madrid once each.

The five administrative divisions that had answered "yes" to Question 6 mentioned Paris five times, Buenos Aires four time's, Berne, London, and Yaoundé twice, and Rio de Janeiro, Athens, Havana, Brussels, Port-au-Prince, and Bordeaux once each.

The 10 functional divisions that had answered "yes" mentioned Paris 10 times, Brussels, Berne, Athens, Rome, and Rio de Janeiro twice, and Yaoundé, Bordeaux, and Havana once each.

Several of these replies indicated that the choice of French made by posts was due to reasons of personality. The Finance Division went so far as to attach the names of the French-speaking ambassadors to each of its five posts: Rio de Janeiro (Paul Beaulieu), Havana (Léon Mayrand), Paris (Jules Léger), Buenos Aires (Jean Bruchési), and London (Lionel Chevrier). The Legal Division replied that "generally the missions included French Canadians." Personnel Operations Division, after mentioning the Paris embassy, indicated that "for the others, in the matter of personnel, everything, or almost, depends upon the author of the communication."

Commentary. The replies to this question lead one to anticipate a certain "personalization" of the use of French in posts abroad.

Question 7(c): If yes, what percentage of the telegraphic communications received from each of the missions listed above (7(b)), and referred to you for action, would you estimate was in French in 1964, in the first six months of 1965, in the quarter April-June 1965?

We first established a list of the seven posts most frequently mentioned in Question 7(b) by the divisions of the central administration. These were Paris (29 per cent); Berne (9.5 per cent); Buenos Aires (9.5 per cent); Rio de Janeiro, Brussels, and Athens (6.4 per cent); and Havana (4.8 per cent). For each of the periods indicated we then grouped the replies submitted by categories of divisions (political, functional, and administrative), so as to enable us to calculate average percentages for the 18 months covered by the three periods. It is apparent from these calculations that 21.9 per cent of the telegraphic communications received from the Paris embassy by the central administration between January 1964 and June 1965 were drafted in French, and that the percentages for the other posts were as follows: 29.5 per cent (Berne), 16.9 per cent (Buenos Aires), 11.7 per cent (Rio de Janeiro), 20.8 per cent (Brussels), 8.7 per cent (Athens) and 1 per cent (Havana). In the case of Paris and Athens, it was the political divisions that reported the highest average percentages. In the case of Berne, Buenos Aires, and Brussels, it was the functional divisions.

Question 7(d): The same as question 7(c), but for non-telegraphic communications.

Proceeding along the same lines as for 7(c), we obtained the following average percentages for non-telegraphic communications: Paris (14.8 per cent), Berne (39.2 per

cent), Buenos Aires (17 per cent), Rio de Janeiro (13.6 per cent), Brussels (24.3 per cent), Athens (10.9 per cent), and Havana (4.3 per cent). It will be noticed here that, except for Paris where the telegraphic traffic is considerable, the percentages of non-telegraphic communications in French are slightly higher than those for telegraphic communications. In both cases it is a question of assessments made by the central administration or by the addressees themselves. We thought it worthwhile to compare these estimates with a factual study of the traffic between the missions and Ottawa carried out on our behalf by the "mail opening unit" of the Registry Division.¹⁵ It must be stressed that this study has only a reference value for our purposes, since it deals with a period (July 15-September 15, 1965) later than the one with which our questionnaire was concerned.

Table 12 lists for non-telegraphic communications only the percentages of communications received by the central administration from certain missions abroad estimated to be in French by the division concerned and those reported by the Registry Division.

Table 12. Use of French in non-telegraphic communications received in Ottawa from seven missions abroad as seen by various divisions of central administration and by the Registry Division, estimated percentages

Mission	Average estimate of the various divisions	Estimate of the Registry Division July 15-Sept. 15, 1965
	Jan. 1964-June 1965	
Paris	14.8	22.0
Berne	39.2	18.7
Buenos Aires	17.0	1.6
Rio de Janeiro	13.6	4.4
Brussels	24.3	3.0
Athens	10.9	4.3
Havana	4.3	5.0

This table is open to two interpretations: either the period July-September is in no way representative of the normal work of these posts, or the estimates jointly arrived at by the Ottawa divisions are manifestly inaccurate, except for those of the Paris embassy. We do not believe that the July-September or summer period is abnormal for the posts abroad, with a few exceptions. At the most, it is a season when diplomatic activity perhaps slows down a little. Moreover, for two of the missions listed (Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro, which are in the southern hemisphere) the period July-September corresponds to winter. The disparities revealed by this table are also too wide not to be striking. For four of the seven posts, the corresponding percentages fall from more than 10 to less than five; for the fifth, from 39.2 to 18.7. This is surprising, to say the least, in the case of missions under the same French-speaking officers. And one cannot place on the same footing two embassies that like Paris and Berne have percentages comparable to those reported by the Registry Division, given the very different size in volume of their respective communications. Would this mean that only the Canadian Embassy in Paris consistently uses French as a working language abroad? "Perhaps," we are tempted to

reply, at least at this stage of our examination. However, before arriving at such a conclusion we plan to examine first the replies to our questionnaire from the posts abroad.

The most important points in the results of the first questionnaire are summarized below.

B. Summary

1. The use of French as a working language in the central administration is generally at a low level.
2. The administrative divisions of the central administration are those in which French is the least used; one political division (European), and two functional divisions (Press and Liaison, and Information), whose very function consists in part in dealing with the Canadian public, appear to use French fairly frequently.
3. The use of French in the central administration divisions shows no marked tendency either to increase or decrease.
4. The use of French in the central administration seems to be in inverse proportion to the extent of its field of use.
5. With a few exceptions, the central administration divisions appear to use French to the extent that it is imposed upon them by posts abroad, rather than undertaking themselves to ensure a wider diffusion of the language.
6. The placing of the Department within the general context of a unilingual federal administration, the habit and the convenience of using English for working purposes, and finally the fact that the Department of External Affairs has neither the clerical and administrative personnel nor the necessary technical means to do otherwise seem to be the main reasons which restrict the use of French as a working language in the central administration.

By their replies to Questionnaire No. 2, posts abroad showed that generally speaking they were less sensitive than the divisions in Ottawa to the use of French as a working language. Certain posts took a considerable time to return the questionnaire. One Canadian ambassador in a European country stated that he felt obliged to take exception to "a few of the ambiguous and statistical misconceptions of the oversimplified approach in this questionnaire." The reasons put forward in support of this statement appear further on in our text, in the appropriate places. The vast majority of the missions abroad replied more obligingly, some by qualifying their replies with reservations or commentaries appropriate to their particular situation, others by taking certain liberties in interpreting a particular question.

A. Questions and Answers

Question 1: Is French used as a working language at your post?

Of the 88 replies possible, three were missing: the permanent delegations to the three European communities in Brussels—the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). We shall presume however that the reply received from the Canadian Embassy in Brussels covered the whole area of work for which this mission is responsible, that is, the work situation in the embassy itself and in the relations of its personnel with these three organizations. Among the replies received, two were from the consulate general in New York—one from its consular section, the other from its information and administration section.

Fifty-six posts replied "yes" to Question 1; 29 "no." The latter were: Cairo, Pretoria, Wellington, Colombo, Dar-es-Salaam, Port of Spain, Nicosia, Georgetown, New Delhi, Karachi, Rawalpindi, Berlin, Hamburg, Bonn, Dusseldorf, Dublin, Stockholm, Oslo,

Tokyo, Manila, Djakarta, Quito, San José, New York (consulate general), Detroit, New Orleans, Seattle, Los Angeles, and the Canadian delegation to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva.

Commentary. Nearly half the posts where French is not used (14 out of 29) are in Commonwealth countries or the United States. Among the important European countries, only the missions in Germany (Bonn, Berlin, Hamburg, Dusseldorf) do not use French.

Question 2(a): If yes, how often? ¹

Of the 56 replies received, five posts replied "most of the time," six "about half of the time," and 45 "occasionally, but less than half the time." The five posts using French most of the time, which according to our grading could only mean "more than half the time," were Marseilles, Bordeaux, Paris (embassy), Athens, and Port-au-Prince. The six posts that said they used French "about half the time" were Beirut, Yaoundé, Brussels, Berne, Phnom Penh, and the permanent Canadian delegation to UNESCO (Paris).

Commentary. There is a striking coincidence here between the significant use of French in the 11 missions just mentioned and the status of that language in the countries in which the missions are located. In these countries French is either the official language, as in France; or, as in Cambodia, it enjoys the enviable status of a privileged foreign language. Moreover, it should be noted that the five posts where French was used more than half the time were all directed by Francophones.

Table 13. Use of French in 11 missions abroad 1964 and 1965, estimated percentages

Mission	1964	Jan.-June 1965	April, May, June 1965
Beirut	55	55	60
Brussels	40-50	40-50	40-50
Marseilles	— *	— *	60
Bordeaux	— *	85	—
Paris (embassy)	64	66	67
Berne	40	75	75
Athens	15	30	30
Phnom Penh	50	50	50
Yaoundé	45	45	45
Port-au-Prince	55	60	61
Unesco (Paris)	40	50	50

*Not open during a part or all of this period.

Question 2(b): If yes, what percentage of all the work at your post would you estimate was in French—in 1964, during the first six months of 1965, during the quarter April-June 1965? ²

Sixty-one replies were received including those from Cairo, Tokyo, Quito, San José, and the Canadian delegation to the Disarmament Conference which had replied in the negative to Question 1. Table 13 sets out the replies of the 11 missions using French at least "half or more than half the time."

Among the other replies, there are first those from the missions where French already occupied a relatively important place (25 per cent or more): Leopoldville, Accra, Copenhagen, OECD (Paris), and NATO (Paris).³ Secondly there are all the other posts where the percentages ranged from 20 (Buenos Aires) to 0.25 (Chicago). Of the latter, 26 missions reported percentages lower than 5 for all three periods. The Madrid post reported 20 per cent in 1964, or more precisely until the departure of Ambassador Jean Bruchési, and 5 per cent since that time.

Half of the replies received showed no tendency either to an increase or decrease in the use of French during the three periods under study. Four of the replies registered a downward trend: Warsaw (20 per cent, 2 per cent, 1 per cent), The Hague (1.5 per cent, 1 per cent, 1 per cent), Montevideo (2 per cent, 0.5 per cent, 0.5 per cent), and Caracas (15 per cent, 8 per cent, 5 per cent). On the other hand, Vientiane showed a considerable increase (5 per cent, 35 per cent, 46 per cent). The delegation to the Disarmament Conference (Geneva), which declared originally (Question 1) that it did not use French, moved from 4 per cent in 1964 to 10 per cent during April-June 1965.

Commentary. For all practical purposes, no serious change can be detected from 1964 to 1965 in the percentages relating to the use of French in posts abroad. However, in the case of the majority of the 11 posts where French is used "half or more than half the time" as well as in the case of other missions, it seems obvious that such replies included an unspecified fraction covering the use of non-written French.

Question 2(c): If yes, what percentage of the telegraphic communications from your post to central administration would you estimate was in French?

Twenty-nine of the 61 posts entered 0 per cent against each of the three periods indicated. It should be noted that one of these posts, Phnom Penh, had replied "50 per cent" to question 2(b). Of the other 10 posts where French was used at least half the time, the lowest percentages were those of Beirut (0.56, 0, and 0), and the highest, those of Berne (35, 65, and 70). The Paris embassy reported 10 per cent, 20 per cent, and 20 per cent; the Brussels embassy, 2 per cent, 2.5 per cent, and 5.5 per cent. The embassy at Leopoldville noted that all its telegraphic communications addressed in French (5 per cent of its total traffic in 1965) were destined for the External Aid office (French section presumably).

Commentary. Generally speaking, a very small percentage of telegraphic communications emanate from missions abroad in French. Except for Berne, nowhere did the proportion reach 20 per cent during the three periods under review. In fact, in the majority of cases the percentage remained between 0 and 1 per cent.

Table 14. Use of French in non-telegraphic communications received in Ottawa from eight missions abroad as seen by the missions themselves and by the Registry Division 1965, estimated percentages

Mission	Highest estimate of the mission itself	Estimate of the Registry Division
Paris (embassy)	28.0	22.0
Berne	80.0	18.7
Buenos Aires	20.0	1.6
Beirut	20.0	6.3
Yaoundé	30.0	2.4
Vientiane	31.0	9.0
Port-au-Prince	59.0	18.9
New York (UN)	20.0	0.0

Question 2(d): If yes, what percentage of non-telegraphic communications from your post to central administration would you estimate was in French?

Twenty-five of the 61 replies showed 0 per cent for each of the three periods. Twenty other missions gave figures which did not exceed 5 per cent from the beginning of 1964 to the middle of 1965. For one or other of the three periods nine posts reported figures of 20 per cent and over: Beirut (20), Yaoundé (30), Paris (embassy) (28), Berne (80), Vientiane (31), Buenos Aires (20), Port-au-Prince (59), UNESCO (Paris) (56) and the permanent delegation to the UN (20).⁴ Table 14 shows the percentages mentioned above (except for UNESCO (Paris) owing to lack of figures) alongside the corresponding percentages quoted by the Registry Division in its report for the period July 15-September 15.

This table calls for comments generally similar to those relating to question 7(d) of Questionnaire No. 1. We shall however add one point: among the above embassies, only the Canadian Embassy in Paris seems to have had some real concern for accuracy in formulating its reply.

Question 3: How many of the officers and the clerical and administrative personnel at your post are bilingual, and how many are not? ⁵

Eighty-five replies out of a possible 85 were received.⁶ Six posts (Hamburg, Dusseldorf, Stockholm, Sao Paulo, Los Angeles, and San Francisco) reported that they had no foreign service officer on their staff at the time of replying to the questionnaire. Among the 79 others, 20 replied that they had no bilingual officer. In the remaining 59 posts, 118 officers were reported bilingual and 117 not bilingual.

Of 85 posts, 40 reported that they had no external affairs officer on their staff. Of the 45 others, 25 declared that they had no bilingual external affairs officer. In the remaining 20 posts there were reported to be 24 external affairs officers who were bilingual and 42 who were not.

The part of Question 3 referring to the "clerical and administrative personnel" applied less to people abroad than to those in Ottawa. Indeed, in the majority of missions it is likely that the degree of bilingualism of at least a part of this personnel is better defined by the knowledge they possess of the dominant working language of the Department—English—and of the language of the country in which they are located, than by their knowledge of the two official languages of Canada.

Commentary. In the light of the information that the Personnel Operations Division has assembled on the degree of bilingualism among foreign service officers—some of it dating back to 1961—the various totals of bilingual diplomatic personnel in posts abroad, as reported above, are open to doubt. In fact, in their replies several missions interpreted the term "bilingual" in a much broader sense than we had done in the note at the beginning of Question 3.⁷ Certain unilingual persons obviously felt no obligation to respect the meaning of the term "bilingual" as it is applied to French-speaking Canadians throughout the whole of the federal administration.

Question 4: At present which of the following factors would you say definitely inhibit the use of French as a working language at your post?

The following four posts did not reply explicitly to this question: Mexico, New York (consulate general), Seattle and the permanent delegation to the UN (New York). The 81 others replied as follows:

	<i>No. of Replies</i>
— lack of bilingual officers	32
— lack of bilingual clerical or administrative personnel	48
— lack of appropriate technical equipment	14
— none of the three factors above	30

Commentary. It would appear that the lack of bilingual personnel is *a priori* the first factor responsible for the slight use of French abroad.⁸ Without wishing to deny or minimize the importance of this inhibiting circumstance, we refer the reader to Question 5, where the general reasons for this state of affairs are more apparent.

Question 5: What other factors, if any, restrict the use of French as a working language at your post? Please elaborate.⁹

Seventeen of the 82 replies reported that they saw no factors other than those mentioned under Question 4. Of these 17 posts, seven had checked "none of the three factors above" in the preceding question, which suggests that nothing restricted them in their use of French as a working language. These posts were Bordeaux, Dusseldorf (where French is not used at all), Vientiane, Sao Paulo, Santo Domingo (which explained in a comment that the working language in the Dominican Republic is English), Port-au-Prince (which noted that it had to use English for reasons of efficiency and rapidity), and

Boston. The other posts indicated the following reasons which restricted the use of French:

	<i>No. of Replies</i>
– efficiency and rapidity	24
– the language of the country where the post is located is English	28
– the working language of the post is English	38
– absence of technical facilities ¹⁰	11
– local translators do not know French	1

Several added individual remarks to the reasons listed above. The Canadian delegation to the UN (Geneva) noted that in Geneva "English is more used as an 'original' conference language," and the Canadian Embassy in Mexico pointed out that "under the impact of 'big business' and tourists (2,000,000 annually) from the U.S., English is by far the foreign language in most general use in Mexico." The embassy in Montevideo wrote that "in a small post such as this, in a country where neither French nor English is an official language, and where neither is readily understood, the use of French or English as a working language in correspondence to the Department would depend to a great extent on the language in which the drafting officer is most conversant." The Vienna embassy stressed the presence on its staff of representatives of the departments of Trade and Commerce, Manpower and Immigration, Justice, and National Health and Welfare, adding that "since English is a second language for many Austrians with whom we do business, French is not essential." The Warsaw embassy recognized that "French is a great asset in Warsaw (and even more so for those who speak no Polish)," but that the use of French is restricted to "replies to letters of French Canadian citizens, certain standard protocol notes and social correspondence."

The Canadian delegation to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva reported that "in the frequent meetings of the delegations of the four NATO members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), English is the working language," and that "of the 17 representatives on the ENDC, 11 deliver their statements in English, 3 in Russian, 2 in French and 1 in Spanish." The Canadian delegation to the "Kennedy Round" negotiations noted laconically the "lack of use by GATT and other delegations of French as a working language." The permanent Canadian delegation to NATO (Paris) insisted that "out of 14 officers only 5 (including the head of the delegation) are from the Department of External Affairs," and that "a very large proportion of communications from Ottawa originate therefore from departments other than External Affairs and approximately the same proportion from this mission to Ottawa originate from non-External Affairs officers." Finally, the delegation to the international commission for supervision and control in Vietnam pointed out "the fact that the working language of the international Commission is English."¹¹

Commentary: Although several missions stated either that "the major part of their correspondence dealt with administrative and technical questions,"¹² or that certain French-speaking Canadians, through lack of habit, failed to work in their own language or were incapable of doing so, it appears that the use of French in posts abroad is restricted

more by external circumstances than by conditions depending upon the Department. To the enormous progress of English as a universal diplomatic language must be added two incontrovertible facts: the importance of federal departments other than the Department of External Affairs in the supervision of the technical aspects of foreign policy, and the exclusively "Anglo-Saxon" associations and "special ties" of Canada in the field of international relations.

Question 6: Does the inter-departmental use to which your reports may be put in Ottawa ever influence you *not* to draft in French when sending communications to Ottawa? ¹³

Fifty-nine of the 82 replies received were marked "never." Five (Ankara, Prague, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, and the permanent delegation to the UN (New York)) replied "yes, most of the time"; 17 replied "yes, sometimes"; Copenhagen was the only post to reply, "yes, always."

Question 7: Does the central administration (Ottawa) communicate with you in French?

Sixty-one posts out of 85 replied "yes" and 24 "no." The latter were Leopoldville, Cairo, Pretoria, Wellington, Colombo, Nicosia, Georgetown, Karachi, Rawalpindi, Hamburg, Dusseldorf, Madrid, Copenhagen, Tokyo, Djakarta, Lima, Quito, Sao Paulo, the consulate general in New York (consular section), Detroit, Chicago, Seattle, Los Angeles, and GATT (Geneva).

Question 8(a): If yes, how often?

All 70 replies received, with the exception of two, stated "occasionally but less than half the time." Yaoundé replied "about half the time" and Manila, still more curiously, "most of the time." The nine replies received over and above the total of replies possible can probably be explained by the inclusion of "Circular Documents" among the communications received from the central administration.

Question 8(b): If yes, what percentage of the telegraphic communications addressed by central administration to your post would you estimate was in French- in 1964, during the first six months of 1965, during the quarter April-June 1965?

Sixty-seven replies were received. All the figures varied between 0 and 5 per cent (particularly 0 and 1 per cent) for each of the three periods mentioned,¹⁴ apart from percentages from the following posts: Leopoldville (5, 8, 8), Yaoundé (15, 15, 15), Paris (embassy) (11, 16, 18), Berne (20, 35, 40), Phnom Penh (20, 20, 20), Buenos Aires (5, 10, 10), Santo Domingo (10, 10, 10), and UNESCO (Paris) (10, 10, 20). It may be that the same confusion as in the preceding question slipped into many of the replies. No tendency either upward or downward was discernible.

Question 8(c): If yes, what percentage of non-telegraphic communications addressed to your post by the central administration would you estimate was in French—in 1964, during the first six months of 1965, during the quarter April-June 1965?

Of the 66 replies received, 45 showed percentages that at their highest did not exceed 5.0 per cent. Of the other 21 replies, Berne was at the head of the list with 40 per cent, followed by Bogota (30), Yaoundé (25),¹⁵ Manila (30), Phnom Penh (20), Buenos Aires (20), and UNESCO (Paris) (20). The Paris embassy reported only 11 per cent, 10 per cent, and 10 per cent, while all the permanent delegations to international organizations—OECD, NATO, Disarmament, GATT, the UN (Geneva), the UN (New York)—had percentages which did not exceed 5 per cent. As in the case of Question 8 (b), no recession or progress was discernible. On the whole, however, where French was used, the percentages of non-telegraphic communications received from the central administration were slightly higher than the percentages of telegraphic communications.

B. Summary

1. The use of French as a working language in posts abroad was at an extremely low level.
2. The use of French was for all practical purposes confined to the posts situated in French-language countries or countries of the “French community.”
3. The use of French in the countries mentioned in (2) showed no marked tendency to increase or decrease in the period surveyed.
4. Among the large, “important” embassies, only the Paris embassy apparently used French constantly; among the permanent delegations, those situated in French-language countries (France, Belgium, Switzerland) used French essentially for local purposes.
5. More than by conditions peculiar to the Department itself, such as the lack of bilingual personnel and adequate technical facilities, the extension of French as a working language among posts abroad was impeded by three essential factors:
 - a) the world ascendancy of “Anglo-Saxon” diplomacy, which gives English a dominant position in international relations;
 - b) the “special ties” of Canada with the United States and the Commonwealth countries;
 - c) the veritable take-over by other agencies of the federal administration of the execution, if not the direction, of Canadian foreign policy.

When an attempt is made to compare the outstanding features in the replies to our two questionnaires, one is immediately struck by the way in which the reasons cited to explain the meagre use of French in the Department interact and overlap. On the negative side, both in Ottawa and abroad, one must recognize beyond dispute the imperatives of speed and efficiency, the absence of bilingual personnel, the lack of adequate technical resources, and finally the fact that the Department of External Affairs fits into the general context of the federal administration. On the positive side, which is much less important,

our attention is drawn to the concentration of Francophone officers in certain positions in the central administration and in posts abroad, the effect of which is to facilitate the use of French within and between certain working units. But the reader has no doubt observed that the only sectors of the Department where French is really employed are precisely the missions directed by French-speaking officers and the divisions of the central administration where Francophones are well represented. Because the initiative for the use of French comes essentially from missions abroad, it is particularly useful to look into the situation at the embassy where French is used most frequently and where the circumstances are as favourable as possible for the use of French—the Canadian Embassy in Paris.

A. The Paris Embassy

The Canadian Embassy in Paris is the most important of the Canadian embassies in French-language countries. It is also one of the most outstanding on the European continent, both for the number of its personnel and the scope of its services.

The embassy's personnel includes about 60 Canadians, of whom about 20 have diplomatic status, that is, their names appear on the diplomatic list. It maintains a variety of diplomatic, consular, commercial and military services whose range at any time is roughly proportionate to the importance of current relations between Canada and France. Furthermore, the embassy has one special feature: it serves as a relay point for communications between Ottawa and the Paris offices of several federal government agencies and a certain number of Canadian diplomatic missions, notably in Europe. In fact it is the largest centre of official Canadian communications in Western Europe.

Most of the embassy services are grouped together under one roof, that is the chancery, Avenue Montaigne. The commercial and military services come under the control of the departments of Trade and Commerce and National Defence respectively; the diplomatic services, which comprise political, cultural and administrative affairs, and consular services are all under the jurisdiction of the Department of External Affairs.

B. General Organization of Work

In this section we shall describe briefly the present structure of the diplomatic and consular services of the embassy, and shall define the responsibilities of those directing these services.

The ambassador is the head of the embassy. Theoretically, he is responsible for all the embassy services, including commercial and military services. Usually he deals with the heads of the embassy's departments or sections, except in political (and economic)

matters when he sometimes prefers to discuss problems directly with the officer responsible for preparing a particular dispatch or report. In general, the ambassador signs texts prepared for him by the embassy's personnel—providing that he is in agreement. He reserves for himself the task of making reports on problems discussed with the French authorities at the higher echelon. He also deals directly, of course, with those responsible for Canadian policy in Ottawa.

The minister is both the managing director of the embassy and the head of the political affairs section. In fact he is the deputy head or the "number 2" man. He is generally more involved than the ambassador in immediate problems. It is he who puts into practice the ambassador's general ideas on how the work should be organized. The minister himself, at the time of our survey, also insisted on following the economic policy of France, particularly problems related to the Common Market.

The first counsellor or "number 3" in the embassy is the head of the chancery and the person in charge of administration. He also supervises the consular affairs section. Like the minister and all the officers working in the various sections, the counsellor undertakes the drafting of numerous reports in those fields for which he has the primary responsibility.

The rest of the work in the diplomatic and consular services is divided among four main groups or sections: 1) political affairs, 2) press and cultural affairs, 3) consular affairs, and 4) administrative affairs.

The embassy's awareness of the needs of the central administration in Ottawa is the common concern that dictates the work of the above sections. The essential function of the political affairs section, which keeps track of the political situation in France, is to provide Ottawa with relevant information. The press and cultural affairs section, which has much to do on the spot, was at the time of our survey in the process of developing regular contacts both with the Information Division of the Department and with certain cultural agencies in Canada, particularly the National Gallery and the Canada Council. The consular affairs section, a good part of whose work is also essentially local, deals with certain divisions of the central administration, such as the Consular and Legal divisions. The administrative affairs section, which is entrusted with the conduct of the internal services of the embassy, is responsible to the various administrative divisions in Ottawa for the administration of the embassy.

It will be seen that these four sections are more or less autonomous in their respective fields. They are nevertheless closely interdependent from the point of view of the execution of their duties. The work of the political, press and cultural, and consular sections depends partly on the resources of the administrative section, particularly its communications facilities. At the same time, some of the work of the administrative section, particularly the way in which it applies the Department's regulations to the embassy, affects all the sections. This means that the work of one section can hardly be isolated from a network of dependencies and interdependencies, and that no section really escapes the effect of certain external conditions. However, as far as French is concerned, it is the conditions peculiar to each section of the embassy that determine the degree to which it is used as a working language.

C. Use of French: The Facts²

For our purposes, we shall consider the ambassador's office on the same footing as the various sections of the embassy.

1. Office of the ambassador

This office consists of the ambassador himself and his female secretary, both French-speaking. Except for one or two subjects (among them nuclear energy) and dispatches that are of interest primarily to the Canadian embassies in English-speaking countries, in particular Washington, the ambassador uses only French in drafting reports and dispatches. He also writes in French to the English-speaking personnel in the central administration whom he knows can read French. About 90 per cent of the work of this office is therefore conducted in French.

Moreover, French is the language in which the ambassador conducts all the weekly (External Affairs) and monthly (External Affairs, Trade and Commerce, National Defence) meetings of the diplomatic personnel at the embassy.

2. Political affairs section

This section is composed of six foreign service officers (three French-speaking and three English-speaking) and five female secretaries, all French-speaking Canadians. The work is drafted in either French or English, about equally. The French-speaking officers of this section deal with their superiors, apart from the ambassador, sometimes in French, sometimes in English. Their Anglophone colleagues normally use their own language in the regular embassy staff meetings held in the ambassador's office.

3. Press and cultural affairs section

This section is composed of a foreign service officer and an external affairs officer, both French-speaking, and the secretaries who are French nationals. French is used 90 to 95 per cent of the time in the work of this section.

4. Consular affairs section

This section consists of an English-speaking foreign service officer, a "chief clerk" whose language is French, and two female secretaries, both French-speaking Canadians. The section works in "*la langue de la clientèle*," and deals with the central administration in the two languages, "taking it for granted that the language of a part of the personnel of the Consular and Passport divisions in the central administration is French."³ It uses mainly two reference documents, the Canadian Citizenship Act (1947) in its French version, and the "Consular Instructions," which exists only in English.

5. Administrative affairs section

This section contains the largest number of Canadian employees: one external affairs officer, three clerks, one female secretary, one accountant, one receptionist, five people in charge of records and mail, one maintenance man—all of them Francophones; 17 cipher clerks or communicators and technicians of whom seven are Anglophones, three confidential messengers including two Anglophones, and five security guards of whom one is an Anglophone.

Yet the administrative affairs section presents the most obstacles to the use of French. The first obstacle is the state of bilingualism among its personnel. At least six of its Anglophone employees—one technician, one guard and four communicators—are either unilingual or very slightly bilingual. Furthermore, a fair number of the Francophone employees belong to an uncertain category that is neither French nor English. Several of them have a poor knowledge of written French, while others, on their own admission, are more at home in English than in French when expressing themselves.

The second obstacle concerns certain technical aspects of the work of the section. Since September 1965 the embassy has classified documents for its archives according to the new system introduced into the central administration (Ottawa) in March 1965. This system has the undeniable advantage of ensuring the uniform treatment of documents throughout the whole Department.⁴ As a result, however, all the titles of the embassy records except one, the *accord-cadre*, are in English. In regard to communications, it is important to distinguish between the manual and mechanical operations of ciphering and deciphering. In the case of those posts at present served by the Paris embassy which are not equipped with mechanical means of communication, such as Madrid, Lisbon, and Yaoundé, the transmission from Paris of messages ciphered in French represents an extremely slow and time-consuming operation, as does the reception, which requires from 20 to 30 hours of work.⁵ For messages ciphered and deciphered mechanically, a knowledge of French is not essential, although it is useful, especially when confused portions of messages have to be redrafted.⁶

The third obstacle derives from the fact that all regulations and reference documents in the administrative sector of the Department are exclusively in English. The result is that the personnel of the administrative affairs section naturally work in English and do not dare depart unilaterally from the traditional working rules in this sector of the Department.

The administrative affairs section therefore carries on its business in English, both with the other sections of the embassy and with Ottawa. It uses French only in its relations with the French authorities (letters, forms, and so on). However the section has been endeavouring for some time to translate into French or to draft in both languages certain documents not circulated beyond the staff of the embassy.

D. Use of French: An Interpretation

It is clear from the above comments that French is widely though unevenly used as a working language at the Canadian Embassy in Paris. Compared with the commercial and military services of the embassy, both of which communicate almost exclusively in

English with their respective departments of Trade and Commerce and Defence,⁷ that part of the embassy which is under the jurisdiction of External Affairs makes a very good showing. Where French is least used, particularly in the administrative and consular affairs sections, it would appear that the embassy is the prisoner of the general system prevailing throughout the Department. The inferior educational level of the lower-ranking Francophone personnel constitutes an additional limiting factor.

The positive side of the situation is based on several key elements. The personalities involved are the basic factor. It is always as a result of a personal decision that certain officers of the embassy use French; what is more, those who draft their communications in French do so with less and less concern for the problems which the use of this language may create in Ottawa. It is abundantly clear that these officers are seeking to establish the habit of French, by imposing it on the central administration. But it is no less evident that they could not display such boldness—at least not for long—if they were not receiving the more or less direct approval of their superiors. It is a well-known fact that the central administration, or the Department as such, has always been careful not to formulate any general policy whatever on the use of French as a working language; and that the Department has never wished even to appear to encourage “the widest possible use” of French—except for a single gesture following an initiative taken in 1964 by the embassy in Paris regarding the transmission of certain documents.⁸

It is clear in the circumstances that the embassy authorities must have assumed responsibility for explicitly encouraging officers to work in their own language. The embassy makes it clear unofficially to every officer that he can work in his own language, whether French or English. But such an option could have been neither valid nor applied if the managing director of the embassy, in this particular case the minister, had not possessed an excellent knowledge of French and if the ambassador himself had not set an example.

This positive side, however, is not without its weaknesses. For example, officers who have chosen to work in French while in Paris⁹ run the risk of losing ground in English, which is the predominant language in the Department. Such a risk is a serious matter as these officers will inevitably encounter English again, either in the central administration or in other posts abroad. It is undeniable that the use of French in the embassy (or the tendency towards its increased use) remains basically a matter of chance, in the sense that it results from the changing pattern of personnel in the Department. There is no doubt that high-ranking officers less zealous than others to encourage the use of French, less qualified themselves to work in French, or less attuned to the political events in Canada than were the officers serving at this embassy in September 1965, might very well call everything into question once more, in view of the absence of a policy or a general plan.¹⁰ Small embassies in French-speaking countries, such as the embassies at Berne and Port-au-Prince, illustrate convincingly that the situation can change overnight under the influence of changes in personnel, from one in which French is used entirely or partially to one in which it is not used at all and vice versa. Be that as it may, the case of the Canadian Embassy in Paris proves, in our opinion, that with the help of other favourable circumstances a concentration of Francophone officers in a given sector of the Department can lead to results which may be limited but are nevertheless important from the point of view of the use of French as a working language.

The object of our study was to describe, according to the terms of reference of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the composition of the diplomatic personnel of the Department of External Affairs, and to report on the use of French as a working language in the Department. It appears useful at this point to set out the main arguments developed in the course of this study, and to draw a number of practical conclusions from them.

Whatever the situation may be from the point of view of bilingualism and duality of culture, and whether or not the Department is more or less bilingual, basically or nominally bicultural, we have first and foremost tried to stress an extremely important fact: that the Department of External Affairs has grown at a rate which must inevitably be responsible for serious structural deficiencies (*see* Introduction, 4-8). In our view, this condition has predetermined any steps that might have been taken to transform the Department into an authentically bilingual and bicultural organization.

It is clear from our study that until the early 1950's, and most certainly up to the end of World War II, that is to say during the main period of its development, the Department of External Affairs was dominated by an English-speaking elite, relatively homogenous both in origin and professional training (*see* Recruitment, 57-62 and 76-9) and in background and education (*see* Recruitment, 79-83). It is evident that this elite has been able to set the pattern for the fundamental orientation of the Department's personnel policy. In any case, all evidence suggests that this elite has favoured the recruitment of career officers from the faculties of arts and sciences, and has ensured that the philosophy of "on-the-job training" be adopted. Moreover, the criteria and standards of the elite prevailed in the Department in the use that was made of foreign service officers and in how their services were judged (*see* Postings, 102-9 and Advancement, 115-16).

The elite was undoubtedly able to exercise considerable influence on both the formation and replacement of the upper echelons of the Department. Profiting from the circumstances of World War II, the elite benefited first of all from the influx of

Anglophone officers whose entry into the Department was favoured by the rule of priority for veterans, particularly between 1946 and 1950. It should be recalled that the elite had proceeded earlier, between 1942 and 1946, to select carefully some exceptionally gifted English-speaking officers. It also endeavoured to strengthen itself, in the years following the war, by the transfer and reclassification of Anglophone personnel from other departments of the federal administration (*see Recruitment, 45-57*). Beyond doubt it very skilfully consolidated its position, and the positions of those who took over from it, by what we have called the "operation of October 1, 1952." It would therefore be in no way surprising to discover that the very considerable influence of this elite continues to make itself felt today in all those areas with which our study is concerned.

Naturally this elite does not bear the sole responsibility for the difficulty experienced by French-speaking officers in gaining access to the key positions, or for the weak French Canadian representation in the Department. Quite the contrary. It should be given credit for the first breakthrough of French-speaking career officers (Laurent Beaudry in 1935, Léon Mayrand in 1949). Had not several of the early Francophone officers of the same generation as Jean Désy and Pierre Dupuy systematically refused to serve in the central administration—and consequently to take part in either the bureaucratic mid-elite or the departmental elite—this English-speaking core would perhaps be more responsible for the small participation of Francophones in the decision-making centres of External Affairs. It is however this elite which, by admitting French-speaking officers from outside the Department directly into the diplomatic mid-elite (*see Recruitment, 45-51*), with the evident aim of ensuring a certain representation of Francophones in External Affairs, that in fact confirmed the practice of what we have called "political biculturalism."

During the period under review it is evident that French-speaking career officers formed part of the power elite and the bureaucratic mid-elite of the Department according to special rules. Where the rules of political biculturalism are least relevant, that is at the level of the bureaucratic mid-elite, all evidence indicates that the Francophone element of the Department has been left far behind. Even where the rules of this kind of biculturalism are usually the most pertinent, that is at the levels of the diplomatic mid-elite and the departmental elite, rarely has French-speaking participation been proportionate to the numerical importance of Francophones in the Canadian population, or of French-speaking officers in the Department (*see Advancement, 117-27*).

Since the 1950's certain steps have been taken by the English-speaking elite in the personnel field—notably the setting up of a Personnel Division in 1947, the general streamlining of the personnel organization in 1951, and the growing emphasis on recruiting career officers at the lower level (*see Recruitment, 51-7*). Yet despite these initiatives the elite had not yet succeeded by the end of 1965 in correcting the numerical under-representation of Francophones (21 per cent) in the officers' establishment of the Department. More serious, however, is the fact that this elite has not allowed the Department, despite a so-called integrated personnel policy, to post Francophone officers to the central administration in the same proportion as Anglophone officers. Nor has it succeeded in bringing Francophone officers, to any appreciable extent, into certain key

sectors of the Department, particularly the Economic and Defence Liaison divisions (*see Postings*, 104-5). Nor have its attitudes encouraged the use of French-speaking officers in the diplomatic missions considered particularly significant for Canada abroad (particularly Washington, the Commonwealth countries, and the United Nations) in proportion to the numerical importance of the Francophone element in the Department. It may very well be that the primary consequence of this under-representation and under-participation of French Canadians in the Department, both of which are partly the reflections of a somewhat peculiar conception of biculturalism on the part of this English-speaking elite, has been to impair from the very beginning the projection abroad of a bilingual and bicultural Canada.

It appears to us that a situation exists in the Department which conceals an involved mechanism for preserving power (whose functioning it was not our task to clarify here); and that the present state of affairs has its roots in the failure to recruit French-speaking officers between 1945 (indeed, 1943) and 1950. We therefore believe that the Department has little likelihood of finding solutions for its present bicultural weakness capable of producing results in the near future. In addition if, as we are inclined to believe, the departmental elite and its anti-chamber, the bureaucratic mid-elite, correspond to what may be called a self-perpetuating elite, it would be necessary to propose outright nothing less than the introduction from outside the Department of dynamic Francophones at the highest level. However, such an injection of new blood would yield concrete results only if it were done at the level of (1) under-secretary, which appears to be the ideal solution; or (2) assistant under-secretary responsible for personnel; or else (3) a new post which might be created in this particular sector. Another solution, which does not exclude these suggestions but which would be all-encompassing, is a general reorganization of the entire Canadian foreign service.

It would be wrong to pretend ignorance of the tightening hold of other federal departments and agencies on the execution, if not the direction, of Canadian external policy. This tendency has been suggested in those parts of our study dealing with the use of French as a working language in the Department of External Affairs. It exists to the same extent in the area of personnel as such. Willy-nilly, the Department of External Affairs is being gradually outflanked by numerous federal agencies having interests abroad. In fact, following a general trend for which the ever-broadening relationships between countries are responsible, other departments of the federal administration—particularly certain “technical” departments and several public agencies (such as the Canadian Wheat Board and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited) and increasingly the External Aid office (now the Canadian International Development Agency)—exert a considerable influence on the foreign policy of Canada, when they do not determine it outright.

The influence of certain departments, particularly Finance and Trade and Commerce, is such that they compel the Department of External Affairs, in so far as its economic responsibilities are concerned, to use their standards in appointing officers at senior levels. Thus there is not the slightest doubt that the economic adviser to the Department (usually one of the assistant under-secretaries of state), even the head of the Economic Division, and probably the Canadian ambassador to Washington and his minister

responsible for economic affairs—all clearly under the jurisdiction of the Department of External Affairs—have to match their technical “opposite numbers” in the federal administration. At least until recently, the naming by the Department of appointees to the above posts usually had to have the tacit approval of their counterparts in these other departments. It is a well-known fact that because of their working conditions, the technical departments of the federal administration have been much less able than the Department of External Affairs to take into account the requirements of political biculturalism in making appointments. One can readily guess, therefore, at what great disadvantage French-speaking officers of the Department are when certain nominations or appointments are made.

These same departments, as well as other departments and agencies of a similar nature, tend to exercise greater and greater autonomy over their technical services abroad. Although usually located within diplomatic posts that are under the authority of the Department of External Affairs, these departments and agencies enjoy in practice a total independence in the postings and transfers of their personnel abroad. For the same reason as that mentioned earlier, this situation is very likely to thwart if not to cancel out any policy that the Department of External Affairs might have of projecting abroad a bilingual and bicultural Canada.

It would be illusory to think of reforming the situation described in this study without first raising the question of the unification of responsibilities in the field of external affairs. The statutes of the Canadian Parliament relating to the Department of External Affairs, in particular the Department of External Affairs Act,¹ are all clearly inadequate in this respect. The latter, for example, merely states that “the Minister, as head of the Department, has the conduct of all official communications between the Government of Canada and the Government of any other country in connection with the external affairs of Canada.” It contains no clause dealing with the relations that should exist between this Department and the other federal departments in the matter of external policy, nor does it refer in any way whatsoever to the direction of the Canadian foreign service. This is a serious omission.

We are of the opinion that the Department of External Affairs should at least acquire responsibility, through a foreign service act, for the organization and direction of an integrated Canadian foreign service. This service should include not only the External Affairs foreign service but also the services maintained abroad by the other departments or agencies of the federal government. The object of this law would obviously not be to unify all the services of the federal government abroad; but rather to aim at making each of them an integral part of a whole, and to subject them within a fairly short period of time to uniform criteria and common basic principles. It would be fitting if this foreign service act conferred official sanction upon the bicultural character of the integrated Canadian foreign service. It would also be important that it allow the Department of External Affairs to exercise effective and permanent supervision over all federal government officers serving in posts abroad.

This act should, in particular, provide for the nomination of a director or head of the foreign service responsible to the under-secretary of state for External Affairs or to the secretary of state for External Affairs. Such an official would have special responsibility for the selection and training of personnel serving at Canadian posts abroad. This senior

official would, in our opinion, replace the head of the Personnel Operations Division. He would also override departmental barriers with regard to diplomatic personnel, to the extent that he would be responsible for regulating the temporary attachment to External Affairs of officers from other departments sent to posts abroad. Finally, his moral authority and his powers would be such that he could take steps to have the Canadian foreign service acquire a truly bilingual and bicultural character.

As any measure aimed at giving the Canadian foreign service a truly bilingual and bicultural character can only be based on "educating" the officers and on developing their awareness of what lies at the very basis of Canada's existence, the foreign service act should likewise provide for the creation of a Canadian foreign service institute. This institute would have the specific responsibility of ensuring the initial training of officers, and subsequently of providing all officers about to be posted abroad with refresher courses and other courses likely to enhance their bicultural awareness. Under the jurisdiction of the director of the foreign service, and thus dependent basically on the Department of External Affairs and ultimately the federal government, this institute, essentially bicultural in character, should seek to operate in conjunction with those provincial governments, notably Quebec, which act or would like to act on the international scene in their own fields of jurisdiction. For obvious reasons, the seat of such an institute should be in Montreal.

With regard to the use of French as a working language in the Department, it is clear that the situation existing in 1965, and still more the lack of progress that has been made since 1964, reveal a general condition that goes beyond the under-representation and under-participation of French Canadians, or even the shortage of lower grade bilingual personnel in External Affairs. The Department is no doubt a victim of its own nature, which is that of a co-ordinating agency. Moreover, having at least half of its personnel abroad and at the same time distributed among numerous divisions, it cannot do otherwise than accept the many technical limitations which at the very outset militate against any desire that might exist to use French more widely. Communications within the Department, particularly between the central administration and posts abroad, are generally subject to the demands of urgency and secrecy. Therefore, the major part of the communications system of the Department involves a relatively high degree of technical skill and the use of equipment which, in Canada, is North American.

There are also, of course, Canada's "special ties" on the international plane, which are themselves partly the result of the enormous power of the United States and which can scarcely contribute to giving French a firm basis in the central administration. But in our opinion the greatest handicap, and what might easily destroy at the outset any programme aimed at extending the use of French in the Department, is the general practice of rotating personnel, particularly at the foreign service officer level. Indeed, so long as all the Anglophone officers of the Department are not able to work equally and indiscriminately in either French or English—which is not the same thing as being "bilingual"—the departmental rule of rotation can only make uncertain, or even illusory, the progress of French. But, on reflection, a change in this rule might mean the abandonment of the principle of integration, at least as it has been applied up to now to French-language career officers.

The solutions which have been suggested in this study have no doubt convinced the reader of our belief that the situation of diplomatic personnel in the Department of External Affairs contains elements of serious weakness from a bicultural point of view. We consider that far-reaching reforms are necessary. We believe that nothing less than a concerted action on the entire foreign service front can have any lasting significance. We also firmly believe that individuals outside the present system should be entrusted with the task of directing such an undertaking. Finally, at the basis of all our thinking lies the conviction that it is of the utmost importance to give biculturalism in the Canadian foreign service a working rather than a political basis.

Appendices

I. Recruitment

1. What was your occupation at the time you joined the Department?
 - a. *If studying*
 - In what institution?
 - What kind of studies?
 - Did you have to interrupt your studies to join the Department?
 - b. *If employed*
 - In what firm or institution?
 - In what kind of job?
 - What other permanent jobs did you have before joining the Department?
 - Have you already worked in the public service?
2. While studying or working did you associate sufficiently with Canadians of the other main linguistic group to feel that you knew them when you entered the Department?
3. When did you first think of making a career in External Affairs? Under what circumstances?
4. When did you make the final decision to enrol for the foreign service competitive examination conducted by the Civil Service Commission? What made you decide to take this examination?
5. At the time of this examination, had you made up your mind to enter External Affairs?
 - a. *If so*, why External Affairs?
 - b. *If not*, what other department would you have wanted to join?
 - c. Would you have been very disappointed if you had not passed this examination?
 - d. At that time had you made other plans in case you failed?
6. What is your memory of this examination?
 - a. How do you rate it in comparison with other examinations you have taken or heard about in the public service?
 - b. In comparison with the kinds of examination you took during your studies?
 - c. To what do you specifically attribute the fact of having passed the examination?
7. Did you have any hesitation before accepting the Department's offer of employment? If so, why?
8. Did this offer suggest to you at that time that you were being invited to join a select group of officials in the federal administration?

9. What was the breakdown according to the two main linguistic groups of officers in your class?
 - a. What were the general characteristics of both groups?
 - b. Did you have the impression that the officers of your linguistic group differed other than by language from the officers of the other group?
 - *If so*, in what respect?
 - *If not*, what were the characteristics common to all the officers in your class?
 - c. Did this distribution correspond in your opinion to a concern for ensuring a certain numerical FC* representation in the Department?
 - d. Do you believe that the Department has sought in the past or is currently seeking, in its annual recruiting examination, to keep more or less strictly to a numerical equilibrium between the two principal linguistic groups in Canada?
10. In order to ensure this balanced distribution between the two linguistic groups, do you believe that the Department may have applied or may be applying different criteria to FC and EC officers at the time of their recruitment?
 - a. *If so*, what are these criteria?
 - What was the situation as far as your class was concerned?
 - Do you consider that such a practice goes against the very principle of the merit system?
 - b. *If not*, why, in your opinion?
11. Do you think that the recruiting of officers by competitive examination is the only valid system of recruitment? Why?
 - a. Is this method as valid for recruiting specialists and members of senior personnel?
 - b. Would this method be valid, in your opinion, if an effort were being made to establish a numerical balance between the two main linguistic groups?

II. Training

1. Did you receive some training during your first year in the Department?
2. If so, what was the objective of this training programme in your opinion? What is your assessment of the different points of such a programme?
3. As a foreign service officer, what benefit do you consider that you personally derived from this programme?
 - a. Would you have preferred to receive a more intensive (or systematic) training on joining the Department?
 - *If so*, what type of training? in what particular field? for what reasons?
 - *If not*, why?
 - b. Do you believe that your opinion in this matter would be shared: (i) by the majority of your colleagues? (ii) by the majority of the officers belonging to the same linguistic group as yourself?
4. Do you see a difference between the training that the Department gives its officers today and the one that it offered in the past, or the one that you yourself received?
 - a. *If so*, how in your opinion does the Department's new training programme, in operation since 1963, differ from the former programme, or from the one you received yourself?
 - Does the new programme seem to you more valid from a professional point of view?
 - Do you think that this programme is more useful to FC or EC officers, each taken as a group?
 - b. *If not*, does this mean that the new training programme in operation since 1963 does not differ from the former programme any more than from the one you took yourself?
 - What makes you think that?

*The initials FC signify French-speaking Canadian(s), and EC English-speaking Canadian(s).

5. Have you already received from the Department, or through the Department, additional academic, university, or technical training? Were you ever posted to the National Defence College (Kingston), the NATO Defence College (Paris), the Imperial Defence College (London), or to a school of foreign languages?

- a. *If so*, was it at your own request? Why do you think that you were selected for this type of training?
- b. *If not*, would you have accepted or would you accept from the Department, while continuing to receive your salary, additional academic training?
 - *If so*, in what field? For your personal benefit? For your benefit as an officer?
 - *If not*, why?

6. Do you attach any particular significance to the appointments made by the Department to the various defence colleges or schools of languages?

- a. Do you differentiate among these institutions?
- b. Do these courses represent in your opinion a complement to academic training or an element of formal training for a foreign service officer?
- c. Are these appointments in your opinion a mark of favour?
- d. Are they of any benefit to the Department itself?

III. Career

(N.B. The term "career" is used here solely in relation to assignments and postings.)

1. Which postings in the Department have you valued the most up to now?

- a. In Ottawa? For what reasons?
- b. Abroad? For what reasons?

2. In your opinion is there a logical sequence or a certain consistency in your postings?

- a. *If so*, what is it? How do you account for it?
- b. *If not*, to what do you attribute such a situation?

3. Do you have the impression that your career in terms of postings is a type of career common in the Department?

- a. *If so*, in what way? In terms of posts, areas or sectors, or in terms of responsibilities?
 - Is the line that your career has followed as common among Anglophones as among Francophones?
- b. *If not*, in what way is it exceptional?
 - What would the typical career of an officer in the Department be?

4. Are your postings in the central administration the result of a combination of circumstances or chance, or are there areas and particular divisions in the central administration to which you were appointed at your request or on your initiative?

- a. *If at your request*
 - Why did you make the request?
 - How and to whom? Do you correspond personally, with this object in mind, with certain of your former colleagues? Do you think that your colleagues do the same?
 - Speaking generally, have you always been informed in advance of your postings in the central administration?
 - Have you had the impression that the Department has done everything in its power to take your preferences into account as regards postings? Have you always been satisfied yourself?
- b. *If by chance*
 - Have you never made such a request? Why?
 - What may have been the reasons, then, that you were given these postings?
 - Do you sometimes correspond with certain of your former colleagues on this matter? Do your professional concerns have anything to do with this? In your opinion is this a current practice in the Department?

– Is it your impression that the Department does everything in its power to take your preferences into account as regards postings? Are you satisfied yourself?

5. Are there sectors in the central administration to which you would have particularly liked to be posted, but

- Which you were refused? (Why, in your opinion?)
- Which were never offered to you? (Why, in your opinion?)
- Which you think you will not likely attain? (Why, in your opinion?)
- Are there some to which you would prefer not to be posted? Which? Why?
- Are there some to which FC or EC prefer not to be posted?

6. Have the rules governing your posting in the central administration functioned in the same way in regard to your posting abroad? Are there posts abroad to which you have been sent, either at your request or on your initiative?

- If so*
 - Which ones? Why these in particular?
 - Do these posts appear to you much in demand?
 - Are they offered to certain types of officers: specialists or officers of acknowledged potential?
 - Do you believe that your tours of duty in these posts have been of much help to you professionally? By the nature of your responsibilities or by the personal contacts you made?
- If not*
 - What were the reasons advanced by the Department when offering you a particular posting? Are these reasons still valid, in your opinion?
 - Did you agree with these reasons?

7. Are there posts abroad to which you would have particularly liked to be assigned, but

- Which you were refused? Why, in your opinion?
- Which you were never offered? Why, in your opinion?
- To which you think you have little chance of going? Why, in your opinion?
- Are there some to which you would prefer not to be sent? Which ones? Why?
- Do you think there is a difference between the preferences of EC and FC in the matter of posts abroad?

8. Is it your impression that postings in the Department are determined according to a system?

- What is this system, in your opinion?
- Does this system tend, as has been said, to produce only generalists?
- Do you agree that certain specialized circuits in the Department are necessary? Which ones?
- What types of officers, in your opinion, enter these circuits? How do they get into them?
- Do you consider that you belong, or have belonged, to one of these circuits?
- If not* would you like to enter one?
- Do you think it possible to get into one?

IV. Advancement

(N.B. We distinguish here between advancement in terms of grades or promotions, and advancement in terms of positions and responsibilities.)

A. Grades or Promotions

- Are you satisfied in general with your advancement in the Department in terms of grades? Very satisfied? Satisfied? More or less satisfied?
 - How would you describe your rate of promotion: steady or uneven, accelerated, average, or retarded?

2. How do you rate yourself in this respect: a) By comparison with the officers who joined the Department at the same time as you did? b) By comparison with your EC colleagues? c) By comparison with your FC colleagues?
3. Can your performance be considered normal for the Department? Why?
4. What, in your opinion, does the Department mean by promotion on merit?
 - a. What are the main criteria for promotion? What is their relative importance?
 - b. In what way, for example, do these criteria correspond to those of industry or of the universities?
 - c. Do you believe that these criteria are applied in the same way to FC and EC?
 - *If not*, how does their application differ? Why?
 - d. Are there, in your opinion, factors other than objective criteria that ensure accelerated promotion to certain officers?
 - e. From the point of view of the assessment made of your work in the Department or of your "merit," do you prefer on the whole to work under an FC or an EC officer?
 - Do you believe that their appreciation of your work differs?
 - Have you had or do you have some difficulty in expressing yourself or in communicating in English as the working language of the Department?
 - Do you believe that the difficulties experienced by FC officers in handling the English language may place them at a disadvantage by comparison with EC colleagues and slow down or delay their rate of promotion?
5. Basing your opinion upon such criteria as there are for promotion on merit, and judging by the quality of work done, what are the strong points of FC and EC officers. each considered as a group?
6. What rating (from 1 to 5) would you personally give to the FC and EC groups for each of the five following fundamental characteristics possessed in varying degrees by all officers?

	<i>French Canadians</i>	<i>English Canadians</i>
a. Ability to organize	—	—
b. Attention to detail	—	—
c. Speed in getting work done	—	—
d. Reliability	—	—
e. Ease in interpersonal situations	—	—

B. Positions and Responsibilities

1. Are you generally satisfied with your advancement in the Department in terms of positions? Very satisfied? Satisfied? More or less satisfied?
 - a. To what extent does your career so far correspond in this respect to what you had envisaged?
 - b. Has your advancement in terms of grades corresponded, in your opinion, to a parallel increase in your responsibilities?
2. In your opinion, what are the qualities which best ensure competent officers access to positions of authority in the Department (assistant under-secretary or head of certain key divisions)?
3. Are you of the opinion that the same factors operate to the same extent in the case of FC as EC officers who gain access to positions of authority?
 - a. Are these qualities the same as those required at lower levels?
 - *If not*, would the advancement of certain FC officers to positions of authority partly reflect a concern for ensuring FC representation in the upper strata of the Department?
 - Or do you believe that these FC officers are promoted because of their special qualities?

4. Assuming that these FC officers are as competent as their EC colleagues, do you believe that they take the same time as their EC colleagues to reach these high posts?
 - a. *If not*, why?
5. Do you believe that you yourself can one day reach one of these key posts in the Department?
 - a. *If not*, why not?
 - b. How high do you believe you can rise in the departmental hierarchy?
6. Do you think that FC and EC look upon the question of their advancement in the Department in the same way?
 - a. Are their ambitions similar, do you think? In Ottawa? Abroad?
 - b. All things being equal, do you prefer to work in the central administration (Ottawa) or in a post abroad?
7. Do you feel that there are divisions in central administration where an officer must assert himself in order to ensure a reasonable chance of advancement?
 - a. In what subjects or fields: economic, defence, Canadian-American relations?
 - b. In what divisions: what are, in your opinion, the key divisions of the central administration?
 - c. In what kinds of divisions: political, functional, administrative?
 - d. On what desks: NATO, Russian, etc?
8. Are there, in your opinion, certain posts abroad where the majority of the officers who have risen to positions of authority in the Department have served?
 - a. Are such posts the same for all officers? For FC and EC officers?
9. Are there certain postings within the Department or certain tours of duty outside the Department that appear to you particularly desirable as a means of advancement? Which ones? Why?

Appendix B contains facsimiles of two questionnaires on the use of French as a working language in the Department.

The first was sent to all branches, divisions, and units in Ottawa.

The second was sent to all posts in Canada and abroad.

ROYAL COMMISSION ON BILINGUALISM AND BICULTURALISMQuestionnaire No. 1

To: All Divisions in External Affairs (Ottawa)

SUBJECT: Use of French as a working language in the Department of External Affairs.

Note: For the purpose of this questionnaire, the use of French as a working language excludes the use of French in translation. It is also limited to written communications only. "Working language" is defined as the language used originally in the work of your Division.

1. Is French used as a working language in your Division (or unit or service)?

Yes ()
No ()

2. If yes,

a) how often?

Most of the time ()
About half the time ()
Occasionally, but less than half the time ()

b) what percentage of the production of your Division would you estimate was in French?

in 1964, ____ %
in the first 6 months of 1965, ____ %
in the quarter April - June 1965. ____ %

- 2 -

c) during the past twelve months, how frequently would you say French has been used by your Division in written communications of the following types:

	<u>Most of the time</u>	<u>About half the time</u>	<u>Occasionally but less than half the time</u>	<u>Never</u>
i) those circu- lating within your Division only	()	()	()	()
ii) those circu- lating in other Divisions of the Depart- ment	()	()	()	()
iii) those circu- lating in other Departments in Ottawa	()	()	()	()
iv) those sent to Canadian missions abroad	()	()	()	()
v) those addressed to the public	()	()	()	()
d) what percentage of the telegraphic communications sent by your Division to Canadian diplomatic missions abroad would you estimate was in French	_____	in 1964,	_____ %	
	_____	in the first 6 months of 1965,	_____ %	
	_____	in the quarter April - June 1965,	_____ %	
e) what percentage of the other communications sent by your Division to Canadian diplomatic missions abroad would you estimate was in French	_____	in 1964,	_____ %	
	_____	in the first 6 months of 1965,	_____ %	
	_____	in the quarter April - June 1965.	_____ %	

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3. Note: "Bilingual officers and bilingual clerical or administrative staff are defined as persons who can perform adequately their duties in both official languages.

How many of your External Affairs staff are bilingual and how many are not bilingual?

	<u>Number bilingual</u>	<u>Number not bilingual</u>
- Foreign Service Officers	_____	_____
- External Affairs Officers	_____	_____
- Administrative and clerical staff other than locally engaged	_____	_____

(For cross reference purposes with External Affairs records, would you please list under, by categories; your External Affairs staff who are bilingual)

Foreign Service Officers External Affairs Officers Administrative and clerical staff

- 4 -

4. At present, which of the following factors would you say definitely inhibit the use of French as a working language in your Division? (Please check all that apply)

() lack of bilingual originating officers
() lack of bilingual administrative or clerical staff
() lack of adequate technical facilities in External Affairs (Ottawa)
() none of these factors

5. What other factors, if any, restrict the use of French as a working language in your Division? (Please elaborate).
() if none, check here.

6. Do the diplomatic missions abroad with which you are dealing communicate with you in French?

Yes ()
No ()

7. If yes,

a) how often?

Most of the time ()
About half the time ()
Occasionally, but less than half the time ()

- 5 -

b) please list the missions which most frequently send communications to you in French.

- Post 1 _____
- Post 2 _____
- Post 3 _____
- Post 4 _____
- Post 5 _____

c) what percentage of the telegraphic communications received from each of the missions listed above (7-b), and referred to you for action, would you estimate was in French

	<u>Post 1</u>	<u>Post 2</u>	<u>Post 3</u>	<u>Post 4</u>	<u>Post 5</u>
- in 1964,	____%	____%	____%	____%	____%
- in the first 6 months of 1965,	____%	____%	____%	____%	____%
- in the quarter April-June 1965.	____%	____%	____%	____%	____%

d) what percentage of the communications other than telegraphic received from each of the missions listed above (7-b), and referred to you for action, would you estimate was in French

	<u>Post 1</u>	<u>Post 2</u>	<u>Post 3</u>	<u>Post 4</u>	<u>Post 5</u>
- in 1964,	____%	____%	____%	____%	____%
- in the first 6 months of 1965,	____%	____%	____%	____%	____%
- in the quarter April-June 1965.	____%	____%	____%	____%	____%

Date: _____

Name of division: _____

Signature: _____

ROYAL COMMISSION ON BILINGUALISM AND BICULTURALISMQuestionnaire No. 2

External Affairs Project

To: All Canadian diplomatic missions

Subject: Use of French as a working language in the Department of External Affairs.

Note: For the purpose of this questionnaire, the use of French as a working language excludes the use of French in translation. It is also limited to written communications only. "Working language" is defined as the language originally used in the work at your post.

1. Is French used as a working language at your post?
Yes ()
No ()

2. If yes,

a) how often?

Most of the time ()
About half the time ()
Occasionally, but less than half the time ()

b) what percentage of all the work at your post would you estimate was in French

- in 1964, ____ %
- in the first 6 months of 1965, ____ %
- in the quarter April-June 1965, ____ %

c) what percentage of the telegraphic communications from your Post to External would you estimate was in French

- in 1964, ____ %
- in the first 6 months of 1965, ____ %
- in the quarter April-June 1965, ____ %

d) what percentage of the other communications from your post to External would you estimate was in French

- in 1964, ____ %
- in the first 6 months of 1965, ____ %
- in the quarter April-June 1965, ____ %

- 2 -

3. Note: "Bilingual officers and bilingual clerical or administrative staff" are defined as persons who can perform adequately their duties in both official languages.

How many of your External Affairs staff are bilingual and how many are not bilingual?

	<u>Number bilingual</u>	<u>Number not bilingual</u>
- Foreign Service Officers	_____	_____
- External Affairs Officers	_____	_____
- Administrative and clerical staff other than locally engaged	_____	_____

(For cross reference purposes with External Affairs records,
would you please list under, by categories, your External
Affairs staff who are bilingual)

Foreign Service Officers External Affairs Officers Administrative and Clerical staff

4. At present, which of the following factors would you say, definitely inhibit the use of French as a working language at your post?
(Please check all that apply)

- () lack of bilingual originating officers
- () lack of bilingual administrative or clerical staff
- () lack of adequate technical facilities at your post
- () none of these factors

- 3 -

5. What other factors, if any, restrict the use of French as a working language at your post? Please elaborate.

() If none, check here.

6. Does the inter-departmental use to which your reports may be put in Ottawa ever influence you not to use French when sending communications to Ottawa?

() Yes - always
() Yes - in most cases
() Yes - in limited instances
() No - never

7. Does External Affairs (Ottawa) communicate with you in French?

Yes ()
No ()

8. If yes,

a) how often?

- Most of the time ()
- About half the time ()
- Occasionally but less than half the time ()

- 4 -

b) what percentage of the telegraphic communications addressed by External Affairs to your post would you estimate was in French

- in 1964, _____ %
- in the first 6 months of 1965, _____ %
- in the quarter April-June 1965. _____ %

c) what percentage of the other communications addressed to your post by External Affairs would you estimate was in French

- in 1964, _____ %
- in the first 6 months of 1965, _____ %
- in the quarter April-June 1965. _____ %

Date: _____

Name of post: _____

Signature: _____

Appendix C

Three Departmental Documents on the Use of French

A. Guide to Language Assessment

(Circular Document, Administration No. 38/63, Ottawa, July 29, 1963)

1. We have been aware for some time of the inadequacy of our information about the ability of English-speaking officers to speak or to work in French. At present, only two sources of information are available to us: the assessment of his own ability given by the officer himself in his Posting Preference Form, and comments by rating officers in connection with the annual rating. Last year for the first time, rating officers were instructed to include comments on an officer's competence in his second Canadian language.

2. As the number of positions where a knowledge of both languages is valuable or even essential continues to grow, we are finding it increasingly necessary to have precise information about the ability of our English-speaking officers to speak, read and write French. This is required not only to determine officers who could now be sent to such posts, but also to provide information as to those officers who might usefully be enabled to improve their knowledge at public expense in order to qualify for such assignments if funds can be obtained to provide the necessary facilities. If we are to make viable proposals for the provision of any such facilities, it is essential that we have more accurate and complete information on the *status quo*.

3. Pending consideration of more accurate methods of determining language competence, we must continue to rely on the officers themselves and on rating officers for our information. It is hoped, however, that by laying down more precise criteria of what we mean by "Excellent," "Good," "Fair" and "Poor," we can make it easier for officers to rate themselves in accordance with a common standard, which is not now the case. Cases exist of officers who describe their knowledge of French as "good" being the subject of complaint from French-speaking visitors to their missions because of their lack of knowledge. In most cases, the wide variation in the meaning given to the terms "Excellent," "Good," etc. is no doubt mainly due to a genuine confusion about the standard to be applied.

4. In future, then, it would be appreciated if both the officers assessing their own ability and supervisors making comments on the officer's rating forms would apply the terms strictly as we have defined them in Appendix "A." In considering assignments etc. we shall assume that this has been done.

5. So that the improvement in our stock of information need not be delayed until all officers have completed another Posting Preference Form, we attach questionnaires on Language Information. If no forms have been attached, this document is for your information only. It would be appreciated if these could be filled out by English-speaking officers and returned to Personnel Division as soon as possible.

B. Guide to Language Assessment (Appendix "A" of the Preceding Document)

In rating yourself or another officer "Excellent," "Good," "Fair" or "Poor" you should use these terms as follows:

Speaking

Excellent	The officer can converse in French as easily (if not always as well) as in English. He can conduct business at any level and on any but highly technical subjects.
Good	The officer can adequately conduct all routine consular and administrative and most other kinds of business in French. He can carry on social conversation easily and without strain indefinitely. He can understand spoken French at its normal speed.
Fair	The officer can carry on social conversation in French for a limited time and can make himself understood in routine matters of business.
Poor	Has some knowledge.

Reading

Excellent	The officer's reading speed for any but highly technical matter is as great in French as in English. He can cope with all material (including technical data) without difficulty.
Good	The officer can cope with all non-technical material in French without frequent reference to a dictionary and at reasonable speed.
Fair	The officer can get the sense of an article, letter, or draft with the aid of a dictionary in not more than double the time that would be required in his own language.
Poor	Has some knowledge.

Writing

Excellent	Can prepare letters, drafts and other written work which do not need correction at reasonable speed.
Good	Can prepare routine correspondence without error. Can prepare drafts for other written work which may require correction but not rewriting.
Fair	Can prepare drafts for routine correspondence.
Poor	Has some knowledge.

C. Memorandum on the Problem of Communications in External Affairs (Communications Division, December 1965)

Written Communications

1. There is no problem other than the increased carriage costs which are incurred when the communication must be sent out in *both* languages. Since most of our carriage is by air, and airmail costs are high, there will be a significant increase in postage estimates as the years go by and the use of the French language increases.

Telegraphic Communications

2. The type used in all international telegraphic networks does not include the accents, without which the typed messages in French apparently present a rather poor format, and are not as easily readable as a similar message in English.
3. A message in French is usually slightly longer than a similar message in English, which results in an increase in telegraphic charges. If the message must be sent in *both* languages the increase in cost is over 100 per cent.
4. In order to decrease the length of a message and thereby save telegraphic charges, it is possible to introduce abbreviations and phraseology in English texts to the point where we have been accused

of "murder" of the English tongue. It appears to be a much more difficult operation to perform in the French language, and therefore we may expect the cost of messages in that language to be greater than their counterparts in English.

5. Many of our missions are in countries which have very indifferent communications systems, and the delivery of poorly hand-written copies or of garbled parts of messages is not uncommon. If the message is in French the English-speaking operator is in difficulty.
6. It is essential that communications procedures be the same whether the message be in French or English. We have gone a long way in producing procedures that "work" in both languages but much yet remains to be done. We do not doubt that we can overcome all the difficulties.

Personnel

7. Communicators

- (a) We have a fair percentage of operating personnel who are bilingual to a degree, but until we have a 100 per cent bilingual staff we will have difficulty due to complications in posting, rotation, and assignment to shift. We should be recruiting only bilingual personnel but either the pay, conditions of work and prospects for the future are not sufficiently attractive or the supply of bilingual personnel is too small, and it is necessary to recruit some English-speaking personnel who will become a problem to the organization in the years to come.
- (b) Communicators over the age of 50 are no problem, as useful employment can probably be found for them for the few years of active employment left to them, and their lack of French will probably not have any adverse effect on their careers.
- (c) The real problem is in the English-speaking age group between say 30 and 50. They have little hope of becoming bilingual as their services cannot be spared off shift to enable them to take French-language courses. Even if there were a sufficient establishment increase to permit them to be away, the rotating nature of their shifts makes it impossible for them to attend any kind of a course. The problem is that personnel in this group are unable to become bilingual either due to their age, or inability to find the time, and at the same time are trained in a trade for which there is little market outside Canadian Government services.

8. Technicians

The majority of our technicians are English-speaking, but bilingualism presents no problem in this field. The equipment, instructions, blue prints, etc., are all British, Canadian or American produced and the technical terms used are the product of years of standardization. A technical textbook written in Continental French would be quite useless in this work. We are in fact tied with a Gordian knot to United States technical and industrial jargon rather than to a language.

Appendix D

Mail Received by Diplomatic Bag at the Department (Ottawa), July 15–September 15, 1965*

Post (point of mailing)	Total no. of documents	No. of "personal" documents (envelopes)	No. of documents (envelopes) addressed to other departments or government agencies	No. of documents (or reports) destined for the Department		Addressees of documents drafted in French
				English	French	
Accra	231	51	28	152	0	
Ankara	160	61	39	59	1	J**-1
Athens	170	97	27	44	2	POL-2
Beirut	199	111	9	74	5	J-2, POL-3
Belgrade	332	170	66	96	0	
Berlin	92	23	4	65	0	
Berne	40	3	5	26	6	B-1, J-3, EAO-2
Bogota	104	26	15	63	0	
Bonn	407	71	142	194	0	
Bordeaux	32	1	0	31	0	
Boston	74	25	10	39	0	
Brussels	183	23	61	96	3	J-2, F-1
Buenos Aires	258	127	12	117	2	POL-2
Cairo	555	368	89	98	0	
Canberra	213	24	73	116	0	
Caracas	123	31	8	84	0	
Chicago	154	16	6	132	0	
Cleveland	24	8	3	13	0	
Colombo	230	139	23	68	0	
Copenhagen	162	19	9	134	0	
Dar-es-Salaam	376	32	71	273	0	
Detroit	29	4	5	20	0	
Djakarta	200	73	9	118	0	

* This report was prepared in the Department of External Affairs by the Mail Opening Unit of the Registry Division.

** For the meaning of abbreviations see the end of this table.

Post (point of mailing)	Total no. of documents	No. of "personal" documents (envelopes)	No. of documents (envelopes) addressed to other departments or government agencies	No. of documents (or reports) destined for the Department		Addressees of documents drafted in French
				English	French	
Dublin	81	12	2	67	0	
Dusseldorf	15	0	0	15	0	
Geneva	317	95	65	157	0	
Georgetown	201	56	17	128	0	
Guatemala	52	30	5	17	0	
The Hague	185	66	38	81	0	
Hamburg	40	1	0	39	0	
Havana	310	100	51	151	8	POL-6, A-2
Helsinki	100	30	1	69	0	
Hong Kong	118	33	26	59	0	
Karachi	599	364	53	182	0	
Kingston	186	40	1	145	0	
Kuala Lumpur	321	40	22	259	0	
Lagos	212	59	21	128	4	C-1, EAO-3
Leopoldville	193	91	4	98	0	
Lima	190	79	25	86	0	
Lisbon	110	41	8	60	1	B-1
London	1031	225	420	386	0	
Los Angeles	75	16	0	59	0	
Madrid	130	25	10	95	0	
Manila	33	1	7	25	0	
Marseilles	70	10	5	49	6	R-5, J-1
Mexico	171	59	28	84	0	
Milan	16	0	0	16	0	
Montevideo	155	53	26	76	0	
Moscow	764	349	150	265	0	
New Delhi	725	411	75	239	0	
New Orleans	29	5	2	22	0	
New York (Consulate)	153	13	50	90	0	
New York (UN)	511	158	119	234	0	
Nicosia	63	13	19	31	0	
Oslo	121	25	21	75	0	
Paris (Embassy)	494	126	169	155	44	A-1, B-4, C-3, D-3, E-3, EAO-2, F-1, J-22, POL-4, L-1
Paris (NATO)	998	163	555	277	3	J-1, POL-1, D-1
Philadelphia	17	0	0	17	0	
Phnom Penh	100	61	2	36	1	EAO-1
Port-au-Prince	80	35	8	30	7	POL-3, B-1, J-1, V-2
Port of Spain	98	6	6	86	0	
Prague	326	202	17	106	1	L-1
Pretoria	150	56	8	86	0	

Post (point of mailing)	Total no. of documents	No. of "personal" documents (envelopes)	No. of documents (envelopes) addressed to other departments or government agencies	No. of documents (or reports) destined for the Department		Addressees of documents drafted in French
				English	French	
Quito	93	17	16	60	0	
Rio de Janeiro	382	182	65	129	6	POL-3, B-2, E-1
Rome	198	27	56	115	0	
Saigon	1087	869	84	134	0	
San Francisco	60	2	10	48	0	
San José	112	40	7	65	0	
Santiago	212	72	15	125	0	
Santo Domingo	193	80	53	60	0	
Sao Paulo	32	8	3	20	1	C-1
Seattle	61	13	3	45	0	
Singapore	7	1	2	4	0	
Stockholm	50	12	4	34	0	
Teheran	295	184	11	98	2	POL-1, D-1
Tel Aviv	316	132	61	123	0	
Tokyo	242	66	59	117	0	
Vienna	236	58	49	129	0	
Vientiane	96	56	7	30	3	EAO-2, POL-1
Warsaw	554	149	211	194	0	
Washington	1658	367	643	647	1	W-1
Wellington	96	18	11	67	0	
Yaoundé	261	102	44	112	3	POL-3

A: Administrative Services Division
 B: Protocol Division
 C: Consular Division
 D: Defence Liaison Division
 E: Economic Division
 EAO: External Aid Office
 F: Supplies and Properties Division
 J: Information Division
 L: Legal Division

POL: Political Divisions
 African and Middle Eastern Commonwealth European Far Eastern Latin American USA
 R: Finance Division
 V: United Nations Division
 W: Press and Liaison Division

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Strang, William (Lord Strang). *The Foreign Office*. London, 1955.

——— *Home and Abroad*. London, 1956.

Notes to Chapters

Preface

1. "It is difficult, if not impossible for us, however, to allow outsiders, no matter how much confidence we may repose in them, to delve into the Department's and indeed the Government's formulation of foreign policy. I am sure you will understand that to do so might, in certain instances, put in jeopardy some of the things we are trying to achieve in the foreign field and if I may say so frankly, for little or no apparent purpose in terms of furthering bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada." Letter of February 11, 1965 from Marcel Cadieux, under-secretary of state for External Affairs, to Davidson Dunton, co-chairman of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

2. "... the basic difficulty is that even our general files contain a great amount of confidential material on individual members of the service. This material, although having to do with individual employees, is occasionally placed on general files to help establish, define, illustrate or modify broad personnel policies and practices. It would therefore be impossible for Mr. Lalande, or anyone else, to read these files without gaining access to information which I regard as of a highly private nature." Letter of August 25, 1965 from Marcel Cadieux to Dr. Meyer Brownstone of the Commission.

3. "... it has been agreed upon that for security purposes no classified documents should be passed on to Professor Lalande...." Letter of July 23, 1965 from Marcel Cadieux to Dr. W. Kaye Lamb, dominion archivist, Public Archives of Canada.

4. "... the Department (of External Affairs) has recommended that Prof. Lalande of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism is authorized to read [a permission previously refused] the documents referred to in their letter but only in the presence of an Officer of the Archives and with the restriction that no notes be taken at any time." Letter of December 13, 1965 from Léo Lafrance, deputy director of Commissions and Conferences, Privy Council Office to Dr. W. Kaye Lamb. The documents were: 1) Glassco Project 20 (Administrative Aspects of the Department of External Affairs); 2) Memorandum to record discussion with head of the Personnel Division of External Affairs, May 30, 1961; and 3) Glassco Project 2 (Manpower in Government Service), vol. 88, Interim report on findings, Department of External Affairs.

5. "... some aspects of the proposed research cannot be pursued as it would mean infringing upon some confidential information the Department has received from its members." Letter of July 27, 1965 from Marcel Cadieux to Dr. Meyer Brownstone.

6. "Recently Professor Lalande requested files on individual FSO's of our Department which hold the classification 'Personnel' and which, we are told, have now become historical documents. . . . These files which are only classified 'Personnel,' contain nevertheless all confidential or secret documents on

these officers. . . . Although we are prepared to inform Professor Lalande that he can consult these files at the archives, it would be imperative that the classified material be removed from these files prior to his access to them" Letter of July 23, 1965 from Marcel Cadieux to Dr. W. Kaye Lamb.

7. "Before studies can be pursued within the Department, we have to consider first the security aspects of any proposed programme and, second, the limitation of our human resources which can be made available for such purposes." Letter of July 27, 1965 from Marcel Cadieux to Dr. Meyer Brownstone.

8. "With respect to certain non-confidential information, which could be made available but would have to be extracted from departmental files, it was made clear I think that we do not have the necessary personnel resources to do it." *Ibid.*

Introduction

1. An Act to create a Department of External Affairs, 8-9 Edward VII, c.13; rev. 1946; R.S.C. 1952, c.68.

2. "For a long time, the Department retained something of its earlier character as a kind of adjunct to the P.M.'s Office." H. Gordon Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad: from Agency to Embassy* (Toronto, 1945), 262.

3. "Dr. O. D. Skelton [under-secretary from 1925 to 1941] was frequently described as a kind of Deputy Prime Minister." *Ibid.*

4. "Some of such activities in which the Department became involved were censorship, intelligence and security, psychological warfare, economic warfare, the control of aliens, recruitment of aliens in Canada by their national authorities and the Permanent Joint Board of Defence." Public Archives of Canada, R.G. 33 (Glassco Commission), project 20, file 9, project group reports, appendix 70, "The Department of External Affairs: The War Years, 1939-46."

5. "The first real attempt to achieve a formal organization came only after the death of Dr. Skelton." *Ibid.*

6. ". . . concerned with the protection of the position of Canadian prisoners of war in enemy countries, relations with the protecting powers, questions arising under the Prisoners of War Convention, the position of enemy prisoners of war and internees in Canada, protection of Canadian nationals and Canadian interests in enemy and enemy occupied countries and repatriation . . . and also of economic warfare work, export control policy, censorship questions and Black List Committee." Official documents of the Department of External Affairs, file of Alfred Rive.

7. These three senior officers "share the ultimate responsibility for the work of the Department." Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad*, 284.

8. "For the first time with the establishment of this Department in 1909, a start was made in planning the appropriate disposition of the ever-growing accumulation of inactive files." "The Problem of Records in External Affairs," *External Affairs*, IV, 5 (May, 1952), 182.

9. ". . . set up of Press Office to assist members of the press to obtain information concerning Canada's external relations." Department of External Affairs, Circ. Doc., Admin., September 15, 1950.

10. Beginning December 1, 1950, this section was under the supervision of the Director of Research and Reports (P. E. Renaud) who was to chair the Department Library Committee and whose responsibilities included the "direction of the Archives and Historical Unit and supervision of the preparation of the Annual Report."

11. ". . . to conform more closely to international practice." Circ. Doc., Admin., November 1952.

12. The Political Coordination Section was responsible for "(a) Preparation of policy guidance for the CBC [International Service], (b) assembling political intelligence for departmental use." *Ibid.*, Attachment to Record of Heads of Divisions Meeting No. 6 of February 9, 1953.

13. ". . . to review the work and performance of each post in all its aspects, political, functional, representational and administrative." Circ. Doc., Admin., December 1955.

14. ". . . an Economic II Division, charged solely with the consideration of Canadian assistance to other countries from the External Affairs point of view." P.A.C., R.G. 33, project 20, file 9, project group reports, appendix 70, "The Development of the Department of External Affairs: 1945-60."

15. "The main responsibility is to provide a channel of communication between the Department on the one hand, and the press and general public, various government organizations such as the CBCIS and the National Defence College and certain other government departments, such as the Prime Minister's office, on the other hand." *Ibid.*

16. ". . . in order more precisely to identify its function both within and outside. . ." Circ. Doc., Admin., September 1963.

17. Administrative Improvement Unit, charged with making "a detailed examination of the organization and administration of the Department." *Ibid.*, February 1964.

18. Urwick Currie Ltd., Toronto.

19. "Generally speaking, the formal structure of the Department has undergone few alterations. . ." Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1964*, 52.

20. "Establishment increases result basically from recognition of increased work-load requiring new positions either from opening of new posts abroad, the joining or augmented participation in international organizations, the strengthening of headquarters machinery and the continuing improvement of such things as Communication, security, etc." P.A.C., R.G. 33, project 20, series 46, vol. 468, appendix 134, October 6, 1961.

21. Department of External Affairs, Reference Paper, no. 60, rev. August 1961.

22. "When the position of Counsellor was established in 1925, some duties were assigned to it which with the growth of the legal work of the Department are now necessary to assign to an officer with more specialized qualifications. Further, it is desired to bring the duties of Counsellor more into harmony with the general plan of organization based on that of the British Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service in general which was adopted by the establishment of posts of Third, Second and First Secretaries in 1928, the post of Counsellor being the senior in the series beginning with Third Secretary." Letter of March 13, 1929 from Dr. O. D. Skelton to the Secretary of the Civil Service Commission, Ottawa (P.A.C., R.G. 32, vol. 351).

23. Department of External Affairs, *Bulletin*, April-June 1940.

24. Clumsily called in French "Comité de l'effectif" in the Department's *Annual Report, 1949*, 84 (French ed.) and 77 (English ed.).

25. "For the first time, therefore, we now have a recognized establishment for the Department." Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 45/52, July 24, 1952.

26. P.A.C., R.G. 33, project 20, file 9, project group reports, appendix 70, "The Development of the Department of External Affairs: 1945-60."

27. Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1952*, 45-7.

28. "It is proposed that the Establishment Board shall carry out a general review of the Department's establishment annually immediately before the preparation of the estimates for the following fiscal year." Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 45, July 24, 1952.

29. Treasury Board Minute no. 44006, February 13, 1953.

30. According to the terms of reference these objectives were: a) to eliminate existing anomalies in the treatment accorded heads of posts; b) to provide a means of retaining career officers in the service while they held senior appointments and consular posts; c) to provide a head of post establishment [in fact, the heads of missions were henceforth to be listed with the graded officers "as covering off positions corresponding to their salaries"]; d) to provide salary adjustments for some heads of posts to bring them into line with increases granted since December 1950 to other comparable groups of public servants.

31. In the Department's submission to the Civil Service Commission, it was mentioned that "for the most part, career officers who were previously certified by the Civil Service Commission are now being recommended for recertification in appropriate grade." The only criterion used to support this submission was under-grading of the reclassified officers, according to a letter of March 4, 1953 from L. Dana Wilgress, under-secretary of state for External Affairs, to the secretary of the Civil Service Commission: "In putting forward these recommendations for certifications, we have followed the

suggestions of the Civil Service Commission in under-grading rather than over-grading. . . ." (P.A.C., R.G. 32, vols. 357-8.)

32. "I see no reason why I should be recertified by the Civil Service Commission as an officer in the new Grade 10." Letter of April 9, 1953 from Hume Wrong, Canadian ambassador to Washington, to L. Dana Wilgress. (*Ibid.*, vols. 358-9).

Part I

Introduction

1. Especially in the sense given to "a social group" by Emilio Willens in *Dictionnaire de sociologie*, French adaptation by Armand Cuvillier (Paris, 1961).

2. "By a career system, one generally means a system within which entrance is predominantly at the bottom level, with middle and top positions reserved for careerists." Mottram Torrie (ed.), *The Selection of Personnel for International Service* (Geneva, 1963).

3. ". . . the extraordinary (personal) quality of the atmosphere which distinguished the Department before, and even during, the war years," memorandum by A. D. P. Heeney to H. O. Moran, dated June 14, 1951. P.A.C., R.G. 33, project 20, file 9, appendix 70, "The Development of the Department of External Affairs: 1945-60."

4. ". . . une unité collective réelle, mais partielle et directement observable. . ." Georges Gurvitch (ed.), *Traité de sociologie* (Paris, 1962), I, 187.

5. John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto, 1965).

6. James Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada* (Toronto, 1961).

7. Gary Caldwell, "The Participation of French Canadians in the Department of External Affairs," M.A. thesis, Laval University, 1965.

8. Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad*.

9. Notably Caldwell, "The Participation of French Canadians."

10. G. Graydon: "May I ask Mr. Heeney, out of the total number of high commissioners, ministers, and ambassadors, how many could be regarded as career men in the ordinary sense of the term as it is used, and how many are non-career men?" A. D. P. Heeney (under-secretary of state for External Affairs): "It is not a very precise term. . . . I would say that a career man was someone who has been in Government service prior to his appointment as the head of a mission." Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*, May 18, 1950, 188.

Chapter I

1. The first of the series, Personnel Records Basic Documents, "Composite List of Officers of External Affairs," is dated December 27, 1949.

2. "Any establishment represents what Treasury Board, the Civil Service Commission and External Affairs consider a minimum in terms of number and classification of positions for the Department to fulfil adequately its responsibilities." P. A. C., R.G. 33, project 20, series 46, vol. 468, appendix 134, October 6, 1961.

3. Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report, 1949*, 84-7.

4. See Chapter IV for more precise information on "career officer."

5. Skilling seems by inference to agree with the truth of this assertion. "The Department . . . is somewhat disproportionately weighted with persons of Anglo-Saxon origin. The French Canadians, however, number approximately a dozen in Ottawa and abroad, as compared with some 45 English-speaking members. This represents a proportion only slightly less than the French Canadian proportion of the total population." *Canadian Representation Abroad*, 266.

6. Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Canada, 1961*, I, pt. 2, Bulletin 1.2-9, Introduction.

7. We estimate that as of July 1, 1965, the proportion of these officers who were French-speaking was not more than 10 per cent of all the officers.

Chapter II

1. ". . . recruiting of suitable people under war conditions is very difficult. As a general policy, I think it more satisfactory to strengthen the Department with temporary outside appointments releasing regular officers for the foreign service than to make additional *ad hoc* appointments to the individual legations." Memorandum of N. A. Robertson to the prime minister, February 5, 1943.

2. The reasons given were: a) the growth of Canada's international responsibilities, b) the demand for personnel to provide delegations to international conferences, and c) the maintenance of permanent representatives at the headquarters of important international organizations. "The Foreign Service Officer Competition," *External Affairs*, V, no. 7 (July, 1953), 218.

3. "The plain answer is: get more people," Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 1/65, "Personnel Administration—Problems and Policies," December 28, 1964.

4. "At the root of our troubles is the fact that the Department of External Affairs has always had, has now, and looks like having for the foreseeable future too few people for the jobs assigned to it." *Ibid.*

5. "The chief emphasis of the system of competitive examinations is on selecting officers [who] . . . possess the intelligence and flexibility of mind for a job in which a wide variety of subject matter is handled; [who] must be able to work harmoniously with others and be readily adaptable to contrasting circumstances and conditions of work; [who] must be able to exercise independent judgment and to assume increasing responsibilities." "The Foreign Service Officer Competition," *External Affairs*, X, no. 9 (September, 1958), 229.

6. Marcel Cadieux, *The Canadian Diplomat* (Toronto, 1963), 80.

7. (a) "The normal method of entry into the Service is by appointment to the position of third Secretary following competitive examination by the Civil Service Commission." "Canadian External Affairs Service, Third Secretaries Regulation," Ottawa, July 15, 1938. (Document in the Department's files.) (b) "For some years, the Department has been recruiting FSOs at the most junior level. This policy has been largely satisfactory and will continue to be the basis for departmental recruitment." Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 25/55, June 29, 1955.

8. ". . . since then, we managed to arrange after long delays with the Civil Service Commission for a competition for posts in the senior grades of the foreign service. This was primarily designed to enable us to give permanent appointments to men like Messrs. Pierce, Holmes, A. C. Smith and some others who had served the Department very well during the war but did not possess veteran's preference. Under the regulation, before permanent appointments could be made, we had to satisfy the C.S.C. that the veteran's preference regulations were met by opening the competition to all comers." Letter of June 14, 1946 from Hume Wrong to L. B. Pearson, Canadian ambassador to Washington (P.A.C., R.G. 32, vols. 358-9).

9. "The Department has decided therefore that in view of its needs it must offer a few positions at higher than FSO-1 rank to persons with the special qualifications required. The Department has set a high standard for the competition and it will be maintained absolutely." Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 25/55, June 29, 1955.

10. "A common examination for all university graduates applying for positions in the Government service." Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 73/57, October 23, 1957.

11. Oral examination: "The function of the board is to assess the personal suitability of the candidate . . . intellectual capacity, moral and personal integrity, sense of responsibility, initiative, adaptability, effectiveness of speech and appearance and manner." "The Foreign Service Officer Competition," *External Affairs*, V, no. 7 (July, 1953), 219.

12. In the words of the Department, this requirement has for a long time been "a degree from a university of recognized standing." Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes*, May 17, 1956, 235.

13. "The Foreign Service Officer Competition," *External Affairs*, X, no. 9 (September, 1958), 227.

14. In this context, the term "*baccalauréat*" is an exact translation of bachelor of arts, or an English-language baccalaureate which marks the completion of the first or undergraduate level of studies at a university. *Ibid.*, 228.

15. "A good honours degree, therefore, in any of these or related fields, such as political science, geography, law, which provides a basic equipment of thought and expression will be entirely adequate." T. W. L. MacDermot, "Training for the Foreign Service," *International Journal*, IV, no. 1 (1948-9), 30. A former principal of Upper Canada College, Mr. MacDermot was the first head of the Personnel Division of External Affairs.

16. "An examination of this kind [that of 1952] favoured, and was no doubt intended to favour, university graduates in such courses as history, political science and economics, and law...." Fayers, *The Art of the Possible*, 50.

17. *External Affairs*, X, no. 9 (September, 1958), 228.

18. Testimony of R. M. Macdonnell (deputy under-secretary), before the Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes*, May 17, 1956, 238.

19. "... and if possible, some post-graduate work as well." MacDermot, *International Journal*, IV, no. 1 (1948-9), 28.

20. a) "All we ask is a degree from a university of recognized standing." Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes*, May 13, 1947, 100. b) "The impression seems to have existed—I hope it no longer exists—in some quarters that the only persons who could possibly get employment in the Department of External Affairs must be those with quite extraordinary academic qualifications." *Ibid.*, November 22, 1949, 54. c) "...broadly speaking what we want are people who have been trained to think; people who have a broad grasp of public affairs rather than highly specialized people." *Ibid.*, May 6, 1954, 150.

21. "*Les diplômes n'ont d'importance que dans la mesure où ils sont un gage de culture, l'indice d'une certaine habileté d'ordre intellectuel.*" Marcel Cadieux, *Le Ministère des Affaires extérieures* (Montréal, 1949), 63.

22. Q. by Mr. Marquis: "Mr. Matthews, is there any distinction in the qualifications of an applicant for the Department of External Affairs and the applicant for a position in any other department?" A. by Mr. W. D. Matthews: "The normal requirement is a five year period of residence in Canada while it is ten years for the Department of External Affairs." Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes*, May 13, 1947, 101.

23. "*Il est plus important qu'il soit en bonne santé de façon à pouvoir fournir la somme de travail nécessaire.*" [It is more important that he be in good health so that he can accomplish the necessary work.] Cadieux, *Le Ministère des Affaires extérieures*, 53.

24. Q. by Mr. Fleming: "Is it not a requirement that all officers must have a fluent command of two languages?" A. by Mr. R. A. MacKay [acting under-secretary of state for External Affairs]: "No, we do not make that a requirement.... So far that has not be [*sic*] practical." Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes*, May 6, 1954, 146.

25. "The competitive examinations for admission to the Department have been constituted to conform to a logically developed idea of the young Canadian diplomat." Cadieux, *The Canadian Diplomat*, 78.

26. The Royal Commission on Government Organization [Glassco Commission], *Report*, IV, (Ottawa, 1963), 105.

27. "The Canadian diplomatic service is staffed almost exclusively with officers who are expected to be able to turn their hands to any of the duties for which the service is responsible." D. V. Le Pan, "Memorandum on the Canadian Diplomatic Service. Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel" [Herter Committee], Washington, D.C., June 25, 1962 (mimeo.).

28. R. A. MacKay, testimony of May 6, 1954. Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes*, 150, 151.

29. *External Affairs*, X, no. 9 (September, 1958), 229.

30. *Ibid.*, XII, no. 9 (September, 1960), 779.

31. a) "The chief emphasis is not on erudition or brilliant academic attainment but on the flexibility of mind and the normal results of solid study." MacDermot, "Training for the Foreign Service," 29. b) "We operate on the principle that Foreign Service Officers should be recruited for their general potential rather than any particular or specialized qualification." Letter from Marcel Cadieux to Dr. N. A. M. MacKenzie [then president of a study committee of the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada on the teaching of international relations in Canada], April 23, 1963.

32. R. A. MacKay, testimony of May 6, 1954, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes*, 150.

33. "... *Ceux qui sont admis après l'âge de 35 ans n'ont généralement plus la malléabilité requise.*" [Those admitted over the age of 35 generally no longer have the necessary flexibility.] Cadieux, *Le Ministère des Affaires extérieures*, 54.

34. *External Affairs Register: Biographical Notes on the Officers of the Department of External Affairs*. Ottawa, 1949-1964.

35. R. A. MacKay and G. P. de T. Glazebrook who, after leaving the Department in 1946, returned in 1947 and 1949 respectively.

36. "Technical competence as the basis of recruitment is essential to the idea of a fully rationalized bureaucracy. Thus competitive examinations for recruitment and promotion are considered likely to produce the most technically qualified people." Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*, 419.

37. "For some years, the Department has been recruiting FSOs at the most junior level. This policy has been largely satisfactory and will continue to be the basis for departmental recruitment." Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 25/55, June 29, 1955, and no. 31/58, May 14, 1958.

38. "... *tirer parti d'une expérience et d'un point de vue qui élargissent ses horizons et qui peuvent corriger ce qu'il pourrait y avoir d'étroit dans une équipe dont les membres tendent à avoir la même formation, les mêmes intérêts professionnels et aussi les mêmes préoccupations.*" Cadieux, *Le Ministère des Affaires extérieures*, 102.

39. *Ibid.*

40. Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 25/55, June 29, 1955.

41. *External Affairs*, VI, no. 10 (October 1954), 312.

42. *Ibid.*, V, no. 7 (July, 1953), 218.

43. "The essential purpose of the system of competitive examinations is, then, to select for a career of some thirty-five years, officers. . ." *Ibid.*, XII, no. 9 (September, 1960), 782.

44. R. M. Macdonnell, assistant under-secretary, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes*, May 6, 1954, 146.

45. Le Pan, "Memorandum on the Canadian Diplomatic Service."

46. "... même si théoriquement les femmes sont admises et traitées au Ministère sur un pied d'égalité, de rares exceptions pourront vraiment y faire leur carrière." [. . . even if theoretically women are admitted and treated equally by the Department, only a few rare exceptions will really make it their career.] Cadieux, *Le Ministère des Affaires extérieures*, 55.

47. Unlike the situation in Britain, where "when the Foreign Service was opened to women in 1945, a rule was made limiting their recruitment to posts in Branch A to 10% of the total intake in any one year." Great Britain, Parliament, The Committee on Representative Services Overseas Appointed by the Prime Minister under the Chairmanship of Lord Plowden 1962-1963, *Report*, (London, 1964).

48. "These [some eleven women] also came from similar university backgrounds or the teaching profession and were assigned to the same type of work as junior officers to all intents and purposes." P.A.C., R.G. 33, project 20, file 9, project group reports, appendix 70, "The Department of External Affairs: The War Years, 1939-46."

49. Distribution of the Canadian population by religious affiliation (in percentages):

	1941	1951	1961
Roman Catholics	41.8	43.3	45.7
Anglicans	15.2	14.7	13.1
Baptists	4.2	3.7	3.3
Presbyterians	7.2	5.6	4.5
Members of the United Church	19.2	20.5	20.1
Jews	1.5	1.5	1.4
Others	10.9	10.7	12.0

Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Canada, 1961*, I, pt. 2, Bulletin 1.2-6, Introduction.

50. In England Anglicans are adherents of the Church of England; in the United States adherents of the same type of episcopal church government are called Episcopalians.

51. "Religious qualifications for office belong to the pre-rationalized bureaucracy." Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*, 443.

52. "The Anglican Church in Canada sees itself not as a specifically Canadian church but rather as belonging to a wider international Anglican community.... It may be that Anglican leaders see themselves as representing an eternal link with Great Britain, Canterbury and the Crown." *Ibid.*, 515.

53. *Ibid.*, 290.

54. Quoted in *ibid.*, 519.

55. "D'un certain point de vue il est préférable que les jeunes secrétaires (agents) soient déjà mariés car, alors, ils ne sont pas exposés à épouser des étrangères...." [From a certain point of view, it is preferable that young secretaries [officers] be married, for then they are not in danger of marrying foreigners.] Cadieux, *Le Ministère des Affaires extérieures*, 55.

56. "It should also be said that the Canadian diplomatic service has owed a great deal to the close relations it has had with Canadian universities. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs between 1925 and 1941, which were crucial years in the formation of the service, was Dr. O. D. Skelton, who had been previously Professor of Political Science and Dean of Arts at Queen's University. The Hon. L. B. Pearson and Hume Wrong were both Professors of History at the University of Toronto, joining the Department of External Affairs in the late twenties." Le Pan, "Memorandum on the Canadian Diplomatic Service," 3.

57. This B.A. or bachelor of arts should not be confused with the *baccalauréat ès arts*, the diploma given at the end of secondary school studies in Quebec in 1965.

58. "Certainly it is very noticeable that new entrants to the Department of External Affairs nowadays have ordinarily received much less education than was the case not many years ago." Le Pan, "Memorandum on the Canadian Diplomatic Service," 7.

59. Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible*, 7.

60. "The close link between certain universities and the foreign service that was forged in its early years not only gave it an initial cast of high intelligence but enabled it subsequently to attract some of the most able university graduates." Le Pan, "Memorandum on the Canadian Diplomatic Service," 3.

Chapter III

1. "This systematic training of junior F.S.O.'s is only now being introduced and it will be developed in the light of experience." Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 42, November 1, 1948, to the heads of Canadian posts abroad.

2. *External Affairs*, V, no. 7 (July, 1953), 220.

3. "University of the East Block," *ibid.*, VI, no. 10 (October, 1954), 311.

4. "Practice makes perfect." Cadieux, *Le Ministère des Affaires extérieures*, 35.

5. "The training provided for new Foreign Service Officers is essentially training on the job." Le Pan, "Memorandum on the Canadian Diplomatic Service," 8.

6. "No new officer is posted abroad until he has served in Ottawa for at least a year." *Ibid.*

7. *External Affairs*, V, no. 7 (July, 1953), 220.
8. *Ibid.*, VI, no. 10 (October, 1954), 311.
9. Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 42, November 1, 1948.
10. *External Affairs*, VI, no. 10 (October, 1954), 311, 312.
11. "Apprenticeship of a Diplomat," *ibid.*, XV, no. 9 (September, 1963), 333.
12. Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes*, no. 10, May 20, 1954, 299.
13. Jules Léger (under-secretary of state for External Affairs, 1954-8), *ibid.*, no. 4, August 6, 1958, 163.
14. "The first posting abroad is an essential stage in the training of an F.S.O." Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 42, November 1, 1948.
15. "To sum up, Heads of Missions should endeavour to give junior officers experience in the various aspects of the work of their Missions, so that they may progressively be assigned heavier responsibilities in any one of the fields of diplomatic activity." *Ibid.*
16. "They are encouraged to learn the two official languages of the country. . . ." *Ibid.*
17. "We expect when they come into the Department they will master the other language as quickly as possible." R. A. MacKay, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes*, May 6, 1954, 146.
18. Evidence of R. M. Macdonnell, *ibid.*, May 17, 1956, 235.
19. *Ibid.*
20. "It would be widely agreed that the development of language training in the Department has been hindered by the fact that in theory all officers are fluent in both of the official languages, although the theory is substantially at variance with the facts." Le Pan, "Memorandum on the Canadian Diplomatic Service," 8.
21. "We also have French classes that they can follow, if they are not too fluent in French. . . ." Jules Léger, Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes*, August 6, 1958, 163.
22. R. Campbell (assistant under-secretary), Memorandum, P.A.C., R.G. 33, project 20, file 13, project group reports, appendix 155.
23. "English-speaking candidates for the service should aim to be able to read French easily; second, to understand the spoken word; third, to speak it; and last, to write it—in that order, for that is the order in which they will have most need of it." MacDermot, *International Journal*, IV, no. 1 (Winter, 1948-9), 31.
24. *External Affairs*, XII, no. 9 (September, 1960), 782.
25. "No serious difficulty exists in this regard for our French-speaking officers, who are all reasonably competent in English when they join us. For them the development of bilingualism is a question of practising the use of English in Departmental work." R. Campbell, Memorandum, P.A.C., R.G. 33, project 20, file 13, project group reports, appendix 155.
26. Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report*, 1963, 50.
27. "We have also been endeavouring, within the resources at our disposal, to provide more training in French and English for certain entrants." Letter of April 23, 1963 from Marcel Cadieux to Dr. N. A. M. Mackenzie.
28. Canada's Defence College, founded in 1947, offers middle-rank officers expert courses on "the military, economic, scientific, political and organizational aspects of national security." *External Affairs*, XIV, no. 2 (February 1962), 73.
29. The object of the Imperial Defence College, established in 1927, is "to produce throughout the Commonwealth a body of senior officers of the fighting Services and Civil Service who will be capable of holding high commands and key appointments in the structure of Commonwealth defence both in peace and war." *Ibid.*, VI, no. 2 (February, 1954), 60.
30. Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report*, 1949, 79-80.
31. "The objective of the service is not, it seems, to ensure that French Canadians become more so (I hasten to add that the reverse is not true) and limit themselves to being the interpreters and advocates of Quebec views. . . ." Letter of March 22, 1965 from Marcel Cadieux to Dr. Michael Oliver, Director of Research for the Commission.
32. Letter of April 12, 1966 from the Department to the author.

33. "... de vous jeter dans le bain, de vous initier au métier, de vous mouler graduellement."
34. "... pourront justifier à l'occasion le regardement d'une promotion dont aurait pu (sinon dû) bénéficier un fonctionnaire francophone."

Chapter IV

1. Q. by H.W. Herridge: "On what basis are these appointments [heads of missions] made? Is it a committee, or who decides where the various representatives will go?" A. by Howard Green (secretary of state for External Affairs): "... in the first place it is the responsibility of the assistant under-secretary in charge of administration..." Standing Committee on External Affairs, *Minutes*, May 3, 1961, 70-1.

2. "In posting involving officers up to Grade 4, the Head of Personnel Operations Division may usually approve the posting recommendation without reference to higher authority, except in special circumstances." Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 2/65, "Personnel Administration: Problems and Policies II. Departmental Officers: Posting Policies," December 29, 1964.

3. *Ibid.*, no. 28/57, "Departmental Officers: Posting System," May 3, 1957.

4. *Ibid.*, no. 2/65.

5. These officers were: W. D. Matthews, January 1945 to January 1950; H. O. Moran from January 21, 1950; R. A. MacKay from September 1, 1952; R. M. Macdonnell from September 6, 1955; W. D. Matthews from April 30, 1956; E. W. T. Gill from September 15, 1959; and J. K. Starnes in an acting capacity from April 24 to July 6, 1962.

6. "The number of officers was so small that it was possible for those responsible for administering the Department to know all of them with some degree of intimacy and to keep their interests and inclinations and abilities reasonably well in mind." Le Pan, "Memorandum on the Canadian Diplomatic Service," 11.

7. "From the beginning, it has been an integrated service, whose officers were expected to rotate not only between foreign posts but also between Canada and abroad." *Ibid.*

8. "All the highest posts in the service, both at home and abroad, are open to career officers. The Under-Secretaryship, the Deputy Under-Secretaryship and the various Assistant Under-Secretaryships are invariably career appointments." *Ibid.*

9. Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 28/57, May 3, 1957, "Departmental Officers: Posting System." The Department added, in Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 2/65, that it sought "gradually to broaden the experience of the specialist in order to prepare him to assume more general responsibility as a senior officer."

10. "F.S.O.'s or E.A.O.'s are deployed to meet the requirements of the service." Letter of March 22, 1965 from Marcel Cadieux to Michael Oliver.

11. Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 28/57.

12. Letter of March 22, 1965 from Marcel Cadieux to Michael Oliver.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Cadieux, *The Canadian Diplomat*, 54-5.

15. Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 28/57, May 3, 1957.

16. *Ibid.*, no. 2/65, December 29, 1964.

17. "The various functional specialities . . . participation in defence colleges . . . and the training or experience officers may have had in the areas covered by area divisions, or in any section within those divisions, or in any country of sufficient importance to warrant specialized study of its affairs. . . ." *Ibid.*

18. "There is however a great deal of flexibility in the system and it is commonplace for officers to be sent to fill a position one or two grades higher or a grade lower than their own rank." *Ibid.*

19. "It should, however, be borne in mind that posting preferences can never be the decisive factor," since "every mission worth opening and operating is worth staffing properly." *Ibid.*

20. "Where possible, considerations such as education facilities and accommodation in relation to an officer's family situation will be taken into account in determining the nature of the posting suggested, as well as the timing." *Ibid.*

21. "The Department will however try to give a second consecutive posting to a more temperate climate to a middle-rank officer on completion of a tour of duty at a class 'D' post." *Ibid.*

22. "Cross postings are more common for FSO-3 and above, although it is unusual for them to spend more than 6 years abroad without being given an assignment in Ottawa." *Ibid.*

23. Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 1/65.

24. "The only objection I can see to this slate of Ministers [W. F. Turgeon to Mexico, Dr. H. Laureys to Peru, and Senator X who had just left Louis St. Laurent (then Minister of Justice) know that he was disposed to accept an appointment as head of a post in South America] taking shape, is the preponderance of French Canadian Ministers to Latin American countries. It is true that taking the Service as a whole, there is no such disproportion between the English and French, Protestant and Catholic appointees. At the same time, there might be legitimate criticism of too many French appointments to Latin American posts. Such criticism could be met by appointing an English Protestant to Argentina." Note of December 10, 1943 from N. A. Robertson, under-secretary of state from 1941 to 1946 and from 1958 to 1964, to Prime Minister Mackenzie King.

25. "The somewhat unfortunate practice has developed of generally appointing French Canadians as heads of missions in French and Spanish-speaking countries, so that such countries have not on the whole the opportunity of dealing with English-speaking Canadian diplomats, and the French Canadian diplomats have been restricted in their field of activity abroad." Skilling, *Canadian Representation Abroad*, 271.

26. "There must be no exaggerated insistence, furthermore, that the character of each mission... be representative of Canada; it is enough if the service in general properly reflects the essential qualities and broad interests of the country." Cadieux, *The Canadian Diplomat*, 55.

27. It is worth noting that Lionel Chevrier, a French-speaking officer but not a career officer, who was appointed Canadian high commissioner to London in 1964, was not one of the 362 officers who on December 31, 1964 had what is considered the minimum number of years' service for a career officer in the Department, that is, five years.

28. Glassco Commission, *Report*, IV, 114.

29. Cadieux, *The Canadian Diplomat*, 55.

30. Letter of March 22, 1965 from Marcel Cadieux to Michael Oliver.

31. Cadieux, *The Canadian Diplomat*, 57-8.

32. *Ibid.*, 64.

33. "Ils [les Canadiens français] ne doivent s'y orienter que s'ils sont eux-mêmes prêts à se déposséder de ce qu'il pourrait y avoir d'exclusif dans leurs conceptions nationales." [They [French-speaking Canadians] should consider [this career] only if they are prepared to drop those characteristics they consider unique to their national identity.] Cadieux, *Le Ministère des Affaires extérieures*, 20.

34. "Les deux groupes ont les mêmes tendances et préfèrent de beaucoup les directions politiques aux directions administratives."

Chapter V

1. Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 49/52, July 23, 1952.
2. *Ibid.*, no. B/41, March 5, 1948.
3. "One of the principal purposes of the Board is to prevent or to remove any inequities that may arise or have arisen during the abnormal recruiting period of the last two or three years." *Ibid.*
4. "The general ratings are reviewed by the Board in an effort to put them on a common basis and, together with all other available evidence, they enable a reasonable judgment to be made of merit." *Ibid.*, no. 49/52, July 23, 1952.
5. "The aim of this comprehensive review is to give the new ratings the highest possible measure of continuity and consistency, and to ensure that they reflect the rate of development as well as the actual performance of the officers." *Ibid.*, no. 31/58, May 14, 1958.
6. *Ibid.*

7. "Members of the Review Board (and hence of the Promotions Committees) are chosen for their general departmental experience and for their knowledge and understanding of personnel questions. An effort is also made to ensure as far as practicable that they include persons familiar with the work of the various units of the Department, both at home and abroad." *Ibid.*, no. 42/64, July 16, 1964.

8. See the section in the Introduction to Part 1 on officers 17-19.

9. "For the first time in the officer ranks, promotion policies were carried out within an authorized establishment." Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report*, 1952, 44.

10. "Today, our establishment provides for a fixed number of positions in each of the officer grades, and we are dependent on a vacancy occurring in a given grade before someone can be advanced from the junior level." Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 49/52, July 23, 1952.

11. Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report*, 1964, 54.

12. "It also provides for a general rating for all-round usefulness and suitability." Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 49/52, July 23, 1952.

13. *Ibid.*, no. B/41, March 5, 1948.

14. "In the junior grades, however, age and seniority may count for slightly more than they do in the senior grades." *Ibid.*, no. 49/52, July 23, 1952.

15. *Ibid.*, no. 31/58, May 14, 1958.

16. *Ibid.*, no. 42/64, July 16, 1964.

17. *Ibid.*

18. See "the operation of October 1, 1952," in the Introduction, 13-14.

19. This is in contrast to the practice for grades 1 to 6, where consistently "promotions are publicized in the Personnel Administrative Notice as soon as they have been sanctioned by the Civil Service Commission." Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 31/58, May 14, 1958.

20. ". . . since all the relevant factors are reviewed before recommendations for promotions are made, the privilege of appeal should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances." *Ibid.*, no. 49/52, July 23, 1952.

21. "It was possible during those years of expansion to have positions reclassified and to arrange individual promotions on a basis that resulted in abnormally rapid promotion." *Ibid.*, no. 49/52, July 23, 1952.

22. "The elite are those with most power in a group; the mid-elite are those with less power, and the mass are those with least power. . ." H. D. Lasswell, in *Introductory Readings in Political Behaviour*, ed. S. Sidney Ulmer (Chicago, 1961), 425.

23. C. Wright Mills defines the power elite as "those who decide whatever is decided of major consequence" or "those who are able to realize their will even if others resist it, [or] those who are in positions to make decisions having major consequences, for they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of the structure." *The Power Elite* (New York, 1956), 20.

24. Glassco Commission, *Report*, IV, 109.

25. Department of External Affairs, *Annual Report*, 1964, 84.

26. "He [a head of division] stands at a nodal point in the traffic of business, the point at which instructions from above meet recommendations from below. . . He must be alert to note and to warn his superiors, if policy is getting out of harmony with the facts." William Strang, *Home and Abroad* (London, 1956), 282.

27. Of the 24 English-speaking officers in our sample, 20 "felt that considerations of ethnic balance entered into promotions to positions of authority within the Department, and in particular ambassadorial appointments."

28. ". . . où on a l'impression de piétiner . . . les affectations que j'ai eues à l'étranger m'ont permis d'assumer des responsabilités et de faire preuve d'initiative."

29. ". . . avec les avantages financiers équivalents à ceux que les agents touchent généralement en vivant à l'étranger."

30. ". . . leur aptitude à effectuer des tâches variées" and "leur utilité auprès de leur supérieurs immédiats."

31. ". . . le parrainage d'agents séniors influents."

32. “... une intelligence supérieure ... une capacité de travail considérable ... certaines qualités particulières de la personnalité ... l'ambition et du savoir-faire ... une connaissance approfondie des rouages et du fonctionnement et de l'administration fédérale.”

33. “His absence [that of Laurent Beaudry, assistant under-secretary and French-speaking representative in the elite until April 1948, when he was forced to stay at home on account of ill health] means that we have not a senior French Canadian officer on the permanent establishment in Ottawa. . . . The question of balance and language representation within the Department is rather important and I think we may have to consider bringing Mayrand back from Rio in the autumn. . . .” Memorandum of August 6, 1943 from N. A. Robertson, the under-secretary, to Prime Minister Mackenzie King.

Part 2

Chapter I

1. “I had not submitted this form because the Administrative Improvement Units do not parallel those of a division. This is a temporary grouping of a few people to carry out one or two special projects at the request of the Under-Secretary. There is no establishment for this Unit; it doesn't exist. Almost none of the questions fit us; we don't correspond with posts, etc.” Comment made by the director of this unit.

2. *Ce questionnaire n'est pas entièrement adapté aux conditions de travail de cette Direction puisqu'une partie importante de ses activités revêt une forme orale, et que d'autre part elle se consacre surtout à des tâches de liaison avec la presse et nos missions diplomatiques à l'étranger, dans la plupart des cas à partir de textes établis par d'autres directions. Nous avons essayé de réduire au minimum les renseignements qui ferait double emploi avec ceux que vous obtiendrez d'autres Directions. Nos réponses portent donc sur l'activité propre à la direction. Elle ne se réduit pas facilement à une analyse statistique.*” [This questionnaire is not entirely suited to the working conditions in this Division, since an important part of its activities are oral, and since the Division's primary job is to act as liaison between the press and our diplomatic missions abroad, mostly using material written by other Divisions. We have tried to reduce to a minimum information which would duplicate the information obtainable from other Divisions. Our replies therefore relate to our own strictly departmental activities. These do not lend themselves readily to statistical analysis.] Comment of the Press and Liaison Division.

3. “Virtually no documents regarding Commonwealth affairs originate in the French language or at Canadian posts abroad where French is frequently used as a working language. Nor is an ultimate recipient of papers on the Commonwealth likely to find French convenient. While many Commonwealth members have other languages, the language in common is English which is a working language in almost all (Cyprus, Malta exceptions).” Comment of the Commonwealth Division.

4. “On disarmament questions, missions abroad, even in French language countries, accept and use English as a lingua franca, as do most Foreign Ministries.” Comment of the Disarmament Division.

5. “Essentially, DL (2) Division is a liaison division which deals mainly with the Department of National Defence and the RCMP. The latter two organizations, especially in the field of activities with which we are concerned, are not as yet in a position readily to communicate or to work in the French language.” Comment of the Defence Liaison (2) Division.

6. “While we have 50 communicators on our establishments in Ottawa and abroad, we have no means of knowing the extent of their fluency in the French language since they have not been required to carry out their duties in that language.” Colonel W. Lockhart, head of the Communications Division, September 2, 1965.

7. The card index of the Personnel Operations Division (Postings) and the files we were allowed to consult in the Public Archives indicate that only 198 of the foreign service officers between 1945 and 1965, including the 124 French-speaking officers, considered themselves bilingual during that period.

Moreover the Department itself acknowledged in July 1963 that the only two sources from which it could determine the degree of bilingualism of its English-speaking officers were: "The assessment of his own ability given by the officer himself in his Posting Preference Form, and comments by rating officers [whose knowledge of French may have often been elementary] in connection with the annual rating." (Circ. Doc., Admin., no. 38/63.) It was only then that the Department defined the terms "poor," "fair," "good," and "excellent" used to determine the officer's linguistic knowledge in the three areas of speaking, reading and writing. (See Appendix C, 187-8.)

8. "We are in fact tied with a Gordian knot to United States technical and industrial jargon rather than to a language." From a memorandum of the Communications Division; reproduced in Appendix C, 189.

9. "Officers of French background turn to English in many instances where they could very suitably use French." Comment from the African and Middle Eastern Division.

10. a) "... much more work would be done in French if it could be assumed that throughout the Civil Service of Canada professional officers could at least have a reading knowledge of French, even if they could neither write nor speak it proficiently" (European Division); b) "Most important single factor is the fact that correspondence is often intended for addressees who are not bilingual, primarily outside the Department" (Legal Division).

11. "There is no real requirement as yet to use French as a working language. Much of our work is technical and the textbooks, pamphlets, instructions, etc., are in English" (Passport Division).

12. "If there were less day-to-day pressure, drafting officers, especially those who are less proficient, would have more time to use French and to develop competence in it" (Economic Division).

13. "Most of those agencies or persons whom we correspond with prefer to work in English" (United Nations Division).

14. "The traditional reason is that English has been the working language. Having learnt to think in English, at least where government business is concerned, bilingual people in the public service experience a decided difficulty to re-adapt, although they would like to" (Protocol Division).

15. A section of this report is reproduced in Appendix D, 190.

Chapter II

1. The Canadian ambassador referred to on p. 147 asserted here that Questions 1 and 2 "imply that the principal work of a post abroad is preparing communications to Ottawa whereas this function occupies a relatively small percentage of our time."

2. The ambassador referred to above asserted that "the statistical approach is also fallacious because while only a small fraction of the communications of this post during the last year have been in French, some of these concerned subjects of substantial importance, and much of the communications in English concerned matters of administrative routine."

3. According to the permanent Canadian delegation to NATO, the reason for the importance of French there is that "this mission administers itself in French in its contact with local authorities and population, other delegations and international secretariat."

4. This delegation made the following general commentary: "*Le français et l'anglais sont les deux langues de travail de l'ONU. Il s'ensuit que plusieurs membres de la délégation canadienne utilisent le français, soit dans leurs consultations avec des collègues, soit lorsqu'ils expriment le point de vue canadien au sein des commissions ou à l'Assemblée Générale.*" [French and English are the two working languages of the UN. It follows that several members of the Canadian delegation use French, either in their consultations with colleagues, or when they express the Canadian point of view on commissions or at the General Assembly.]

5. The ambassador referred to above wrote here that "this question ignores the competence of our personnel in languages other than English or French and also the working language of primary importance at this post."

6. The number of possible replies will not include henceforth the three European bodies with headquarters in Brussels.

7. The Embassy in Mexico City, for example, defined "bilingual" as meaning "a sufficient knowledge of French to enable a person whose first language is English to work effectively with a colleague wishing to operate in French, an ability to understand perfectly spoken French and read rapidly and accurately written French without missing any important subtleties of the language, plus an ability to prepare simple correspondence in French."

8. The permanent Canadian delegation to NATO noted in this regard that "the contributing factor so far has been the lack of bilingual stenographers—one per 14 officers. We would go further and say that if we had more bilingual stenographers available, the 5 foreign service officers of this mission might be able to perform adequately all their duties in the two languages."

9. The ambassador referred to above stated here that Questions 4 and 5 "seem to imply that the problem of bilingualism can be overcome by removing a few fundamental impediments such as those mentioned in no. 4," and that these questions were "a poor substitute for a thorough study and analysis of the ramifications of the problem in terms of personnel, finance, communications, training, operations, etc."

10. The Madrid embassy noted that "... *la terminologie et les manuels techniques du Ministère sont en anglais, ce qui gêne beaucoup l'emploi du français pour toute communication se rapportant aux règlements administratifs et consulaires.*" [...] the terminology and technical manuals of the Department are in English, which is a considerable obstacle to the use of French in any communication referring to administrative and consular regulations.]

11. "... *le fait que la langue de travail de la Commission internationale est l'anglais.*"

12. "... *la majeure partie de [leur] correspondance traitait de questions administratives et techniques,*" according to the Canadian consulate at Marseilles, which was in process of being set up at the time of our survey.

13. The ambassador referred to above wrote here that this question "leaves the impression that inter-departmental utility is one of the principal reasons why we do not prepare communications to Ottawa in French. This aspect of the problem does not merit such exaggerated prominence in relation to other more formidable factors."

14. The Canadian delegation to the International Control Commission at Saigon, which reported 5 per cent, noted that "if direct written communications without information material is what is meant here, our answers to questions 7 and 8 would be 1 or 2.0 per cent."

15. Yaoundé established a distinction in questions 8(b) and 8(c) between the communications received from the Department's central administration, of which the percentage was low, and those coming from the External Aid Office, of which the percentage was high. The percentages quoted in the text are those of the Department.

Chapter III

1. The situation described here is the one that existed at this embassy in September 1965. Our account is based entirely on observations made on the spot.

2. The facts reported here are either observations made by the author on the spot, or more frequently statements or evidence offered by the members of the embassy.

3. "... *en prenant pour acquis qu'une partie du personnel de la direction consulaire et du bureau des passeports de l'administration centrale est de langue française.*"

4. The basis is Department of External Affairs, *Records Classification Guide* (Ottawa, 1963).

5. "The dispatch of a message of a page and a half is judged to require the time of two men at work for 12 hours."

6. Inconveniences can result here from the fact that from 4 pm on Fridays until Monday mornings there is only one communicator on duty at the embassy.

7. According to the Communications centre, about 95 per cent of the Ottawa-bound telegraphic messages of the commercial and military services of the embassy are drafted in English.

8. "Transmission of documents in French to the Canadian Embassy, Paris: Divisions are asked to take note that where possible communications and documents which are intended either for transmis-

sion to the French authorities or for public release in France should be sent to our Embassy in Paris in French or in both languages." Department of External Affairs, Personnel Administrative Notices, Serial no. 39, September 18, 1964. These instructions were extended to the missions in Belgium, Switzerland, the Congo (Leopoldville), the Cameroons, Haiti, Lebanon, Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam, as well as to missions with a double accreditation to French-speaking countries. *Ibid.*, Notice no. 52, December 11, 1964.

9. The normal duration of a tour of duty is three and a half years.

10. The proof is that until recently almost the entire work of the Canadian Embassy in Paris was carried out in English.

General Conclusions

1. R. S. C. 1952, c. 68.

4 Provincial Autonomy, Minority Rights and the Compact Theory 1867-1921

Ronald G. Evans



Provincial Autonomy,
Minority Rights and
the Compact Theory,
1867-1921

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4

Provincial Autonomy, Minority Rights and the Compact Theory 1867-1921

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Professor of History
York University

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Acknowledgements v

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"The enactment of the British North America Act," the Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations noted in 1940, "did not of itself assure the balance between national loyalties and interests and provincial loyalties and interests which an effective federal system requires."¹ In the course of the years immediately following 1867, particularly during the first two decades, there was an almost constant clash of loyalties and interests between the federal and provincial governments. That clash took the form of a great constitutional debate in which the nature and objectives of the new constitution were the subjects of discussion. In that debate certain intellectual weapons were forged which gradually became the clichés of Canadian constitutional discussion. "Centralization" and "decentralization," the "national interest" and "provincial rights": these were the great issues of the first 20 years of the constitutional and political history of the new nation. It was from this debate that one of the most controversial theories of the Canadian constitution emerged: the theory that the constitution was founded upon a compact entered into by the provinces which agreed to establish a federal union.

Perhaps the greatest value of the compact theory was its imprecision. The questions which it raised were more numerous than those which it answered. Did the compact include only the original three provinces, or were the later joiners also parties? Did both Quebec and Ontario agree to the compact or had they participated as a single unit, since that was their constitutional status under the 1841 Act of Union? Was it a legal contract sanctioned by the Parliament of Great Britain (no one ever dared suggest that it was sanctioned by the people or even their representatives), or was it rather a moral compact sanctioned by natural and divine law? These and many other questions have been raised about the concept of compact. They have never been answered finally, at least in the sense that the theory has been proven or exploded to the satisfaction of all. And it would seem that the very durability of the term is at least partly explained by its imprecision.

That the compact theory became a doctrine for all seasons may be illustrated in a number of ways. For example, the term "compact" was used not merely by Mowat, Mercier and Ferguson, but also by Tupper, Laurier, Borden, Meighen and King. Moreover

the concept was extremely malleable. After the war for provincial autonomy—or at least one engagement in the war—was concluded about 1890, a new struggle opened. That was the conflict over the rights of the Roman Catholic and Francophone minorities in the provinces where the majority was Anglophone and Protestant. Out of this struggle a new concept of compact was born: the concept of Confederation as a compact between two cultures, French and English. But even in the discussion of the relations between these two cultures the compact theory could be made to serve different masters. Henri Bourassa believed that the cultural compact of Confederation guaranteed the equality of the two cultures throughout the Dominion. D'Alton McCarthy insisted that the compact of Confederation explicitly limited the use of the French language to the federal Parliament and the province of Quebec.

As is often the case in constitutional debate it was possible for both sides, or rather all sides, to cite scripture in supporting their various cases. A careful search of the utterances of the Fathers of Confederation and the British North America Act could produce scraps of evidence to give some credence to nearly every argument. The Fathers of Confederation, like their successors in the debate over the nature of the constitution, were, as has so often been remarked, practical lawyers and politicians rather than political philosophers or professors of constitutional law. The result was that in discussing the structure that they had built they were more interested in its practicability and acceptability than in the exact philosophical or theoretical meaning of the terms they had used in the political debate which preceded its acceptance. Their speeches have therefore become a kind of scriptural grab-bag of proof-texts for subsequent sectarian squabbles.

A further complication worth noting at the outset is that the party labels and sides in the debate over the compact theory alter and change with time and circumstance. If one had to select a father for the theory of compact in its provincialist version, the title would doubtless be awarded to Oliver Mowat, Liberal premier of Ontario, 1872 to 1896. The leading opponent of the Mowat viewpoint was of course Sir John A. Macdonald, the Conservative prime minister of Canada during much of the same period. Yet in the 1930's when the same debate raged again, the most thorough exposition of the compact theory was issued under the name of G. Howard Ferguson, Conservative premier of Ontario. Norman McLeod Rogers, political scientist and later Liberal cabinet minister, replied to the Ferguson thesis, providing what has become the standard refutation of the compact theory.²

There is yet another complication. Professor Rogers, while totally rejecting the theory of the compact of provinces, appears nevertheless to have accepted some of the implications of the theory of the compact of cultures. In an article which is less well known than his famous assault on the provincial compact theory, Rogers wrote:

The theory which regards the constitution as in the nature of a treaty or compact is equally untenable unless an entirely fictitious character is given to those provinces which have been created by an Act of the Dominion Parliament out of the Northwest Territories. There is, however, one aspect of treaty engagements which must be given serious consideration in any procedure which may later be adopted for the amendment of the Canadian constitution. The racial and religious minority, which has shared with pioneers of Anglo-Saxon stock the task of building a Canadian nation, holds a position within the Dominion which is not derived from

the grace or discretion of the majority, but rests upon the capitulations of Montreal and Quebec and upon the terms and implications of the Treaty of Paris. Great Britain having been a party to this treaty, the rights and privileges granted have been confirmed by the several Constitutional Acts which the British Parliament has enacted for the Government of its British North American Provinces. In the protection of these rights, which are capable of specific designation as clauses of the British North America Act, there is every reason for a requirement of unanimous provincial consent as a condition of alteration.³

Finally, it may be remarked that while the debate over the nature of the constitution has never been a simple French-versus-English, Quebec-versus-Ottawa dispute, Franco-phone Canadians have doubtless been the most consistent exponents of the compact theory in both its provincial and cultural variations. As one writer has remarked in speaking of the French Canadian's attitude to '*la loi de 1867*': "He regards it mainly as a 'pact' between each of the Canadian provinces, and more particularly as a pact between the 'English' and the 'French' in Canada. Going even further he considers it a pact between Protestants and Catholics, by the terms of which all political rights granted to the French Canadian Catholics in Quebec would be automatically guaranteed to all Catholics throughout the country."⁴ Indeed the view of Confederation as a compact of provinces has achieved something of an official status in Quebec because it has been enacted as the preamble of a provincial statute.⁵ The report of the Tremblay Commission, in 1956, represents a detailed exposition of the compact theory in both its variations.⁶

Nevertheless, it was also a French Canadian prime minister, Mr. St. Laurent, who rejected most forcefully the implications of the compact theory when he told the House of Commons in 1949 that the Canadian constitution could be modified without the consent of the provinces. He noted:

The leader of the Opposition [Mr. Drew] says that whenever there has to be any kind of amendment whatsoever to any part of the constitution there should be consultation with the provinces. That is an opinion that is very frequently voiced, but it is one which we cannot accept. It would imply that the British North America Act was a contract, and that every clause thereof has the effect of a contract between the Canada that did not then exist and the provinces that did not then exist, but which would affect Canada as it now exists and as it came into being when the act was proclaimed, and the provinces which came into being at that time.

With that theory we are in diametric disagreement. We think the British North America Act is a statute which had the effect of distributing the sovereign powers of this young and growing nation between the central authority as to one part of them and the provincial authorities as to the other. We think that the central authority has no right whatsoever to deal with anything which was allocated to the provincial authorities; and on the other hand, that the provincial authorities, legislatures and governments, in respect of matters which by the constitution were allocated to the federal parliament and the federal government, do not represent the people who inhabit their provinces. With respect to those matters allocated to the federal parliament and the federal government, the people inhabiting the provinces are represented by the members they elect to sit and vote for them in this House of Commons.

That is not only our theory. That has been the theory followed in practice since the earliest days of Confederation. Not less than ten times from 1871 to 1949, amendments to the constitution have been proposed and made without

consultation with the provincial governments or the members of the provincial legislatures. That has been the practice, and in the responsible position we occupy we feel that we have no right to recognize that the provincial legislatures or provincial governments have any control whatsoever over those matters of public interest and national sovereignty allocated to the federal authority.⁷

It was also Mr. St. Laurent who was reported to have expressed the view that "It matters very little whether the British North America Act is a contract or simply a law, provided that the federal government respects the powers and the rights of the provinces, and the provinces respect the rights and powers of the federal government."⁸ From these remarks it would obviously be dangerous to attempt to suggest that the theory of compact is the product of any particular ethnic group or political party. The history of the idea clearly confirms this conclusion.

The fact is that the doctrine of "compact" is as complex and elastic as any individual proponent chooses to make it. Therefore, while the theory could be analysed as an abstract legal concept or as a postulate of moral philosophy, I have concluded it would be more fruitful to examine it as an evolving term of political controversy. I have chosen this approach in the belief that "legal argument is of little avail in changing opinions, and proofs that the B.N.A. Act is or is not founded on a compact or treaty do not go to the real issue, which is one of power rather than of law."⁹ In other words the object of this study has not been to prove or to disprove the validity of the compact theory so much as it has been to indicate and explain what men and governments have believed about it and to suggest, as far as possible, why they believed what they did.

An American scholar, discussing the "state rights" question in the history of the United States, concluded many years ago that:

There can be no doubt that state rights agitation has played a large part in American history; but it is equally clear that the controversy must always be studied in its relation to time and circumstances. The state rights doctrine has never had any real vitality independent of underlying conditions of vast social, economic or political significance. The group advocating state rights at any period have sought its shelter in much the same spirit that a western pioneer seeks his storm cellar when a tornado is raging. The doctrine has served as a species of protective coloration against the threatening onslaughts of a powerful foe. As a well-known American historian has tersely said, "Scratch a Wisconsin farmer and you find a Georgia planter."¹⁰

This contention, with necessary Canadian emendations, could very well be taken as the conclusion reached in this study, with one major exception. It is true that a Mowat, a Pattullo, a Ferguson or an Aberhart could defend provincial rights as loudly as a Mercier, a Taschereau or a Duplessis. It is even true that a Nova Scotia politician in 1886 or a Manitoba agrarian politician in 1925 could express separatist sentiments similar to those voiced by some French Canadians in the 1930's or the 1960's. But a question still remains to be answered: "If you scratch a French Canadian farmer or journalist, do you find an English Canadian lumberjack or businessman?" The answer to that question may be found in the fact that the study of the "compact" theory in Canada cannot be limited to our variation of the "state rights" controversy. It has also necessitated an examination of

the difficult question of "minority rights," which is not only different from "provincial rights" but is often in conflict with it.

Since the study of the compact theory is a subject of venerable age, it has not appeared necessary to enter into and repeat again all its well-known aspects. The arguments for and against the theory have been explored many times, most notably by Professor Rogers and Father Arès.¹¹ The crucial question of disallowance and reservation has been extensively treated by G. V. La Forest,¹² while J. T. Saywell's *The Office of Lieutenant-Governor*¹³ carefully examines the role that this office has played in dominion-provincial relations. J. A. Maxwell in his *Federal Subsidies to Provincial Governments in Canada*¹⁴ naturally is concerned with the most material and important aspect of the problem of Canadian federalism. In his *Constitutional Amendment in Canada*¹⁵ Paul Gérin-Lajoie has presented a detailed account of the highly technical question of changing the constitution. Many, though not all, of the politicians in the 1867-1921 period have been subjected to detailed consideration in published works. Finally, a general outline of the whole question may be found in two Royal Commissions' findings: *Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations* and *Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems*. Valuable documentation is published in the *O'Connor Report** and in W. E. Hodgins' volumes, *Correspondence, Reports of the Minister of Justice and Orders in Council on the Subject of Provincial Legislation, 1867-1895*.¹⁶ What I have attempted to do, therefore, in addition to summarizing much familiar information, is to add some new documentation and particularly to relate the questions of provincial autonomy, minority rights and the compact theory to political thought and action. It is hoped that through this approach a familiar theme may be viewed in a slightly new fashion.

* See Note 2, Chapter I.

Though it was not always so, it now seems unnecessary to offer an elaborate proof of the contention that the Fathers of Confederation intended to establish a highly centralized federal system in which the central government would exercise a well-understood predominance. For more than a generation scholars and publicists have devoted themselves to the task of examining every available document, public and private, in an effort to establish beyond all doubt the views of the Fathers of Confederation.¹ Today, both Francophone and Anglophone scholars appear to agree that the spirit of 1867 was the spirit of centralization.² Therefore it is unnecessary to rehearse the arguments in detail.

The objective of the Confederation scheme was clearly defined by its chief architect as early as 1861. Macdonald told the Canadian Assembly:

In speaking of a confederation, I must not be understood as alluding to it in the sense of the one on the other side of the line, for that has not been successful. When I say this, I do not say so from any feeling of satisfaction at such a result.... But while I thus sympathize with them I must say let it be a warning to ourselves that we do not split on the same rock on which they have split. The fatal error which they have committed—it was, perhaps, unavoidable from the state of the colonies at the time of the revolution—was in making each State a distinct sovereignty, in giving to each a distinct sovereign power except in those instances where they were specially reserved by the constitution and conferred upon the general Government. The true principle of a confederation lies in giving to the general Government all the principles and powers of sovereignty, and in the provision that the subordinate or individual States should have no powers but those expressly bestowed upon them.³

The debate on the Confederation proposals in the Canadian Assembly in 1865 is full of similar expressions by both French and English Canadian speakers. For the supporters of the scheme, its great strength lay in its claim to have solved the problem of “state rights,” which was believed to have been the downfall of the American constitutional system. For the critics of the scheme the greatest fault in the plan was that it gave too much power to

the central authority, thus offering a legislative union in disguise. J. B. E. Dorion who worked from a theory of federalism contrary to Macdonald's, put the critic's case this way:

I am opposed to the scheme of Confederation because the first resolution is nonsense and repugnant to truth; it is not a Federal union which is offered to us, but a Legislative union in disguise. Federalism is completely eliminated from this scheme, which centres everything in the General Government. Federalism means the union of certain states, which retain their full sovereignty in everything that immediately concerns them, but submitting to the General Government questions of peace, of war, of foreign relations, foreign trade, customs and postal service. Is that what is proposed to us? Not at all. In the scheme we are now examining, all is strength and power in the Federal Government; all is weakness, insignificance, annihilation in the Local Government! ⁴

What was stated in the Assembly was repeated by the publicists in their examinations of the union proposals. The *Bleu* journalist, Joseph Cauchon, could argue that security for all lay in a union as close to a legislative one as possible. "To admit State Sovereignty and the privilege of delegating power as the basis of a general Constitution," he wrote, "would be to assert the right of secession; it would be to introduce into the system a germ of dissolution which would, sooner or later, produce fatal consequences."⁵ To this claim an anonymous *Rouge* pamphleteer replied, "Is not the so-called Confederation they have just imposed upon us identical with Lord Durham's plan—a legislative union?"⁶ Obviously no one was in doubt about the nature of the new government, though there were sharp differences about the virtues of the scheme.

Still, the new union was not, however much Macdonald may have wished it, a legislative union. It could not be. As Cartier reportedly informed the Quebec Conference: "We thought that a federation scheme was the best because these provinces are peopled by different nations and by peoples of different religions."⁷ Therefore, while the paramountcy of the central government was to be recognized in matters touching the affairs of the entire country, local control over local concerns was also affirmed. Canada East and Canada West were to have their local governments restored to them, while the Maritime Provinces were not asked to integrate themselves completely into the new union.

Again, it need hardly be emphasized, the local governments were to be strictly limited to matters of local concern. Their powers and, perhaps more important, their financial resources were to be closely defined, and the residual powers left to the federal government. Perhaps nothing more obviously underlined the subordinate role of the provinces than those sections of the constitution which defined the appointment and position of the federal officer who was to act as lieutenant-governor of each province, and the sections which gave the federal government the authority to disallow provincial legislation. As has been frequently pointed out, the constitution-makers of 1867 took as their pattern not the American federal system, but rather the British Empire in which Ottawa replaced London and the provinces assumed the role of colonies.

But despite every effort to ensure the predominance of the federal authority, the fact remained that the system was federal and where there is a division of powers, there can be a dispute about the nature of the division. Indeed the Fathers themselves did not manage

to conclude their pleas in favour of the new system without the use of some language that was later to be employed by the proponents of provincial rights. In attempting to convince the Canadian Assembly of the need to accept the Quebec Resolutions in their entirety and unchanged, Macdonald himself described the agreement as a "treaty." "If any important changes are made," he maintained, "every one of the colonies will feel itself absolved from the implied obligations to deal with it as a Treaty, each province will feel at liberty to amend it *ad libitum* so as to suit its own views and interests."⁸ Cartier, in turn, spoke of the "treaty" and of the "sworn engagement" of the parties.⁹ These arguments were again repeated, and made even more explicit in the debates which took place in the British Parliament at the time of the passage of the British North America Act. In the upper house the colonial secretary, Lord Carnarvon, remarked: "The Quebec Resolutions, with some slight changes, form the basis of the measure that I now have the honour to submit to Parliament. To those resolutions all the British Provinces in North America *were, as I have said, consenting parties*, and the measure founded *upon them must be accepted as a treaty of Union.*" In the House of Commons, Mr. Adderley, the under-secretary of State, expressed similar sentiments, though with an important variation of language. He said:

The House may ask what occasion there may be for our interfering in a question of this description. It will, however, I think be manifest, upon reflection, that, as the arrangement is a matter of mutual concession on the part of the Provinces, there must be some *external authority* to give a sanction to the compact into which they have entered.... If, again, federation has in this case specially been a matter of most delicate *treaty and compact between the provinces*—if it has been a matter of mutual concession and compromise—it is clearly necessary that there should be a *third party ab extra* to give sanction to the *treaty made between them*. Such seems to me to be the office we have to perform in regard to *this Bill*.¹⁰

Thus, whatever arguments could be brought against the "compact" theory in later years, the supporters of that doctrine were always able to find some evidence for their position in the words of the very people most responsible for the drawing up of the British North America Act.

Even without this language, of course, there would undoubtedly have been a dispute about the nature of the division of powers in the new constitution. As the report of the Rowell-Sirois Commission observed, "No amount of care in phrasing the division of powers in a federal scheme will prevent difficulty when the division comes to be applied to the variety and complexity of social relationships."¹¹ The Canadian federal system is a stellar example of this rule. Its unique structure, and peculiar division of powers, has continued to baffle students of federalism, as Professor Wheare's often-cited remark illustrates: ". . . it is hard to know whether we should call it a federal constitution with considerable unitary modifications, or a unitary constitution with considerable federal modifications."¹² For the political scientist, with his desire to tidy up history by applying neat definitions, Canada is a "quasi-federal state." But to the public men involved in making the new system work in the years immediately after 1867, it was not so much a question of abstract definition as of real political power.

Much has been said about the machinery of centralization established by the British North America Act. Less attention has been paid to the energy that determined the

direction in which the machinery would move: the political parties. It is possible, though unlikely, that the new constitution would have operated to the complete satisfaction of everyone, if the same political party had held office at Ottawa and in each of the provinces. But that is speculation. What is a fact is that Macdonald believed that, in the working out of the new system, politics was nearly as important as the constitution itself, and that the policies of the central government would be more readily adopted if his friends held power in the provinces. For that reason he sought to maintain a close relationship between federal and provincial parties through the use of the dual mandate, which permitted politicians to sit in both federal and local legislatures, through the establishment of a federally determined franchise, and through the enactment of legislation and the exercise of federal powers in a manner which would assist his political supporters. Macdonald was certainly not misled in his belief, for the new confederation was still very young when its political opponents began to attack it, or at least to attack Macdonald's interpretation of it. So too, they attacked the basis of Macdonald's political influence: the dual mandate, the federal franchise, and the various acts and policies of the federal government which were damaging to their political prospects. Before long, Macdonald's opponents were entrenched in the provincial capitals, developing a theory of the constitution contrary to that held by the federal Conservative party, and expressed in terms of "provincial rights" and the compact of Confederation. In the first decade after 1867 political lines became clearly drawn, and much of the debate centred on questions of federal supremacy and provincial rights.

Macdonald never disguised his attitude toward the provinces: they were to be treated not as independent sovereignties, but rather as administrative bodies similar in status to municipal councils. Nor was Macdonald unaware that the provinces might find this minor status unacceptable; but he was prepared to fight for his viewpoint. As he told a member of Parliament in 1868: "I fully concur with you as to the apprehension that a conflict may, ere long, arise between the Dominion and the 'States Rights' people. We must meet it, however, as best we may. By a firm patient course, I think the Dominion must win in the long run. The powers of the General Government are so much greater than those of the United States, that the central power must win in the long run. My own opinion is that the General Government or Parliament should pay no more regard to the status or position of the Local Governments than they would to the prospects of the ruling party in the corporation of Quebec or Montreal."¹³

By this date Macdonald had already faced and surmounted one serious provincial revolt. The first post-Confederation election in Nova Scotia had returned a local assembly dominated by the anti-Confederation party, and all but one of the federal members of Parliament from Nova Scotia shared the same view. In February 1868 the Nova Scotia Assembly unanimously accepted a resolution stating the province's grievances and calling for the repeal of the union. In effect this resolution was based on the assumption that what was wrong with Confederation was that it was not and never had been a "compact" so far as Nova Scotia was concerned, for the union had been imposed upon the province. The most important section of the resolution declared: "That there being no Statute of the Provincial Legislature confirming or ratifying the British North America Act, and it never having been consented to nor authorized by the people, nor the consent of the

Province in any other manner testified, the preamble of the Act, reciting that this Province has expressed a desire to be Confederated with Canada and New Brunswick is untrue, and when Your Majesty was led to believe that this Province had expressed such a desire, a fraud and imposition were practised on Your Majesty." The resolution continued by noting that an election had now been held, that an anti-Confederation majority had been returned, and that therefore the British North America Act was declared to be "unconstitutional and in no manner binding on" the people of Nova Scotia.¹⁴

The resolution, accompanied by a petition, was sent to the Colonial Office in due course. It received a cold reception in London for the issue was judged to be a question of purely local concern. The solution to the problem was reached through direct negotiations between the Macdonald Government and the leaders of the separatist party in Nova Scotia. In brief, the outcome provided better financial terms for Nova Scotia and a position in the federal cabinet for Joseph Howe, the anti-Confederation leader.¹⁵

The interesting point, however, in the context of the discussion of the nature of the constitution is not the fact that Macdonald could rather easily restore Nova Scotia's loyalty, at least temporarily, but rather the light that the incident casts upon the compact theory. Nova Scotia, in effect, had denied that it had ever been party to a compact, a view which the events leading up to Confederation in Nova Scotia support. By denying that it had been consulted, Nova Scotia was able to claim, and obtain, better financial terms. But that very action brought a response from another province, Ontario, which was perhaps the first statement of the provincial rights case with its underpinnings in the compact theory. Contending that the federal government had overstepped its powers in unilaterally altering the financial terms agreed upon in 1867, the Ontario Legislature passed a resolution praying that legislation be passed by the Imperial Parliament "for the purpose of removing any colour for the assumption by the Parliament of Canada of the power to disturb the financial relations established by the British North America Act (1867), as between Canada and the several provinces."¹⁶ A similar view was expressed by the Liberal Opposition in the federal Parliament, and in fact the view was accepted in a parliamentary resolution which passed in 1870.¹⁷

The implications of this debate are clear. The federal government had unilaterally amended the constitution in the matter of financial terms. Ontario, governed in 1869 by a Liberal-Conservative Government, had protested the action on the grounds that such an alteration required the sanction of the provinces. In 1870 Macdonald allowed a similar resolution to pass the federal House of Commons because he wished to forestall further provincial claims on the federal treasury. In fact, of course, like every subsequent statement on the finality of financial terms, this was only final until new political pressures appeared to force another round of better terms.¹⁸

The main conclusion to be drawn from this affair is that "provincial rights," as Macdonald had anticipated, had been born with the new constitution. The division of powers in the British North America Act was a recognition that there was a division of loyalties among the people federated. As long as that division of loyalties remained, there would be appeals to local loyalties as well as to national loyalties, and these appeals would often take the form of disputes over the precise meaning of the constitution.

The continuing division of loyalties was evident not only in Nova Scotia, where it took a radical if short-lived form. It was evident also in Ontario and Quebec though it was expressed in a more conventional manner and, at least during the first decade of Confederation, was never as strongly expressed as in Nova Scotia. There can be no doubt that for both Ontario and Quebec, Confederation was important as much for what it divided as for what it united. Unfortunately, while the reasons for Quebec's anxiety to achieve a large measure of control over matters connected with French Canadian survival are always noted, it is often forgotten that Canada West also expressed a powerful desire for control over her own affairs. Indeed, it is too often forgotten that Canada West was much more anxious to end the unitary regime of 1841 than was the eastern section of the United Canadas. There is no need to repeat again the story of the bitter complaints of George Brown, the Toronto *Globe* and the Reform party about the fashion in which Canada West's ambitions were constantly frustrated in the union. Whether it was expressed in terms of the injustice of equal representation for each section at a time when Canada West was rapidly outnumbering its partner, or whether it was the loud outcry against "French domination," the demand of large sections of opinion in Canada West for a new form of government which would provide local self-government was irresistible by 1865. There was also, of course, a section of opinion in Canada West that was anxious for a completely organic, legislative union; Macdonald represented that view. But it would be a serious error to ignore the Ontario "rights" sentiment even at the time of the Confederation debates. After the enactment of the union, it is impossible to ignore this sentiment since it rapidly becomes the dominant theme in Ontario politics.

The vehicle of the Ontario rights movement after Confederation, as before, was the Reform party of George Brown, Edward Blake and Oliver Mowat. The first resolution agreed upon by the Reform party of Ontario in June 1867 made plain that group's interpretation of the union that was about to be officially proclaimed: "*Resolved*—That this Convention records its high gratification that the long and earnest contest of the Reform Party for the great principles of Representation by Population, and local control over local affairs, has at last been crowned with triumphant success."¹⁹ And from that date onward the Ontario Reform party took as its rallying cry the defence of Ontario's right to "local control over local affairs," a phrase of enough vagueness to ensure a bitter battle once it became mixed with party politics.

That it should become mixed with party politics was perhaps inevitable, given the facts of political life in Canada at Confederation. In the first place, though it travelled under the name of coalition, the Government of John Sandfield Macdonald, which held office in Ontario from 1867 to 1871, was in reality the political ally of the federal Liberal-Conservative administration. This was fully in keeping with Sir John A. Macdonald's view that regimes of a similar political stripe at the federal and provincial levels would be useful at least "until the new constitution shall have *stiffened in the mould*."²⁰ But this also meant that the local government was constantly open to the charge of being nothing more than the tool of Ottawa. Secondly, as long as the dual representation system existed, some members took the opportunity to sit in both houses. The natural result of this situation was that the political struggles of Ottawa were reproduced in the local legislatures and vice versa. Thus the criticisms that Blake and

Mackenzie directed at the federal administration in Ottawa were repeated on the floor of the Ontario Legislature in Toronto. While the attack was readily repulsed in Ottawa, it quickly gathered momentum at Toronto.

At the end of 1871 Edward Blake was called upon to form the first Reform Government in Ontario. His opening statement of policy was both a summary of his party's attitude during the preceding years and a set of guidelines for the future. He declared:

The first point upon which I desire to state the policy of this administration is with reference to what may be called the external relations of the Province. My friends and myself have for the past four years complained that the late administration was formed upon the principle and the understanding that it and the Government of the Dominion should work together—play into one another's hands—that they should be allies. My friends and myself thought, and my administration now thinks, that such an arrangement is injurious to the well-being of Confederation, calculated to create difficulties which might otherwise be avoided; and that there should exist no other attitude, on the part of the Provincial Government towards the Government of the Dominion, than one of neutrality; that each Government should be absolutely independent of the other in the management of its own affairs. As citizens of the Province of Ontario we are called upon to frame our own policy with reference to our Provincial rights and interests, and to conduct our own affairs; and we deprecate, nay more, we protest most strongly against any interference, we equally protest against the proposition that the Provincial Government ought to interfere as a Government with the affairs of Canada or any of the other provinces.²¹

Blake here laid down the principle which was to guide the Reform party's battles with Macdonald, the Ontario government's battles with Ottawa, over the next 25 years. While the abolition of the dual mandate in 1872 forced Blake to give up the Ontario premiership in favour of his federal seat, his views as well as his position were soon taken over by Oliver Mowat. Indeed Mowat more than took over Blake's views; he extended them on all fronts. It is clear from these early years, as it was to become increasingly obvious in subsequent ones, that the political fortunes and ambitions of individuals and parties can never be successfully separated from abstract arguments about provincial rights.

Quebec politicians had been deeply attached to the Union of 1841 in its later years, largely because the principle of equal representation had given them a certain sense of security. But by the mid-1860's it was recognized that the union could not long be preserved unchanged in the face of political instability, economic difficulties, and external pressures. The quest therefore was to devise a new system which would remove the difficulties while at the same time offering continued security for the French Canadian way of life. Confederation, in the view of its supporters, provided exactly that. The defenders of the scheme emphasized that French Canadians were once more being given a government of their own, that Quebec would again be the capital of French Canada. The theme of division was underlined. But in Quebec there was also a powerful group that opposed Confederation outright because, it was believed, the division was more apparent than real. After the scheme had been adopted it fell to this group to take up the cry of provincial rights. It was, then, the former opponents of Confederation, the

Rouges, that formed the core of the provincial rights party in Quebec. In giving up their total opposition to Confederation, the *Rouges* did not forego their belief that unless the autonomy of the provinces became the fundamental principle of French Canadians, the worst fears about the future would be fulfilled. *Le Canadien* put the case very frankly in 1868 when it stated: "More than ever we see that the current régime is nothing but a legislative union in disguise. Local power lacks strength and means. Every day the federal government removes a stone from the building which it has temporarily constructed. If Nova Scotia is right in fearing for its autonomy, for what must Lower Canada hope?"²² It was not, however, only the *Rouges* in Quebec who had opposed Confederation. There was a second group, many of whom had Conservative origins, who had united to publish the newspaper *Union nationale* as an organ of opposition to Confederation. This group was made up of young men who were *nationalistes* before they were party members, but at the same time they were unwilling to associate themselves too closely with the *Rouges* who were suspected of anticlericalism and annexationism.²³ In the years after Confederation had been adopted, many members of this group retained their earlier suspicions of the Confederation scheme, and therefore took up the cause of provincial rights. What is most interesting about this group's viewpoint is that it tended to identify French Canadian "national" rights with provincial rights. This was an opinion later expressed by numerous writers in the influential journal *L'Opinion publique* to which several of the earlier *Union nationale* writers contributed. One of the clearest statements of this viewpoint came from the journalist Oscar Dunn, who in the 1870's never tired of advocating the formation of a "*parti national*" to defend French Canada's interests in Confederation. In 1871 he wrote: "However it is mainly in Quebec that solid minds are needed, for it is there that the future of French Canadians is being prepared. The failure of the attempts which doubtless will be made later to transform Confederation into a legislative union depends upon the wise administration of our local affairs and the perfect functioning of the provincial government."²⁴ And it was a future Conservative premier of Quebec, J. A. Mousseau, who had declared in the pages of the same journal that "It is in Quebec, especially in Quebec, that the maintenance, the strength and the future of national autonomy can be assured."²⁵

In the election of 1871, one of the opponents of Confederation, Louis Jetté, defeated Sir Georges-Étienne Cartier. While that defeat was only a straw in the wind, it was an important indication of future developments. For the next 15 years the cry of provincial autonomy was evidently not a particularly effective one in Quebec. Indeed the condition of *Bleu à Ottawa, Bleu à Québec* was apparently far less dangerous politically in Quebec than in Ontario. The *Bleus* held power in Quebec continuously from 1867 to 1886 with the brief exception of the Letellier ministry in 1878-1879. And that tumultuous year, as we shall see, is perhaps the exception that proves the rule. There were, of course, a multiplicity of reasons for Conservative strength in Quebec: the bad reputation of the *Rouges* in clerical circles, the effectiveness of Conservative organization, the divisions of the opposition groups, and so on. But the fact remains that until an issue arose that could unite sentiments of "national" rights with those of provincial rights, the close alliance of Quebec and Ottawa apparently worked to the satisfaction of French Canadians. And it is no accident that Honoré Mercier, the politician who succeeded in moulding "nationalists"

and "provincialists" into a single movement, was a Conservative who had left his party over the Confederation issue.

The development of the provincial rights parties in the provinces paralleled similar developments at the federal level. Once again, not unnaturally, the party of provincial rights was the Liberal party. On every possible occasion the Liberal leaders advanced a theory of the constitution which emphasized the role of the provinces. When Macdonald altered the financial terms with Nova Scotia, Luther Holton moved: "That in the opinion of this House any disturbance of the financial arrangements respecting the several provinces provided for in the *British North America Act* unless assented to by all the provinces, would be subversive of the system of Government under which the Dominion was constituted . . ."²⁶ This statement of the unanimous consent doctrine of constitutional amendment, though rejected by Parliament in 1869, became standard Liberal constitutional argument. In 1871 when the British North America Act was amended to give undoubted authority for the admission of new provinces, David Mills moved: "That the respective Legislatures of the Provinces now embraced by the Union have agreed to the same on a Federal basis, which has been sanctioned by the Imperial Parliament, this House is of opinion that any alteration by Imperial Legislation of the principle of representation in the House of Commons, recognized and fixed by the 51st and 52nd Sections of the *British North America Act*, 1867, without the consent of the several Provinces that were parties to the compact, would be a violation of the federal principle in our constitution, and destructive of the independence and security of the Provincial Governments and Legislatures . . ."²⁷ Again this explicit statement of the compact theory was rejected by the House of Commons.

In the same year the Liberals launched an attack on what they considered the vicious system of the dual mandate. Again, it seems hardly necessary to point out that whatever principle was at stake, the system was operating to the disadvantage of its opponents and to the advantage of its supporters. David Mills, who presented the motion for abolition, insisted that, "until there was a complete separation of the Legislative functions of the local Legislatures and those of the Parliament of Canada, they would never be enabled to fairly carry out the principle of Confederation." Masson, a French-speaking Conservative, replied that the existing system was entirely satisfactory to the province of Quebec, and that Mills' motion was nothing short of an attempt to force Ontario views down Quebec throats.²⁸ Masson was at least partly justified in his view that Quebec was satisfied with the system, for a similar bill had been defeated in two successive years in the Quebec Legislature.

The 1871 debate on the dual mandate in the Quebec Legislature provided an occasion for the local Liberals to define their doctrine of provincial rights and explain their conception of the Canadian federal system. No one was more forthright than Wilfrid Laurier. He began by declaring that the dual mandate was incompatible with Confederation, which he defined as "a cluster of states which together have common interests, but which nevertheless vis-à-vis each other have distinct and separate local interests." He continued: "The states have a common legislature, the federal legislature, for all their common interests and needs. They each have a separate local legislature for all their local interests. Both the local and federal legislatures, within the respective scope

of their own powers, are sovereign and independent of each other." He concluded with the Quebec version of the provincial rights rallying cry: "With the ordinary mandate, Quebec is Quebec; with the dual mandate, it is only an adjunct of Ottawa."²⁹

It is not, of course, the specific question of the dual mandate that is interesting here—it was soon to be abolished—but rather the arguments that developed around it relative to the nature of the constitution. In contrast to Macdonald's "municipal corporations," the Liberals looked upon the provinces as "independent sovereignties" within the spheres allocated to them by the constitution. The overall implication of the Liberal view, as it emerges from these debates on financial terms, amendment and dual representation, was that of Confederation as the child of a compact entered into by the provinces. These provinces, while retaining certain clear and sovereign powers, had delegated matters of national concern to the federal government.

Yet despite the emerging differences between the Liberal and Conservative parties on the subject of dominion-provincial relations, the matter was never explicable simply in party terms in the years immediately after Confederation. Before the constitution had celebrated its fifth birthday, the question of federal ascendancy and provincial rights had already been complicated by the problem of minority rights. An examination of this problem suggests that the simple dichotomy of Liberal versus Conservative must to some extent at least be modified by a second pair of political tags, the "ins" and the "outs."

The problem of minority rights is related to the matter of the federal power of disallowance, which will be examined more closely in the next chapter. For the moment, two points may be established. First, this power was, in Macdonald's view of the constitution, absolutely vital to the preservation of the new nation's integrity and the predominance of the federal government. As Minister of Justice in 1868 he set down the broad principles which he believed should govern the exercise of the federal veto. He listed four types of legislation: (1) as being altogether illegal or unconstitutional; (2) as illegal or unconstitutional in part; (3) in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, as clashing with the legislation of the General Parliament; (4) as affecting the interests of the Dominion generally.³⁰ It is perhaps worth noting in passing that in addition to the broad character of these principles, the important fact is that the judgement was to be made not by a court but by the federal Minister of Justice.

A second point that deserves to be noticed at this stage is that the opponents of Confederation, and later the critics of the Macdonald Government, focussed a great deal of attention on the question of disallowance. Both A.-A. Dorion³¹ and Oliver Mowat, who, ironically, sponsored the resolutions on disallowance at the Quebec Conference,³² attacked this power as the chief threat to provincial autonomy. It might therefore be assumed that attitudes toward the exercise of this power could be distinguished on the party lines. But that assumption is only partly correct as the cases of the New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island school questions illustrate.

In 1871 the Legislature of New Brunswick enacted a statute dealing with the school system which brought protests from the Roman Catholics of that province and demands that the legislation be disallowed. Macdonald refused to accede to his petitioners' request, indicating his reasoning as follows: "Now the provincial legislatures have exclusive powers to make laws in relation to education, subject to the provisions of the 93rd clause of the

British North America Act. Those provisions apply exclusively to the denominational, separate or dissentient schools, they do not, in any way, affect or lessen the power of such provincial legislatures to pass laws respecting the general educational system of the province... It may be that the Act in question may operate unfavourably on the Catholics or on other religious denominations, and if so, it is for such religious bodies to appeal to the provincial legislature, which has the sole power to grant redress. As, therefore, the Act applies to the whole school system of New Brunswick, and is not specially applicable to denominational schools, the Governor General has, in the opinion of the undersigned, no right to interfere.”³³

When a motion calling for the disallowance of the Act was introduced into the House of Commons, both Macdonald and Cartier defended the Government’s refusal to exercise the power of disallowance. Both of them argued that if education had not been placed under the jurisdiction of the provinces in 1867, Quebec would never have joined the union. Cartier further warned that to countenance interference in this case would create a precedent dangerous to Quebec. Speaking for the Opposition, A.-A. Dorion insisted that the Government “ought to interfere, for a third of the people of New Brunswick have been treated unfairly.”³⁴

The following year, however, the House passed a resolution strongly regretting the action of the New Brunswick Legislature. The resolution expressed the hope that the minority’s grievance would be redressed, and suggested that the opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council be sought on the subject of the legal position of Roman Catholic schools in New Brunswick. This resolution brought a loud protest from the government of New Brunswick. The protest pointed to the dire consequences which the passage of the resolution in Ottawa would produce, for its intention was to alter the very basis of Confederation and lead to the “centralization of power in the Parliament of Canada.”³⁵

The assumption of office by Alexander Mackenzie’s Liberals allowed the friends of the minority in New Brunswick (and also the enemies of the Liberal party) to test the sincerity of the Liberals’ earlier demand for federal intervention in the New Brunswick school case. John Costigan moved that the British North America Act be amended to empower the federal authorities to alter the school legislation in New Brunswick. Naturally this proposition was strongly opposed by the Mackenzie government, David Mills remarking that the resolution represented a “very serious violation of the federal compact.”³⁶

Of course, the extraordinary Costigan proposal was hardly comparable to the earlier demand for disallowance. In 1877, however, there was a case offering a closer parallel. In that year a demand arose for the disallowance of an Act passed in Prince Edward Island which the Roman Catholic minority felt infringed upon their rights. In his report explaining his refusal to exercise the federal power of disallowance Rodolphe Laflamme stated: “... however arbitrary or unjust the mode of enforcing it may appear, it would not seem proper for the federal authority to attempt to interfere with the details, or with the accessories of a measure of the local legislature the principles and objects of which are entirely within their province.”³⁷

Thus, by 1877, both parties had been faced with the thorny question of the relation between minority rights and provincial rights and their answer had been the same: provincial rights have precedence over minority rights. Another decade was to pass before the question was to be raised again in serious form, and during that decade the struggle between those who upheld the federal ascendancy and those who argued for provincial rights reached a new level of intensity. There were few arguments presented in the later period that had not been at least implied in the discussions of the subject during the first decade of Confederation.

While federal politicians could spar and even exchange the occasional heavy blow over provincial rights, the main match was between the federal and provincial governments. The contestants' colours had not, however, changed, for the 1870's and early 1880's witnessed the birth and growth of a provincial rights movement, composed largely of provincial Liberal parties, which reached its culmination in the Interprovincial Conference of 1887.

There is no easy explanation of the revival of local loyalties in the 1870's and 1880's. There are several partial explanations. In the first place, it is plain that despite the hopes of the Fathers of Confederation that a "new nationality" could be conjured up to replace local loyalties, the development was more easily described than achieved. This is not altogether surprising for each of the provinces had a long history behind it, while the Dominion was a new entity. The brilliant Christopher Dunkin in his speech criticizing the federal scheme in 1865 had prophesied that the "new nationality" would be a fragile flower. He explained:

We have a large class whose national feelings turn towards London, whose very heart is there; another large class whose sympathies centre here at Quebec, or in a sentimental way may have some reference to Paris; another large class whose memories are of the Emerald Isle; and yet another whose comparisons are rather with Washington; but have we any class who are attached, or whose feelings are going to be directed with any earnestness, to the city of Ottawa, the centre of the new nationality that is to be created? In the times to come, when men shall begin to feel strongly on those questions that appeal to national preferences, prejudices and passions, all talk of your new nationality will sound but strangely. Some older nationality will then be found to hold the first place in most people's hearts.¹

Perceptive as these remarks were, what not even the realistic Dunkin perceived was that British North Americans felt even stronger provincial loyalties than the ones to which he pointed.

Doubtless, too, the economic depression which struck Canada in the early 1870's contributed greatly to the stifling of whatever "national" outlook had developed in the

years immediately after Confederation. This factor, and its implications, was noted in the Rowell-Sirois report:

A bald statement of the length of the depression gives little hint of its effect upon the lives of the people. Federal policies had burdened them with debt and failed to bring prosperity. The only large-scale remedy which the Dominion had been able to offer was the National Policy of 1879. In these circumstances communities had to do what they could to help themselves, looking to the provinces for the help which the Dominion failed to give. The provincial governments attempted to promote expansion on their own frontiers by railway building and immigration policies. But most of them quickly discovered the strait jacket in which the financial settlement of Confederation had placed them. The agitation for better terms gathered strength and led to differences with the Dominion. The failure of the Dominion's economic policies, which formed such important elements in the new national interest, discouraged the growth of a strong, national sentiment; and local loyalties and interests began to reassert themselves.²

And finally, as has already been suggested, it would be a mistake to underestimate the significance of the rivalry of the political parties in the growth of provincial rights. It is no accident that the provincial rights standard was first firmly planted in Ontario after the Liberals had gained office, that it was the Liberal party in Quebec that used the same weapon in its quest for power, and that in both Nova Scotia and Manitoba provincial rights became the leading plank in the Liberal party's platform. To say this, of course, is to leave unresolved the chicken-and-egg question of which came first: provincial rights sentiment or the Liberal party? The question is unresolvable. What is quite plain, however, is that once the Liberal party had attained power in several provincial seats of government, the federal Conservative party found itself hard pressed to maintain its concept of the predominance of the federal government. When the onslaughts of the provincial Liberal governments found support in the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the concept of federal predominance suffered a serious defeat.

It was probably inevitable that the richest province, the province least dependent upon federal financial aid, should become the first and most effective bastion of the provincial rights cause. After 1867 Ontario was the wealthiest, actually and potentially, of all the provinces. It was also the province with the most effectively organized system of local government and public finance. Its concern therefore was not to obtain further financial concessions from Ottawa, but rather to prevent the federal government from granting better terms to other provinces at Ontario's expense. It was also concerned to run its own affairs and, to the extent possible, to direct its own development free from the interference of the federal government. Yet these abstractions explain everything and nothing, unless the political and personal factors are recalled. Only if it is remembered that Macdonald and Mowat belonged to different parties, were men of very different temperaments, and had long been on touchy personal terms, can the bitterness of the quarrel between Ottawa and Toronto be understood. Like most disputes over great political principles, the struggle of federal ascendancy versus provincial rights was characterized by very mixed motives.

The quarrel between Ontario and Ottawa centred on three general questions, two of which had several particular aspects. All related to the exercise of federal powers which

Mowat believed unjustifiably constrained the provincial governments and threatened provincial autonomy. The questions at issue were the position of the lieutenant-governor, the federal power of disallowance, and the Manitoba-Ontario boundary dispute. Each of these questions has received detailed examination in the published study of J. C. Morrison and what follows is in large part an abstract of that author's work, reducing the detail to manageable proportions and concentrating on the provincial rights concept.³

As Morrison has clearly shown, the Manitoba-Ontario boundary dispute concerned no question of provincial rights in a constitutional sense. Nevertheless it provides necessary background, and offers a very material explanation of the bitterness with which the war over other, more abstract, questions was fought. In its barest detail the question related to the undefined northwestern border of Ontario. The initial steps taken by the John Sandfield Macdonald administration to settle the question were repudiated by the Liberals when they came to power in 1872. A settlement reached by an arbitration board established jointly by the Mowat and Mackenzie administrations was in turn repudiated by Conservatives on their return to office at Ottawa. In 1881 Macdonald attempted to settle the issue by enacting legislation extending the eastern boundaries of Manitoba, but this settlement was unacceptable to Ontario. In 1884, after a period of near civil war in the disputed territory, it was agreed to submit the dispute to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which ruled in Ontario's favour. Macdonald, in effect, refused to recognize this decision and it was not until a second Judicial Committee ruling was obtained in 1888 that the matter was finally terminated. It is easy to understand that a dispute of this nature, even stripped of all its details, could do nothing but create the worst atmosphere of suspicion between the Dominion and the province of Ontario. Morrison's balanced conclusion seems fully justified. "The blame for this delay," he writes, "and for the animosities thereby engendered cannot be laid wholly on one side or the other; rather it must be attributed to the mutually antagonistic aims of Ontario and the Dominion, complicated by the personal antagonism between Mowat and Macdonald and by the rivalry, jealousy, and 'fear of domination' which exercised the provinces of Ontario and Quebec."⁴ It was against the background of this quarrel that the constitutional issues relating to the lieutenant-governor and the federal power of disallowance were fought.

The office of the lieutenant-governor, as a leading authority has written, "in theory at least, was an integral part of the scheme which was designed in 1867 to assure the paramountcy of the central government in the federation."⁵ It was Mowat's belief that if the autonomy of the provinces was to be fully established, the status of the lieutenant-governor had to be altered. The object was to make the lieutenant-governor as much the representative of the Queen in the province as the governor general was the representative of the Queen in federal affairs. This, of course, directly contradicted the original view of the lieutenant-governor as an officer of the federal government in the province.

As is so often the case in constitutional disputes, the quarrel about the lieutenant-governor erupted over a question of patronage. This issue was the right of the province to appoint Queen's counsel. Beginning as early as 1872, Ontario and the federal government had disagreed about the right of the lieutenant-governor to make this appointment. The

details of the argument are unimportant, except to say that on the apparent understanding that Dominion approval had been granted, legislation on the subject of Queen's counsel was passed by the Ontario Legislature in 1873. In 1886, however, the federal government determined to ignore provincially appointed Queen's counsel. Mowat's angry protest against this apparent reversal of federal policy was couched in terms designed to express his view of the status of the lieutenant-governor: "The position of my Government is, that the Lieutenant-Governor is entitled *virtute officii*, and without express statutory enactments, to exercise all prerogatives incident to Executive authority in matters over which Provincial Legislatures have jurisdiction; as the Governor-General is entitled *virtute officii* and without any statutory enactment, to exercise all prerogatives incident to Executive authority in matters within the jurisdiction of the Federal Parliament. . . ."⁶ In short, the lieutenant-governor was seen to hold a status comparable to that of the governor general, rather than that of an officer of the federal government.

Though the battle over the status of the lieutenant-governor did not end here, this passage is enough to illustrate Mowat's concept of the office, and also of the place of the provinces within Confederation. Mowat pursued this question with his usual tenacity through a number of disputes, and then had the matter taken up at the Interprovincial Conference in 1887. While the federal government never accepted Mowat's view of the office of the lieutenant-governor it received a much more sympathetic hearing from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, as the 1892 case of *The Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. the Receiver General of Canada* indicated.

Again, with respect to the dispute over the federal power of disallowance, detailed examination seems unnecessary since it has been analysed both by Morrison and La Forest.⁷ What remains to be considered is neither the detailed argument nor the legal subtleties, but rather the part that this dispute played in the development of the autonomist argument.

While Ontario was prepared to protest the use of the federal power of disallowance even during the regime of John Sandfield Macdonald, it was not until Mowat took office that the question assumed any serious proportions. As always, there was an important material issue at stake.⁸ It arose first over the disallowance of an Ontario Act relating to escheats and forfeitures. In disallowing this Act, which was designed to provide revenues for the provincial treasury, the federal Minister of Justice argued that it represented an unconstitutional infringement on the governor general's prerogatives and on federal jurisdiction over criminal procedure.⁹ Mowat's reply was that since the provinces before Confederation had exercised control over these matters, they retained the power after Confederation. He then outlined his conception of the legal basis of Confederation in this important paragraph: "Either. . . escheated and forfeited property belongs still to the provinces, or the Crown at Confederation resumed all provincial rights which the Confederation Act did not deal with, an alternative which is wholly unsupportable, and which the undersigned trusts the authorities of the Dominion, as well as those of the provinces, will at all times unite in repudiating. The undersigned assumes it to be undeniable that all rights of the provinces as they existed before Confederation have, by the Confederation Act, been divided between the Dominion and the provinces, and that whatever has not been given to the former is retained by the latter."¹⁰ To this claim the

federal Minister of Justice replied, not unexpectedly, that “on the contrary, whatever right has not been given to the provinces, is vested in the Dominion.”¹¹ It is noteworthy that at the time of this exchange the federal Minister of Justice, A.-A. Dorion, was a member of a Liberal administration. It is thus clear that while the federal Liberals were prepared to take provincial rights as a rallying cry, they were unwilling to accept Mowat’s extreme claim regarding the residual power. Throughout most of the Mackenzie administration, the question of the federal power of disallowance raised no serious disagreements, though Edward Blake was by no means reluctant to threaten its use.¹²

It was only after Macdonald won a sweeping victory in the election of 1878 that the dispute over disallowance became a primary issue in the relations between the Dominion and Ontario. While there were several pieces of legislation at issue, the one which best illustrates the practice and theory of the two disputants related to “An Act for Protecting the Public Interests in Rivers, Streams and Creeks,” which was enacted by Ontario in 1881. The bare facts of the case concerned a demand from a logging company owned by one Caldwell, a reputed Mowat supporter, to make use of a river that had been improved for the purpose of floating logs by one McLaren, a reputed Conservative. The Ontario Act of 1881 gave all persons the right to make use of the river in question.

The federal Minister of Justice disallowed the Act on the grounds that it took away “the use of his property from one person and [gave] it to another,” an act which represented a “flagrant violation of private right and natural justice.”¹³ The Ontario government’s reply came quickly and it struck at the crucial question of the federal government’s right to judge in such a critical and controversial matter. It then went on to state the province’s assumption about the nature of Confederation in a forthright fashion:

The Confederation Act was intended to give practical effect to the exercise of the fullest freedom in administration and control in local matters within each Province, which was the main object of Quebec and Ontario, especially, in seeking such union. This fundamental principle of local self-government runs through the whole of this constitutional Act, and in order that it may be preserved intact, the utmost vigilance on the part of every Province should be constantly alive to every attempt of the Central Government to transfer the control of Local Affairs from the Government having the greatest interest in them, and possessing the fullest knowledge of them, and under a direct responsibility to the people of the Province, to a Government which necessarily has the least knowledge of, and the smallest interest in, such matters.¹⁴

In the two subsequent sessions of the Ontario Legislature, the Act was passed again, only to be disallowed. In 1884 it was re-enacted and finally accepted. In the course of this heated struggle the theory of the sovereignty of an autonomous province had been fully refined. In the session of 1882-1883 Mowat made explicit his view that the federal power of disallowance, as exercised in the Ontario Rivers and Streams case, was wholly destructive of the federal system. He maintained: “The principle involved in this disallowance was of the gravest character. It destroyed the self-government they thought they had secured by the British North America Act. It involved the admission that the functions of the Federal Government are to examine each act of that Legislature, and if they disapproved of it, veto it.”¹⁵

Issues such as those involved in the Ontario Rivers and Streams Bill naturally spilled over into federal politics. At Ottawa the division usually took place on strict party lines. In 1882, speaking on this matter, Wilfrid Laurier delivered an eloquent plea for a non-partisan approach to the question, directing his appeal especially to his colleagues from Quebec. "The occasion may arise some day when the rights of our Province may be interfered with, and then if we fail to get the measure of justice which we should expect we shall have only ourselves to blame."¹⁶ Mr. Mousseau, a Quebec Conservative, had no sympathy for such a doctrine; he believed that the safety of the rights of French Canada rested with the federal authorities. "Well, I am glad that there are in our constitution," he said, "two great safeguards which will ensure the success of Confederation: the first is that the Dominion Parliament may dismiss the Lieutenant-Governors, and the second that we may disallow Bills passed by the Local Legislatures."¹⁷ A more unabashed defence of the predominance of the central government in the federal system would be difficult to discover. It is not without interest that the two questions which Mousseau doubtless had in mind related as much to party politics as they did to constitutional theory: the Letellier affair and the Ontario Rivers and Streams Bill.

In the same year that the Rivers and Streams Act was finally allowed to stand, a new dispute broke out which once again united questions of constitutional principle with political patronage. In 1884 the Ontario Legislature passed an "Act Respecting Licensing Duties." It was immediately disallowed. This Act was Mowat's reply to the Dominion Licensing Act of the previous year, which in turn had been an effort to override an Ontario statute of 1875. As Morrison summarizes the subsequent discussion, "it was less a constitutional dispute on the subject of disallowance than a political struggle for control of the patronage involved in supervising the liquor trade."¹⁸

The case was further complicated by the fact that in the case of *Hodge v. the Queen* (1883), the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council found the Ontario legislation of 1875 valid. The federal government intended, apparently, to ignore that decision.¹⁹ In the end this rather squalid quarrel was settled by the courts in Ontario's favour. But the moral Mowat drew from the incident was plainly stated during a speech in the Ontario House in 1884. He declared: "I think the veto power is a bad thing, and stands in the way of the prosperity of this Province, and I think every Province should desire it to end. I think experience shows that it was a mistake to give it to the Dominion authorities. I am sure that Confederation would not be weakened if it were taken away, and I desire it should be taken away. I desire it to be taken away because I wish our Province to improve at its greatest possible pace, so that it may come to the greatest possible strength."²⁰ By this date, 1884, Mowat had won a large part of his battle. But he was prepared to carry the war further, especially since by this time he was finding allies in other provinces, notably Quebec, Nova Scotia and Manitoba. Each of these four provinces had specific grievances but all, by 1887, were prepared to attribute their troubles to the federal government's paternalistic attitude toward the provinces.

In Quebec the origin of the provincial rights doctrine was as closely connected to the political struggles of the day as it was in Ontario. Perhaps even more so, for in Quebec each party, while presenting itself as the defender of autonomy, was prepared to forego principle for power when the occasion necessitated it. What was true of parties was true

of individuals. For example, the independent journal *L'Opinion publique* carried two comments on the New Brunswick school question which are very revealing. In 1872 the Macdonald Government's refusal to disallow the New Brunswick School Act gave L. O. David an opportunity to point out that all his direct warnings of 1867 had proven correct. He noted, without mentioning that his main reason for opposing Confederation in 1867 was because he believed the federal government was too powerful: "Will those who mocked us in 1866 because we said, while opposing Confederation, that the right of veto would work only in favour of the English Protestant majority, permit us to ask in passing who was right?"²¹ In the same journal a few months later, J. A. Mousseau put the case for the defence by pointing out that French Canadians would be placing themselves in a dangerous position in calling on the federal government to intervene in New Brunswick. That would surely create an undesirable precedent whereby the federal government might someday intervene in Quebec's affairs.²²

Nor did these arguments exhaust the possibilities when it came to arguing about the nature of the constitution and the rights of the provinces. In 1874 the journalist Oscar Dunn presented a particularly interesting example of the uses to which the compact theory could be put. The context of the discussion was the difficulty that had arisen between the federal Liberal government and the province of British Columbia over the implications of the agreement to build the Canadian Pacific Railway. The agreement had been part of the terms of British Columbia's entry into Confederation and the Mackenzie administration, facing shrinking financial resources, was anxious to modify the terms. Dunn asked the question of whether this could give British Columbia grounds for secession. He wrote:

It is true that the Constitution makes the building of the Canadian Pacific a special condition for British Columbia's entry into Confederation. However, does it truly make the railway a main, essential condition? Rather, it seems to us that the main idea of the federative pact is the national idea, the idea of founding a country, a great country, a new national entity in the world. . . . If we accept this starting point, if we use this formula as the guiding light for our institutions, the federal pact becomes easy to interpret. The formation of a new country is the fact to which all these clauses are subordinated. . . . The organization of a people is the goal; the construction of the Canadian Pacific is the means of reaching this goal. If this is the case, we can perhaps consider this enterprise as a necessary condition, but not as the basis or as the prime condition of the Confederation contract. Consequently the federal legislature, acting as the representative of the provinces who have similar interests in this contract, can modify the details of the construction of the Canadian Pacific without so giving British Columbia the right to secede.²³

Needless to say this view was more easily defended in Quebec than in British Columbia.

Yet even when events closer to home are considered, it is not easy to find completely consistent arguments about the nature of the constitution, of federal powers and of provincial rights. Nothing illustrates this better than the two controversies over the role of the lieutenant-governor. The first arose in 1874 when the Ouimet government was forced to resign following revelations concerning the so-called Tanneries Scandal. When the question arose as to which set of politicians should be called upon to form a new government the Liberals adopted the line that the lieutenant-governor, as a

federal officer, should follow whatever instructions were given him by Ottawa. The federal government at the time was, of course, in the hands of the Mackenzie administration. The case was put in a series of letters published in *L'Événement* under the signature "Quelques Députés." According to Robert Rumilly, the author was the well-known Liberal, François Langelier. "The lieutenant-governor is the officer, the representative of the federal executive in the local government. He is there to govern the province in the name of the federal government. Thus he must govern it in accordance with the views of that government."²⁴ This was Liberal doctrine which Oliver Mowat would certainly not have recognized.

On the Conservative side, however, there was a view expressed which would have been equally unrecognizable to Sir John A. Macdonald. Oscar Dunn, defending the choice of the Conservative Boucherville rather than the Liberal Joly, insisted that the lieutenant-governor, though appointed by Ottawa, drew his authority from the province and was thus independent of federal directives. He concluded his argument by conjuring up the ogre of legislative union, the favourite demon of every provincial rightist: "It was claimed before 1867 that our Confederation was only a legislative union in disguise. We must admit that if today this doctrine of the subjection of the lieutenant-governors to the federal authority were to triumph, nobody could speak any longer about disguises, for legislative union would be a fact."²⁵ The purpose of the remark was, of course, to pour salt on *Rouge* wounds. The irritation was increased, no doubt, by the warnings issued by the Conservative *La Minerve* on the dangers of the doctrine of *Rouge à Ottawa, Rouge à Québec*. "If Mr. Joly and his friends attained power in Quebec, they would be the humble valets of Messrs Mackenzie and Fournier. The exploitation of our province, begun in Ottawa, would be continued in Quebec City. Actually Messrs Fournier, Geoffrion and Laflamme would be governing this province."²⁶

Five years after the Ouimet controversy a much more violent dispute broke out over the role of the lieutenant-governor, a dispute which gives weight to Rumilly's description of Quebec parties in this period as "churches without dogmas, but not without a mystique."²⁷ The affair began with Lieutenant-Governor Letellier's *coup d'état* of 1878. In brief, the difficulty arose out of the decision of Lieutenant-Governor Luc Letellier St. Just, who had been appointed by the Mackenzie Government, to dismiss his Conservative ministry headed by Charles Boucher de Boucherville. He chose to dismiss his ministry rather than accept its advice on the subject of a railway bill passed by the legislature.²⁸ Henri Joly de Lotbinière, the Liberal who was called upon to form a government, defended the position of his government and the action of the Lieutenant-Governor in the following terms: "The Constitution has granted us autonomy and the right to govern ourselves; within the scope of its powers, our government is not inferior to any other. At the moment Quebec is undergoing a crisis which endangers its autonomy. The attempt made to obtain the removal of the Lieutenant-Governor constitutes a danger to our provincial independence. My honourable friends on the left consider the Lieutenant-Governor as a mere servant of the federal government. I hold an opposite view. . . ."²⁹

At Ottawa the Conservatives fulminated against the action of the Quebec Lieutenant-Governor, moving a motion condemning his action. The Mackenzie Liberals, then in

office, had to fight off the resolution, though they were in an embarrassing position as the defenders of the somewhat arbitrary act of Letellier. The solution to this dilemma was naturally to defend provincial rights. Prime Minister Mackenzie argued that "nothing could be more fatal to provincial autonomy which exists under the Confederation act than such an unwise and unwarranted interference...."³⁰

Elections soon followed both in Quebec and on the federal level. The contest in Quebec resulted in a stalemate. In the Dominion election the Conservative party was returned. When the Quebec electorate failed to remove Joly, and by implication Letellier, Quebec Conservatives turned to their federal allies for assistance. There were few philosophical or even constitutional arguments in the letters which Macdonald received from Quebec supporters in their appeal for the removal of the erring Lieutenant-Governor. Mousseau wrote: "You see Sir, I am dealing only with the political aspect of the *coup d'état* and removal. I leave to you the constitutional aspect. But I cannot help saying what everybody says: 'If Letellier did not do enough to deserve being *kicked out* what must he do?'"³¹ Chapleau was perhaps a little more subtle: "It would be ill-timed for Quebec to learn now that the lieutenant-governor periodically imposed upon her by the federal government is certain of impunity as long as he does not absolutely and directly disturb the political operations of the federal cabinet and that the province's political autonomy is at the mercy of the federal officer, who can violate it without fear of censure, provided he *then* succeeds in buying a semblance of a majority in the House of Assembly."³²

Macdonald wavered; the realism of Quebec politics seemed too much even for the old chieftain. He was convinced enough of the power of the federal government to depose Letellier, but he did not want to burst open the hornet's nest of provincial rights. Finally, however, a method of action was agreed upon. In March 1879 Mousseau introduced a motion in the House of Commons calling for the dismissal of Letellier. The debate which followed allowed all the changes to be rung on the themes of provincial autonomy and federal power, but the resolution passed. After a complicated argument with the Governor General, who was opposed to the deposition, Letellier was finally removed from office.³³ In the end the matter was carried to London, but the Colonial Office upheld the claim of the federal authorities that Ottawa could dismiss a lieutenant-governor "if he wears a black cravat, and they wish him to wear a blue one."³⁴ Only the slip in the tie colours makes the instance inexact!

The politics of provincial autonomy, in the Letellier case, presents a perfect illustration of the subordination of constitutional theory to political interest. Subtle constitutional arguments were obviously easily devised to support varying political needs. In the years after 1878, the Letellier affair became the King Charles' head of Quebec politics as the debate on autonomy grew more vigorous and more frequent, as provincial finances became increasingly shaky.

The chronic financial difficulties experienced by provincial governments in Quebec were the result of at least three causes. In the first place the province lacked those municipal institutions which in Ontario were able to bear some of the burden of public expenditure. Secondly, in common with other provinces, Quebec was reluctant to exercise its powers over direct taxation and this became a matter of great political importance in the 1880's. Finally, despite its financial position, the Quebec government

was generous, not to say lavish, in the financial support it gave to railway construction. The combination of these circumstances produced a situation in which Quebec repeatedly found it necessary to press the federal government for modifications of its subsidy, or for special financial arrangements. Throughout the 1880's nearly every budget speech presented by the Quebec provincial treasurer was concerned with the inadequacy of the federal subsidy. The question of autonomy was readily linked with this financial question, for a province obviously was not autonomous unless it could pay its own way.³⁵

An example of the problems that the province's financial difficulties could create is seen in the debate on the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne in 1881. The speech itself presented a glowing picture of the province's past achievements and future prospects. Joly, the Opposition leader, was unimpressed. He launched an attack beginning, naturally, with reference to the damage that had been done to provincial autonomy in the Letellier affair, and then turning to the financial problem: "We have reached a critical position. We are faced with a terrible situation after fourteen years of provincial autonomy, and it is more than likely that the province will be able to get out of the financial difficulties in which it finds itself and honour its commitments only by the imposition of a direct tax."³⁶ Mercier, who was much quicker than Joly to grasp the "national" implications of every political situation, moved later in the same session for a special committee to consider the financial question and to propose remedies. For Mercier, there were two alternatives: better terms or the imposition of a direct tax. His explanation of why, in his view, Quebec received less satisfactory treatment than the other provinces is important:

After what has gone on for several years in Ottawa we may say that we shall get nothing from the federal government. Every government in power in Ottawa since the early days of Confederation has scarcely concerned itself with our province. Why? The answer is quite simple. At the federal level the majority is English and in Quebec it is French. We are the minority and we must bend to the rule of the strongest. It is inexorable and its consequences are inevitable. We have entered into a disadvantageous union; now that we have done so, we must suffer in silence and try to improve our lot through our own resources, with intelligence and patriotism and without counting on the others. The day when we finally must count upon the federal government as our only resort in solving our financial difficulties will be the day of our national downfall.³⁷

The Government, of course, rejected these suggestions, but repeatedly in the following years the debates ranged over the same subjects.

By 1884 the situation had reached such a serious stage that the provincial government had to use all its resources and power to win a concession from Ottawa. Interestingly, it would appear that its greatest resource in this particular battle was the one that Cartier, in the Confederation debates, had claimed French Canada would always have: its strong federal delegation.

Neither the details of the Quebec debt nor the reasons advanced by the province for a readjustment of its subsidy are important in this context.³⁸ The point of greatest interest is the method used to obtain a financial concession. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the largest part of Quebec's financial problems arose out of railway construction.

After the subsidy readjustment of 1874 the province had been left nearly free of debt; by 1882 it had established a debt of \$15,000,000 on which the annual charges were about \$885,000. Despite Chapleau's decision in 1882 to sell the North Shore Railway in order to reduce the province's indebtedness, financial difficulties remained nearly insurmountable. Since the imposition of a direct tax was politically unthinkable, the government determined to appeal to Ottawa.

The basis for Quebec's claim in 1884 was that since the federal government was providing financial support for railways running west, it should also subsidize railways in Quebec that were part of the national system. There was also a second claim based on the old problem of the pre-Confederation debt. When the demand was first presented, Ottawa, for all practical purposes, turned a deaf ear. Then in 1883 Chapleau and Mousseau changed places, giving a perfect illustration of the close relations between federal and provincial wings of the party. Mousseau became premier; Chapleau took the vacant seat in the federal cabinet. Early in 1884 Mousseau began pressing with renewed vigour Quebec's claims for better terms. The federal members of Parliament were soon presented with a situation tailored for their purposes. It happened that early in the 1884 session the Government brought forward certain resolutions to provide additional financial assistance for the C.P.R. Apparently, though the details are by no means all firmly established, the Quebec members caucused and decided that unless the demands of their province were met, they would not be able to support the C.P.R. resolutions. In the face of this threat the Macdonald Government relented, and the province of Quebec received a special subsidy. Macdonald denied that his decision was made with a shotgun at his head but the coincidence was too obvious to be wholly accidental.³⁹

The Liberals were, of course, exceedingly self-righteous about these blackmailing tactics. Laurier argued that an act of this type was a threat to the autonomy of the provinces, for it placed every province at the mercy of the federal treasury.⁴⁰ While the charge was valid enough, it left unanswered, and probably unanswerable, the question of the point at which provincial expenditures could no longer be considered legitimate. It was true, of course, that a sound principle of government finance was that the government that spends should also collect. But that was perhaps a less realistic principle than it sounded if the general attitude toward direct taxation is remembered.

At any rate Quebec obtained redress of its financial grievances in 1884. But the question of provincial rights which had been associated with the financial question, was far from dead. Indeed by 1884 it was entering a new, more vigorous phase. In the previous year the first important statement in Quebec of the legal basis of provincial autonomy had been advanced by Judge T. J. J. Loranger in his *Letters upon the Interpretation of the Federal Constitution known as the British North America Act (1867)*. Loranger was a Conservative, a fact which the provincial Liberals revelled in pointing out, for his letters provided them with just the documentation they required for their speeches on autonomy.

Loranger's immediate concern was with the signs of centralization which he detected in such legislation as the Licensing Act of 1883. In his examination of the powers of the federal government he presented the theory that the legal basis of Confederation was a compact among the provinces, a theory very similar to that upon which Mowat was acting

in Ontario. Indeed, it is interesting to note that one of the chief purposes of Loranger's letters was to tell his readers that it was time Quebecers stopped letting Ontario do all the work in the fight to defend provincial autonomy.

The Quebec judge's view of the "federal compact" was based on the following historical observation: "The resolutions of the Quebec conference were founded upon the principle of the strict equality of or equal authority between the Dominion and the provinces, without the subordination of the latter to the former, within the limits of their respective powers. In the sphere of their local powers the authority of the provinces was to remain absolute, as the federal power was to be within the limits of the general powers. It was upon these conditions that the provinces, and especially the province of Quebec, consented to enter the Federal Union."⁴¹

Fundamental to his whole case was Loranger's contention that the federal government was the creation of the provinces which existed before Confederation and were certainly not abolished by it. He wrote: "In constituting themselves into a confederation, the provinces did not intend to renounce their autonomy. This autonomy with their rights, powers and prerogatives they expressly reserved for all that concerns their internal government; by forming themselves into a federal association, under political and legislative aspects, they formed a central government, only for interprovincial objects, and, far from having created the provincial powers, it is from the provincial powers that has arisen the federal government to which the provinces have ceded a portion of their rights, property and revenues."⁴²

Loranger deals briefly with the role of the Imperial government in the making of this "federal compact." Here he states in its most simple form the fundamental contention of those who subscribed to the provincialist version of the compact. "The confederation of the British Provinces," he concluded, "was the result of a compact entered into by the Provinces and the Imperial Parliament, which, in enacting the British North America Act, simply ratified it."⁴³

Much could be said about the historical and legal claims that are made in the Loranger version of the compact theory, but in the context of the developing theory of provincial rights in the 1880's, two points seem especially important. In the first place, Loranger was concerned with, and only with, the compact of the provinces. While he makes reference to Quebec's special interest in provincial autonomy, he nowhere suggests that Quebec's position in the compact is any different from that of any other province. Indeed, what he really was advocating was that Quebec should join Ontario in the campaign against the federal government. There is, in short, not even a hint of the idea of a compact of cultures. Secondly, what is important about Loranger is that his views were almost immediately taken up by Mercier and the Liberals in the Quebec Legislature.

On April 7, 1884, Honoré Mercier moved the following set of resolutions:

That an humble address be presented to His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor, praying His Honor to be pleased to transmit the following Resolutions to His Excellency the Governor General:

1. That the *British North America Act, 1867*, was intended, in the opinion of its authors, to have consecrated the autonomy of the Provinces of the Confederation,

and that the said Act has definitely determined the relative powers of the Federal Parliament and of Provincial Legislatures.

2. That the frequent encroachments of the Federal Parliament upon the prerogatives of the Provinces are a permanent menace to the latter; and that this House, justly alarmed by these encroachments, deems it to be its duty to energetically express its determination to defend all provincial rights and to firmly proclaim its autonomy as established by the Federal Act.⁴⁴

The debate which followed upon this resolution, and upon the resolution later proposed as a substitute by the Government, offers a complete catalogue of the autonomist arguments in Quebec. For the most part they differed very little from those that had been heard in Ontario for many years.

Mercier's opening speech was not much more than an explanation of the views put forward by Loranger the previous year. Indeed Loranger's opinions, which were quoted at length, provided almost the entire basis of the Liberal case. And where Mercier was not repeating Loranger, he was drawing his examples from Ontario. He concluded his appeal by remarking, "In view of the energetic vindication of provincial rights on the part of our sister provinces shall we, the representatives of the people of Quebec, remain silent much longer? ... May God grant that this time party spirit does not choke off the voice of patriotism and duty."⁴⁵

To this rhetoric, Taillon, the Premier, replied that everyone was agreed on the necessity of maintaining the autonomy of the provinces, but there was marked disagreement on the means of doing so. He did not like the accusatory tone of Mercier's motion and promised that later in the session there would be a better opportunity presented to members who wished to state their views on the autonomy question.⁴⁶

Several other points of interest were made in this first debate. Mr. Irving, a Liberal who supported the Mercier motion, nevertheless presented the most effective refutation of the Loranger-Mercier view of the constitution. He maintained:

I do not agree with the honourable member from St-Hyacinthe [Mr. Mercier] in all the opinions he has expressed. I even reject absolutely some of his claims. He has brought forth a theory of the origin of provincial powers with which I cannot concur. We must not make this type of mistake regarding this part of the question. The one and only basis of our constitution is the Act of 1867. The federal Parliament is the supreme authority in our organization. All the powers belong to the federal government. This is the starting point. For reasons of sound administration and political necessity, this supreme authority is in part delegated to special bodies created in order to exercise these delegated powers. The only exceptions are the rights especially granted to the provinces. In my opinion, this leads to the need to defend both the rights of the federal government and the powers of the provinces.⁴⁷

Unfortunately very little of the debate was devoted to a serious consideration of these two conflicting viewpoints. For the most part the Liberals, who dominated the debate, were satisfied to restate the Loranger thesis, though the occasional speaker introduced the "national" question. M. Lemieux supported the resolution on the ground that it was necessary for "the defence of our provincial prerogatives and, at the same time, of our national prerogatives."⁴⁸ M. Turcotte connected the attacks on provincial autonomy with

"these repeated outrages on our religion and our national status."⁴⁹ On the Conservative side these remarks were answered in a variety of ways. M. Nantel was particularly resourceful. He pointed out that while Mercier's resolution claimed that provincial autonomy was consecrated in the constitution, Mercier had opposed Confederation in 1867 claiming exactly the opposite. He then went on with enthusiastic partisanship to indicate that while the Liberals now posed as the defenders of provincial autonomy, it was those same Liberals who at Ottawa had called upon the federal government to infringe upon New Brunswick's autonomy in the school issue.⁵⁰ And so the debate continued until the resolution was defeated.

Nevertheless it is clear that the autonomy question was one of political significance in Quebec in 1884. This is underlined by the fact that within two weeks after the defeat of the Mercier resolution, a second debate took place. The occasion was a resolution on the same subject, more mildly worded than the Mercier motion, and moved by two Government supporters. The resolutions declared:

Resolved; That an humble Address be presented to His Honor the Lieutenant-Governor praying His Honor to be pleased to transmit to His Excellency the Governor General the following Resolutions:

1. That the success of the Confederation and the prosperity of the Provinces of *Canada* depend in a great measure upon the care which the Parliament of *Canada* and the Provincial Legislatures take to confine themselves within the limits of their respective powers.
2. That it is the duty of the Legislature of this Province to resist energetically any attempt tending to attack the rights of the Province of *Quebec* or its autonomy.
3. That this House while desirous of maintaining the harmony which should exist between the Parliament of *Canada* and the Legislature of this Province, will be prepared to give a cordial and energetic support to the Government of the Province of *Quebec* whenever it is necessary to assert the rights of the Province as guaranteed by the Confederation Act.⁵¹

This resolution differed from the earlier one in that it made no assertions about past infringements upon the autonomy of the province, but simply called for a confession of faith in the idea of autonomy.

The debate which followed the introduction of this second resolution was, in most respects, a repeat performance. Its main difference was that since it was a government-approved resolution, it gave the Conservatives an opportunity to express their view more freely. M. Duhamel, the sponsor of the resolutions, set the tone of the discussion with his remark that "the autonomy of the province of Quebec is essential to its existence as a nation." But he indicated that Quebec did not have to depend only upon the provincial Legislature for the defence of its rights. "There is sufficient patriotism among the Quebec members of the federal Parliament and among the members of the Quebec provincial government," to defend the province's autonomy.⁵² This, of course, had been the view of the Quebec Conservatives at Confederation, and it was still apparently an acceptable argument in 1884.

A backbencher, M. St. Hilaire, made the closest identification of the interests of the province and the interests of the "nation," arguing, in effect, that "*Québec n'est pas une*

province comme les autres." He summed up his position as follows: "As a result of the differences which exist in our language, our laws and our religion, our province's exceptional position in Confederation requires that we enjoy this absolute and independent authority in order that we may maintain intact and enduring within a heterogenous population our treasured French Canadian nationality. This is the reason for the establishment of Confederation; if autonomy for the province of Quebec had not been necessary, we would have had a legislative union since 1867."⁵³

The position of the Government in this debate was simple. It would support the resolution because it recognized that provincial autonomy was guaranteed by the British North America Act. Moreover, Government speakers insisted that the Opposition had failed to prove any infringements upon the province's rights had taken place, and that, in any case, the place to prove the existence of infringements was not in the Legislature but in the courts.⁵⁴

The two debates in 1884 provide the basis for some general remarks on the subject of the idea of provincial rights as it had developed in Quebec in the years since Confederation. In the first place it is worth noting again that the doctrine of provincial rights was a weapon which the Liberal opposition was attempting to use to undermine the Conservative ascendancy in local politics. Secondly, the very general nature of the debate is significant. Unlike the controversy in Ontario, and also in Nova Scotia and Manitoba, where specific issues were in question, the debate in Quebec related to an abstract proposition. When the proposition was made more concrete, as it was the following year, then the debate assumed an air of greater reality. Thirdly, it seems apparent that while provincial autonomy was something no politician in Quebec could afford to oppose outright, it was nevertheless quite possible to defend the *status quo*, for the resolutions passed in 1884 were really nothing more than that. Finally, it is perhaps most significant to note that while the debate contains many references to provincial autonomy as the first line of defence for the French Canadian nationality, there was never any suggestion that a conflict might exist between provincial autonomy and the rights of the minorities outside Quebec. Nor was there any suggestion that Confederation had been a cultural compact guaranteeing the rights of French Canadians and Roman Catholics in all parts of the country. It is in the light of these general remarks that the debate over the fate of Louis Riel becomes more significant and its outcome more understandable.

As is well known, the Northwest Rebellion, the trial, and particularly the hanging of Louis Riel caused an explosion of sentiment in Quebec. The importance of these events is so great that they are usually taken as a turning point in the history of the two political parties in Canada, and in Confederation itself. A reading of the debates on the Riel question in the Legislature of Quebec suggests two important observations on the subject of provincial autonomy. First, the very fact that the Riel question was debated in a provincial legislature illustrates the way that provincial autonomists were willing to "infringe" upon questions that were essentially federal. Moreover, it is important to note that the moral which French Canadian politicians seem to draw from the Riel affair is not that provincial autonomy is a poor defence of French Canada's position in Confederation, but rather that Quebec is the only place where French Canadian rights are secure. The tendency already apparent in the 1884 debates to identify French Canada with Quebec is

now exploited to the full. Mercier, who had kept this theme muted in his 1884 speeches, was now prepared to advance it to the head of his list of arguments for autonomy. His theme was now that Riel's death represented the death of French Canada's influence in Confederation outside Quebec; and that, therefore, French Canadians had a duty to cease their fratricidal quarrels and unite in a crusade to preserve the nation in Quebec from encroaching federal power. "We felt," he declared, "that the murder of Riel was a declaration of war against French Canadian influence in Confederation, an abandonment of right and justice. This is a national question because Riel was hanged in Regina because he was one of us."⁵⁵ Speaking of the promises of Confederation in the Legislature, he declared, "We have been deceived; we have been betrayed!"⁵⁶

For the purposes of this study the politics of Mercier's *Parti national*, his alliance of Liberals and dissident Conservatives, is unimportant. But nothing is more revealing of the interpretation which he now placed on provincial autonomy than the electoral program he issued at the end of June 1886, in preparation for the coming election. Its essentials were twofold. The first theme was an attack on the unholy alliance which existed between the provincial Conservatives at Quebec City and the federal Conservatives at Ottawa which "is preparing the downfall of our provincial independence." The second point of emphasis was that party division in Quebec made the defence of the province's rights impossible and that, therefore, patriotism required a national party. "Division, born of party spirit, has done great damage; union, born of patriotism, will repair this damage." While the program called for a variety of reforms, it was nevertheless the autonomist issue that was the key to the "national" program.⁵⁷

While the nationalist aspects of Mercier's attitude were clearly underlined in 1885-1886, it would be wrong to place all the emphasis on this aspect of his doctrine of provincial autonomy. It is important to keep in mind that Mercier never suggested French Canadians alone were the defenders of autonomy; they would find allies both in Quebec and in the English-speaking provinces.⁵⁸

Indeed to see Mercier simply as a nationalist would be to mistake a politician for an ideologue. His nationalism was doubtless sincerely felt; doubtless also he recognized it as a potent political weapon. But in this battle for power and provincial rights, he was prepared to give assistance to his federal Liberal friends, and also to call upon the leaders of other provinces to form a united front against federal centralization. Certainly this latter intention lay behind the announcement in the 1887 Speech from the Throne that the Quebec government had taken the initiative in calling a conference of provincial premiers. And even here, Mercier's pragmatism may be discerned. Despite all the earlier discussion of the abstract question of provincial autonomy, there is not one suggestion in the Speech from the Throne in 1887 of constitutional reform.⁵⁹ The whole basis of Quebec's grievance is represented in a return to an earlier theme: the need for better financial terms. Mercier thus appears much more a man of his times than as a prophet of some new constitutional order.

Before turning to the 1887 Interprovincial Conference, some notice must be taken of the developing provincial rights sentiment in Nova Scotia and Manitoba.

In at least one important respect the sources of grievance against the federal government and against Confederation itself in the two outlying provinces of Nova Scotia

and Manitoba were more serious than those of the two powerful central provinces. The grievances of these provinces grew out of a belief that certain aspects of national economic policies worked to their detriment. In Nova Scotia's case it was the tariff; Manitoba objected to federal railway policy. Since these two small provinces were much weaker in their numerical representation at Ottawa than the populous central provinces, their capacity to bring political pressure on the federal authorities was much more limited. That fact perhaps helps explain the extreme lengths to which they were prepared to go in attempting to win redress for their grievances. It is characteristic of the provincial rights struggle that, while both provinces had complaints which were basically economic, these complaints were translated into constitutional terms.

The case of Nova Scotia is well known. The roots of the problem lay partly in the fact that even at Confederation the economy of Nova Scotia was moving into a time of crisis with the passing of the great age of the sailing ship. This initial difficulty was greatly intensified by the depression of the 1880's. In the face of apparently desperate economic conditions, Nova Scotians turned their wrath once more against the nation which they could always say had been foisted upon them. In 1886 the Liberal Government of W. S. Fielding, in preparation for a coming election, presented the Legislature of the province with a lengthly resolution calling for a repeal of the union, and inviting the other Maritime Provinces to join it in a Maritime union. The heart of the resolution, which passed by a vote of 24 to 8 read as follows:

That after nineteen years under the Union, successive governments have found that the objections which were urged against the terms of Union at the first apply with still greater force now than in the first year of the Union, and the feeling of discontent with regard to the financial arrangements is now believed by this House to be more general and more deeply fixed than ever before;

That Nova Scotia, previous to the Union, had the lowest tariff, and was, notwithstanding, in the best financial condition of any of the Provinces entering the Union;

That the commercial as well as the financial condition of Nova Scotia is in an unsatisfactory and depressed condition;

That it seems evident that the terms of the "British North America Act," combined with the high tariff and fiscal laws of the Dominion, are largely the cause of this unsatisfactory state of the finances and trade of Nova Scotia;

That there is at present no prospect that while the Province remains upon the existing terms of Union a member of the Canadian federation, any satisfactory improvement in the foregoing respects is at all probable.⁶⁰

With this bill of particulars as ammunition, Fielding faced his electors and won 35 of 38 seats. Nevertheless his reluctance to act immediately on the resolutions was widely interpreted as a willingness to accept much less than secession. Indeed more than one Nova Scotia newspaper argued that not secession, but rather reciprocity with the United States was what was really on Fielding's mind. "Repeal," the *Nova Scotian* argued, "means reciprocity, and reciprocity means two dollars per barrel more for mackerel, one dollar per barrel more for herring, fifty cents per quintal more for cod fish. . . ."⁶¹

Whether the repeal cry was merely an election slogan or a lever to force the federal government to alter its tariff policy, or more likely both, one thing is clear: there was no

rush to act upon it. Fielding explained his delay on the grounds that a federal election was in progress and that a new government at Ottawa might put an entirely new colour on the matter. But that election saw the electors of Nova Scotia, who had earlier been hot on the path of repeal, return 13 Conservatives and only eight Liberals. The voice of Nova Scotia was obviously less than clear. What saved Fielding from taking any further definite steps was Mercier's invitation to participate in a conference of the provinces late in 1887.

Like Nova Scotia, Manitoba found by the 1880's that federal developmental policies were not tailored to the province's needs. Specifically Manitoba objected to federal railway policy. The charter granted by the federal government to the syndicate which agreed to construct the transcontinental railway contained a clause giving the company an effective monopoly in western Canada. The purpose of the clause was to guarantee that no railway lines would be built running from points in Canada, west of the Great Lakes, to the United States. From one viewpoint the policy was obviously sensible: traffic was likely to be so small in the West that the C.P.R. would need to have the right to carry it all if even a small profit was to be made. On the other hand, Manitoba farmers, anxious for the cheapest modes of transportation, felt no strong reasons for making the C.P.R. economically viable. It is not clear whether the monopoly clause was to prohibit all railway building in the west, or merely those lines which would siphon off traffic to the United States. However, when in 1882 the federal government disallowed certain railway charters passed by the Manitoba Legislature, it became obvious that it would be impossible for Manitoba to have an independent railway policy. From this point onward, throughout the 1880's there was an almost constant conflict between Winnipeg and Ottawa over the federal power of disallowance.⁶²

In the first years of the struggle the Norquay Government, nominally a non-partisan administration, attempted to ride out the storm of protest over disallowance by working to obtain better financial terms for the province. However, the provincial rights issue involved in the disallowance question soon became the chief political issue in the province. Indeed provincial rights was the principle on which the first party division in the history of Manitoba took place. Thomas Greenway, an Ontario Liberal who had moved to Manitoba, quickly took up the provincial rights issue and by the end of the 1880's had succeeded first in driving a wedge between Norquay and the federal Conservatives, and then in defeating him. Though Norquay carried on a valiant battle against the monopoly clause, it was Greenway who in the end benefited from its repeal. It was also Greenway who then went on to use the provincial rights cry to defend his province's decision to abolish separate schools in 1890.

Ottawa's view, in the dispute over railway disallowance, was that the federal government had the right to use its veto power in order to ensure that national policies were in no way hampered by provincial policies. Sir Charles Tupper put the case bluntly, and in a way that was certain to annoy Manitobans, when he stated in 1883: "I say that the interests of this country demand that the Canadian Pacific Railway should be made a success, and the man who does any act by which that success is imperilled takes a course which is hostile to the interests of Canada. But somebody may ask what about the interests of Manitoba? Are the interests of Manitoba and the Northwest to be sacrificed to the policy of Canada? I say, if it is necessary—yes."⁶³ The result of this policy, not

unnaturally, was the development of a sectional discontent based on the suspicion that the east acted upon the assumption "that they had bought us and that in some respects we were their colony."⁶⁴ By 1886 Norquay found that with the Liberals cutting support from under him with the provincial rights cry, it was politically necessary for him to break his ties with the federal Conservative party and take up an autonomist stance himself. It was a dangerous course which he chose. It was to bring his eventual downfall, for it meant that he made enemies of his former friends at Ottawa, without winning the support of the Liberals in Manitoba. But before his defeat, he gave clear evidence of his revolt against the federal government and its policies by accepting Mercier's invitation to attend the Interprovincial Conference. He was the only non-Liberal premier there.

Thus, by the end of the 1880's the majority of the provinces were in full revolt against the paternalism of the federal government. Each had its own reason, though in every case, except that of Ontario, these were directly connected with financial problems. Each of the discontented provinces, with the exception of Manitoba, expressed its dissatisfaction by electing the Liberal party to office; and in their battle they allied themselves with the federal Liberal party, which made provincial rights one of its leading policy positions. The climax of the revolt came with the meeting of the Interprovincial Conference in the autumn of 1887.

Two provinces, British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, rejected the invitation to attend the Interprovincial Conference. The attitude of these two provinces is explained partly by the Conservative complexion of the ruling politicians, but more by the fact that both had recently received special treatment from the central government. What is particularly interesting here is that, since each of these provinces had entered Confederation late, their terms of union had been somewhat unusual. They were, in effect, provinces "*pas comme les autres*."

British Columbia's entry into the union of 1871 was arranged through the granting of special terms including an especially generous federal subsidy rate, and the promise that a transcontinental railway would be constructed. On this latter point, clause 11 of the Act of Union guaranteed that the railway would be started within two years and be completed in ten. While the federal government insisted that the ten-year guarantee really meant "as soon as possible," and that the whole agreement was based on the understanding that taxes would not have to be increased, British Columbians were inclined to place a more fundamentalist interpretation on the terms of the agreement.⁶⁵

When the Mackenzie Government took office in 1873, the first part of the agreement had already been broken, for railway construction had not yet been started. One of the primary objectives of the Liberal Government, whose members had previously been highly critical of the terms of union, was to have clause 11 altered. It was British Columbia's intention that the terms should be fulfilled to the last letter. Mackenzie's first move was to dispatch a representative to Victoria to negotiate with the Walkem Government. The mission was fruitless, though it confirmed Walkem in his belief that the Liberals were untrustworthy and intent upon breaking the agreement with British Columbia. In an attempt to check the federal government, Premier Walkem appealed to the Imperial authorities. British Columbia's appeal was received with some sympathy in London: Lord Carnarvon, the Colonial Secretary, offered to mediate the dispute.

Mackenzie was extremely irritated at the Imperial government's failure to support completely the federal government's position. Nevertheless after the Governor General, Lord Dufferin, pressed Mackenzie to accept the Colonial Secretary's offer, the federal government agreed.

The details of the Carnarvon terms are unimportant. What is important is that they represented a modification of the original term of union. But even that proved unacceptable to a powerful wing of the Liberal party. By 1875 Mackenzie was finding it more necessary to come to terms with Edward Blake than with British Columbia. Blake returned to the cabinet as Minister of Justice, but he insisted that Carnarvon's terms were unacceptable because of the expenditures involved, and also because he resented the interference of the Imperial authorities. The result was a long, complicated struggle with the Governor General, and a failure to satisfy British Columbia, where secessionist sentiment began to reach serious proportions.⁶⁶

The return of the Conservatives to office in the general election of 1878 prepared the way for the appeasement of British Columbia. Macdonald was, of course, clearly committed to the construction of the C.P.R. with all due haste. The Conservative Prime Minister was also willing to adopt other methods of quieting British Columbia's discontents. In 1880 the province was given an outright grant of \$250,000 for the construction of the dock at Esquimalt. Four years later, after the provincial government had bungled the construction of the dock, Ottawa assumed responsibility for its operation and also granted a subsidy for the construction of a railway from Esquimalt to Nanaimo. Since the C.P.R. was brought to completion in these years, British Columbia became, temporarily, a satisfied province.⁶⁷ "The spoilt child of Confederation"⁶⁸ thus had no reason to attend Mercier's conference.

Prince Edward Island's position was similar. In 1873, after six years of intermittent negotiations, political crises and mounting financial difficulties, Prince Edward Island succumbed to the temptations of Canada. Like British Columbia, the late entrance allowed Prince Edward Island to bargain for and to receive special terms. The financial arrangements were generous, designed to permit the province to solve its chief difficulties: absentee landownership and debt-burdened railways.⁶⁹

Again like British Columbia, Prince Edward Island's peculiar geographical position presented a special problem and not one that could be solved by a railway. Therefore the Dominion agreed to establish "efficient steam service for the conveyance of mails and passengers, to be established and maintained between the Island and the mainland of the Dominion Winter and Summer, thus placing the Island in continuous communication with the Intercolonial Railway and the railway system of the Dominion."⁷⁰ This unusual clause naturally became the source of much subsequent disagreement for, literally interpreted, the phrase "continuous communication" could cause the federal government serious embarrassment. By the 1880's Prince Edward Island politicians had discovered that strict interpretation was a useful way of obtaining further special treatment from Ottawa.

In 1881 the provincial Legislature protested that the screw steamer which maintained service between the Island and the mainland for all but about two months of the year was inadequate. The Sullivan Government demanded not only better "continuous com-

munication," but also compensation for past inadequacies. At first Ottawa chose to ignore the demand. A direct appeal to London from Charlottetown brought no results. Within a few years, however, Ottawa made a series of minor financial concessions to the province. But even these failed to shore up the province's sinking finances. In 1887 Sullivan appealed again to Ottawa, this time emphasizing his political friendship with the federal Conservatives. The plea met with sympathy; \$20,000 was added to Prince Edward Island's annual subsidy. Two years later Sullivan went to the bench.⁷¹ The chair provided for Prince Edward Island at the Interprovincial Conference remained empty.

Thus, though special "compacts" had been devised to bring British Columbia and Prince Edward Island into Confederation, the federal government subsequently managed to undermine the contractual principle by timely concessions to provincial demands. It is, then, especially interesting, indeed ironical, that the two provinces that had made specific agreements before entering the federal union cast a cold eye on the proceedings of the Interprovincial Conference called in 1887 to re-examine the terms of the "federal compact."

Nothing better indicates the assumption that underlay the thinking of the premiers who met at Quebec City on October 20, 1887, than a passage from the welcoming address by the representative of the province of Quebec. The address noted: "The kind manner in which you have accepted the invitation tendered you shows conclusively that you appreciate all the importance of this Interprovincial Conference, *the first which has been held since 1864*, which was attended by distinguished statesmen from Upper and Lower Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia and *whose resolutions served, in some respects, as the basis of the Union Act of 1867.*"¹ In short, it was to be a new conference on the terms of union, in direct succession to the Charlottetown and Quebec conferences, called to reassess the decision of the earlier gathering. But, plainly, it was a little difficult to extend this façade too far. In the first place only five of the seven provinces had agreed to attend. British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, ruled by Conservative administrations, had refused to attend. All those attending, except Norquay, were Liberals, and even Norquay could hardly be classed an orthodox Conservative by 1887. The federal government, which had been invited to the conference, chose to ignore it. Therefore from the outset the conference had large difficulties in representing itself as a "second Quebec Conference," and after it was over Macdonald had little difficulty in branding it as a parley of Liberal chieftains.²

Despite these limitations, the conference was an extremely important event in the evolution of provincial rights theory and practice. For the first time, it brought together all the leaders of provincial discontent. But since each province had a peculiar grievance, the problem which the conference faced was the construction of a platform upon which they could stand united. Even a quick glance at the 22 resolutions accepted by the five premiers indicates the method by which this unity was achieved. The resolutions fall nicely into two general categories: claims for better financial terms and wider revenue resources for all the provinces, and demands for constitutional changes aimed at limiting the powers of the federal government. There can be little doubt that most of the demands for constitutional reform were designed to meet the views of Mowat and Ontario, the one province that was satisfied with its financial position. Equally it cannot be doubted that

most of the suggestions in the field of finances came from Quebec. Of course Manitoba, too, was interested in both constitutional reform and better terms, while the two Maritime Provinces were chiefly concerned about the subsidy question and, probably, trade policy.

The resolutions which the conference accepted after a week of discussions reflected clearly the various provincial discontents which had emerged over the two previous decades. In addition to demanding an upward revision of federal subsidies, the resolutions called for the abolition of the federal power of disallowance; a better, but unspecified, method of determining the constitutionality of federal and provincial legislation; Senate reform giving the provinces the right to appoint half the senators and reducing the term of office to four years; abolition of the federal power to place local works under federal jurisdiction; provincial control of the franchise; and the recognition that all public lands belonged to the provinces. In keeping with the constitutional theory of the conferring premiers, these resolutions were to be presented to the provincial legislatures for approval.³

Three special resolutions of the conference deserve particular attention. First, Nova Scotia, doubtless still worried about its embarrassing repeal resolution, asked that the minutes record that Nova Scotia did not want any misunderstanding of its position: the acts and resolutions of the conference were not to be considered as an obstacle to Nova Scotia's right, if necessary, to find a method of achieving "the separation of the Province from the Dominion."⁴ Manitoba too, received special recognition. The conference declared its "sympathy with the people and Legislature of Manitoba in their struggle for the constitutional rights of their Province."⁵ This resolution, of course, referred to Manitoba's demand to be permitted to charter local railway lines. Finally, despite its professions to the effect that it had no intention of expressing hostility to the federal government or of interfering in federal affairs, the conference called for the establishment of unrestricted reciprocity between Canada and the United States.⁶ There was no mention of the fact that trade and commerce fell within the federal jurisdiction, or that unrestricted reciprocity was becoming a major plank in the platform of the federal Liberal party.

In terms of immediate results the conference was a failure. Macdonald refused to have the federal government represented, and he later rejected a suggestion that he should meet the premiers to receive their resolutions officially.⁷ For the immediate future Macdonald's tactics proved successful. Indeed, in pressing the unrestricted reciprocity resolution issue, the provincial premiers provided Macdonald with a powerful weapon with which to strike the Liberal party in the election of 1891: the charge of annexationism.

Nevertheless the conference cannot be written off as a total failure. It had brought together a group of Liberal leaders, three of whom later became federal cabinet ministers, and the ground was thus prepared for the last assault in 1896 upon the Conservatives' federal ascendancy. Moreover, the conference provided a practical expression of the provincial rights theory of the constitution. This theory was presented in its full-blown form by the Toronto *Globe*, the organ of the Ontario Liberal party, in its comment on debate on the resolutions of the conference in the Ontario Legislature:

The Confederation has its origin in a bargain between certain Provinces, in which bargain the Provinces agree to unite for certain purposes and to separate or continue separated for others. The Provinces party to the bargain were at the time of the compact independent nations in the sense that they enjoyed self-government subject to the Imperial veto upon their legislation, to the Imperial appointment of their Governor-General, and to the Queen's command of the Forces. The Dominion was the creation of these Provinces; or, in other words, was created by the British Parliament at the request of the Provinces. The Dominion being non-existent at the time the bargain was made, was plainly not a party to the bargain. It cannot, then, be a party to a revision of the bargain. The power to revise the created body must lie in the hands of those who created that body. The overwhelming majority of those who created the Dominion being in favour of the revision of the Confederation compact, the British Parliament is not entitled to look any further or to consult the wishes of the Dominion Government in the matter. The resolutions of the Quebec Conference, after they have been approved by the Legislatures representing the Provinces party to the Conference, will therefore furnish the British Parliament exactly the reasons and the authority for a revision of the Confederation pact as was furnished to and acted upon by the same body twenty-two years ago and resulted in the British North America Act being passed.⁸

It would be difficult to find a more complete expression of the provincial rights viewpoint than this one stated by the anointed organ of Ontario Liberalism. It is, however, worth pointing out that despite the consistency with which the editor pursued the implications of the compact theory, his very consistency landed him in almost immediate difficulties. Nothing could change the fact that the 1887 conference was not a conference of all the provinces. The editor was therefore forced to give up the unanimous consent implications of the compact theory in favour of an "overwhelming majority" theory. But that must raise the question: when is a compact a compact and when is it majority rule? That such a question can even be raised once more indicates the ambiguity of the compact theory and the undefined nature of the principles of provincial rights.

While it is easy enough to point out the vagueness of the compact theory and its twin, provincial rights, it is impossible to deny that after 1887 it apparently became an increasingly acceptable doctrine. There are several ways in which this conclusion may be illustrated. One may note the agreement by the Macdonald Government in 1888 to revoke the monopoly clause in the C.P.R. charter, and to revise its position on the question of disallowance. As Jackson argues, "the policy of disallowing solely on the grounds of public policy was abandoned in 1888."⁹ This may be a slight over-simplification, but as La Forest's study shows, the period of widespread disallowance for what were essentially policy rather than strict constitutional purposes was certainly over.¹⁰ While it is dangerous to generalize from a specific issue, especially when the issue is as unusual as the Jesuit Estates Act, it is nevertheless clear from the position taken by both the Government and the Opposition in that debate that the federal power of disallowance was likely to be used only with extreme caution in future. "No Government can be formed in Canada," Macdonald said during that debate in 1889, "either by myself, or by the Hon. Member who moves this resolution [Mr. O'Brien] or by my Hon. friend who sits opposite [Mr. Laurier] having in view the disallowance of such a measure."¹¹ This, of course, does not suggest that the power of disallowance was never to be used again, or that it had ceased to exist. It does suggest, however, that the Macdonald who looked

upon the provinces as municipal corporations in 1868 had come to realize that the political power of the provinces was much greater than he had either intended or expected.

The growing recognition of the power of the provinces can be further illustrated in a number of other matters. While it will be necessary to return to the Manitoba School Question in the later discussion of the compact of cultures, several observations are relevant here. From the beginning of that controversy in 1890 to its settlement in 1897, there was, to say the least, a marked reluctance on the part of federal politicians, Conservative and Liberal, to take any action which might be represented as an interference with provincial rights. It is true that the Conservative Government passed a remedial order, which was defied by Manitoba, and then attempted to pass remedial legislation. But the reluctance with which this action was finally taken, and the party's defeat at the polls in 1896 may be taken, in part at least, as an indication of the strength of provincial rights sentiment. It must, however, be emphasized that the Manitoba School Question was much more than a simple question of provincial versus federal jurisdiction. It was complicated by cultural and religious factors which were probably much more important—though it is typical that much of the argument was couched in terms of constitutional rights and wrongs.¹² The Liberal position throughout the debate was never clearly or simply a defence of provincial rights, but the party's victory in 1896 brought to power the party which had made the rights of the provinces one of its chief policies. Laurier himself was certainly never wholly committed to the view that provincial rights took precedence over minority rights, but in practice this was what his victory in 1896 and the subsequent Laurier-Greenway settlement represented.¹³

After 1896 provincial rights and the compact theory attained a position close to motherhood in the scale of Canadian political values. It would be difficult to find a prominent politician who was not willing to pay at least lip-service to the principle of provincial rights and its theoretical underpinning, the compact theory. A few of the more interesting examples may be worth citing.

There is, for example, the view of Sir Charles Tupper, Macdonald's alter ego for so many years and the sponsor of the remedial bill in 1896. In 1899 when Laurier attempted to reform the Senate by having reform resolutions passed through the provincial legislatures, Tupper appealed to the compact theory to block the move. Writing to the leader of the Conservative party in the Ontario Legislature he noted: "The Imperial Parliament will never be a party to the breaking up of a compact upon which Confederation was formed unless the House of Commons and Senate both agree to the resolution and that resolution has been before the people and the Legislatures subsequently elected have endorsed that proposal."¹⁴ The remark causes one to wonder just a little about Sir Charles's memory of the sanction which the people of Nova Scotia gave to the original "compact." At any rate the plebiscitary implications of Tupper's concept of compact add yet another complication to the apparently endless variations of the theory.

On the views of the Imperial Government, however, Tupper was apparently very close to the mark. When Laurier informed the Colonial Secretary of the Canadian Government's desire to modify the composition of the Senate, Joseph Chamberlain replied

in words that could have been written by Oliver Mowat or Judge Loranger. "Any change in such a Constitution as that of Canada," he remarked, "is of course a matter of gravest importance, involving great [sic] responsibility on the Imperial Parliament—the greater in that the present constitution is the result of a pact or treaty between the self-governing Colonies which now constitute the different provinces of the Dominion, the terms of the compact being placed under the guarantee of an Imperial Act."¹⁵ To Chamberlain's reputation as an Imperial "centralizer," it might be well to add a footnote on his views as a Canadian "decentralizer." That the same views triumphed in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is a conclusion that hardly needs documentation at this late date.¹⁶

The viewpoints of the two political leaders in the first decade of the new century differed very little on the subject of provincial rights. It could hardly be expected that Laurier would hold any other position, given his past and given the composition of his cabinet. His first cabinet contained three premiers who had attended the Interprovincial Conference: Fielding of Nova Scotia, Blair of New Brunswick and Mowat, whom Laurier described as "... the most correct interpreter of our constitution that Canada has produced."¹⁷ In a debate in 1907 on the subject of the representation of the provinces, Laurier expressed his view of the constitution in these terms: "Confederation is a compact, made originally by four provinces, but adhered to by all the nine provinces who have entered it, and I submit to the judgement of this House and to the best consideration of its Members, that this compact should not be lightly altered. It should be altered only for adequate cause and after the provinces themselves have had an opportunity to pass judgement on the same."¹⁸

Near the end of his life Laurier wrote an extensive account of his view of the federal system in response to an article criticizing Confederation for its centralizing characteristics. Laurier made two points which are of particular interest. First he indicated that he disagreed completely with those who held that in a federal system the residual power should rest with the provinces. He wrote:

I believe our system is superior because it gives the residual powers to the federal government. The aim of the federative system is to make a solid whole out of diverse elements while still permitting each element to conserve its own existence; that is to say, union without fusion. The new state cannot help but be more solid and stronger if the final authority is entrusted to the power uniting all these elements. This idea is even more evident if the aim of the federation is the creation of a new nation from diverse and previously separate elements.

But he admitted that in his estimation the Confederation scheme had erred in the direction of centralization in one important respect—disallowance. His words are again worthy of quotation:

On the other hand, provincial authority must be sovereign in the areas granted to the provinces by the constitution; this principle cannot be too strongly emphasized. When dealing with this topic, you could have dwelt more upon the danger of disallowance. That is the weak point of the Canadian Confederation. I can hardly understand how such a sharp, alert person as Cartier could have found a guarantee for the minorities in disallowance. There are only two kinds of minorities in the Canadian Confederation a minority of race and a minority of religion. Giving the central authority where the racial and religious majorities are found, the right

to infringe arbitrarily in provincial fields is to destroy and make a mockery of the legislative independence of the provinces. All the disturbances which at different times have shaken the young Confederation have one root cause—the constant attempts of the central government to encroach upon provincial prerogatives. The Liberals have unbendingly resisted these attempts and have been the champions of provincial autonomy from the outset.¹⁹

In practice Laurier was not quite so consistent as his theory suggests. He contravened his principles most obviously, it may be argued, in the case of the legislation establishing the new provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta. Here two points may be made. In the first place, in the matter of the federal government's retention of control over public lands in the new provinces, the Liberals followed the pattern of paternalism set down by the Conservatives in the Manitoba Act of 1870. In 1905 the Conservatives, now in Opposition, attacked the Government for this policy.²⁰

Secondly, it was argued in 1905 that by including in the Autonomy Bills a section relating to education in the new provinces, the Liberals were once again contravening established principles. But Laurier maintained that in this case the constitution made it quite clear that provincial rights did not take precedence over minority rights. The Conservatives, who in 1896 had upheld Section 93, now attacked Laurier's interpretation of that clause.²¹

In the matter of the position of the lieutenant-governor, the Laurier Government found itself in an embarrassing and somewhat contradictory position when it became necessary to remove Lieutenant-Governor McInnes in 1900. Though McInnes' supporters in British Columbia shouted loudly about provincial rights, there was hardly any alternative to the dismissal. The case differed from that of Letellier: McInnes and his main supporters were at least nominally Liberals, and in the election preceding the dismissal, the people of the province returned a Legislature markedly unfavourable to this group. Professor Saywell writes of this case: "That Laurier found the principle of dismissal distasteful is undoubtedly true, and only when McInnes left him no alternative did he exercise the power lawfully possessed by the federal government. In 1878 and 1879 Laurier had argued that dismissal was virtually a delegated power, held in trust by the federal government and exercised only upon request, and in 1900 he exercised the power only when he became convinced that the province of British Columbia overwhelmingly demanded it."²² The fact remains, however, that distasteful or not, in office Laurier found it necessary to exercise a power that was difficult to justify within the strict interpretation of provincial rights.

Nor, of course, did the Liberals in office allow the federal power of disallowance to fall into total disuse. Its use was limited, however, its main application being to attempts by British Columbia to restrict Oriental immigration. The legislation was repeatedly disallowed on the argument that it interfered with Dominion and Imperial interests.²³ When disallowance of a railway charter granted in British Columbia was threatened, the Attorney General of that province responded with a statement on the constitution which might very well be taken as a summary of the Liberal view, since the legislation was not disallowed. He wrote:

In the early days of Confederation the Dominion executive appear to have been imbued with the notion that the relation between the Dominion and the provinces was analogous to that existing between parent and child, and have acted accordingly. That view of the status of the provinces has been overthrown by a series of Imperial Privy Council decisions which have clearly established that the provinces acting within the scope of their powers are almost sovereign states, and that they are entitled to exercise all the prerogatives of the Crown not conferred upon the Dominion.²⁴

Robert Borden, the Conservative leader during the first two decades of the twentieth century, was not prepared to defend all the doctrines of past Conservative administrations. If anything, he was more vocal in his claim to the title of defender of the provinces than Laurier. In 1907, in a debate already referred to, he joined Laurier in affirming the compact theory. He said: "I agree with what has been said by the right hon. gentleman regarding the undesirability of lightly amending the terms of our constitution and am inclined to agree with him on the necessity of some consultation with the provinces, although of course all the provinces are represented here. But inasmuch as this is a federal compact which we are asked to vary, it is only right that each province should be consulted and its decision given, in the right of its separate entity."²⁵ And, as has already been noted, in the debates on the Autonomy Bills, Borden insisted that Laurier and the Liberals were undermining provincial autonomy in both the lands question and the educational question. In 1907 in his "Halifax Platform," Borden again returned to the charge, contending that the constitution was being twisted out of shape by the Liberals. His platform promised "the unimpaired maintenance of all powers of self-government which have been conferred upon the Provinces of Canada under the Constitution."²⁶ It may be added that when Borden attained office in 1911, he did not rush to fulfil his promise to restore control of public lands to the western provinces.

Yet the fact is that during the years after 1896 the relations between Ottawa and the provinces entered an extremely amicable phase. This was doubtless due partly to the fact that the major battles had been won before 1896, and also to the return of prosperity, which eased tempers and raised the level of public revenues. On this point the meeting of the Interprovincial Conference of 1902 is instructive. The conference won the approval of all the provinces, though Ontario and British Columbia were unable to attend. Its objects and discussions were devoted almost exclusively to the subsidy question. Indeed its resolutions were largely a repetition of the financial claims set forth in 1887. But perhaps its greatest significance is that the demands for constitutional reform which had been so large a part of the 1887 resolutions were completely ignored.²⁷

While the Laurier Government did not respond to the premiers' demands immediately, by 1905 the stage was set for a new round of better terms based on the 1902 resolutions. It has been suggested that the strongest impetus to this new subsidy arrangement was the internal political revolution that took place in Quebec in 1905 when Lomer Gouin replaced S.-N. Parent as Premier. Perhaps in order to stabilize Gouin's position, Laurier agreed that new financial terms should be worked out. This was achieved at a Dominion-Provincial Conference in 1906. Everyone except Premier McBride was satisfied by the 1906 offerings, but the British Columbia leader insisted that "geographic

consideration" necessitated even better "better terms" for his province. The other provinces, however, turned down McBride's demand for a special commission to investigate British Columbia's claims. In the end the province carried its protest to Britain where it succeeded in convincing the Imperial Government that the "finality clause" should be removed from the amendment to the constitution in which the new financial terms were embodied.²⁸

The outbreak of war in 1914 created a unique situation in the history of Canadian federalism. The implementation of the War Measures Act gave the federal government such sweeping powers that the Rowell-Sirois Commission felt justified in remarking that "for a time, Canada exhibited the essential features of a unitary state."²⁹ Yet, as the Rowell-Sirois Report also noted, this condition was due as much to the common will of the people of the country to see the war successfully completed, as to any especially draconian legislation.

War necessities encouraged, even forced, the federal government to expand its activities. Government finance, the threat of inflation and military requirements all combined to make it necessary for the federal government to assume a far more positive role in the economic activities of the nation than at any time in the past. Most notable, perhaps, was the decision taken after much hesitation in 1917 to move into the field of direct taxation through the enactment of a personal income tax law. These measures all found their constitutional justification in the character of the emergency, an argument put forward during the war, and accepted in large measure by the courts.³⁰

Of course, the most controversial measure enacted by the federal parliament during the war was not one to which constitutional objections could be raised. That was the Military Service Act of 1917. The bitterness of the debate which centered on the conscription policy was not constitutional, but political and cultural in origin. The passage of this Act, the formation of the Union Government, and the violently fought general election of December 1917 produced a deep resentment in Quebec. This feeling was given opportunity for expression in the debate on the peculiar motion presented to the Quebec Legislature by J.-N. Francoeur in January 1918. It read: "That this House is of opinion that the Province of Quebec would be disposed to accept the breaking of the Confederation Pact of 1867 if, in the other provinces, it is believed that she is an obstacle to the union, progress and development of Canada."³¹ It is difficult to know how to characterize this resolution, since it fell short of calling for the repeal of the union, leaving the decision to the other provinces. The debate which followed had a curiously unreal tone for, since no one called for secession, there was really no question at issue. Each speaker noted the various problems created by the limitation of minority rights in the other provinces, and the abusive political campaign through which the country had just passed, but none expressed a preference for an alternative system of government. The resolutions were withdrawn without a vote, following a paean of praise for Confederation sung by the Premier of the province, Sir Lomer Gouin.³²

The importance of the war period for the present discussion should not be overemphasized. It is true that, in a sense, it reversed the trend of previous years and restored the federal government to a position of undoubted ascendancy. But it was a temporary development, due entirely to the emergency. In the long run the war had the

effect, from a political viewpoint, of "calamitously damaging the federal initiative in internal affairs."³³ The immediate post-war years thus became, in the phrase of the Tremblay Commission, a period marked by "the preponderance of provincial activity."³⁴

The conclusions that may be drawn about the post-1896 period are thus fairly obvious. In these years both the compact theory and provincial rights were widely accepted. Every leading politician seems to have plighted his faith in these verities. Yet that fact alone is perhaps cause for wondering if the concepts really had any serious meaning or if they had merely become the clichés of political discussion bereft of any definition. Since they were no longer ideas that aroused passionate debate, every politician apparently found it both wise and safe to express his support of them.³⁵

The same conclusion cannot be drawn about the doctrine of cultural compact. It was the provincial rights controversy which sparked the most heated discussion in the first 25 years of Confederation; the second 25 witnessed a debate over minority rights. In the first period the concept of compact served its provincialists well. While the compact was adapted for use in the struggle for minority rights, it proved much less effective.

By the 1890's the combination of the strenuous battle waged by the provinces, the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and, not least of all, the declining strength of the federal Conservative party ensured at least a partial victory for the proponents of provincial rights. But if the provincial rights struggle was nearing at least a temporary conclusion, an equally serious conflict was just reaching a new stage of intensity. That was the conflict over minority school and language rights.

There had been high hope at the time of Confederation that the old racial and religious quarrels which had racked the union would be ended forever, but the hope proved too optimistic. In 1865, Hector Langevin had predicted that "in Parliament there will be no question of race, nationality, religion or locality, as this Legislature will only be charged with the settlement of the great general questions which will interest alike the whole Confederacy and not one locality only."¹ Nothing could better illustrate the foolishness of prediction. In the 1870's there was legislation in two provinces, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, which Roman Catholics felt destroyed their guaranteed minority rights. By the 1890's the scene of the conflict shifted to the developing West, and it was fought there with a bitterness which shook the very foundations of Confederation. The growing fear that Francophone and Roman Catholic minority rights were in danger of being wiped out by provincial legislatures dominated by Anglophone Protestant majorities stimulated the development of a new theory of the Confederation compact. This was the theory of the compact of cultures.

The theory of the compact of cultures is less easily defined in detail than the theory of the compact of the provinces. In general it is based on the contention that Canada was established through an agreement of two founding peoples, the Francophones and the Anglophones. By the compact that was ratified in 1867, these two peoples agreed that Canada should be a country inhabited by two nationalities and that the new nation, Canada, should recognize its bicultural nature. But to move beyond these generalities to the specific application of them is to walk a path cluttered with conflicting claims. The fact seems to be that the compact of cultures, like the compact of provinces, was a

weapon developed in the heat of battle, rather than a well-defined doctrine which had been carefully worked out in 1867.

There are several obvious points that can be made about the attitude of the Fathers of Confederation to this question of cultural duality. In the first place, there can be no doubt that the Fathers, French and English, were intent upon the establishment of a "new nationality." Speaker after speaker in the Confederation debates emphasized this point. But it seems equally true that none of the Fathers intended or expected that the new nation would be culturally and linguistically homogeneous. It was to be a political nation in which cultural differences were accepted as *une chose donnée*. The French Canadian speakers in particular were concerned to establish the point that Confederation was a guarantee of the survival of the French Canadian culture. "The idea of unity of races," Cartier said, "was utopian—it was impossible."²

If cultural duality was recognized, then, what guarantees were given to protect the minority? Again, speaker after speaker emphasized that the proposed federal system gave Quebec a local government that would exercise control over those subjects that in 1867 seemed necessary to her survival. Moreover, the British North America Act provided that French should be recognized as an official language in Parliament and the courts, and that Quebec should be an officially bilingual province. Finally, it was agreed that in certain circumstances the federal government would have the power to redress the grievances complained of by religious minorities in educational matters. But here it should be underlined that this power related to religious, not national minorities.³ These then in outline were the statements of intent and legal actions of the Fathers of Confederation when they were faced with the facts of Canadian duality. Probably no one stated the Fathers' assumptions more clearly than Cartier, who declared: "Now, when we were united together, if union were attained, we would form a political nationality with which neither the national origin, nor the religion of any individual, would interfere. . . . In our Federation we should have Catholic and Protestant, English, French, Irish and Scotch, and each by his efforts and his success would increase the prosperity and glory of the new Confederacy."⁴

What is especially striking about such a statement is the lack of anything that might be called "racial" thinking in the statements of the Fathers. That Cartier spoke of Irish and Scottish, as well as English and French, suggests how little weight can be given to the idea of "national" blocks in the new Confederation. As Donald Creighton has written, the Fathers of Confederation "were as far away from the dogmas of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment as they were from twentieth-century obsessions with race, and with racial and cultural separatism."⁵

There were, of course, some speakers in the Confederation debates who found the government's statements, or the relevant sections of the Quebec Resolutions, unsatisfactory guarantees of the rights of the minority. A.-A. Dorion, for example, felt that the worst failing of the proposals was that they left the minority open to majority pressures. He noted: "I know that majorities are naturally aggressive and how the possession of power engenders despotism, and I can understand how a majority, animated this moment by the best feelings, might in six or nine months be willing to abuse its

power and trample on the rights of the minority, while acting in good faith, and on what is considered to be its right.”⁶

Another speaker, this time a Conservative who apparently had some doubts about the plan, spoke specifically about a contract. François Eventurel remarked: “I am in favour of the principle of Confederation, and am one of those who maintain that by means of that principle the rights and liberties of each of the contracting parties may be preserved; but on the other hand, I am of opinion . . . that it may be so applied as to endanger and even destroy, or nearly so, the rights and privileges of a state which is party to this Confederation. Everything, therefore, depends upon the conditions of the contract.”⁷ Yet even here one must be wary of reading too much into such a statement, for the speaker never made clear in speaking of the “parties” to the contract whether he meant the provinces or the two particular nationalities. And what is equally important, he did not continue his speech by suggesting that there either was, or should have been, a specific contract of any kind.

It would therefore seem that the most that can be said about Confederation is that, while it was clearly intended to meet the needs of both French and English Canadians, there was no detailed contract stating the conditions of the agreement. Nor was there any attempt to sketch out guidelines that might be followed when the country expanded into new areas. It may be worth adding that a reading of the Confederation debates gives the very strong impression that all the supporters of the scheme were far more concerned about the survival of British North America against outside pressures than about internal threats to the survival of either French or English Canadians. Likewise, those who opposed Confederation seemed, on the whole, to discount the external threat to survival and to emphasize internal dangers. But neither group, it can definitely be said, suggested anything like what in the next 50 years became the theory of cultural compact.

It may, of course, be suggested that the true intentions of the Fathers were expressed in the years immediately following Confederation in the legislation establishing Manitoba, and the Act of 1875 which made French an official language in the Northwest Territories. In one sense, at least, that contention would be valid. Macdonald and Cartier, who were responsible for the Manitoba Act, and the Liberals who sponsored the 1875 legislation all recognized facts when they saw them. Or to put it another way, they recognized that there was a large Francophone community in the newly acquired territories and that therefore it was both just and necessary to give the group’s language and schools recognition.⁸ But to take the next step, and to argue from these actions that the Fathers of Confederation worked from a theory that Canada was bilingual and bicultural from coast to coast, would be to step beyond the evidence into the realm of speculation. It would ignore also the cases of Prince Edward Island and British Columbia, which entered Confederation without the “bicultural” question being raised. What seems to be true is that the Fathers of Confederation were tolerant realists rather than theorists; where the minority existed in large enough numbers to make its presence felt, it was given recognition.

It was not until 1890 that serious discussion of the relations of French and English in the new western settlements was reopened. Just as the depression seemed to heighten the struggle between Ottawa and the provinces, so also it appeared to contribute to the

renewed friction between French and English. Moreover, the late 1880's witnessed two events that were tailor-made to revive the old cultural conflict. The first was the hanging of Louis Riel, and the second the passage of the Jesuit Estates Act. Riel was probably first and foremost a westerner, but the fact that he was partly French Canadian and a Roman Catholic ensured that the sympathies of many Quebecers would be with him. These same facts, and the earlier execution of the Ontario Orangeman, Thomas Scott, likewise ensured that many English Canadians would be hostile to him. When he was hanged, most French Canadians appear to have believed that an injustice was done; many believed that the hanging was a direct attack on French Canada itself. When in 1888, Honoré Mercier, who as a defender of Riel already had a dubious reputation in English Canada, sponsored the Jesuit Estates Act, strong religious and cultural prejudices were stimulated in English Canada.

Writing of this period Professor Saywell has perceptively remarked:

The growth of a strident and belligerent nationalism, which elsewhere found expression in the so-called new imperialism in the last decades of Victoria's century, was not absent in Canada, although it took a devious form which served to obscure its connection with the racist implications of social Darwinism. Two threads are reasonably observable in English Canada: American Protestant nativism and imperial Pan Anglo-Saxonism, the former finding its outlet in attacks on the menace of Catholicism and the latter echoing Lord Durham's cry that the nation could not survive half French and half English. The two schools of thought were closely connected, indeed almost inseparable, and to the extent that they were the foundation of much English-Canadian nationalism that nationalism was divisive rather than unifying.⁹

In these same years French Canada also experienced a heightening of national consciousness, represented in politics by Mercier's *Parti national*, in ecclesiastical affairs and politics by the ultramontane Castors, and in journalism by the separatist views of Jules-Paul Tardivel. Which was cause and which effect is a question so complicated that not even a suggestion can be hazarded here.

It was in this atmosphere that the language and religious questions in western Canada became issues of debate. That the debate ended in the virtual abolition of minority language and religious rights in Manitoba and language rights in the Northwest Territories, is at least partly explained by the fact that in the waves of new immigrants moving into the Territories, very few spoke French. From the time Manitoba was founded, appeals were made, especially by the Roman Catholic Church, for settlers to move West.¹⁰ In 1887 Archbishop Taché of St. Boniface issued an appeal which revealed the nature of the problem:

I have, many times in the past, either in conjunction with the Canadian Episcopate or in my own role as Bishop of Saint-Boniface, tried to encourage our friends in the mother province to send us a strong wave of French Canadian immigration. I now must admit that I have discovered with deep sadness the secret cause of the almost complete lack of success of my efforts. Having a foothold in the main areas of Manitoba, we were equal in number and situation to the other groups there. Although we have succeeded in maintaining our situation, today the others have numerically surpassed us. They have understood the importance of the location and have taken such advantage of the opportunities that our beautiful prairies offer to

the settler's plough that their numbers have grown to the point that our numerical proportion has been reduced. I shall say also that not only have England and Scotland supplied Manitoba with more settlers than has Quebec, but even Russia has supplied as many.¹¹

Taché's appeal went largely unheard as French Canadians chose rather to follow Curé Labelle into the north or, more often, to follow the lure of quick success in the mill towns of the neighbouring United States. The stage was thus set for the fulfilment of Taché's worst fears.

By 1890 many of the same people who had been caught up in the Riel and Jesuit Estates Act agitations were drawn into the campaign to abolish the official use of the French language wherever it was not specifically guaranteed by the British North America Act. In January 1890, D'Alton McCarthy introduced the following resolution into the House of Commons: "Whereas it is expedient in the interest of the national unity of the Dominion that there should be community of language among the people of Canada, and that the enactment in 'The North-West Territories Act' allowing the use of the French language should be expunged therefrom."¹² McCarthy's speech on the resolution was largely devoted to supporting the first part of his proposition -that national unity required a single language. Not unnaturally French Canadians looked upon the motion as being directed as much against Quebec as against the small Francophone settlements of the West.

Like most parliamentary debates, this one produced much consideration of specific legal points and very little of a philosophical nature. A good deal was said on all sides about "French aggression" and "English bigotry," but nothing was said about the cultural compact of Confederation. The nearest anyone came to that idea was the Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, who uttered the frequently quoted sentences:

I have no accord with the desire expressed in some quarters that by any mode whatever there should be an attempt made to oppress the one language or to render it inferior to the other; I believe that would be impossible if it were tried, and it would be foolish and wicked if it were possible. The statement that has been made so often that this is a conquered country is *à propos de rien*. Whether it was conquered or ceded, we have a constitution now under which all British subjects are in a position of absolute equality, having equal rights of every kind of language, of religion, of property and of person. There is no paramount race in this country, there is no conquered race in this country; we are all British subjects, and those who are not English are none the less British subjects on that account.¹³

Macdonald's statement is a fine one; but when examined closely its meaning is less than clear. Did he mean that all British subjects, whatever their nationality, had an equal right to the official recognition of their language in the political and educational institutions of the country? Though Macdonald's statement was later interpreted to mean that French and English Canadians, as groups, had absolutely equal rights throughout the country, it is difficult to believe that this was Macdonald's understanding, or even that any one else in 1890 believed that it was. This conclusion seems to follow the fact that in the debate on the McCarthy resolution Macdonald was not supporting absolute rejection but rather an amendment which left the question to the determination of the local legislature. That step was, for all practical purposes, an acceptance of abolition. It was also a further

acceptance of the idea, implicit in the New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island school cases, that minority rights were provincial rather than national responsibilities.

In the debate on the McCarthy motion only one speaker seems to have held the view that 1867 represented an agreement which foresaw the eventual extension of French Canadian language and Roman Catholic religious rights across the entire country. This appears to be the implication in the remark of M. Amyot: "If we diminish the strength of the French language in any part of Confederation, we reduce the strength of the language as a whole. That is unjust, because when we entered Confederation it was promised that we would receive full justice and never lose any of our rights."¹⁴

In most respects the 1890 debate on the French language in the Northwest is more revealing than the subsequent years of debate over the Manitoba School Question. The Manitoba debate related so closely to a specific federal power that few speakers ventured into the realm of general principles. Throughout the debate the deteriorating Government held the view that it was its responsibility to protect the rights of the Roman Catholic minority in Manitoba. The filibustering Opposition, on the other hand, admitted that the power existed but argued that it could not be enforced, and that conciliation was preferable to coercion. As a sidelight on the provincial rights aspect of the question, it may be noted the Liberal majority in the Ontario Legislature in January 1896 passed a resolution which, in effect, upheld the position of Laurier and his friends in Ottawa. Not even so strict a provincialist as Oliver Mowat, who moved the resolution, could resist the temptation to reach out beyond the province when party advantage was to be gained.¹⁵

A great deal was said in the debate over the Manitoba School Question about provincial rights and federal duties, perhaps even more than about minority rights, which was the essential issue. But there was no great debate about the cultural compact of Confederation. The same M. Amyot who in 1890 had come close to espousing this doctrine, opposed disallowance of the Manitoba School Act in 1893 with the following argument: "To disallow a law is to go against the principle of autonomy. We are all in favour of autonomy. Some years ago we members from the Province of Quebec were glad that the principle of autonomy was applied in the question of the Jesuits' estates. We were glad to be protected by that rampart. . . . Shall we for a single exception risk the whole system of autonomy?"¹⁶ M. Amyot's position in these two instances is indicative of the difficulty faced by those who wanted to defend both the rights of minorities and the autonomy of the provinces.

The fact is that a reading of the almost endless debate on the Manitoba School Question reveals little on the subject of the "cultural compact" of Confederation. It may be argued that this was so because it was simply taken for granted. Charles Hibbert Tupper, for example, told his father that the passage of remedial legislation was necessary to prove "good faith—keeping the bargain of the Federation pact."¹⁷ But he failed to spell out the nature of the bargain. On the other hand it was possible for those who opposed the spread of the French language beyond Quebec to appeal to the compact to support their views. Speaking to his electors in 1896 D'Alton McCarthy is reported to have said, "I am still of the opinion, which I have hitherto with your approval contended for, that, except where permitted by the terms of the Confederation Compact, there should be but one official language in Canada. To me it seems as unstatesmanlike as it is

unpatriotic for the sake of a temporary peace with our French Canadian fellow subjects to foster a spirit of French nationalism which can never be permitted to attain fruition so long as Canada remains a part of the British Empire.”¹⁸

The fact seems to be that it was only after the Manitoba School Question, and more particularly after the great movement of new settlers into the Northwest following the turn of the century, that much thought was given by anyone to the problem of the rights of French Canadians in a nation that was now being peopled from coast to coast. No one gave this question more consideration than Henri Bourassa. Indeed he would appear to be the father of the doctrine of the cultural compact of Confederation.

It is much simpler to state the Bourassa thesis on the nature of Confederation than to provide a consistently argued case to support it. It was a theory which evolved, and its applications only became apparent as the conflict over religious and linguistic rights outside Quebec was manifested in specific issues. It is, however, perhaps best to begin with a statement of the doctrine in its complete form, before examining its development. In 1916, when the struggle against Regulation XVII of the Ontario Department of Education was at its height, Bourassa wrote:

In the minds of the Fathers of Confederation, the federal pact and the constitution which defines the terms of its approval were to end racial and religious conflict and to assure all, Catholics and Protestants, French and English, complete equality of rights throughout the whole of the Canadian Confederation. The Manitoba Act, passed by the Imperial Parliament in 1870, and the Northwest Territories Act, passed by the Ottawa government in 1875, bear the fleeting imprint of the same intelligent and generous thought. Those were our last victories.¹⁹

What was the evidence that Bourassa adduced to support this proposition?

The answer to that question is both simple and complex. The simple answer is that he arrived at that conclusion in the heat of battle when every intellectual weapon was necessary to assist the cause of the beleaguered minority. It should never be forgotten that Henri Bourassa was primarily a journalist and a politician involved in the great issues of his time, rather than a secluded constitutional scholar. The earliest statement of Bourassa's view of the compact appears to have been in 1902. At that point he spoke of a dual compact, the one provincial, the second national. He wrote: “The imperial statute which the current government has given us is only the force of a double contract. One was concluded between the French and the English of the old province of Canada, while the aim of the other was to bring together the scattered colonies of British North America. We are thus party to two contracts—one national and one political. We must keep a careful eye on the integrity of these treaties.”²⁰ At this stage Bourassa made no effort to explain the nature of the “national” contract, though it is interesting to note that he spoke of the contract as one between the two Canadas and to which apparently the other provinces were not party. The second contract, which, in the years following the Boer War, was Bourassa's main preoccupation, was the contract that ensured Canada was not required to assume any new Imperial responsibilities. Indeed, in these years it was the relations of Canada with the outside world that concerned Bourassa most consistently. He appears to have believed that the partnership which had been contracted “on equal and well defined bases” was one that guaranteed English Canadians would not impose Imperial obligation on French Canadians.²¹

Bourassa's association with the Ligue nationaliste canadienne illustrates his early concern with the internal question of the relations of French and English Canadians. The Ligue's program was devoted to three main subjects: the autonomy of Canada within the Empire, the intellectual and material development of the Canadian nation, and, thirdly, "Absolute maintenance of the rights guaranteed to the provinces by the Constitution of 1867 within the intention of its authors. Respect for the principle of the duality of languages and the right of the minorities to separate schools."²² The following year, 1904, in the Ligue's newly founded newspaper, *Le Nationaliste*, Bourassa set down the general principles of his view of Canada—views which never seriously changed.²³

For us the mother country is Canada as a whole; that is to say, a federation of distinct races and autonomous provinces. The nation we wish to see develop is the Canadian nation, composed of French and English Canadians; that is to say, of two elements separated by language and religion and the legal arrangements necessary for the conservation of their respective traditions, but united by brotherhood and a common attachment to a common motherland.²⁴

Until 1905 Bourassa's concept of the cultural compact remained largely a theory. But in 1905 he faced the necessity of drawing out its implications when the bills were brought forward establishing the new provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta. At this point, it is possible to return to the debate and place Bourassa alongside others who were participating in it.

In the debate on the Autonomy Bills in 1905 the Laurier Government found itself under attack from two directions. In the first place, since the legislation contained the clauses designed to guarantee the continuation of minority schools as they existed in the Territories, it was criticized by those who believed the new provinces should be left absolutely free in educational matters. On the other side the attack came from those few members who believed the bills did not go far enough in providing guarantees for the minority in the new provinces. Laurier's position with respect to both these attacks was, in effect, to defend what he considered to be the status quo though he did present a theory of Confederation which went part way in meeting Bourassa's claims. He stated his position as follows, referring to the intention of Section 93 of the British North America Act:

But I shall be told that this exception applies to Ontario and Quebec alone, and not to the other provinces. Sir, that is true. Amongst the four provinces then united, Ontario and Quebec alone had a system of separate schools. But I reminded the House a moment ago, that it was not the intention of the fathers of Confederation, it was not the intention of Sir John Macdonald or Mr. Brown, to limit Confederation to the narrow bounds it had in 1867.... Is it reasonable to suppose, if the Confederation act recognised that other provinces were to come into Confederation similarly situated to Ontario and Quebec, that the same privileges should not be given to the minority as were given to the minority in Ontario and Quebec?²⁵

He concluded by saying that if separate schools existed in a territory at the time of application for provincial status, then those schools should be brought under the protection of Section 93. It is important to note here that Laurier was not advancing a

general theory of Confederation; rather he was interpreting the legal intention of the constitution in a specific instance. Moreover, he was speaking specifically of separate schools as religious institutions. At a later stage in the debate, Laurier expressed his opposition to an amendment which sought to make French an official language in the new provinces, by pointing out that while the constitution contained specific guarantees of religious rights, it was silent on the subject of language.²⁶ Finally, to the claim of the Opposition that the educational clauses infringed upon provincial rights, Laurier insisted that the constitution plainly provided that minority rights should take precedence over provincial rights in the matter of separate schools.²⁷

It fell to Bourassa 'to defend the view that the intentions of the Fathers of Confederation went much further than the Government or the Opposition recognized. He argued that Section 93 was intended to guarantee that "a man, in whatever province of Canada he may choose his abode, can rest assured that justice and equality will reign and that no matter what the majority may attempt they cannot persecute the minority." The contract, he continued, which guaranteed this situation, was not a written one. It was rather an unwritten, but well-understood, contract based on the entire history of the country beginning with the decision of the British, after the Conquest, to guarantee the rights and privileges of the French Canadian Roman Catholics. When his speech was interrupted by a question about the place of the Maritime Provinces in this contract, Bourassa responded saying that "the great difference is that they were already self-governing provinces when they entered the Confederation compact in 1867. They had a school system as well as a judicial system under which they had lived for years. But the Northwest Territories were purchased by the people of Canada. The money which has been spent for the settlement of that country has been the money of Catholics as well as of Protestants, the money of French Canadians as well as of English Canadians."²⁸ At this point, the argument had obviously moved from constitutional to historical, legal, and even economic grounds. It should be added that in reading Bourassa it is never entirely clear whether he was speaking about the kind of country he wished to see develop, or whether he meant the country he believed the Fathers of Confederation had intended to establish. It was, perhaps, a case of the wish being father of the thought.

The next occasion on which the question of minority rights arose was in 1912 when the Keewatin Territory was transferred to Manitoba. While this action raised again the whole question of the rights of minority schools, no speaker in the debate subscribed to the theory of cultural compact, though many defended the rights of the minority on more narrow legal grounds. Outside the House of Commons, however, Bourassa once more advanced his view of the constitution with his usual vigour and resourcefulness.²⁹

The most important debate on the status of the French language, outside the province of Quebec, as opposed to that of separate schools, took place during the controversy over Regulation XVII. As in most debates of this kind, all sides presented statements and counter-statements, finding some evidence to support their respective cases.

As usual, it is possible to discover real and apparent contradictions in the positions of most of the disputants. The debate raged with increasing fury from 1912 to 1916. It first became a matter of open political controversy in January of 1915 when two Anglophone Protestant members of the Quebec Legislature moved the following resolution:

That this House, without derogating from the principles of provincial autonomy, and without any intention of interfering with any of the provinces of Confederation, in any manner whatsoever, views with regret the divisions which seem to exist among the people of the Province of Ontario over the bilingual school question, and believes it is in the interest of the Dominion at large that all such questions should be considered on broad, generous and patriotic lines, always remembering that one of the cardinal principles of British liberty throughout the Empire is regard for the rights and privileges of minorities.³⁰

In supporting this resolution, which, regardless of protestations to the contrary, did touch the affairs of another province's jurisdiction, Premier Gouin appealed to an argument which Bourassa had been advancing for years. "Who will pretend," he asked rhetorically, "that it was not in the minds of the framers of the constitution to give equal rights in matters of language, of religion, of property and of person to both races as avowed by Sir John Macdonald in 1890; and who will pretend that the British North America Act was not inspired by the same sentiments?"³¹

Gouin was nevertheless very uneasy about the action of his Legislature in passing this resolution. He wrote to Premier Hearst several weeks after the debate, explaining that no official copy of the resolution had been transmitted to the government of Ontario because he did not wish to "dictate to a sister province." Hearst replied coldly that "it appears to me a somewhat dangerous practice for one Legislature to attempt to criticize the Act of another, naturally inviting similar criticisms in return."³² A year later the matter was further complicated when the Quebec Legislature passed an act which gave Quebec school commissions the right to contribute directly to the support of Franco-Ontarian schools.³³ It would be impossible to justify this action on the basis of any strict theory of provincial autonomy.

By this time, the matter had spilled over into federal politics. In March 1915 a resolution was presented to the Senate by Senator L.-O. David which stated:

This House, without derogating from the principal [sic] of provincial autonomy, deems it proper and within the limits of its powers and jurisdiction and in pursuance of the object for which it was established, to regret the divisions which seem to exist among the people of the province of Ontario in connection with the bilingual school question and believes that it is in the interest of the Dominion at large that all such questions should be considered on fair and patriotic lines and settled in such a way as to preserve peace and harmony between the different national and religious sections of the country, in accordance with the views of the Fathers of Confederation and with the spirit of our Constitution.³⁴

An inconclusive debate raged around the proposition that the passage of any such resolution would be a grave injustice to Ontario, and an infringement upon provincial autonomy.

In the meantime pressure was being brought to bear on Prime Minister Borden to take some action which would at least quiet the situation. Borden refused on the ground that the matter at issue was essentially a provincial question.³⁵ Laurier found it much less easy, or desirable, to resist the pressure in his own party to take a public stand on the Ontario bilingual school question. He therefore gave his support to a plan to raise the question, in the form of a resolution, in the House of Commons.

On May 9, 1916, Ernest Lapointe moved the following resolution:

It has long been the settled policy of Great Britain whenever a country passed under the sovereignty of the Crown by treaty or otherwise, to respect the religion, usages and language of the inhabitants who thus become British subjects.

That his Majesty's subjects of French origin in the Province of Ontario complain that by recent legislation they have been to a large extent deprived of the privilege which they and their fathers have always enjoyed since Canada passed under the sovereignty of the British Crown, of having their children taught in French.

That this House, especially at this time of universal sacrifice and anxiety, when all energies should be concentrated on the winning of the war, while fully recognizing the principle of provincial rights and the necessity of every child being given a thorough English education, respectfully suggest to the Legislative Assembly the wisdom of making it clear that the privilege of the children of French parentage of being taught in their mother tongue be not interfered with.³⁶

It is a little curious that this resolution dealt only with Ontario, since a similar situation existed in less critical form in the province of Manitoba. It was charged that the federal Liberals were prepared to condemn a provincial Conservative administration in Ontario, but ignore the sins of a provincial Liberal administration in Manitoba. Doubtless there was something in this charge, though it may also be noted that some members of the Franco-Manitoban community had appealed to Laurier to let them settle their own difficulties quietly in Manitoba.³⁷

What is interesting about the debate on the Lapointe Resolution, apart from its relatively mild character, is that the appeal of the supporters of the resolution was almost exclusively to the good will of English Canadians. While much was said about the history of Canada, and about its constitution, no speaker made any attempt to advance a general theory of Confederation as a bicultural compact. Again as in earlier debates on similar questions, the members' attention was focussed on the specific situation under discussion rather than on any general theory of the relations of French and English Canadians in Confederation. Of course, the resolution itself presented a general theory, but it was hardly a theory of cultural compact; it was rather a statement of "British fair play."

The very limited claims of the supporters of the resolution may be illustrated best by the speech of Paul-Émile Lamarche, a close follower of Henri Bourassa, who in 1916 sat as an Independent in Parliament. He put his case briefly and untheoretically:

Let me in a few words state our position in regard to the English and French languages. We consider a French education as a duty, and the acquisition of the English language as a necessity. We will not budge from our duty; we will remain Frenchmen. But we realize the necessity of a knowledge of English in all walks of life. The lack of it would be a serious handicap in the race for material success in life, not only in this country but on the whole continent of America.³⁸

Outside the House the exposition of a more general theory was left to Bourassa. On this occasion, as so often before, he plighted his faith in a thoroughly bicultural Canada. To support his view that such a vision had moved the Fathers of Confederation, he quoted, as he had done previously, the remarks made by Macdonald in the debate on the French language question in the Territories in 1890.³⁹

The Lapointe Resolution of course failed to pass. Its opponents adopted, for the most part, the argument that the subject should not even have been raised in the federal Parliament. As that paragon of provincial-rights virtue, the *Toronto Globe*, put it: "Canada is a Confederation. The Federal Parliament seems to forget that fact occasionally, when it gives advice to the provinces."⁴⁰

It is difficult to assess, in any final way, the importance of the theory of cultural compact. It can certainly be stated that however much it may have reflected the spirit of Confederation, it was nevertheless a theory advanced by only a minority even in the Francophone community. It would be difficult to find a single English Canadian who supported the idea in the years before 1921—unless Macdonald's candidacy is accepted. Bourassa himself was aware of the difficulties of the theory, for he recognized that it was based more on an historical and moral claim than on any constitutional document which could be made to stand up in court. In 1913 he wrote:

The magistrate or the lawyer who believes he knows the constitution of Canada because he has a detailed knowledge of the text of *The British North America Act* and because he has minutely examined each of its sections is an ass if he does not know the origin of the public power modelled on the British constitution and the peculiar circumstances preceding and surrounding the signing of the federal pact. In other words, he must have a deep knowledge of British and Canadian history.⁴¹

But, as Bourassa knew, interpretations of history differ, and law courts demand specific legal texts rather than discourses on the spirit of the constitution or the intentions of the Fathers of Confederation. In 1914 Bourassa told a correspondent:

... according to the opinion of every jurist, these guarantees only cover the rights of the Catholic and Protestant minorities to separate schools. They do not refer at all to the teaching of language. On this matter we can only appeal to an indirect guarantee, which I feel is formal, if we appeal to the spirit of the constitution. However, as you know, jurists always go by the letter rather than the spirit of the law.⁴²

Bourassa's cultural compact was, in the last analysis, a moral compact. But in the politics of a constitution, claims based on moral principles are often less successful than those based on specific legal guarantees, or on power. The idea of provincial compact was successful to the extent that it won the support of a number of provinces. The failure of the idea of cultural compact was that it had no similar appeal.

Perhaps it was for this reason that the practical politicians who in 1918 debated a resolution in the Quebec Legislature suggesting that Quebec might withdraw from the pact of Confederation, if the other provinces believed her an obstacle to Confederation's progress, made no claims about cultural compact. In this debate, which had a tenor more of sorrow than of anger, it was Sir Lomer Gouin who expressed the characteristic viewpoint. He declared:

I wish to make my position on the subject very clear, Mr. Speaker. I believe in the Canadian Confederation. Federal Government appears to me to be the only possible one in Canada because of our differences of race and creed, and also because of the variety and multiplicity of local needs in our immense territory.

To make myself more clear I declare that if I had been a party to the negotiations of 1864, I would certainly have tried, had I authority to do so, to obtain for the French Canadian minority in the sister provinces the same protection that was obtained for the English minority in the Province of Quebec. I would have asked that not as a concession, but as a matter of justice. And even if it had not been accorded to me, I would have voted in favour of the resolutions of 1864.

At the time of the debate of 1865, I would have renewed my demand for this measure of prudence and justice. And if I had not succeeded, I would still have declared myself in favour of the system as it was voted March 13, 1865. And even at this moment, Sir, in spite of the troubles that have arisen in the administration of our country since 1867, in spite of the trouble caused those people from Quebec who constitute the minority in the other provinces, if I had to choose between Confederation and the Act of 1791, or the Act of 1840-1841, I would vote for Confederation still.⁴³

Gouin's statement may be taken as a suitable summing up of the views of Confederation held by the vast majority of Canadians before 1921.

The concept of the compact of cultures had on its side none of the powerful influences which had played so large a part in gaining wide acceptance for the theory of the compact of provinces. No political party adopted it as part of its platform that would appear to be true even of the Nationalistes or Autonomists who took a general lead from Bourassa in the 1911 election. Nor did the theory win the whole-hearted approval of powerful provincial governments; indeed to the extent that it implied a limitation on provincial powers, it went against the views of most of the provinces. Not even the province of Quebec, despite Premier Gouin's statements and actions to the contrary during the Ontario school crisis, adopted the theory in any consistent fashion. Finally, the compact of cultures, unlike the theory of the compact of provinces, won no support from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In fact, minority rights fared less well in this court than in Canadian courts.⁴⁴ In the light of these observations, it is not surprising that the concept of the cultural compact of Confederation remained the possession of only a small minority of Canadians.

Two of the main themes which dominated Canadian political and constitutional history in the years between 1867 and 1921 were the conflict of federal and provincial powers, and the conflict which arose over the rights of the religious and linguistic minorities. It is obvious that if provincial rights and minority rights had coincided within the same geographic or constitutional boundaries, the problem would have been a relatively simple one. But the complexity of the problem, in part, arises out of the fact that this coincidence did not exist, and that provincial rights and minority rights often were in conflict. For obvious political reasons the minorities could usually expect to win a more sympathetic hearing at Ottawa than in provincial capitals. On the other hand, the defenders of provincial rights often looked on Ottawa as the enemy.

In each of the conflicts a theory of compact was developed. In their attempt to break free from what has been called the paternalism of the federal government, the provinces fell back on the theory that the constitution was based on a compact or agreement among the provinces which had created Confederation. The federal government was thus seen as *primus inter pares*, at best, or in the extreme, as the servant of the provinces. In the attempt to protect and extend the rights of the religious and linguistic minorities, the theory of Confederation as a compact between cultures, an Anglo-French entente, was developed. According to this theory, Confederation was a partnership of equal cultures whose rights were guaranteed mutually throughout the whole Confederation. It can be said that by 1921 the doctrine of provincial rights and its compact underpinnings had gained the ascendant among Canadian politicians, and was at least partly accepted by legal scholars. The second theory of compact, that of cultures, had won no such following.

This conclusion is well supported by the evidence that has been briefly examined in preceding chapters. It can be further illustrated by a random sampling of opinions drawn from the writings of influential publicists and scholars. This examination is not intended to be exhaustive, partly because there is no complete bibliography on the subject, and partly because such an examination would prove extremely repetitive.

It is not perhaps surprising that one of the earliest statements of the compact theory by a constitutionalist came from Ontario. In a volume published in 1880 and dedicated to Edward Blake, Samuel James Watson, the librarian of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, argued that the provinces had preceded the federal government and had indeed created it by "federal compact." "It must be borne in mind," he wrote, "that the federal parliament is the off-spring of the provincial legislatures; it is not their progenitor; and that in confiding to it such of their powers as were necessary to establish it as a greater Representative Institution than themselves, there were yet certain powers which they reserved for their own behoof."¹ It was a sign of the times in Ontario that Watson should be deeply concerned with the problem of provincial rights. Indeed it is hard to avoid the impression that his volume was little more than a reflection of the opinion of the Ontario government, that it was an attempt to provide some scholarly veneer to the case which Mowat was presenting against the federal government.

Indeed, Watson's study may well have been written in answer to the work of another Ontario scholar, D. A. O'Sullivan, who in 1879 had vigorously presented the case for the precedence of the federal powers. This writer maintained that "in 1867 the three existing provinces desired to be federally united into one Dominion; and they were so united and formed thereafter Canada. The three provinces were then lost sight of, and in their stead Canada appeared; and Canada was immediately thereafter divided up into four provinces."² Again it may be a sign of the times, or the superior logic of Watson, that in a prefatory statement to a second edition of his text in 1887, O'Sullivan was at least prepared to admit that a case could be, and indeed had been, made for the provincialist version of the constitution.³

A similar division of opinion may be found among Quebec writers. In 1878 in a popular volume on the constitution, B.-A.-T. de Montigny described and justified the highly centralized nature of the Canadian federal system, comparing it favourably with the American system which left the residual power with the states. "Confederation," he wrote, "has the dual advantage of giving us the power of a legislative union and the freedom of a federal union, with protection for local interests." And, in Montigny's judgement, it was this combination, plus the willingness with which the Fathers had put aside their national and political differences which had resulted in "the composition of one of the finest constitutions the world has ever known."⁴

As has already been noted Judge Loranger expressed the provincialist viewpoint in his famous *Letters on the Constitution* in 1883. A more complete exposition of this position was published in 1889 by P.-B. Mignault. In this writer's judgement the Canadian constitution was closely modelled on that of the United States. In the Canadian federal system, he argued, the federal and provincial governments were separate but equal. He wrote:

We said that the contracting parties divide their sovereignty and create through common and reciprocal concessions a new power which contains them without absorbing them. We must draw one essential result from this. Each state or province maintains its own existence and the powers it has not yielded to the central government. The province is not subordinate to the central government nor is the latter subordinate to the province. There is absolute equality and a common

sovereignty; each government is supreme within its own jurisdiction and within the scope of its powers.

But in his concluding section, Mignault went even a step further, indicating that since the federation had been created for the express purpose of protecting the rights of the provinces "their interests are sacred," thus suggesting that the provinces were "more equal" than the federal government.⁵

Two other English-Canadian constitutionalists of some stature may also be noted. Alpheus Todd, in his influential *Parliamentary Government in the Colonies*, committed himself completely to the theory of "provincial compact."⁶ A. H. F. Lefroy, another well-known scholar, writing in 1913, favoured the legalist's view that whatever political process had preceded the passage of the British North America Act, the fact remained that the Act was purely and simply a statute of the British Parliament.⁷

From this brief survey, it is obvious that legal and historical considerations were inconclusive on the nature of the constitution. By combining the two approaches, W. P. M. Kennedy arrived at what was perhaps the most acceptable conclusion presented in the period. In 1921 Kennedy argued that in its origins Confederation was a "thinly veiled legislative union," and that this was clearly the intention of the Fathers of Confederation. Kennedy, it may be noted, was one of the very first writers to examine the stated views of the Fathers with any great care. The writer admitted, however, that the political struggles of the half-century after Confederation, and the legal decisions of the Judicial Committee, had transformed the constitution into a truly federal one. These developments, he believed, served the needs of the country. A powerful central government was necessary during the early years of development, but decentralization suited the country better once these plans had been completed. "The second period is the period of provincial rights," he wrote, "which have increased under judicial interpretations. These, however, have not violated the framework. Indeed it may be said that they have humanized the British North America Act. They have given it the elasticity of life. They have rescued it from the uncritical worship due to an imperishable and immutable relic of rigid antiquarianism."⁸ Kennedy's praise of the decentralization that had taken place in the second period of Confederation may be considered, perhaps, as a characteristic opinion of the times.

Turning from the provincialist version of the compact to the cultural version, one is immediately struck by the lack of illustrative material. None of the writers cited above gave the matter any serious attention, either affirming or refuting it. Indeed they seem not even to have heard of it. Naturally they mention the clauses of the constitution relating to bilingualism and separate schools, but that is the long and the short of it. Nor do the historians provide any contrary examples. From the English Canadian side what was probably a typical view was expressed by G. M. Wrong, an historian whose leading interest was French Canada. He noted: "The federation Act made Canada a bilingual country in federal affairs. French was placed on a complete equality with English in the Federal Parliament. It is equally with English the language of the federal laws and of the federal courts. But while the federation Act expanded, it also limited the official use of the French tongue. It makes the Province of Quebec, and only the Province of Quebec, bilingual."⁹

In the years of struggle over bilingual schools in Ontario, the views of Professor Wrong were not easily accepted by French Canadians. In 1916, a French Canadian constitutionalist assessed the successes and failures of Confederation in these terms:

Has the Constitution of 1867 kept all its promises? I do not hesitate to say yes if we speak about general progress. Our country has sprung into life; its commercial, industrial and material development has been extensive. The whole world has marvelled at our progress. However can we say the same thing with regard to other matters? In many cases the solemn guarantees given to the minorities have been ignored, repudiated and trampled upon like a dirty scrap of paper.¹⁰

Nevertheless conflicting opinions could be found even in the embattled Franco-Ontarian community. Senator N. A. Belcourt, one of the Ontario minority's main leaders, asserted that "the constitution, natural law and justice, every rule of pedagogy, rights acquired by the minority, British fair play, sound policy, and last but not least, common sense, all stand out against it [Regulation XVII]."¹¹

But J.-U. Vincent, a founder of the Association canadienne-française d'éducation d'Ontario, argued at length, and with extensive documentation, that: "Regrettable as it may be, the truth is that the constitution has decreed the equality of both languages only in matters under the control of the federal government and in the province of Quebec."¹²

French Canadian historians, in the years before 1921, provided little evidence to aid the supporters of the compact theory in either its provincialist or its cultural variation. I.-G. Turcotte's study of the union period and Confederation is a remarkably impartial, factual account. It makes no mention of the compact idea.¹³ L.-O. David, who had been an opponent of Confederation in 1865, remained convinced in 1898 that his earlier criticisms had been just, that rather than providing specific guarantees of provincial rights and minority rights, Confederation had been "*une grande victoire anglaise.*"¹⁴ Ludovic Brunet, writing about the same period in 1899, reached the same conclusions: the highly centralized federal system was really a step toward the achievements of Lord Durham's recommendations. "Unfortunately," he concluded, "time and events have proved that the opinions of Mr. Dorion and the Liberal party were correct."¹⁵

The major French Canadian historians of the first part of the twentieth century have expressed similar views on the nature of Confederation, though their assessment of its benefits have differed. For example, the lectures delivered by Abbé Lionel Groulx and published in 1918 contain no attempt to prove that Confederation was a compact either of provinces or of cultures. Speaking of the division of powers, he concluded: "The federal government retained sufficient power to exercise national sovereignty while letting the states (provinces) evolve freely within the scope of their prerogatives. The practice of our institutions has confirmed this theory. Despite several attempts at encroachment, the central government has not been able to prevent the provinces from increasing their autonomy."¹⁶ Groulx's chief criticism of Confederation, which in 1918 he thought was breaking up because of western discontent, was that it had failed to provide adequate protection for the minorities. The English Protestant minority in Quebec had received full security, but the French and Roman Catholic minorities had not received equal guarantees. He wrote: "We must never tire of saying that this and only this

is the basic fault of our constitution and the greatest mistake made by Lower Canada's statesmen. By exclusively giving privileges and exceptions to one group and by permitting the creation of a privileged situation favouring the strongest, they admitted in principle that there would be two standards in this country."¹⁷ In other words, the greatest failure of 1867 was precisely that it had not been based on a cultural compact which guaranteed French Canadians and Roman Catholics outside Quebec the same rights as those given English-speaking Protestants in Quebec. In his view of the nature of Confederation, Groulx was closer to the conclusions of English Canadian writers than to Henri Bourassa and his supporters. It may be added that in this, though on few other matters, Groulx was also in essential agreement with the other great French Canadian historian of that generation, Thomas Chapais.¹⁸

But whatever historians may have concluded about the nature of Confederation in the matter of minority rights, there was by 1921 little dispute on the subject of provincial rights. The legal theoreticians still found it worthwhile to repeat the now well-worn arguments for provincial autonomy. Writing in the spring of 1918, Léon-Mercier Gouin used the old arguments for the compact theory, but he gave them a new twist. He wrote:

We cannot insist enough on the relative independence of the provinces. It is essential in a federation that the local assemblies enjoy complete freedom in the legislative sphere granted to them. In this way the federal pact was to permit the province of Quebec to remain officially French and Catholic. Our Parliament meets in our old capital the court of New France. This is a true national assembly for our people. We have entrusted to it our most treasured institutions. Weary of the hateful régime of 1840, we were finally to be "at home." The federal system promised to insure our survival. We freely entered the "Dominion." The imperial law forming the base of our constitution is but the legal and official expression of the will of the contracting parties. It is the solemn wording of "the desire expressed by the provinces." We find in it the elements of a true social contract, bearing royal approval.¹⁹

Most of the argument was venerable, but it contained the seeds of a later view of Confederation that was to identify fully and clearly nation and province.²⁰ The implications of that identification were hardly hinted at before 1921, though the quasi-separatist views of some of the contributors to *Notre Avenir politique: enquête de l'action française* of 1922 were based on that identification.²¹

The termination of the war in 1918 and the subsequent political instability of the years of reconstruction marked the beginning of a decade of firmly entrenched provincial power. Provincial governments found little difficulty in fending off intermittent efforts to restore the federal ascendancy. It is perhaps fitting that at the end of that decade it was the Premier of Ontario, Howard Ferguson, who issued a new provincial rights manifesto, giving a full exposition of the compact theory. Though a Conservative, Ontario had found in Premier Ferguson an heir for the mantle of Mowat. Premiers Taschereau and Duplessis left no doubt that Mercier's vision was still alive in Quebec. The old weapons were once again brought out to fight new battles. It seems hardly necessary to add that in the campaigns that followed, it was only on rare occasions that the voices of those who spoke of the compact of cultures could be heard over the din.

Chapter I

1. Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, *Report* (Ottawa, 1940), Bk I, 47.
2. Canada, Senate, *Report Pursuant to the Resolution of the Senate to the Honourable the Speaker by the Parliamentary Counsel Relating to the Enactment of the British North America Act* (Ottawa, 1939; repr. 1961), Annex 4, 134-8 (hereafter *O'Connor Report*).
3. Norman McL. Rogers, "Mr. Ferguson and the Constitution," *Canadian Forum*, XI (November, 1930), 49.
4. Jean-C. Falardeau, "Les Canadiens français et leur idéologie," in Mason Wade, ed., *Canadian Dualism* (Toronto and Quebec, 1960), 25.
"Il la considère surtout comme un 'pacte' entre chacune des provinces canadiennes. Plus particulièrement, comme un pacte entre les 'Anglais' et les 'Français' du Canada. Plus encore, comme un pacte entre Protestants et Catholiques, aux termes duquel tous les droits politiques accordés aux Canadiens français et catholiques du Québec seraient automatiquement garantis à tous les Catholiques dans l'ensemble du pays."
5. S.Q. 1953-4, 2-3 Eliz. II, c.17.
6. Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, *Report* (Quebec, 1956), I.
7. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1949, 2nd session, I, 196.
8. *La Presse*, 15 octobre 1949.
"Il importe très peu que l'Acte de l'Amérique britannique du Nord soit un contrat ou simple loi, pourvu que le gouvernement fédéral respecte les pouvoirs et les droits des provinces, et que les provinces respectent les droits et les pouvoirs fédéraux."
9. F. R. Scott, "Areas of Conflict in the Field of Public Law and Policy," in Wade, *Canadian Dualism*, 89.
10. A. N. Schlesinger, "The State Rights Fetish," in *New Viewpoints in American History* (New York, 1922), 243.
11. Norman McL. Rogers, "The Compact Theory of Confederation," *Proceedings of the Canadian Political Science Association* (1931), 205-30; Richard Arès, *La Confédération: pacte ou loi?* (Montreal, n.d.).
12. *Disallowance and Reservation of Provincial Legislation* (Ottawa, 1955).
13. Toronto, 1957.
14. Cambridge, Mass., 1937.
15. Toronto, 1950.
16. Ottawa, 1896.

Chapter II

1. See F. R. Scott, "Centralization and Decentralization in Canadian Federalism," *Canadian Bar Review*, XXIX (December, 1951), especially n. 44, 1108-9.
2. Jean-Charles Bonenfant, "L'Esprit de 1867," *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*, XVII (juin 1963).
3. Sir Joseph Pope, *Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Macdonald*, G.C.B., First Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada (rev. ed., Toronto, 1930), 242-3.
4. *Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the British North American Provinces* (Quebec, 1865), 858 (hereafter *Confederation Debates*).
5. Joseph Cauchon, *The Union of the Provinces of British North America*, trans. G. H. Macauley (Quebec, 1865), 49.
6. *La Confédération couronnement de dix ans de mauvaise administration* (Montreal, 1867), 8.
- "La prétendue Confédération que l'on vient de nous imposer n'est-elle pas identiquement le projet de lord Durham: une union législative?"
7. A. G. Doughty, "Notes on the Quebec Conference, 1864," *Canadian Historical Review*, I (March, 1920), 28.
8. *Confederation Debates*, 31.
9. *Ibid.*, 714.
10. The Carnarvon and Adderley statements may be found in the *O'Connor Report*, Annex 4, 149.
11. Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, *Report*, Bk. I, 31.
12. K. C. Wheare, *Federal Government* (4th ed., London, 1963), 19.
13. Macdonald to Brown Chamberlin, October 26, 1868, in Sir Joseph Pope, *The Correspondence of Sir John A. Macdonald* (Toronto, 1921), 75.
14. Canada, *Sessional Papers*, 1867-68, VIII, no. 66, 3.
15. D. G. Creighton, *John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain* (Toronto, 1955), 1-33.
16. Ontario Legislative Assembly, *Journals*, 1869, 54-6.
17. Canada, House of Commons, *Journals*, 1870, 126-7.
18. J. A. Maxwell, *Federal Subsidies to Provincial Governments in Canada* (Cambridge, Mass., 1937), *passim*.
19. *Proceedings of the Reform Convention Held at Toronto on the 27 and 28 of June, 1867* (Toronto, 1867), 20.
20. Macdonald to Brown Chamberlin, October 26, 1868, in Pope, *Correspondence of Macdonald*, 75.
21. *The Globe*, December 23, 1871.
22. *Le Canadien*, 11 août 1968.
- "Plus que jamais nous voyons que le régime actuel n'est rien d'autre chose qu'une union législative déguisée. Le pouvoir local est sans force, sans moyens, et tous les jours le pouvoir fédéral enlève une pierre de l'édifice qu'il a construit temporairement. Si la Nouvelle-Écosse a raison de craindre pour son autonomie, que doit espérer le bas-Canada?"
23. L.-O. David, *L'Union des deux Canadas* (Montreal, 1898), 212.
24. *L'Opinion publique*, II (27 juillet 1871).
- "C'est pourtant à Québec surtout que nous avons besoin de talents et d'esprits solides, car c'est là que se prépare l'avenir des Canadiens-français. De la sage administration de nos affaires locales et du fonctionnement parfait du gouvernement provincial dépend l'échec des tentatives qui se feront sans doute plus tard dans le but de transformer la confédération en une union législative."
25. *Ibid.*, II (13 avril 1871).
- "C'est à Québec, à Québec surtout, que se peuvent assurer le maintien, la force et l'avenir de l'autonomie nationale."
26. Canada, House of Commons, *Journals*, 1869, II, 260.
27. *Ibid.*, 1871, IV, 253-4.
28. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1871, 200, 202.

29. *Le Pays*, 28 novembre 1871. See also Ulric Barthe, *Sir Wilfrid Laurier on the Platform (Québec, 1890)*.

“ . . . un faisceau d’états qui ont ensemble des intérêts communs, mais qui néanmoins vis-à-vis les uns des autres, ont des intérêts locaux, distincts et séparés . . . Pour tous leurs intérêts et leurs besoins communs, les états ont une législature commune: la législature fédérale; pour tous leurs intérêts locaux, ils ont chacun une législature locale et séparée. Dans le domaine respectif de leurs attributions, les législatures, tant locales que fédérales, sont souveraines et indépendantes les unes des autres . . . Avec le simple mandat, Québec est Québec; avec le double mandat ce n'est que l'appendice d’Ottawa.”

30. W. E. Hodgins, *Correspondence, Reports of the Ministers of Justice, and Orders in Council upon the Subject of Dominion and Provincial Legislation* (Ottawa, 1896), 5-6 (hereafter *Dominion and Provincial Legislation*).

31. *Confederation Debates*, 258.

32. Sir Joseph Pope, *Confederation Documents* (Toronto, 1895), 30.

33. *Dominion and Provincial Legislation*, 662-3.

34. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1872, 197, 706, 709.

35. *Dominion and Provincial Legislation*, 453-79.

36. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1875, 576.

37. *Dominion and Provincial Legislation*, 1197.

Chapter III

1. *Confederation Debates*, 511

2. Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, *Report* (Ottawa, 1940), Bk. I, 54.

3. J. C. Morrison, *Oliver Mowat and the Development of Provincial Rights in Ontario, 1867-96: A Study in Dominion-Provincial Relations 1867-96* (published under the auspices of the Ontario Department of Public Records and Archives, n.d.).

4. *Ibid.*, 99.

5. John T. Saywell, *The Office of Lieutenant-Governor* (Toronto, 1957), 162.

6. Ontario, *Sessional Papers*, XX, Part IV, 1888, Lieutenant-Governor to Secretary of State (no. 37), January 9, 1886.

7. G. V. La Forest, *Disallowance and Reservation of Provincial Legislation* (Ottawa, 1955).

8. *Dominion and Provincial Legislation*, 87.

9. *Ibid.*, 110.

10. *Ibid.*, 113.

11. *Ibid.*, 119.

12. Morrison, *Oliver Mowat and Provincial Rights*, 198-9.

13. *Dominion and Provincial Legislation*, 178.

14. *Ibid.*, 179.

15. Morrison, *Oliver Mowat and Provincial Rights*, 221.

16. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1882, 907.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Morrison, *Oliver Mowat and Provincial Rights*, 224.

19. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1884, 942 *et seq.*

20. Morrison, *Oliver Mowat and Provincial Rights*, 229-30.

21. *L'Opinion publique*, III (13 juin 1872).

“Ceux qui se moquaient de nous en 1866, parce que nous disions, en combattant la Confédération, que le droit de veto ne fonctionnerait qu’en faveur de la majorité anglaise et protestante, nous permettront-ils de leur demander en passant qui avait raison.”

22. *Ibid.*, III (24 octobre 1872).

23. *Ibid.*, V (5 février 1874).

“La constitution, il est vrai, fait du Pacifique une condition spéciale de l’entrée de la Colombie; mais en fait-elle vraiment une condition principale, essentielle? Il nous semble plutôt que l’idée principale du pacte fédératif est l’idée nationale, l’idée de fonder un pays, une grande patrie, une nouvelle nationalité dans le monde. . . Si l’on admet ce point de départ, si on laisse cette formule première au frontispice de nos institutions, le pacte fédéral devient facile à interpréter. Constituer un pays nouveau, en est le terme auquel toutes ces clauses sont subordonnées. . . Organiser un peuple, voilà le but; construire le Pacifique, voilà le moyen d’y arriver. Et si tel est le cas, cette entreprise peut être considérée comme un état nécessaire, mais non comme une fondation première, comme la condition primordiale du contrat de confédération, et, par conséquent, la législature fédérale, en tant que représentante des provinces intéressées au même degré dans ce contrat, pourrait modifier les détails de la construction du Pacifique sans donner par là à la Colombie le droit de sortir de l’union.”

24. Robert Rumilly, *Histoire de la province de Québec* (Montreal, n.d.), I, 284.

“Le lieutenant-gouverneur est l’officier, le représentant de l’Exécutif fédéral dans le gouvernement local. Il est là pour gouverner la province au nom du gouvernement fédéral. Il doit donc la gouverner suivant les vues de ce gouvernement.”

25. *L’Opinion publique*, V (8 octobre 1874).

“Avant 1867, on a prétendu que notre confédération n’était qu’une union législative déguisée; il faut avouer que si aujourd’hui l’on parvient à faire triompher cette doctrine de la sujexion des lieutenants-gouverneurs, personne ne parlera davantage de déguisement, l’union législative sera fait accompli.”

26. *La Minerve*, 1 juin 1875, in Rumilly, *Histoire*, I, 323.

“Si M. Joly et ses amis montaient au pouvoir à Québec, ce serait pour se constituer les humbles valets de MM. Mackenzie et Fournier. L’exploitation de notre province, commencée à Ottawa, se continuerait à Québec. En réalité, se seraient MM. Fournier, Geoffrion et Laflamme qui gouverneraient.”

27. Rumilly, *Histoire*, III, 58.

“. . . les églises sans dogmes, mais non sans mystique.”

28. Saywell, *The Lieutenant-Governor*, 113-119.29. Québec, Législature, *Débats*, 1879, 72.

“En vertu de la constitution nous jouissons de l’autonomie, du droit de nous gouverner nous-mêmes; et dans la sphère de nos attributions nous ne sommes, comme gouvernement, inférieurs à aucun gouvernement. La Province de Québec traverse en ce moment une crise qui met son autonomie en danger. La tentative que l’on a faite pour obtenir la destitution du lieutenant-gouverneur constitue un danger pour notre indépendance provinciale. Mes honorables amis de la gauche considèrent le lieutenant-gouverneur comme un simple serviteur du pouvoir fédéral. Je suis d’un avis contraire. . . .”

30. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1878, II, 1903.

31. Public Archives of Canada (hereafter P.A.C.), Macdonald Papers, 95, Mousseau to Macdonald, November 15, 1878.

32. *Ibid.*, Chapleau to Macdonald, December 2, 1878.

“Le temps serait mal choisi pour apprendre à la province de Québec que le Lieutenant-Governor [sic], qui lui est périodiquement imposé par les autorités fédérales, est sûr de l’impunité tant qu’il ne dérange pas, d’une manière absolue et directe, les opérations politiques du cabinet fédéral, et que l’autonomie politique de la Province est à la [sa] merci, sans crainte de censure pour l’acte qui la viole, pourvu que l’officier fédéral réussisse ensuite à s’acheter un semblant de la majorité dans la Chambre d’Assemblée.”

33. Saywell, *The Lieutenant-Governor*, 234-48.

34. A. Joly de Lotbinière, “Mr. Joly’s Mission to London in the case of Lieutenant-Governor Letellier St. Just,” *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXI (December, 1950), 403.

35. J. A. Maxwell, *Federal Subsidies to Provincial Governments in Canada* (Cambridge, Mass., 1937), 56-63. See also Robertson’s speech in Québec, Législature, *Débats*, 1880, 475-7.

36. Québec, Législature, *Débats*, 1881, 363.

“Nous sommes arrivés à une position critique. Après quatorze années d’autonomie provinciale,

nous avons en face de nous un état de choses terrible et il est plus que probable que la province ne pourra sortir des embarras financiers où elle se trouve et faire honneur à ses engagements qu'en ayant recours à la taxe directe."

37. *Ibid.*, 1881, 855.

"Et il est bien permis de dire après ce qui s'est passé depuis quelques années à Ottawa, que nous n'obtiendrons rien de ce côté. Tous les gouvernements qui s'y sont succédé depuis les premiers jours de la Confédération ne se sont guère occupés de notre province. Pourquoi? C'est bien simple. La majorité est anglaise dans la Puissance, et elle est canadienne-française dans la Province de Québec. Nous sommes la minorité et il nous faut subir la loi du plus fort. Elle est inexorable et ses conséquences sont inévitables. Nous avons fait une union désavantageuse, nous l'avons accomplie, nous devons la subir en silence et tout ce que nous avons à faire c'est de tâcher de l'améliorer nous-mêmes par nos propres ressources, avec intelligence et patriotisme, et sans compter sur les autres. Le jour où il faudra compter fatalement et inexorablement avec le gouvernement d'Ottawa comme notre seule ressource pour nous tirer des embarras financiers dans lesquels on se trouve, ce jour-là marquera notre déchéance nationale."

38. Maxwell, *Federal Subsidies*, 56-63.

39. *Ibid.*, 60; Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1884, 1490 *et seq.*

40. *Ibid.*

41. T. J. J. Loranger, *Letters upon the Interpretation of the Federal Constitution known as the British North America Act (1867)* (Quebec, 1884), v.

42. *Ibid.*, 7.

43. *Ibid.*, 61.

44. Quebec, Legislative Assembly, *Journals*, 1884, 56.

45. Québec, Législature, *Débats*, 1884, 410-11.

"En face de l'énergique revendication des droits provinciaux que font nos provinces-soeurs, resterons-nous plus longtemps silencieux, nous les représentants du peuple de la province de Québec? . . . Fasse le ciel que, cette fois-ci, l'esprit de parti n'étoffe pas la voix du patriotisme, la voix du devoir."

46. *Ibid.*, 413.

47. *Ibid.*, 414.

"Je ne suis pas d'accord avec l'honorable député de St-Hyacinthe [M. Mercier] dans toutes les opinions qu'il a exprimées. Je repousse même absolument quelques-unes de ses prétentions. Il a exposé une théorie à laquelle je ne puis me rallier au sujet de l'origine des pouvoirs des provinces. Il ne faut pas se méprendre de la sorte sur cette partie de la question. La seule et unique base de notre constitution, c'est l'Acte de 1867. Le parlement fédéral dans notre organisation est l'autorité suprême. Tous les pouvoirs sont au gouvernement fédéral. Voilà le point de départ. Cette autorité suprême, pour des raisons de bonne administration et des nécessités politiques, est déléguée en partie à des corps spéciaux créés en vue de l'exercice de ces pouvoirs délégués. Il n'y a donc d'exceptions que le droit spécialement attribué aux provinces, de là, à mon avis, nécessité de défendre les droits fédéraux comme les prérogatives des provinces."

48. *Ibid.*, 454.

". . . la défense de nos prérogatives provinciales et en même temps nos prérogatives nationales."

49. *Ibid.*, 455.

". . . ces attaques répétées à notre religion et à notre nationalité."

50. *Ibid.*, 422 *et seq.*

51. Quebec, Legislative Assembly, *Journals*, 1884, 100.

52. Québec, Législature, *Débats*, 1884, 642-3

"L'autonomie de la Province de Québec, c'est l'existence nationale. . . . Il y a assez de patriotisme dans la députation québécoise au parlement fédéral et dans celle de Québec et son gouvernement . . ."

53. *Ibid.*, 644.

"La position exceptionnelle de notre province dans la confédération, par suite de la différence qui existe dans notre langue, nos lois, notre religion exige que nous jouissions de cette autorité absolue et

indépendante pour maintenir intacte, vivace au milieu d'une population hétérogène notre nationalité canadienne-française qui nous est si chère. C'est pour cela que la confédération a été établie; car sans cette nécessité de l'autonomie pour la Province de Québec, nous aurions depuis 1867 une union législative."

54. *Ibid.*, 779-800.

55. Charles Langelier, *Souvenirs politiques* (Quebec, 1909), I, 245.

"Nous sentions que le meurtre de Riel était une déclaration de guerre à l'influence canadienne-française dans la Confédération, une violation du droit et de la justice. Voilà pourquoi la question est nationale; c'est parce que si Riel a été pendu au gibet de Régina, c'est parce qu'il était un des nôtres."

56. Québec, Législature, *Débats*, 1886, 902.

"Nous avons été bien trompés, nous avons été bien trahis."

57. *La Patrie*, 1 juillet 1886.

"... prépare la ruine de notre indépendance provinciale. . . . C'est la division, née de l'esprit de parti qui a fait mal; c'est l'union née de patriotisme qui le réparera."

58. See Mercier's speech in 1886, printed in J.-O. Pelland, *Biographie, discours, conférences etc. de l'hon. Honoré Mercier* (Montreal, 1890), 160 *et seq.*

59. Québec, Législature, *Débats*, 1877, 10-11.

60. Nova Scotia, House of Assembly, *Journals and Proceedings*, 1887, 102-4, 125.

61. *Nova Scotian*, February 5, 1887.

62. James A. Jackson, "The Disallowance of Manitoba Railway Legislation in the 1880's" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1945).

63. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1883, II, 971.

64. Cited in Jackson "Disallowance of Manitoba Railway Legislation," 44.

65. Margaret Ormsby, *British Columbia: A History* (Toronto, 1958), 232-58.

66. J. A. Maxwell, "Lord Dufferin and the Difficulties with British Columbia, 1874-7," *Canadian Historical Review*, XII (December, 1931), 346-90; Margaret Ormsby, "Prime Minister Mackenzie, the Liberal Party and the Bargain with British Columbia," *Ibid.*, XXVI (June, 1945), 148-74.

67. Maxwell, *Federal Subsidies*, 90-3.

68. Ormsby, *British Columbia*, 258.

69. F. W. P. Bolger, *Prince Edward Island and Confederation, 1863-73* (Charlottetown, 1964).

70. Maurice Ollivier, ed., *British North America Act and Selected Statutes, 1867-1962* (Ottawa, n.d.), 184.

71. Maxwell, *Federal Subsidies*, 70-6.

Chapter IV

1. *Dominion, Provincial and Interprovincial Conferences from 1887 to 1926* (Ottawa, 1951), 11, italics added.

2. D. G. Creighton, *John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain* (Toronto, 1955), 488.

3. *Minutes of the Interprovincial Conference, 1887*, 20-6.

4. *Ibid.*, 19.

5. *Ibid.*, 27.

6. *Ibid.*, 27.

7. Macdonald to Mowat, December 3, 1888, in Sir Joseph Pope, *The Correspondence of Sir John A. Macdonald* (Toronto, 1921), 433.

8. *The Globe*, March 9, 1888.

9. Jackson, "Disallowance of Manitoba Railway Legislation," 135.

10. G. V. La Forest, *Disallowance and Reservation of Provincial Legislation* (Ottawa, 1955), 57-61.

11. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1889, II, 908.
12. J. T. Saywell, *The Canadian Journal of Lady Aberdeen* (Toronto, 1960), xxxiii-xxxxiii.
13. See H. Blair Neatby, "Laurier and a Liberal Quebec" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1956), 87-136.
14. P.A.C., Tupper Papers, Vol. 11, Tupper to Whitney, March 22, 1899.
15. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Vol. 103, Chamberlain to Laurier, March 10, 1899.
16. Vincent C. MacDonald, "The Privy Council and the Canadian Constitution," *Canadian Bar Review*, XXIX (December, 1951), 1021-37.
17. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1903, I, 1578.
18. *Ibid.*, 1906-7, II, 2199.
19. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, "Le Fédéralisme," *Revue trimestrielle canadienne* (novembre 1918), 219-21.

"Je crois bien supérieur notre système qui attribue au pouvoir fédéral tous les pouvoirs non énumérés. Le but du système fédératif est de faire un tout solide d'éléments hétérogènes, tout en conservant à chacun son existence propre, c'est-à-dire, union sans fusion. Le nouvel état sera nécessairement plus solide et plus fort si l'autorité finale est confiée au pouvoir qui unit tous ces éléments. L'idée est encore plus manifeste, si le but de la fédération est de créer une nation nouvelle d'éléments divers et jusque-là séparés en tout. . . ."

"D'un autre côté, dans la sphère attribuée aux provinces par notre constitution, leur autorité doit être souveraine, et ce principe ne saurait être proclamé trop haut. Sur ce point, tu aurais pu appuyer davantage sur le danger du désaveu. Là se trouve le point noir de la confédération canadienne. Je ne m'explique guère qu'un esprit aussi clair et aussi net que Cartier ait pu y trouver une garantie pour les minorités. Il n'y a que deux minorités dans la confédération canadienne: minorité de race et minorité de religion. Donner au pouvoir central où se trouvent la majorité de race, et la majorité de religion, l'autorité de s'ingérer arbitrairement dans la juridiction attribuée aux provinces, c'est détruire l'indépendance législative des provinces et en faire unurre et une moquerie. De fait, dans toutes les agitations qui à différentes reprises ont bouleversé notre jeune confédération, la cause unique reste toujours la même: c'est toujours les tentatives du pouvoir central d'empêtrer sur ces prérogatives provinciales. A toutes ces tentatives les Libéraux opposèrent une résistance inflexible et dès l'origine ils se firent les champions de l'autonomie provinciale."

20. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1905, 1421.
21. *Ibid.*, 1421 *et seq.*
22. Saywell, *The Lieutenant-Governor*, 256.
23. La Forest, *Disallowance and Reservation*, 66.
24. F. H. Gisborne and A. A. Fraser, *Correspondence, Reports of the Minister of Justice and Orders in Council upon the Subject of Provincial Legislation, 1896-1920* (Ottawa, 1922), 616.
25. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1907, 2200.
26. *The Liberal-Conservative Platform as Laid Down by R. L. Borden, M.P., Opposition Leader, at Halifax, August 20th, 1907*, 5.
27. *Dominion, Provincial and Interprovincial Conferences from 1887 to 1926* (Ottawa, 1951).
28. J. A. Maxwell, *Federal Subsidies to Provincial Governments in Canada* (Cambridge, Mass., 1937), 109-11.
29. Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, *Report* (Ottawa, 1940), Bk. I, 93.
30. *Fort Frances Pulp and Paper Co. v. Manitoba Free Press* [1923], A.C. 696.
31. *Quebec and Confederation: A Record of the Debate of the Legislative Assembly of Quebec on the motion proposed by J.-N. Francoeur* (Quebec, 1918).
32. *Ibid.*, 117-36.
33. Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, *Report*, Bk. I, 97.
34. Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, *Report* (Quebec, 1956), I, 97.
35. The fullest contemporary statement of the provincialist version of the compact theory is contained in Sir George Ross, *The Senate of Canada* (Toronto, 1914).

Chapter V

1. *Confederation Debates*, 368.
2. *Ibid.*, 60.
3. Eugene Forsey, "The British North America Act and Biculturalism," *Queen's Quarterly*, LXXXI (Summer, 1964), 141-9.
4. *Confederation Debates*, 60.
5. D. G. Creighton, *The Road to Confederation* (Toronto, 1964), 141.
6. *Confederation Debates*, 250.
7. *Ibid.*, 711.
8. W. L. Morton, *Manitoba: A History* (Toronto, 1957), 141-6. Morton writes that in 1871 "a census was taken; the population of Manitoba was found to be 11,963, of whom 558 were Indians, 5,757 Métis, 4,083 English half-breeds, and 1,565 whites. Catholics numbered 6,247 and Protestants 5,716."
9. Saywell, *The Canadian Journal of Lady Aberdeen*, xxiv.
10. "Circulaire privée au clergé de toute la province ecclésiastique de Québec, octobre 23, 1871," *Mandements, Lettres pastorales, circulaires, et autres documents publiés dans le diocèse de Montréal depuis son érection* (Montréal, 1869-1926), Tome 6, 210-12.
11. Arch. Saint-Boniface to T.-A. Bernier, November 23, 1887 in T.-A. Bernier, *Le Manitoba champ d'immigration* (Ottawa, 1887), 4-5.

"Bien des fois dans le passé, soit conjointement avec l'Épiscopat canadien, soit en mon nom propre, comme évêque de Saint-Boniface, j'ai tenté d'amener nos amis de la province mère à diriger de notre côté un courant d'immigration canadienne-française. Mais je dois l'avouer, ça n'a pas été sans un sentiment de tristesse profonde que j'ai dû constater la cause secrète de la presque inutilité de mes efforts. Nous marchions d'égal à égal autant par le nombre que par la position, ayant, comme vous le dites si bien, un pied-à-terre sur les points principaux du Manitoba; aujourd'hui, bien que nous ayons réussi à garder notre position, nous ne laissons pas pourtant que d'avoir été dépassés en nombre. D'autres ont compris l'importance de la position et ils ont si bien saisi les avantages qu'offrent nos belles prairies à la charrue du colon, que déjà leurs rangs se sont grossis au point de diminuer notre proportion numérique. Et, le dirai-je, non seulement l'Angleterre et l'Écosse ont fourni chacune plus de colons au Manitoba que la Province de Québec, mais la Russie elle-même en a fourni autant."

12. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1890, I, 840.
13. *Ibid.*, 745.
14. *Ibid.*, 968.
15. C. R. W. Biggar, *Sir Oliver Mowat* (Toronto, 1906), II, 645.
16. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1893, 1942. In the 1893 debate one speaker, Joseph-Israel Tarte, did hint at a theory of "cultural compact." Tarte argued that the Fathers of Confederation had intended that separate schools should be extended to all areas of the country where minorities existed. He argued, or rather claimed, further that "Confederation was a compromise between the majority and the minority and the compromise must not be broken without our being consulted." (*Ibid.*, 1174). But Tarte talked so indiscriminately about language and schools, without making any distinction about what the constitution said about them, that it is difficult to find any consistent basis for his claims.
17. P.A.C., Tupper Papers, C. H. Tupper to Sir Charles Tupper, March 26, 1895.
18. Reported by the Toronto *Telegram*, April 28, 1896.
19. H. Bourassa, *Le Devoir et la guerre: le conflit des races* (Montreal, 1916), 3.

"Dans la pensée des Pères de la Confédération, le pacte fédéral et la constitution qui en définit les termes de la sanction, devaient mettre fin au conflit des races et des Églises et assurer à tous, catholiques et protestants, Français et Anglais, une parfaite égalité de droits dans toute l'étendue de la Confédération canadienne. L'Acte du Manitoba, voté par le parlement impérial en 1870, et l'Acte des Territoires du Nord-Ouest, voté à Ottawa en 1875 portent l'empreinte fugitive de la même pensée intelligente et généreuse. Ce furent nos dernières victoires."

20. H. Bourassa, *Le Patriotisme canadien-français* (Montreal, 1902), 8.

"Le statut impérial que nous a donné le régime actuel n'est que la sanction d'un double contrat; l'un, conclu entre les Français et les Anglais de l'ancienne province du Canada; et l'autre qui avait pour but de réunir les colonies éparses de l'Amérique britannique du Nord. Nous sommes donc parties contractantes à deux conventions, l'une nationale et l'autre politique; et nous devons veiller d'un oeil jaloux à l'intégrité de ces traités."

21. H. Bourassa, *Grande-Bretagne et Canada* (Montreal, 1901), 39-40.

"... sur des bases équitables et bien définies..."

22. *La Ligue nationaliste canadienne: programme* (1903), 6.

"Maintien absolu des droits garantis aux provinces par la Constitution de 1867 dans l'intention des auteurs. Respect du principe de la dualité des langues et du droit des minorités à des écoles séparées."

23. André Laurendeau, "Le Nationalisme de Bourassa," in *La Pensée de Henri Bourassa* (Montreal, 1954), 9-56.

24. *Le Nationaliste*, 3 avril 1904.

"La patrie, pour nous, c'est le Canada tout entier. c'est-à-dire une fédération de races distinctes et de provinces autonomes. La nation que nous voulons voir se développer, c'est la nation canadienne, composée de Canadiens français et de Canadiens anglais, c'est-à-dire de deux éléments séparés par la langue et la religion, et par les dispositions légales nécessaires à la conservation de leurs traditions respectives, mais unie dans un attachement de fraternité, dans un commun attachement à la patrie commune."

25. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1905, 1451.

26. *Ibid.*, 8572-82.

27. *Ibid.*, 2917.

28. *Ibid.*, 3256, 8305.

29. H. Bourassa, *Pour la justice* (Montreal, 1912).

30. *Quebec Telegraph*, January 12, 1915.

31. *Ibid.*

32. P.A.C., Gouin Papers, Gouin to Hearst, February 3, 1915; and reply, February 19, 1915.

33. Robert Rumilly, *Histoire de la province de Québec* (Montreal, n.d.), XXI, 49-52.

34. Canada, Senate, *Debates*, 1915, 62.

35. P.A.C., Borden Papers, Casgrain, Blondin and Patenaude to Borden, April 20, 1916; and reply.

April 24, 1916.

36. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1916, IV, 3618.

37. P.A.C., Laurier Papers, Albert Dubuc à Laurier, 26 avril 1916.

38. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1916, 3768.

39. H. Bourassa, *La Conscription* (Montreal, 1917), 20.

40. *The Globe*, May 10, 1916.

41. *Le Devoir*, 3 septembre 1913.

"Le magistrat ou le praticien qui croit connaître la constitution du Canada, parce qu'il possède à fond le texte du statut appelé *l'Acte de l'Amérique britannique du Nord*, et qu'il dissèque à la loupe chacun de ses articles, n'est qu'un âne, s'il ignore l'origine des pouvoirs publics modelés sur la constitution britannique, et les circonstances particulières qui ont précédé et entouré la signature du pacte fédéral. En d'autres termes, il doit connaître à fond l'histoire de l'Angleterre et l'histoire du Canada."

42. P.A.C., Bourassa Papers, Bourassa to Leau, January 9, 1914.

"... selon l'opinion de tous les juristes, ces garanties ne couvrent que les droits des minorités catholiques et protestantes, en matière d'enseignement confessionnel. Elles ne visent nullement l'enseignement de la langue. Sur ce point, nous ne pouvons qu'invoquer une garantie indirecte, formelle selon moi, si l'on invoque l'esprit de la constitution. Mais comme vous le savez, de tout temps, les législateurs s'attachent à la lettre plutôt qu'à l'esprit des lois."

43. *Quebec and Confederation: Record of the Debate on the Francoeur Motion*, 125.

44. F. R. Scott, "The Privy Council and Minority Rights," *Queen's Quarterly*, XXXVII (Autumn, 1930), 668-78.

Chapter VI

1. S. J. Watson, *The Powers of Canadian Parliaments* (Toronto, 1880), 51-2.
2. D. A. O'Sullivan, *A Manual of Government in Canada* (Toronto, 1879), 119.
3. D. A. O'Sullivan, *Government in Canada* (Toronto, 1887), 22, 37-8.
4. B.-A.-T. de Montigny, *Cathéchisme politique* (Montreal, 1878), 51-3.
- “La Confédération possède le double avantage de nous donner la puissance d'une union législative et la liberté d'une union fédérale, avec la protection pour les intérêts locaux. . . . l'édification d'une des plus belles constitutions qu'ait jamais connue le monde.”
5. P.-B. Mignault, *Manuel de droit parlementaire* (Montreal, 1889), 224, 333.
- “Nous avons dit que les parties contractantes font deux parts de leur souveraineté et qu'au moyen de concessions communes et réciproques, elles créent une nouvelle puissance qui les contient sans les absorber. De là, tirent une conséquence essentielle. Chaque état ou province conserve son existence particulière et les prérogatives qu'il n'a pas cédées au pouvoir central. Il n'y a nulle subordination, soit de la province au gouvernement général, soit de ce dernier à la province. Il y a égalité absolue, souveraineté commune; chaque pouvoir est suprême dans sa juridiction et dans sa sphère d'action. . . . leurs intérêts sont sacrés.”
6. Alpheus Todd, *Parliamentary Government in the Colonies* (Boston, 1880), 325-6.
7. A. H. F. Lefroy, *Canada's Federal System* (Toronto, 1913).
8. W.P.M. Kennedy, “The Nature of Canadian Federalism” (1921), in *Essays in Constitutional Law* (London, 1934), 60.
9. G. M. Wrong, “The Creation of the Federal System in Canada,” in *The Federation of Canada* (Toronto, 1917), 29, 30.
10. Charles Langelier, *La Confédération* (Montreal, 1916), 37.
- “Cette nouvelle constitution qui nous fut donnée en 1867 a-t-elle tenu toutes ses promesses? Au point de vue de progrès général, je n'hésite pas à dire oui. Notre pays, en effet, a pris un essor considérable, son développement commercial, industriel et matériel a été énorme; il a fait l'étonnement du monde. Mais sous d'autres rapports, pouvons-nous dire la même chose? Les garanties solennelles données aux minorités sont dans bien des cas ignorées, répudiées et foulées aux pieds comme un vulgaire chiffon de papier.”
11. N. A. Belcourt, *French in Ontario*, repr. from *University Magazine* (December, 1912), 4.
12. J.-U. Vincent, *La Question scolaire* (Ottawa, 1915), 58.
- “Le fait vérifique, tout regrettable qu'il soit, est qu'il n'y a que pour le domaine fédéral et pour la province de Québec que la constitution décrète l'égalité des deux langues.”
13. I.-G. Turcotte, *Canada sous l'union, 1841-67* (Montreal, 1882).
14. L.-O. David, *L'Union des deux Canadas, 1841-67* (Montreal, 1898), 277.
15. Ludovic Brunet, *La Province du Canada: histoire politique de 1840 à 1867* (Quebec, 1908), 298.
- “Le temps et les événements ont malheureusement donné raison aux sentiments de M. Dorion et du parti libéral.”
16. L'Abbé Lionel Groulx, *La Confédération canadienne* (Montreal, 1918), 207.
- “L'autorité du centre retenait assez d'attributions pour exercer la souveraineté nationale tout en laissant évoluer les États dans le libre jeu de leurs activités. La pratique de nos institutions a confirmé cette théorie. Malgré quelques tentatives d'empiétements, le pouvoir d'Ottawa n'a pu empêcher les provinces d'accroître leur autonomie.”
17. *Ibid.*, 168.
- “Car il ne faut point se lasser de le dire: c'est là et pas ailleurs, que se trouvent le vice fondamental de notre constitution et la grande faute des hommes d'État bas-canadiens. En laissant aller les priviléges et les exceptions trop exclusivement d'un côté, en laissant créer une situation de privilège en faveur du plus fort, ils ont admis en principe qu'il y aurait en ce pays deux poids et deux mesures.”
18. Thomas Chapais, *Cours d'histoire du Canada*, VIII (Quebec, 1934), 215.
19. Léon-Mercier Gouin, “Esquisse de droit constitutionnel,” *Revue trimestrielle canadienne* (mai 1918), 71.

"Nous ne saurions trop insister sur l'indépendance relative de nos provinces. Il est de l'essence d'une fédération que les assemblées locales jouissent d'une pleine liberté dans la sphère législative qui leur a été assignée. C'est ainsi que le pacte fédéral devait permettre à la population du Québec de rester officiellement française et catholique. Notre parlement 'à nous' siège en notre vieille capitale, à la cour de la Nouvelle-France. C'est pour toute notre race une véritable assemblée nationale. On lui a confié la garde de nos institutions les plus chères. Fatigués du régime odieux de 1840, nous devions être enfin 'chez nous.' Le système fédératif promettait d'assurer notre survie. Nous entrions librement dans le 'Dominion.' La loi impériale qui forme la base de notre constitution n'est que l'expression légale et officielle de la volonté des parties contractantes. C'est la rédaction solennelle du 'désir exprimé par les provinces.' On y trouve les éléments d'un véritable contrat de société, revêtu de la sanction royale.

20. Michel Brunet, *Canadians et Canadiens* (Montreal, 1954), 30.

21. *Notre Avenir Politique: enquête de l'action française* (Montreal 1923). Yet even in this volume, concern for the fate of the minorities outside Quebec remained something of an obstacle to that identification.

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